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ABSTRACT
Labor, Land Use, and the Luxury City
by
Samuel Stein
Advisor: Cindi Katz

Labor, Land Use, and the Luxury City is an examination into the entanglements of
working-class organizations, real estate capital, and state planning in 20th and 21st century New
York City. Through theoretical inquiry, historical interpretation, and contemporary analysis, I
investigate the motivations – both internally generated and externally imposed – that guide New
York City unions’ and non-profits’ decision-making around questions of land use and
gentrification. These institutions maintain a complex set of relationships to both real estate
capital and the real estate state, leading many unions and non-profits to either support land use
changes that accelerate gentrification or negotiate the parameters of luxury redevelopment rather
than opposing it outright. While many examples of the opposite impulse exist, this work focuses
on understanding why and how labor organizations and real estate capitalists can converge on
land use strategies.
Theoretically, this dissertation argues that urban labor’s land use strategies should be
understood in the context of shifting regional blocs that bring together fragments of labor,
capital, and the state toward a particular spatial strategy. In the capitalist context, labor, capital,
and the state are overlapping but distinct social forces with disparate goals around the parameters
iv

of urban spatial production. In general, labor seeks to produce space in a way that secures social
reproduction; capital seeks to produce space in a way that secures profit accumulation; and the
state seeks to produce space in a way that secures social control. Labor, capital, and the state,
however, are internally fragmented across multiple axes, leading various fractions of each group
to form tentative coalitions with the others in order to secure the power to reshape cities. The
contemporary alliances of elements of New York City labor, capital, and the state that emerge
around luxury redevelopment are a powerful example of such a bloc.
Historically, this dissertation demonstrates both the continuities and variations in union
and non-profit approaches to planning, housing, and development in the US, and New York City
in particular. The New York City union movement’s mid-20th century cooperative housing
initiatives highlight both an alternative model of union-led development, as well as unions’
willingness to partner with elements of capital and the state toward “urban renewal”
development programs that could often displace as many workers as they emplaced. The traumas
and false promises of urban renewal, combined with many other racial, economic, and genderbased inequities, sparked an intense backlash. One strategy to address this crisis was for elements
of labor, capital, and the state to promote non-profit organizations as key players in city politics.
Over the second half of the 20th century, non-profits grew to become a major force in the
provision of low-income housing, as well as, in some cases, a conservatizing force on urban
social movements.
Contemporary analysis shows that union and non-profit engagements in New York City
land use processes are complex and at times chaotic, but are guided by these institutions’
attempts to survive and grow in the face of an emboldened real estate sector. In general terms,
unions intervene in land use processes on the side of real estate capital in order to expand
v

unionized sectors, limit non-union growth, and build collaborative ties with their bargaining
adversaries. Non-profits make similar interventions in order to secure funding (private and
public), space, and development opportunities for their organizations. Ultimately, unions’ and
non-profits’ imperatives to grow, remain funded, invest earnings, and respond to repression
encourages them to form tentative coalitions with real estate capitalists and their supporters in
the state. While these structural explanations are neither permanent nor determinative, they form
a set of incentives too formidable for most union and non-profit leaders to simply reject. Only
pressure from below – from rank-and-file union members and non-profit constituents – can force
these institutions to pursue spatial strategies that constitute a break from real estate capital and
the real estate state.
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Introduction: Outcast and Starving ‘Mid the Wonders We Have Made
It is we who ploughed the prairies, built the cities where they trade
Dug the mines and built the workshops, endless miles of railroad laid
Now we stand outcast and starving 'mid the wonders we have made
But the union makes us strong
– “Solidarity Forever,” Ralph Chaplin

New York is a painfully expensive city. Since the 1980s, its land and property values
have risen at an extraordinary rate, and luxury construction has reshaped the urban landscape.
Numerous neighborhoods and housing typologies once affordable to working-class New Yorkers
have gentrified, leading to widespread displacement, regularized rent gouging, and record levels
of homelessness. Investors have set upon both the city’s existing built environment and the
opportunities for new high-end high-rises in low-income neighborhoods as means to generate
monumental profits. The city that workers built, maintain, and reproduce is becoming too
expensive for many to call home.
As of October 15th, 2019,1 there were 7,250 active construction permits in New York City
for 184,727,813 square feet and 123,768 housing units. Of those permits, 2,907 were for
enlargements of existing buildings, while 4,343 were for new construction (NYC Active Major
Construction 2019).2 Some of these homes will be affordable to working-class New Yorkers and
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This is the day I began drafting this introduction.
Proponents of increased market-rate development argue that the city’s rate of construction has been
underwhelming compared to its rate of growth. While there are many ways to calculate the supply and demand,
the Census shows that between 2000 and 2016 New York City’s population grew by 7.5 percent (or roughly
600,000 people) while the housing supply grew by 8 percent (or roughly 260,0000 homes) between 2000 and
2016. Considering the city’s average household size of 2.6 people, this is a reasonable rate of growth. The supply2

built by non-profit housing organizations; the vast majority, however, is aimed for the top of the
housing market. Whereas in 2000 the median rent for new construction only exceeded the
median rent for existing buildings by $50 per month, by 2016 the divergence between new
construction and the pre-existing stock had widened eightfold to $400 (Furman Center for Real
Estate & Urban Policy 2017, 1).
At the same time, the market for spaces of pure speculation strengthened. Between 2014
and 2016, the number of vacant units neither for sale nor for rent jumped over 35 percent, from
182,571 to 247,977, an increase almost as large as the total number of units built during the same
period (Gaumer 2018).3 While some of these apartments function as pied-à-terres and
unregistered hotel rooms, many operate simply as ornate safety deposit boxes: real estate made
not to live in but to park, launder, and ultimately multiply wealth. As speculative real estate
investment has poured into New York City, the value of the city’s buildings and land has risen to
absurd heights. In the fiscal year ending in 2019, New York City construction levels reached a
10-year high and the city’s combined property was valued at a record $1.38 trillion. This
amounted to a $62 billion increase over the previous year, more than 20 percent of which was
attributable to new luxury development (Braun 2020). According to a recent assessment, since
1993, Manhattan’s land values have increased at a compounding annual rate of 15.8 percent, far
faster than either the rate of job or population growth. By 2014 – after a brief dip caused by the

side scholars are entirely correct that the city’s housing supply has not kept up with demand; however, this is not
because too little market-rate housing has been produced, but rather because too little housing that is affordable
to the people demanding it has been produced. As a result, whereas demand for low-cost housing is high but
unmet, demand for high-cost property is constantly fulfilled.
3
While the number of units that went vacant was smaller than the number of units built, the rate of growth for
empty speculative housing was indeed far larger than the rate of growth for new construction overall (Gaumer
2018).
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2008 financial crisis – the value of Manhattan’s land alone (separate from its buildings) reached
$1.74 trillion (Barr et al. 2018).
At 65 percent of the city’s population, a large majority of New Yorkers are renters, and
they spend an inordinate amount of money on housing every month. 44 percent of city tenants
are rent burdened (or pay more than 30 percent of their income in rent), and 26 percent – over
two million people – are severely rent burdened (or pay more than half of their income in rent).
This amounts to a tremendous indirect transfer of cash each month from tenants’ bosses to their
landlords, which the tenant only temporarily captures. Between 2014 and 2017, the number of
units renting for under $1,500 decreased by 165,000, while almost 100,000 units crossed the
$2,000 per month rental threshold. Median asking rents rose a staggering 34 percent (Gaumer
2018).
Rents now capture an average of 26 percent of couples’ incomes,4 37 percent of adult
single people’s earnings, and 47 percent of single parents’ incomes (Stringer 2019). As with all
facets of the US housing market, these dynamics are highly racially stratified (Taylor 2019).
While 37 percent of White (non-Hispanic) New Yorkers pay more than 30 percent of their
income in rent, 47 percent of Black (non-Hispanic) New Yorkers, 50% of Asian New Yorkers,
and 54% of Latino New Yorkers are rent burdened. Severe rent burdens can throw households
into homelessness, a condition with similarly racist characteristics: of shelter residents who
responded to a Coalition for the Homeless survey, 57 percent are African American and 32
percent are Latino, whereas just 7 percent are White. As of the latest survey, conducted in
August 2019, 61,674 New Yorkers are currently homeless, including 21,802 children. Over the

4

For unknown reasons, the Comptroller’s study specifically focused on married couples.

3

course of 2018, 133,284 people, including 45,600 children, slept in the city’s shelter system. The
number of people seeking refuge in shelters has increased by 63 percent over the past 10 years,
and surveys have repeatedly shown housing unaffordability to be the leading cause of
homelessness (Coalition for the Homeless 2019).
Meanwhile, with residential and educational segregation persisting despite the city’s
demographic diversification, predominantly Black, Latino, and Asian neighborhoods have been
targeted for repeated rounds of upzonings (land use changes intended to spur more intensive real
estate development), while many predominantly White neighborhoods have been granted
protective downzonings or contextual zonings (land use changes meant to discourage denser
development than what currently exists) (Angotti and Morse 2016). These successive city
planning initiatives have channeled luxury high-rise construction toward working-class
neighborhoods of immigrants and African Americans, which has in turn spurred new rounds of
what Roy (Roy 2017) calls “racial banishment.”
Elsewhere I have characterized the element of the state that seeks to drive up private land
and housing costs “the real estate state” (Stein 2019). This formation has been particularly potent
in New York, a city where the real estate industry has long held inordinate political power and
where luxury development has become a component of or precondition for nearly all planning
agendas. Developers and other real estate players are leading political donors, and while
politicians often speak the language of tenant power and anti-gentrification, land use and
development policies are largely written to reward real estate interests. The power of real estate
in this city has, in the past year, been checked in significant ways thanks to impressive and
sustained tenant movement mobilizations, left electoral challenges, and a growing popular
awareness of and disillusionment with real estate state-oriented planning initiatives: in 2019, the
4

state’s rent stabilization and rent control laws were significantly reformed in tenants’ favor, and
several real estate-friendly rezonings of working-class neighborhoods were either reversed by the
courts (in the case of Inwood) or stopped due to popular pressure (in the cases of Bushwick,
Brooklyn and Southern Boulevard in the Bronx). While these changes are historic and could
portend even greater shifts, the real estate state remains a powerful formation in New York City,
and real estate capital remains a driving force in the city’s political economy.
At the same time, however, New York City remains a bastion of worker organizing.
Unions have long been and continue to be a fixture in the city’s political economy, and nonprofit workplace organizing projects are expanding a similar infrastructure into corners of the
economy that have long gone unorganized. The result is not necessarily widespread wealth, but
certainly a higher standard of wages, benefits, safety protocols, and public protections than
would otherwise exist. The title of a Community Service Society report encapsulated the
dynamic of simultaneous union power and unaffordable housing succinctly: Good Place to
Work, Hard Place to Live (Waters and Bach 2013).
At 21.4 percent, New York City’s unionization rate is more than double that of the
United States as a whole (10.5 percent) (Milkman and Luce 2019, 2), and the city boasts the
highest unionization rate of any large city5 in the country (Milkman 2014, 3). Contrary to
common notions of unions as bastions of White male power, New York City union members
today are disproportionately female (23 percent of female workers, compared to 20 percent of
male workers [Milkman and Luce 2019, 14]) and African American and Latino (33 percent of

5

Some small one-industry cities – including state capitals where the state is the predominant employer – have
higher rates of unionization than New York City, but New York retains the highest unionization rate of the 10
largest cities by number of workers (New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, Washington, DC, Houston,
Philadelphia, Atlanta, Miami, and Boston).
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African American workers and 24 percent of Latino workers, compared to 18 percent of White
workers [ibid, 15]).
Unions’ strength in New York City translates not only into higher wages, stronger
benefits, and more power on the job for three quarters of a million New Yorkers, but also a great
deal of political influence. New York City unions form one of the most powerful voting and
local and state electoral turnout machines and, in some cases, hold the power to make or break
political careers (Wang and McKinley 2018). There are clear signs of stress – city unionization
rates declined slightly in the past year, with job numbers growing but wages stagnating
(Milkman and Luce 2019, 4) – but New York City remains, as the popular chant insists, a “union
town.”
The city is also home to a thriving field of non-profit organizations with working-class
bases, including a large number of groups that deal with housing and development as their top
issues. According to Moody (2007, 8), “while some of the old working-class institutions that
helped make New York unique are long gone, new types of community-based working-class
organizations have arisen.” These organizations vary widely in content and form. They include:
Community Development Corporations that build or manage affordable housing while
sponsoring community organizing; member-based organizing projects that combine policy
advocacy, electoral mobilizing, and workplace or neighborhood organizing; service
organizations with advocacy agendas; radical organizations – including workers centers, partyaffiliated organizing projects, and grassroots political projects – that incorporate as non-profits;
and more. Together, they form a potent mix of non-profit institutions organizing around – among
other things – planning, development, and housing politics, and forming a visible constituency

6

for policies that aid in bringing down the cost of living for working-class New Yorkers (WolfPowers 2014).
Though their 501-C3 tax status limits their direct participation in elections, these
organizations’ members and clients tend to be highly vocal and mobilized voters and political
activists (Moody 2007, 272). Often organized geographically, housing-focused non-profit
organizations with working-class bases can function as turnout machines for local political
drives, think tanks for policy development, armies of volunteers to demonstrate and testify at
public hearings and protests, and teams of staffers and members to do the door-to-door work of
community organizing. Elites in government, media, and finance often view these non-profits as
spokespeople for the areas in which they operate – a reputation many non-profits seek to
cultivate.
In times of normalized austerity, non-profits are also a leading generator of new
affordable housing in New York City. With direct public development and ownership of housing
off the city’s political agenda for over four decades due to dwindling federal commitments,
stringent state budgetary controls, and insufficient political will from local leaders, much of the
new housing that is produced for low- and even moderate-income New Yorkers is built and
managed by non-profit organizations. While rising land values and intensive investment interest
make acquisition and development a challenge, non-profits continue to find ways to assemble the
land, capital, and permits necessary to produce new housing aimed at those excluded from the
private development boom.
Ultimately, New York City is two things at once: it is an incredibly expensive city to live
in, and becoming more so every day; and it is home to a host of powerful and well-organized
unions and housing non-profits whose mission is to advance the interests of working-class
7

people and neighborhoods. While one might expect the latter trend to prevent the former, this has
not been the case. In fact, the two have long grown in tandem.
How do these two forces coexist? Why has not the presence of strong unions and housing
non-profits prevented the gentrification of the city, and the luxury reconstruction of workingclass spaces? What is the relationship between powerful unions and non-profits, luxury
developers, and the real estate state? Under what circumstances and for what purposes might
working-class institutions endorse policies that accelerate high-end development in low-income
neighborhoods, and when might they seek to negotiate the parameters of such plans and
programs? These are questions with which I have long struggled, not only as a researcher but
also as a resident of this city and an employee of several unions and housing non-profits.
Ultimately, my experiences as a scholar, activist, and worker have led me to understand that
these institutions maintain a complex set of relationships to both real estate capital and the
politicians that enable them, leading many unions and non-profits to either support land use
changes that accelerate gentrification or to negotiate the parameters of luxury redevelopment
rather than opposing it outright.

Placing Myself in the Research
From 2005 to 2009, I worked as a campaign researcher for the Service Employees
International Union 32BJ, a “mega-local” that represents property service workers (janitors,
doormen [sic], porters, security officers, window washers, and others who maintain buildings in
a non-technical capacity) in New York City and many other cities along the east coast. The heart
of my job was to dig up inconvenient information about non-union building owners and
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contractors, then design strategic campaigns to pressure those firms into signing agreements with
the union stipulating that they would remain neutral in any organizing push and would recognize
the union if a majority of their employees signed cards expressing a desire to join. The data I
sought to uncover took various forms, from embarrassing lawsuits we could publicize to public
contracts we could jeopardize. Perhaps the most potent way the union could exert pressure,
however, was by intervening in a land use change that a building owner or developer desired.
If we figured out that a landowner we were targeting was seeking a rezoning or tax break
in order to build a new project, we would do everything in our power to stop it. Often this meant
constructing elaborate campaigns, bringing together not just union staff and members but land
use consultants and outside coalition partners. For our union, however, a victory did not mean
stopping the development, per se; it meant convincing the developer that it would be cheaper to
negotiate with us than to see their project slowed, stalled, or blocked. If the landowner acceded
to our demands, the union would either drop the campaign altogether, or reverse course and
endorse the developer’s desired land use action. In addition to these developer-targeted
campaigns, we also intervened in city- and state- initiated rezoning, redevelopment, and tax
abatement politics in order to help ensure that new construction would translate into permanent
service sector jobs organized under our union. While 32BJ might start off conditionally opposing
a government-initiated land use action, if their conditions were met we would change sides and
vociferously support the proposed plan. This often meant providing crucial cover for rezonings
or tax abatements that incentivized luxury development in working-class areas, regardless of
their impacts on neighborhood or overall housing markets. I was inspired by the union’s growth
rate as well as its political ingenuity, but I became frustrated by the frequency with which we
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supported projects that I, as a tenant, felt threatened my ability to continue living in the city, and
the working class’s overall ability to afford housing.
After four years, I quit my job and returned to school to study urban planning. I sought a
deeper understanding of the land use processes in which I had been intervening, and craved
answers to lingering questions about how to improve urban environments for working-class
residents without inducing gentrification. While studying, I worked various odd jobs, including a
summer position at the Laborers Eastern Region Organizing Fund, where I helped that building
trades union’s small research division understand how to use land use politics to drive union
growth in a similar fashion as 32BJ. The local leadership was used to using its membership to
show support for union development projects, but wanted to increase its political capacity to stop
non-union projects. While I still worried about aspects of this approach, which uses the
unionization of a workforce as the sole measure of whether to support a development or land use
change, I believed in the mission of building up the union’s oppositional capacities. I ultimately
graduated from planning school with a great deal more context for the role of the state in shaping
the city, but without much of a plan for how to translate my concerns around gentrification into
an actionable city plan.
Rather than work as a planner for the city, I became a tenant organizer at a housing nonprofit called Tenants & Neighbors. In my role as Rent Regulation Campaign Coordinator, I held
several responsibilities, including individual tenant counseling and building-level organizing, but
I spent most of my time trying to translate the issues individual tenants faced into a legislative
agenda to improve the state’s rent stabilization and rent control laws. I coordinated two
committees of Tenants & Neighbors members (one for rent controlled tenants, the other for rent
stabilized tenants) as well as a coalition of tenant and community-based organizations known as
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the Real Rent Reform campaign. Our campaign’s strategy for the 2012 legislative session was
centered around the fact that a lucrative landlord tax break known as J-51 was up for renewal.
We organized to push the state legislature – then split between Democratic and Republican
control, creating a challenging political landscape for tenants – to threaten to vote no on J-51’s
renewal unless significant tenant protections were passed alongside it.
It was a sensible strategy, but as we soon learned, we lacked the power to win it. For the
entire legislative session, we coordinated with Assembly members – including, most importantly,
the long-time Speaker of the Assembly, Sheldon Silver, and the powerful Housing Committee
Chair and Brooklyn party boss, Vito Lopez – who assured us that they would negotiate for key
parts of the platform we were pushing.6 In one meeting with Sheldon Silver, the Assembly
President proudly asserted that the neighborhood he represented was only called “the East
Village” by the rich newcomers – he still called it the Lower East Side. Silver vowed to go even
farther than we were demanding on one of our major legislative planks, and told us we had his
full support if he had ours. We obliged, ensuring that we would coordinate with his staff and
lawyers at key moments throughout the campaign. Vito Lopez was a bit blunter in his dealings.
In one meeting, he offered to call in the president of the most powerful developer lobbying
organization, the Real Estate Board of New York, and negotiate a deal on our behalf. When we
declined – not only did we not think that would work, but we did not trust a politician and a
developer to craft a deal for tenants – he rebuked the tenant movement for being less loyal and
thankful for his largesse than the unions, naming specifically my former employer, 32BJ.

6

It would not be long before both Lopez and Silver would leave the Assembly in disgrace following sexual
harassment and corruption allegations. Lopez died soon after; Silver is currently appealing his corruption
conviction. Lopez’s role in both controlling the state housing agenda and running a housing non-profit is discussed
in Chapter 5.
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Though the meeting was deeply troubling, we continued to coordinate closely with Lopez and
his staff, seeing no other viable option to achieve our goals.
In the final days of the legislative session, however, it became clear that the political
leaders we had relied on were not going to deliver on their promises. The pro-tenant bills we
championed were not attached to the renewal of the landlord’s tax break, and save for a few core
allies, vanishingly few Assembly Members or Senators would commit to voting down the bill. J51’s renewal passed easily in both chambers, and, to add insult to injury, the text of the bill was
quietly amended to include an even greater benefit to a small group of luxury developers: a
surprise clause which extended another even more lucrative developer tax break, known as 421a,
to five Manhattan specific parcels owned by prominent high-end developers who planned to site
the more affordable units they would have to create in other boroughs (Podkul, Kravitz, and
Parker, 2016). I left the job a few months later, but the Real Rent Reform campaign continued to
publicize this secretive giveaway. The defeat stuck with me, though, and helped me see that
smaller non-profits might be nimbler in their operations than big unions, but were subject to
comparable constraints around the parameters of their dissent. I went on to pursue writing and
teaching, and became a PhD candidate at the CUNY Graduate Center.
It was only in the course of researching this dissertation that I learned that the beginning
of my story at 32BJ and the end of my time at Tenants & Neighbors were revealingly related.
According to two former 32BJ staff members I interviewed about their views on labor and land
use, whose pseudonyms are Christopher Florentino and Sally Rohmer, when the press began
reporting that five additional luxury buildings had been quietly granted an enormous tax break,
the Secretary Treasurer of 32BJ, Hector Figueroa, emailed a set of staffers links to the news
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coverage with a message indicating that the union should make a comment.7 The union, at the
time, aimed to portray 421a as a broken program in need of greater oversight in order to secure
language in the legislation that would improve the state’s capacity to enforce its labor standards.
Attacking the program as an unwarranted giveaway to luxury developers would add fuel to their
allegations that the program needed to be reformed. The union’s political director, however,
replied over email that there was a problem with Hector’s proposed strategy: apparently, the
parcels had been granted 421a status in part because the union’s president had personally
intervened by calling the Governor at the developers’ request. The email chain ended, and no
further action was taken.
This one anecdote, which tied together parts of my life in ways I never expected,
underscored the contradictions I had experienced as a worker for both unions and non-profits,
and was now researching as a doctoral candidate. The union I had worked for supported a tax
break for some of the wealthiest luxury developers in the city in order to retain a good
relationship with their bargaining adversaries and keep the industry in which they operate
humming. The non-profit I worked for genuinely wanted to block this and other tax breaks for
luxury developers, but lacked the social power to force the state into action, and relied instead on
close ties with elected officials who seemed unbothered by betraying us.
In the course of my research, I would find dozens more examples of these dynamics
playing out in different ways, with unions siding with real estate players in key land use
decisions, and housing non-profits negotiating compromised positions rather than practicing
more aggressive opposition. Many unions support planning regimes that encourage luxury

7

Figueroa would go on to become president of the union shortly thereafter. He died unexpectedly in the summer
of 2019. I regret that he will not be able to respond to the analysis presented here, as I am certain he would have
provided a thoughtful and spirited rebuttal.
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development in working-class neighborhoods for a myriad of reasons relating to the dynamics of
growth that best suit their local as well as the relationships with bargaining adversaries and
politicians on which they rely for contracts and policy reforms. While housing non-profits do not
often support luxury development in working-class areas without some other form of concession,
they will often support land use changes that encourage such development if they can secure
some form of dispensation from the developer or the state (such as development rights or
programmatic funding) as part of the deal. Unions and non-profits in New York City do not
universally follow real estate’s lead in planning politics, but such alliances and outcomes are far
from uncommon. As MacDonald (2011, 215) describes in one of the few treatments of this
dynamic in the academic literature on labor and gentrification, “the production of New York as a
luxury city cuts through class divisions to secure a basis of support that is broader than might
otherwise be expected.”
From my own experiences as a union and non-profit staffer, as well as from my
interviews with current and former union and non-profit employees, it is clear that staff members
of these institutions are fully aware of these class contradictions. They talk amongst themselves
all the time about their institutions’ entanglements with real estate, and their reactions range from
defending the organizations to quitting in resignation or protest. There is a general cautiousness
about bringing these conversations out into the public, however, for fear of retribution. There are
also concerns that any criticism of unions and non-profits with working-class bases will be
amplified and distorted by conservatives who seek to undermine left organizations. Both are
reasonable apprehensions, and ones I have shared at various times. Ultimately, however, my
sources and I believe these tensions deserve a thorough, theoretically and historically informed
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treatment in order to understand how they arose, why they persist, and what it might take to
change them.
The loose, largely informal, always shifting coalition between constellations of unions,
non-profits, planners, politicians, and real estate capitalists in New York City is an example of
what Woods (1998, 26) calls a “regional bloc:” “an alliance, a bargain, or a contract between
disparate ethnic, gender, class and other elements. The goal of the regional bloc is to gain control
over resources and over the ideological and distributive institutions governing their allocation.”
Regional blocs are fluid, contradictory, unstable, geographically specific, and subject to periodic
crises and reformations. Each component is not equally powerful, and within each component
particular organizations tend to overshadow other players. Even while a regional bloc is
dominant for a particular time, there exist major exceptions to them. This is certainly the case for
New York’s labor-capital-state coalition: from case to case, issue to issue, place to place, and
time to time, there are unions and non-profits that take fully oppositional stances to real estate
capital and fight back wholeheartedly against the luxury city model. While such cases deserve to
be studied and celebrated, it is important to do so in the proper contexts: there is a tendency
among sympathetic scholars to highlight and heroize these exceptional groups and moments
rather than examining the bloc and understanding why it exists (Early 2011, 17; Fitch 2006, 69;
Wagner 2000, 116).
My perspective will likely draw the ire of union and non-profit stalwarts who prefer to
keep these behaviors and criticisms behind closed doors, or to celebrate solidarity rather than
dwell on its absence. It might also disappoint many militants who totally reject non-profits and
mainstream unions as hopelessly hapless when it comes to building the power necessary to make
radical change. When labor and land use come up in either scholarly or popular media
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treatments, the players are often simplified to their basest forms: to defenders they are workingclass heroes and altruistic agents; to critics, they are hardheaded hardhats and “poverty pimps.”
When a non-profit leader met me at a restaurant for an interview, one of the first things they said
to me was, “you’re not going to just shit on community development, are you?” Meanwhile,
several radical planning activists aware of my dissertation topic came up to me and asked
excitedly, “you’re going to take down the unions and non-profits, right?” I hope I have done
neither. My goal is to understand and explain why these institutions behave the way that they do,
rather than either defend or decry them.
Ultimately, this dissertation is a study of a paradox. Following Simone and Pieterse’s
(2018, xiii) celebration of “the constitutive nature and generative potential of paradox” as a
methodology to understand urban processes, I seek to understand why and how many New York
City unions and non-profits have supported – or not directly opposed – land use changes that
accelerate gentrification by intensifying luxury real estate development in working-class
neighborhoods. In answering this question, I develop a theory of labor’s role in the production of
capitalist space, and of labor’s internal division and alliances with elements of capital and the
state. I also provide a historical analysis of both the continuities and divergences in past
iterations of this regional bloc and its impact on the planning and development of New York
City. Combining these theoretical formations and historical narratives with contemporary
analysis of union and non-profit planning politics, I provide a portrait of an enduring set of
contradictions in the social production of urban space.

Minor Theory
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While the particular circumstances I investigate are unique to this moment and place, the
feeling of being displaced from the city you built is a common experience that traverses and
connects across histories and geographies. The classic labor hymn “Solidarity Forever,” credited
to Ralph Chaplin in 1915 and associated with the Industrial Workers of the World as well as
many other labor formations, portrays in multiple verses the pain and the potential power
associated with the contradiction between labor’s role in shaping society and its present place in
the world. The third verse applies this formation specifically to labor’s role in building both the
rural and the urban landscape. Chaplin writes:
“It is we who plowed the prairies, built the cities where they trade/
Dug the mines and built the workshops, endless miles of railroad laid/
Now we stand outcast and starving ‘mid the wonders we have made but/
The union makes us strong”
This verse is a poetic invocation of the dissonance between labor’s central role in the
production of space – and the production of the means of production itself – and its diminished
and degraded place in the resultant social order. The emotions this engenders are built into the
harmonies that traditionally accompany the melody and lyrics. In many versions, the line that
highlights this painful irony – “‘mid the wonders we have made” – is sung over a dominant third
chord (the only non-diatonic harmony in the piece) followed by the minor sixth chord. The line
then resolves to the major tonic through a traditional two-five-one progression under the words
“the union makes us strong.” In other words, while the harmonies underlying “‘mid the wonders
we have made” highlights the dissonance between labor’s production of space and alienation
from their product, the harmonies underlying “the union makes us strong” imply that the union is

17

the way to resolve this tension between labor’s spatially productive capacities and capital’s
capacious desire to usurp them.
What if the union – or, in other cases, the non-profit organizing project – is involved in
planning “the city where they trade” in a way that displaces those who built it? What if the
institutions of labor are implicated in labor’s condition as “outcast and stranded ‘mid the
wonders we have made?” What if the chord progression that underlies these lines is never
resolved? In this case, the poignancy drawn out by the slight dissonance of the harmonies
beneath “‘mid the wonders we have” leads only to the minor sixth chord over the word, “made,”
which would become the new tonic. The union would not get to make us strong; solidarity would
be for later. The stanza would resolve to the relative minor.
This musicological detour highlights the “minor theory” (Katz 1996) to be drawn from
this text, which lingers throughout this dissertation. For Katz, minor theory is not just about the
affect produced by a musical minor key, but the relation between what is dominant (or major)
and what is marginalized (or minor), particularly in theorization and the production of
knowledge in a given time and place. The minor is “the interstitial. It is defined as minor in
relation to the dominant major theory” (ibid, 490). In this case the major – both in the harmonies
of Solidarity Forever, as well as in the dominant interpretations of labor geography – emphasizes
the union as the source of our strength. But to remain in the minor mode – harmonically, but also
theoretically – and delay the major resolution that is offered by the hopeful sentiment that “the
union makes us strong” allows us to experience the dissonance of our alienation from the spatial
product of our labors all around us, as well as the discomfiting feeling that the union may, in
fact, have signed off on this arrangement. This is not to say that “the union” cannot make us
strong, or that the union does not make some of us strong, or even that the union does not make
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all of us strong in certain ways. It is only to say that the official institutions of labor under
capitalism – and particularly in today’s real estate-driven urban political economy – are often
involved in both the emplacement and displacement of labor in the city. It is understanding the
dynamics of and reasons for the latter that constitutes a minor theory in this time and place.
Dwelling in the minor and experiencing its “messy” and “peculiar temporality and spatiality”
(ibid, 488) allows us to come face to face with the paradoxical condition of labor, land use, and
the luxury city in New York today.
This paradox is not commonly plumbed in the academic literature. With some prominent
exceptions – including various treatments of non-profits and their failure to stop gentrification
(INCITE! 2006, Arena 2012, Goldstein 2017) and Ian MacDonald’s body of work on unions and
neoliberal urbanism (MacDonald 2011, 2013, 2014, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d) – studies of
labor organizations and urban planning have dwelled more in the major resolution than the minor
mode. Labor geography as a sub-discipline of human geography, for example, has emphasized
labor’s affirmative role in the production of space (see for reviews of this literature Mitchell,
2005, Castree, 2007, Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2010, Rutherford, 2010, Das 2012). Labor
geographers argue that labor – through its embodied form in individual workers with their own
agendas of survival and progress, as well as the organizations those workers form to promote
their collective interests (i.e. unions) – seeks its own spatial fixes in order to produce space in
such a way as to safeguard their own survival. This assertion of agency was a crucial corrective
to both neo-classical economic geography (which focused almost entirely on the rational choices
of firms) as well as its Marxist critique (which tended to dwell more on the spatial logic of
capital than labor) (Lier, 2007; Hastings 2016).
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Andrew Herod’s seminal works in labor geography are exemplary. Herod – whom
Castree (2007, 854) dubbed the sub-discipline’s “most widely accomplished proselytizer” –
theorized labor’s role in the production of space, and particularly its agency at multiple
geographical scales (Herod 1998, 2001, 2011, 2017). One key aspect of Herod’s theory of labor
geography is the idea that labor necessarily enters into coalition with elements of capital and the
state in order to pursue a spatial strategy based in their need to survive in a particular place and
its particular economy (Herod 2001, 100-101). Whereas Herod theorizes such collaborations as
evidence of labor’s agency and ingenuity, I understand them as exemplary of the structural
limitations on labor institutions within the process of capitalist urbanization, federal law, and city
policy. They are choices, surely, but they are made within a system that robs people and
institutions of other, better options. This reframing constitutes an attempt at “messing with the
project” (Katz 2006) of labor geography: using some of its core observations to reframe the
political meaning of labor’s production of space.
Katz (2004, 242) identifies a common tendency among scholars to see “oppositional
practice” anywhere they wish to. In the case of New York City unions and non-profits, this can
take the form of scholars presenting class compromise as agentic creativity, or interpreting a
complex case of institutional self-interest as a politically-motivated manifestation of solidaristic
ideals. Instead, Katz suggests that scholars and critics should “delineate between the admittedly
overlapping material social practices that are loosely considered ‘resistance’ to distinguish those
whose primary effect is autonomous initiative, recuperation, or resilience; those that are attempts
to rework oppressive and unequal circumstances; and those that are intended to resist, subvert, or
disrupt these conditions of exploitation and oppression” (ibid, 242). In the cases discussed in this
dissertation – unions and housing non-profits either supporting or negotiating the terms of luxury
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development in working-class areas – what is sometimes misread as resistance can be more
accurately understood as resilience or reworking: ways of either surviving as an organization
during difficult circumstances or extracting benefits from otherwise oppressive outcomes.

Labor and Gentrification
I use the term “labor” in an unorthodox way throughout this project. In colloquial
political discourse, as well as in much of labor geography (Herod 2001, 7-8; Tufts and Savage
2009, 946), the word “labor” is often used synonymously with unions, or at least paid workers.8
More specifically, “organized labor” almost always refers to the field of unions in a given
geography, and “labor organizations” commonly means unions in general.9 In contrast, I use the
term “labor” to describe a much larger social formation – what Marx (1867 [1976], 344) calls
“collective labor, i.e. the working class.” By “collective labor” or “working class,” I combine
together: 1) those who sell their labor for wages rather than profit off investments; with 2) those
engaged in various other forms of work not always recognized under that bracket because it is
either unpaid or dispersed. Labor, then, includes those engaged in formal wage work as well as
those whose primary occupations lie in the tasks of social reproduction. Given that the purpose
of wage labor for most workers is to secure the means of social reproduction (housing, food and
water, clothing, health, education, and more) and that the process of production cannot occur
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Later in Labor Geographies, Herod (2001, 47-48) writes “Unions are certainly important, and often powerful,
workers’ institutions, but they do not hold a monopoly as instruments of the expression of working-class people’s
interests. A labor geography should therefore recognize that working-class people – waged and unwaged –
organize along many crosscutting political, social, racial, gender, and cultural lines.” Nonetheless, the rest of the
book is almost entirely about unions, as have been many if not most of the studies that describe themselves as
employing a labor geography framework.
9
Herbert Hill (1996, 189) points out the same bias in another discipline: “what usually passed for labor history was
really union history.”
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without the crucial labor of social reproduction (as without that labor, workers simply perish), it
is not only politically but analytically crucial that these forms of labor be considered in
combination rather than in separate siloes.
This formulation brings together two social spheres commonly parsed through the
language of “labor and community.” “Labor,” in that phrasing, means paid workers organized by
their workplace or employment sector; “community” can mean anyone else. While communities
surely exist, the language of “the community” is all too often used to discount differences
between people living in geographical proximity or sharing a racial, national, religious, or other
background (Joseph 2002). The word “community,” Williams notes, is almost never used with
negative connotations. “What is most important, perhaps, is that unlike all other terms of social
organization (state, nation, society, etc.) it seems never to be used unfavourably, and never to be
given any positive opposing or distinguishing term” (Williams 1983, 76). In activist parlance, as
Mathew (2005, 195-196) points to acerbically, “communities” can, in the non-profit field, be
conjured cynically “at worst as tokens for the self-perpetuation of the activist class, and at best
occasionally mobilized groups of people.” I therefore use the term “community” rarely and
advisedly, and prefer to discuss “labor” instead as a social force that includes many of the people
and organizations more commonly characterized as community members and community
groups.
This theorization builds on Gilmore’s (2007a) classification of labor as including
unionized and non-unionized workers, as well as the “relative surplus population” (Marx 1867
[1976], 798) upon which capitalism depends. There is no one without the other, and therefore the
totality must be considered together. Gilmore (2007a, 56) also refers to labor as “the workerconsumer, who has to work to buy and buy to work,” highlighting the working class’s essential
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role within capitalist society as both the providers of labor (paid and unpaid) and the consumer
bases for the products of our labor, without which they cannot live and labor further. Thinking in
terms of housing, labor is essential as both producers and consumers: building and maintaining
the space, then renting it out or paying a mortgage to a bank based on wages earned elsewhere.
The organizations that represent labor, then, include but are not exclusive to unions.
There are other kinds of institutions – most commonly called “community-based organizations,”
including Community Development Corporations (CDCs) that build and manage affordable
housing and organizing and advocacy organizations that push for tenants’ rights – that aim to
represent the interests of those performing labor outside the workplace, including labor in the
domestic sphere (Marston 2000). Marwell (2007, 149) affirms this inclusive approach to labor
organizations by arguing that “[p]aid work and domestic reproduction then go hand in hand, and
all of the organizational players involved in these contemporary tasks can be considered as part
of the same field.” Fletcher and Gapasin (2008) similarly include non-profits with working-class
bases in their definition of labor. Labor, they argue, is not just made up of units of paid workers
focused around workplace issues, but constitutes a “social-political bloc” (ibid, 174) set apart
from capital and the state. Fletcher and Gapasin further instruct that the
term labor should denote forms of organization with roots in the
working class and with agendas that explicitly advance the class
demands of the working class. In that sense, a community-based
organization rooted in the working class (such as a worker’s center)
that addresses class-specific issues is a labor organization in the
same way that a trade union is. To push that envelope a bit more, a
trade union that addresses the interests of only one section of the
23

working class (such as a white supremacist craft union) deserves the
label labor organization less than does a community-based
organization that assists the unemployed or the homeless (ibid, 174,
emphasis in the original).
By adding “the homeless” to the group of constituencies that organize under the banner of
“labor,” Fletcher and Gapasin make clear that it is neither the sphere of the workplace nor even
the specific position of the worker that defines “labor,” but rather the social relation of the
propertyless to the propertied and the pursuit of collective action toward unmaking or reshaping
those relations.
Though in this framework they can both constitute organizations of labor, unions and
non-profits “rooted in the working class” contain deep class contradictions. CDCs, for example,
are largely financed by the wealthiest corporations, foundations, and individuals in the country,
complicating the notion that they are working-class institutions (even if their client and
organizing base largely is working class). Some craft unions represent independent contractors
who essentially own their means of production, yet are not exactly capitalists. Non-profit staff
are frequently from a different class position than the people they represent (Leondar-Wright
2014), but so too are many of the upper-level staff and leaders of the largest unions (Aronowitz
2014). These institutions, like the broader society in which they are situated, are full of
contradictions, and are never pure in either their class composition or their class politics.
Collapsing various different kinds of people and institutions into the term “labor” can therefore
be quite dangerous. As Maier (1987, 8) argues, “the categories ‘labor,’ ‘unions,’ and ‘labor
leaders’ cannot be used interchangeably,” and any attempt to characterize the actions of unions
and non-profits must distinguish the goals and interests of leaders from those of members or
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constituents. I have tried throughout, then, to make clear when I am talking about labor as socialpolitical block, when I am referring to the collective mass of labor organizations, and when I am
referring only to the leaders of labor organizations. Though all can lay claim to the word “labor,”
they are certainly far from synonymous.
As an urban geographer, I am particularly interested in the type of labor that goes into the
production of urban space: the construction, maintenance, renovation, and repurposing of
buildings, infrastructures, and open spaces; the paid and voluntary care work that animates and
enlivens those spaces and the people who dwell within them; the development of cultural
practices and institutions that give a place meaning, specificity, texture, history, and attachments;
the political organization and mobilization that is built between neighbors, co-workers, and other
relations over the future of places of common interest; and much more. In the novel Zone One,
Colson Whitehead (2011) describes the urban as the product of collective physical, emotional,
and intellectual labor on an almost unfathomable scale. “Millions of people tended to this
magnificent contraption, they lived and sweated and toiled in it, serving the mechanism of
metropolis and making it bigger, better, story by glorious story and idea by unlikely idea.” This
triumphalist description of the feelings conjured by a view of the New York City skyline situates
the city not only as a product of various forms of labor – physical, intellectual, domestic – but
also a space in which those who practice that labor live their lives.
The labor whose product is urban space practices work that is commonly conceived as
production, consumption, social reproduction, and cultural creation. Consider, for example, the
South Bronx in the 1980s. Under conditions of severe and planned disinvestment (Wallace and
Wallace 1998), residents who remained maintained and reclaimed buildings that landlords
neglected and abandoned; they developed institutions to organize their paid and unpaid labor in
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order to provide for their needs, and to make demands of capital and the state; and, most
famously, they developed hip-hop culture in spaces and through materials others had dismissed
as lacking exchange value. As Partis (forthcoming 2021) argues, this famous moment of furious
fomentation was enabled not only by those widely praised as hip hop culture’s “inventors,” but
also by an unnamed but essential cadre of workers and neighbors he terms “transistors:” the
superintendents who made community rooms available to young people wanting to experiment
with new sounds; the gym teachers who opened their spaces to students who were creating a new
form of dance; and the myriad unnamed others whose labor catalyzed this cultural and spatial
production. Today, this very history is repackaged and used by investors and developers to
inflate the area’s exchange value, and to use its history of working-class cultural production as a
selling point for real estate that is intended to exclude those who lived through this period of
disinvestment (Rodriguez 2018).
In this way, real estate capital exploits the multifarious labor that goes into the production
of space: the product of spatial labor is commoditized, and those who labored in the production
of space are alienated from it. The counterforce to labor’s production of space, then, is capital’s
usurpation of it for profit. While this dynamic can take many forms, the particular manifestation
I investigate in this work is gentrification, and specifically the types of “new-build
gentrification” that involve land use intensification and new luxury construction in working-class
areas (Davidson and Lees 2009).
The “gentry” in gentrification are not a new social force, and the transference of land into
their control is not a recent development. For example, “The Diggers Song,” written circa 1649
and sung by a set of English radicals against enclosure, mordantly warns,
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The gentry are all ‘round stand up now/
The gentry are all ‘round on each side they are found/
Their wisdom so profound to cheat us of our ground
As a modern phenomenon, the term was coined by Ruth Glass (1964) to describe the
movement of professional households into working-class neighborhoods of London.
Gentrification is generally used to describe the process by which working-class urban spaces –
buildings, blocks, neighborhoods, or cities – are reinvested, and the people displaced and
replaced by wealthier and often White residents (Lees, Slater, and Wyly 2008). Gentrification is
just one urban process among many. Most urban spaces in the US, for example, are experiencing
gentrification’s opposite and prelude: predatory disinvestment. New development in wealthy
areas is not gentrification and may in fact be a crucial component of combatting exclusion if it is
targeted toward workers earning much less than the local average. Similarly, neighborhood
change that does not alter its class composition or property values (such as the succession of one
similarly situated immigrant group to another) should not be confused for gentrification. While
gentrification is therefore far from the totality of urban change, Mullings argues it should not be
considered an isolated phenomenon. Rather it is “linked to worldwide processes of privatization
and ‘enclosure’ of land, public space, and public services integral to the agendas of neoliberalism
and structural adjustment” (Mullings 2005, 675). Today gentrification is central to capital’s
global growth strategy, with 60 percent of the world’s hard assets invested in real estate, and 75
percent of that investment going toward housing (Farha 2017). A tremendous amount of capital –
and a great deal of city planning – is therefore riding on the proposition that urban rents and land
prices will continually rise, and tenants will pay an increasingly punitive portion of their wages
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toward their housing until they ultimately move to cheaper quarters and repeat the cycle (Stein
2019).
Displacement, then, is integral to gentrification. Displacement is not just about physically
moving individuals from one location to another, but severing the ties between people, places,
and social spheres, and thus producing precarity, vulnerability, and alienation (Fullilove 2005).
According to Slater (2013, 384), “Displacement involves the removal of a basic human need
(shelter) upon which people depend absolutely – practically, socially, emotionally and
psychologically.” The pain of displacement is therefore directly related to the bonds people
develop to their homes and their surroundings: “Human beings have no choice but to occupy a
place in the world, and more often than not develop strong emotional ties to that place, so being
displaced by external forces – having that place taken away, given to someone else, or bulldozed
– is among the most appalling of social injustices” (ibid, 384). In a passage linking feeling and
location of home to the way we see the universe, Tuan (1977, 149-150) marks the home as “the
focal point of a cosmic structure,” and so while “[h]uman beings have strong recuperative
powers” the act of displacement can leave people “thoroughly demoralized, since the ruin of
their settlement implies the ruin of their cosmos.”
Displacement is most visible at the moment when one person or household is forced to
move, but it can take on many forms. Marcuse (1985, 206-208) identifies four types of
residential displacement: “Direct last-resident displacement” (when one resident is forced out to
make way for another) is the clearest, but behind it lies “chain displacement,” or the long string
of previous residents pushed out of a space. In addition to direct and chain displacement, there is
“exclusionary displacement,” which counts those who cannot access housing because it has been
either gentrified or made derelict by a landlord’s action (or inaction). Finally, there is the
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“displacement pressure” put on those tenants who remain in place as their reinvested
surroundings become hostile, discriminatory, and unfamiliar to them, and their landlords use
various forms of harassment to induce their eventual departure (see also Stabrowski 2014). In
practice, these four forms are commonly combined, rather than existing as separate phenomenon,
and serve to transform working-class spaces not only into homes for wealthier residents, but sites
of intensive economic extraction for landowners, landlords, and developers.
As with other forms of capitalist exploitation, gentrification is a process of alienating
people from the products of their labor for the purpose of profit.10 Chatterjee (2014) explicitly
links the extraction of value from people’s labor in commodity production to the extraction of
value from people’s labor in spatial production. First, she demonstrates that “laboring and spaces
of laboring are fused” (ibid, 8): labor occurs not just in the site of commodity production (i.e. the
shop floor), but also in the people’s homes, blocks, neighborhoods, and cities. Not only are
people forced to take work home with them, but they labor to build up and maintain their homes,
blocks, neighborhoods, and cities; they work to create and run social and political institutions
centered around those geographical scales; they develop cultural practices – food, film, music,
murals, vernacular architectures, and more – that express their unique relationship to a particular
space and place; and they care for themselves and others in their homes and neighborhoods. All
of this takes a tremendous amount of effort, time, thought, and planning – in other words, labor.

10

Though I discuss this concept through Ipsita Chatterjee’s scholarship, this insight was first imparted to me by
Peter Kwong, who, in his Hunter College urban affairs class “Gentrification: Chinatown Case Studies,” taught that
the fundamental mechanism of gentrification is robbing working-class people of the fruits of the labor they put
into building up and maintaining their homes and neighborhoods. Kwong agreed to serve on this dissertation
committee shortly before his death in March 2017. Many of the insights contained herein were inspired by his
teaching, writing, and mentorship.
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Once this concept of spatially productive labor is established, it becomes clear that
“displacement is as much ‘estranged labor’ as it is ‘estranged spaces,’” defined as “a deprivation
from the right to produce space and right to place-making” (Chatterjee 2014, 8). When spaces of
labor are valorized by those seeking spaces of profit and leisure, “the production of space
becomes… a production for accumulation’s sake” (ibid, 60). Gentrification, then, is not only a
question of rising rents in working-class neighborhoods, but “[t]he theft of space from labor and
its conversion into spaces of profits” (ibid, 5). It occurs through a process “whereby laboring
landscapes and lifescapes – homes, hearths, and job networks of labor – are usurped, bulldozed,
flattened, and reproduced into landscapes and lifescapes of accumulation” (ibid, 5). The key to
both estranged labor and estranged space, Chatterjee argues, is displacement. “[A]ccumulation
proceeds through displacement: displacement of labor from the laborer (estranged labor) to be
usurped by the capitalist for a wage and displacement of laborer from laboring spaces of her/his
existence (estranged space) to be accumulated by a class of capitalist” (ibid, 61).
Chatterjee’s theory of gentrification as “estranged space” adds a great deal of depth to
labor geography’s assertion that labor is primarily responsible for shaping the landscape and
seeks strategies to secure its own spatial fixes. Labor produces landscape, Chatterjee shows, but
the story does not end there: under capitalism, those landscapes are then routinely and
systematically appropriated by capitalists through multiple rounds of displacement. This is also a
crucial corrective to studies of gentrification which theorize the process as something separate
and apart from the realm of production, except as relates to the mismatch between wages and
rents or the desirable location of residential neighborhoods in relation to jobs and commuting
patterns. The same analytical tools that enable us to understand the process of estranged labor
should be used to understand the process of estranged space. Relatedly, the same political
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imperative to confront and transform the alienation of labor at work can animate the spirit of an
anti-gentrification politics to go beyond technocratic fixes and fight for control over the
conditions and outcomes of spatial production.
When applied to the case I am studying – New York City unions and housing non-profits
that have sided with the real estate industry in questions of land use, planning, and development
– Chatterjee’s framework produces a supreme irony. When labor organizations join real estate
actors in promoting intensified for-profit development in working-class areas and the
displacement that it induces, we witness labor’s self-alienation from space: a strategy that trades
the displacement of labor for gains in status, employment, funding, or – in some cases – a
modicum of space in the luxury city. Labor, then, can be centrally involved not only in the
production of space, but also in its alienation to capital.
Labor organizations participate in this alienation, however, not necessarily because their
leaders are reckless or corrupt (though examples of both are certainly familiar to any close
observer of New York City politics), but because the political economy of the real estate state
creates strong incentives for cooperation over opposition. Directly confronting New York City’s
real estate state and its program of new-build gentrification is not guaranteed to produce positive
outcomes, and may in fact foreclose avenues for organizations’ growth and survival. Institutions
do not operate on an open playing field, in which all options are available at all times. Instead,
they use their understanding of what faces them, what they want, and what they can achieve to
work to enact a particular spatial strategy. “Strategy,” Ganz (2000, 1010) explains, “is how we
turn what we have into what we need – by translating our resources into the power to achieve
purpose. Although we often do not act ‘rationally’ and outcomes are often unintended, we do act
purposefully.” Spatial strategies are ways of pursuing plans to produce space in ways that
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advance an organization’s interests as their leaders or members understand them. My research
findings suggest that at this moment in history, many labor organizations in New York City enact
spatial strategies that marshal their limited resources toward land use policies that work for their
particular interests while also emboldening a set of allied actors representing fractions of capital
(real estate) and the government (the real estate state).

Methods, Approach, and Organization
This dissertation is built on three main methods: extensive readings in geography,
planning, history, sociology, journalism, and other disciplines on theories and histories of labor
and spatial production, particularly in New York City; interviews with 30 individuals with
firsthand knowledge of union and non-profit planning politics, including current or former union
and non-profit staffers, leaders, members, and consultants, as well as activists outside those
organizations and participants in the city’s planning process; and archival research at New York
University’s Tamiment Library and Cornell University’s Kheel Center for Labor-Management
Documentation and Archives.11
The interviews proved especially fruitful, both in illuminating and personalizing the
contradictions of labor, land use, and the luxury city. Interviews and conversations were
conducted with participants based on their experiences with union and non-profit planning and

11

In my proposal, I included a fourth method: participant observation in public hearings, as well as union and nonprofit strategy sessions. This approach – particularly participant observation in private meetings – ultimately
proved untenable. While I attended many such gatherings, I chose to do so as a full participant rather than as an
embedded researcher. I was uncomfortable contributing to strategic and tactical decisions around land use
strategies while also compiling data on how such decisions are made and presenting that data in a critical and
largely unpersonal analysis. Rather than define my role as both a participant and an observer, and chose the
former over the latter.
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development politics. Some were individuals that I knew from prior experiences, but many more
were snowball-sampled from participants’ recommendations for additional sources or tips from
those who declined to speak on the record. Of my 30 on-the-record interviews, ten were with
current non-profit staffers, three were with current non-profit directors, one was with a former
non-profit worker, five were with former union staffers, four were with current union
consultants, two were with activist union members, and five were with miscellaneous others
(including community board members and activists outside the non-profit or union structures). A
majority – 19 out of the 30 interviewees, including nearly everyone who currently works for a
union or non-profit in a non-leadership capacity – opted to have their identities anonymized;
some also asked that their organizations go unnamed, but most wanted to identify their groups.
The interviews ranged from roughly 30 to 120 minutes, with most ranging between 60 to 90
minutes. While many covered similar ground, they were not structured in the sense of relying on
a common prepared set of questions. In addition to the 30 on-the-record interviews I conducted, I
held countless off the record interviews and conversations with similarly situated individuals
who chose not to sign IRB consent forms but nonetheless desired to provide clues or information
on background.
In addition to interviews, readings, and archival research, this dissertation is undoubtably
shaped by my own experiences in unions, non-profits, and New York City planning politics. This
background helped me know what kinds of questions to ask, relate to my interviewees, interpret
the information I gathered from all sources, and test potential explanations against my own lived
experience in these institutions. It also helped guard against presenting either idealized or
demonized depictions of these institutions as heroes or villains. I know that the truth is much
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more complicated, and the reasons for these organizations’ actions extend far beyond the scope
of individual groups and their leaders.
My analysis incorporates both “top down” and “bottom up” approaches to urban politics,
analyzing the paradox of labor, land use, and the luxury city from perspectives of both union and
non-profit leaders (top down) as well as members and clients (bottom up). More than anything,
however, mine is a “middle out” account, building from the experiences and observations of
mid-level union and non-profit staffers and consultants, as well as planners working in local
government agencies. This approach mirrors my own experiences: while I have been a rank-andfile union member (and was one for all but my final year as a PhD student) and a non-profit
board member (including three of the years I conducted this research), most of my experience
comes as a union and non-profit staffer, and much of my social world is comprised of people
engaged in these staff-level positions in labor organizations and planning agencies. I believe
these mid-level sources can provide a depth of knowledge into the daily operations of their
institutions as well as a personal distance from the decisions made by leaders. Whereas both
leaders and members may be inclined to defend organizational decisions to which they
personally object, mid-level employees seemed far more willing to reflect critically on their
organizations’ relations to institutions of capital and the state.
The goal of this dissertation, however, is not to dig up dirt about New York City unions
and non-profits’ entanglements with the real estate state. Nor is it to present a dispassionate
institutional survey, or an inquiry into the dynamics of development and urban housing markets
as such. It is not a comprehensive investigation into the nature and history of all New York City
unions, non-profits, developers, and government agencies, nor is it a sociological or
anthropological study of those institutions’ cultures and organizational structures. To the extent
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that it is a dissertation about unions and non-profits, that is because those are the central
institutions tasked with promoting working-class survival in the city; to the extent that it is a
dissertation about housing, that is because housing acts as both one of the main drivers of the
city’s political economy (i.e. real estate) as well as most people’s means of accessing the city and
building a life in place (i.e. home).
Fundamentally, this work is a scholarly investigation and political intervention into the
relationship between labor, planning, and real estate and in a time and place whose development
is defined by gentrification. My goal is to understand and explain why a significant portion of the
city’s labor organizations act in a manner consistent with the needs and demands of the real
estate sector and its state allies. In Gilmore’s (2002, 17) terms, I aim “to figure out what
(including ‘who’ – i.e. deal with agency in a nonvoluntaristic sense) makes oppressive and
liberatory structures work, and what makes them fall apart.”
In order to understand the full picture, in both its general contours and specific quirks, I
look at New York City unions and non-profits in order to understand also the fields and flows of
capital and the state. Marwell and McQuarrie (2013, 132) make a strong case for the study of
urban organizations, which can inform “us not only about the particular organizations under
analysis but also about a wider set of social processes at play in the world.” Studying particular
organizations allows us to understand the fields in which they are situated, which in turn
“illuminat[es] larger processes of social stability and change” (ibid, 139). Following what they
call the “duality principle” (ibid, 131), Marwell and McQuarrie encourage scholars to view urban
organizations as neither fully autonomous social actors nor cogs in a machine they cannot
control, but rather as “nearly always beset by competing agendas, limited by the bounded
rationality of their inhabitants, and engaged in a critical search for legitimacy in the eyes of
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multiple constituents.” I follow this approach in the following study, which views labor
organizations as equally responsible for their actions and constrained in their options.
This kind of analysis necessitates presenting organizations with which I am broadly –
sometimes deeply – sympathetic differently than their leaders and supporters might desire.12 In
this case, I highlight the ways in which working-class organizations side with real estate capital
and the real estate state, rather than the ways they might challenge those actors. This is not
because the latter never occurs, but rather because the former is also quite common yet rarely
studied. Marx identifies a willingness to confront organizational contradictions as key to political
analysis. He writes of the imperative to draw a “distinction between the phrases and fantasies of
the parties and their real organization and real interests, between their conception of themselves
and what they really are” (Marx 1852 [2019], 508; see also Wilson 2000, 1). This often means
foregrounding information that organizations’ leaders and backers might wish to downplay, and
critiquing what Katz (2005a, 61) calls “‘good guys’ in a sea of far worse political operators.” As
Katz explains, however, the fact that others do worse than a given organization or that we may
agree with much of that organization’s program must never entitle them to evade investigation.
In fact, one of the reasons to do so is specifically to ensure that groups’ “good guy” status does
not indemnify them to investigative scrutiny, critical analysis, or scholarly evaluation. This can
be – and for me certainly was – deeply uncomfortable, but is ultimately essential if we wish to
build institutions capable of fighting gentrification and maintaining labor’s hold over that which
it produces.

12

To explicitly situate myself politically in this research, I am pro-union to the death but I remain very critical of
many unions’ land use politics. I am not enamored with non-profits as political formations, but I am often more
muted in my criticism of their contemporary land use politics because while I feel they often do not go far enough
in their opposition, they rarely support the luxury redevelopment of working-class areas outright.
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The following chapters proceed through three approaches: geographical theory, urban
history, and contemporary analysis. The first body chapter uses geography, planning, and other
literature to construct a three-dimensional theory of how urban space is produced under
capitalism: in the first dimension, we see that urban space is produced socially (i.e. by all, in both
conflict and in concert); in the second dimension, we see that it is produced by labor, capital, and
the state (toward distinct and differential ends); and in the third dimension, we see that it is
produced through regional blocs that combine fragments of labor, capital, and the state (in
coalition with one another and in competition with other segments of labor, capital, and the
state).
This theoretical chapter is followed by two historical chapters. This first analyzes the
period of union cooperative housing construction (1927-1974) as both an alternative to
contemporary union housing politics as well as a foreshadowing of unions’ relationship to other
workers’ displacement. I focus particularly on the case of the Penn South cooperative, which
stands as a monumental achievement in labor’s production of workers’ housing but was achieved
through the displacement of an equivalent number of more marginalized workers. The second
historical chapter analyzes the rise of housing non-profits in urban development (1961-2001),
both as a top-down response to the political crises caused by urban renewal and other midcentury political and economic developments, and as a bottom-up mobilization of communities
into specific and constrained political formations in order to gain access to funding and
development opportunities. This chapter also includes an analysis of the 1975 New York City
fiscal crisis, and the way it reshaped the relationship between unions, non-profits, finance capital,
and city and state government. Following these two historical chapters, I provide a concise
interlude to summarize some of the major developments in 21st century New York City planning
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practice, following the zoning and development agendas of Republican/Independent mayor
Michael Bloomberg and Democratic mayor Bill de Blasio in order to provide context for the
chapters to come.
Following these histories are two chapters of contemporary analysis. The first details
New York City unions’ approaches to land use and development politics, looking specifically at
the programs followed by building trades, public sector, and service sector unions. I show how
unions intervene in land use processes to expand unionized sectors, limit non-union growth, and
build collaborative ties with their bargaining adversaries. The second chapter of contemporary
analysis focuses on New York City housing non-profits’ approaches to land use and
development politics, as well as the differences between the Community Development
Corporations and membership-based organizing projects. In addition to showing how the need
for funding (private and public), space, and development opportunities structure non-profit
decision-making, I provide case studies of the CDC Asian Americans For Equality and the Real
Affordability For All coalition.
In the final body chapter, I return to theory in order to understand the cases and data
presented in the preceding chapters. I contextualize many of the decisions unions and housing
non-profits make under the frameworks of money, power, and survival, looking at how the
imperatives to grow, secure funding, invest earnings, and respond to repression encourage many
labor organizations to join in tentative coalitions with the real estate state. Doing so means
working in cooperation with similarly aligned labor organizations while working at cross
purposes with others. Finally, in a brief conclusion, I draw out the logical end-game of
contemporary pro-real estate labor politics, and consider the possibilities for alternative
pathways.
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The goal of this work is to clarify the politics of urban spatial production in order to aid
in changing them. The contradiction that I present – New York City labor’s production of space
through political coalitions that hasten labor’s estrangement from their spaces – is not an eternal
or unchanging condition, but rather a reflection of contemporary configurations and uses of
power and money. Those social relations are, in turn, produced and reproduced through the
historical construction of political and economic structures – laws and policies, capital flows,
planning paradigms, union and non-profit regulations, bylaws, and contracts, and more.
Untangling what these structures do, when and where they took root, how they operate in
practice, and why they persist is central to any attempt to alter them. That said, identifying and
understanding a contradiction is never enough to unwind it; such a prospect requires deep
political organizing and sustained mobilization. This dissertation aims to uncover the roots of
labor’s relation to the real estate state so that new relations can be imagined, fought for, and
constructed.
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Chapter 1: The Contested Landscape

Cities are collective creations: the product of enormous labor, intensive investment, and
continuous planning. Labor, capital, and the state produce urban space through relationships that
are at once contentious and co-dependent. Each of these three social groupings has its own
spatial desires, dreams, and demands, separate and apart from the others’. At the same time, each
grouping is internally fractured, containing multitudes – people, cultures, habits, organizations,
institutions – that confound any easy attempt at articulating a singular will. While labor, capital,
and the state engage in continuous conflict over spatial politics, in capitalist democracies (that is,
republican governments under the capitalist mode of production) fractions of these groupings are
always also in collaboration with elements of the others.
A trinity of trinities, labor, capital, and the state are each three things simultaneously:
1) internally fractured social groupings whose own fractions sometimes pursue
competing spatial strategies for survival, reproduction, and transformation;
2) social actors in structural conflict with their others in pursuit of particular spatial
agendas; and
3) collaborative partners that tenuously coalesce toward common goals (see figure 1.)
Understanding each set of actors, including their internal cohesions and rifts as well as their
external alliances and antagonisms, is essential to understanding the political economy of urban
space in general, and the particular dynamics of labor, planning and real estate in gentrifying
New York City.

40

Figure 1: Internal fractures, and external collaborations and conflicts

Too often, we imagine urban politics as banal theater. Picture a stage set with a model of
the New York City skyline. Enter LABOR, stage left: workers, tenants, the unemployed, those
who don’t own the means of production or profit directly from urban development, those seeking
to survive in tough times and organizing for ways to thrive. Enter CAPITAL, stage right:
building owners, business owners, investors, those who own the means of production and profit
directly from urban development, those already thriving amid immiseration but always seeking
to do even better. Before mortal combat can ensue, from the sky, center stage, descends THE
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STATE: the government, planners, politicians in fancy suits, their appointees in cheaper suits,
those who create order and balance amid the chaos of LABOR and CAPITAL’s primordial
contest. Together you have THE CITY, humming along in glorious cacophony or falling apart in
dismal chaos.
This is not how it works. Despite these tropes’ pervasiveness, the city is not a stage on
which action takes place; labor and capital are not static forces with set positions in constant
conflict; and the state is not a neutral arbiter that adjudicates from on high (Marcuse 1986). It is
all far messier than that, creating conditions that allow for the kinds of unstable allegiances and
confounding contradictions this dissertation seeks to dissect. In order to understand the milieu
from which “regional blocs” (Woods 1998) emerge around planning issues, we must first
investigate the urban spatial agendas of labor, capital, and the state. This provides the theoretical
grounding on which to base a historical and contemporary analysis of labor, planning and real
estate in New York City.

Social Production of the Urban Landscape
Space – and specifically the urban – is socially and strategically constructed, produced,
and embodied (Low 2014). All of those processes are contested, and thus political. Not only do
things produced in urban space (such as garments in a factory or food in a restaurant) reflect
rules related to the mode of production and the ownership of its means, but spatial production
itself has a political economy, as labor, capital, and the state engage in both acts of discord and
solidarity in order to shape the city toward their particular goals (Lefebvre 1974, 299). Such
strategies are inherently risky propositions because, as Lefebvre (ibid, 336) put it, they can
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sacrifice “the future to immediate interests while simultaneously destroying the present in the
name of a future at once programmed and utterly uncertain.” From this vantage, spatial
production looks less like either a field of harmonious cooperation or pitched battle than an
unmarked political minefield.
One of the classic ways geographers have tried to clarify these processes is through a
concerted study of landscape, a view of the world that combines earthen and cultural factors to
explain how people see the world (Sauer 1925). Cosgrove (1998, 13) defines landscapes as “the
external world mediated through subjective human experience,” and Tuan (1977, 157) calls them
“personal and tribal history made visible.” Landscapes are not only beautiful or horrific sites to
behold, but manifestations of cultural values, historical developments, and social relations
(Mitchell 2012, 44-47).
Urban landscapes are characterized by certain common features, uniquely expressed in
every location, that reflect both physical morphologies and political histories: buildings of
fluctuating sizes, shapes and materials, arrayed at different densities; streets and sidewalks, as
well as passages above and below ground with distinguishing sensorial markers, peopled by
residents, workers and passers-by; open and verdant spaces, or the lack thereof; clear or smoggy
skies, stretching outward toward a horizon that often situates urban residents in relation to their
surroundings. In the urban landscape, buildings take on a monumental function, first reflecting
social norms and values, then projecting them onto the future (Lefebvre 1974, 232; Lefebvre
1981, 45). Among buildings, those used for housing hold particular relevance and resonance for
city dwellers, as well as urban scholars: as means for people and communities to access the city;
as records of personal development imbued with emotional meaning; and as economic drains on
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tenants, sources of revenue for landlords, and means of establishing residency for governments
(Katz 2015).
Geographers often place the proximity between home and work at the center of their
theories of urban spatial production. Smith (1992, 71 and 73) described the urban scale as “the
daily sphere of the labor market,” contrasted with the region as “the site of economic
reproduction… closely bound up with the larger rhythms of the national and global economy.”
With the growing economic power of cities today, and with prohibitive housing costs forcing
workers farther from their central city jobs, the function of these scales seems to have inverted:
the urban is increasingly “the site of economic reproduction,” while the region represents “the
daily sphere of the labor market.”13 This comports with Marston’s (2000, 229) description of the
urban scale as “a manifestation of the centralization of productive capital,” which is spatialized
through a “dialectic of equalization and differentiation” and “mediated through the ground rent
system.”
Despite their centrality to capital accumulation, cities have long been sites of “freedom
dreams” (Kelley 2002) for labor, going back at least as far as medieval serfdom (Goonewardena
2014). Cities hold the potential for radical difference (Young 1990), expressed in everyday
interactions through “conviviality” (Gilroy (2005 xv; Cheng 2013, 199) and unplannable
“contact” (Jacobs 1961; Delaney 1999) among people from diverse backgrounds. They also
represent the opportunity for working-class power – the city is a prize that, if seized politically,
could become both a location and a catalyst for transforming social relations. In addition to
serving as a source of inspiration for labor, however, the city has long been a site of intense

13

For a similar process unfolding in a different context, see Cartier, Carolyn. "Origins and evolution of a
geographical idea: the macroregion in China." Modern China 28.1 (2002): 79-112.
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economic, political, and social exploitation. As such, Heynen, Kaika and Swyngedouw (2006, 9)
argue that “cities seem to hold the promise of emancipation and freedom whilst skillfully
mastering the whip of repression and domination.”
Given these dynamics, an enduring – if ill-defined – demand of socialist movements for
centuries has been for “the abolition of the distinction between town and country” (Marx and
Engels 1848 [1992], 42). This was an animating impulse in 19th-century European utopian and
anarchist urban planning imaginaries, from Reclus and Kropotkin to Geddes and Howard, as
well as a guiding principle for early Soviet planners (Ward 2017; Angotti 2013). Despite some
noble efforts (Hayden 1976), however, that antagonism endures, and has largely been amplified.
Cities have become sites of ever-more intensive land speculation, calling into question the
viability of urbanity’s long-standing association with freedom. Speculators and the planners that
cater to them have capitalized on the very aspects of cities that made them appealing in the first
place – their diversity, liveliness, and productivity – to the point that, as Hern (2016, 19)
observes, “the liberatory potentiality of cities is a weapon being turned on itself.” As a result,
many fractions of labor have recalibrated their orientation toward the urban, and pursued spatial
strategies that engage with the logic that the city itself – its land and buildings – should be the
site and source of intensive accumulation (Tufts 2009; MacDonald 2017a).
The urban landscape is indeed socially produced, but the “social” in “social production”
requires deep scrutiny. It is not a cohesive group that produces urban space, but rather a social
formation that is at once communal, competitive, and contradictory. Labor, capital and the state
(and the various fractions therein) each have divergent relationships to space and the urban, and
thus engage in different sorts of spatial strategies. Labor is a particularly complex formulation,
yet is often evaluated with the least depth and nuance. The chaotic combination of labor, capital
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and the state’s strategic orientations toward space frame New York City’s contradictory and
often confusing landscape.

Labor and the Landscape of Social Reproduction
Labor is the most important but least heralded factor in the production of landscape, as
both a producer of space, and an object of its production; an agent of history, and a subject of
conflict. According to Mitchell’s (1996, 9) “labor theory of landscape,” it is labor first and
foremost – through work, struggle, and movement – that produces the spaces experienced and
represented to the broader world as landscapes. Declaring that labor makes landscape is not
necessarily a celebration of that production per se, which is often done at the command of capital
and under conditions constrained by the state, and can take such brutal forms as slavery,
indentured servitude, sharecropping, and serfdom. Nor is it to say that laboring on land is what
entitles people to it, as John Locke theorized and early US political philosophers argued to justify
settler-colonial projects (Hern 2016, 84-85). The labor theory of landscape simply recognizes not
only the work that goes into spatial production and the communities that sustain those workers,
but also the fact that capital and the state, though structurally empowered in capitalist
democracies, are nonetheless entirely dependent on labor to actually produce space of any sort
(Mitchell 2012, 47).
As Hayden (1997, 15) argues, labor stands alongside other actors in co-producing space:
“indigenous residents as well as colonizers, ditchdiggers as well as architects, migrant workers as
well as mayors, house-wives as well as housing inspectors, are all active in shaping the urban
landscape” through “incremental modifications as much as in an original city or building plan.”
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As such a list suggests, the positionality of peoples classed as “labor” varies drastically.
Indigenous residents and colonizers may both produce space through their labor, but they
generally do so in direct opposition to one another’s territorial ambitions. As McKittrick (2006,
77) argues, enslaved workers in the US not only produced space through their labor, including
hidden spaces and plots for their own survival, but “were subject to the literal and ideological
production of space due to their indispensable economic roles: plantation, regional, and national
economies required racialized labor and bodies to build and maintain material and discursive
geographies.” The term labor itself can flatten social relations, failing to distinguish between, for
example, rank and file union or community group members (themselves a diverse group), paid
staff, and elected or appointed leadership. This complexity is written into the landscape labor
produces, which is one reason its spatial contributions and its distinct and sometimes
contradictory interests are not always made clear.
Landscapes are imbued with myths, none more powerful than that they are the creation of
gods and masters rather than workers and communities (Mitchell 1996; Checker et al. 2015, 11).
This myth is as prevalent in literature and portraiture as it is in political theory and philosophy
(Williams 1975, 30-31). When labor is represented, it is often as a racial and gender-constructed
threat rather than as a central force in spatial production (Cheng 2013, 134). Over time, through
the selective process of historical preservation – which is often controlled by capital through the
state – spaces of labor built for labor are rarely preserved into the future, while buildings laborers
made for bosses – spaces meant to celebrate or generate corporate profits and inculcate or
demonstrate coercive state power – become the stuff of archives, monuments, and exhibitions.
This perpetuates the notion that labor is rootless, and therefore undeserving of historical claims
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to space; in reality, while always mobile, labor is constantly in the process of producing space for
its own purposes (McDaniel 1982).
The most important aim in labor’s spatial production is its social reproduction – all the
factors that enable ongoing survival (Mitchell 2012, 71). Katz (2001, 711) famously describes
social reproduction as “the fleshy, messy, and indeterminate stuff of everyday life.” While this
evocative phrase is often quoted, its continuation is equally important: social reproduction “is
also a set of structured practices that unfold in dialectical relation with production, with which it
is mutually constitutive and in tension.” This is key to understanding labor’s condition under
capitalism: securing social reproduction, including through the production of space, entails both
securing the methods of labor’s survival, as well as securing the means for capital’s continued
expansion – a dynamic that in and of itself inhibits labor’s independent political, social, and
spatial development. As Marston (2000, 233) argues, “social reproduction entails both the
reproduction of the social relations that maintain capitalism as well as the reproduction of the
material bases upon which social life is premised.”
Much of labor’s struggle over the urban landscape concerns the ability to secure the
means of social reproduction: housing, wages, food, healthcare, education, and so on. These are
fundamentally spatial, as well as political and economic, concerns because where they happen is
essential to the question of whether they happen at all. Housing is not just an abstract shelter that
can be dropped anywhere, just as wages – at least under the capitalist mode of production – are
generally attached to a job that must be accessed in a particular place. As labor has struggled
over the years to secure these means of survival through union activity aimed at capital (i.e.
higher wages and benefits), political activity aimed at the state (i.e. public housing and mass
transit), and independent activity toward self-provision (i.e. cooperative and solidarity
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economies), the state and capital have divested significantly from prior place-based
commitments to labor’s reproduction (Katz 2004, 179). As real estate and luxury development
become increasingly important aspects of urban economies, labor is put in a difficult bind.
MacDonald (2011, 215) notes that this dynamic “confronts the working class with a trade-off
between good jobs and affordable neighborhoods – both of which, of course, are necessary to
social reproduction.” Under these conditions, labor is forced to choose which form of “intimate
dispossession” (Katz 2011, 50) to suffer in order to continue living.
The ubiquity of such false choices demonstrates the great distance between the magnitude
of labor’s contribution toward the production of urban space and the structural position in which
labor is placed in capitalist democracies. Marxist activists and theorists have long argued that
labor has a “right to the city,” a claim not just to living in the city but to securing the power to
determine its contours (Attoh 2019). As Harvey (2012, 137) articulates, “all those whose labors
are engaged in producing and reproducing the city have a collective right not only to that which
they produce, but also to decide what kind of urbanism is to be produced where, and how.”
Securing such a right is a revolutionary proposition; doing so would mean transforming
urban social relations in ways that, under capitalism, remain aspirational (Harvey 1973;
Anderson 2018). Even such aspirations have not commonly been expressed by mainstream US
labor leaders; as Greenberg and Lewis (2017, 10) point out, while struggles for “the urban
commons have always been as essential to the well-being of low-income and working people as
their wages, hours, and working conditions… the former has not always been understood in these
terms by the leadership of worker movements.” More often, Herod (2017, 198) suggests, the
“material geographical contexts” of urban labor struggles pattern perceptions of the possible.
Labor’s production of space thus has a reflexive internal logic: as Herod (ibid, 199) continues,
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“geographies, once made, play central roles in shaping the political behavior of social actors”
into the future.
These dynamics suggest a basic question about how labor produces space: in a capitalist
democracy, just how much agency does labor have in pursuing its own spatial strategies for
securing social reproduction, or transformation? This question has sparked more intensive debate
than any other issue in labor geography (Castree 2007; Tufts and Savage 2009). The labor
geography project was launched in part as a strong critique of both neoclassical and Marxist
economic geographer’s “capitalcentric” approach, which arguably left little room for labor to
take strategic action (Gibson-Graham 2006, 6). In contrast, Herod (2001, 34) argued in one of
the sub-disciplines key texts, that “not only may workers take on very active roles in helping to
ensure that investment flows into, rather than out of, their communities, but they do so as
economic and geographic agents rather than as class dupes.”
This theorization drew strong critique. Castree (2007, 858) claimed that in labor
geography, “agency is both under-theorized and under-specified” to the point where it becomes
“a catch-all for any instance in which some group of workers undertake any sort of action on
behalf of themselves or others.” Peck (2003, 520) accused Herod of betraying “a countervailing
form of laborcentricity” in its rejection of “capitalcentricity,” while Mitchell (2012, 169)
reminded his colleagues in labor geography that “workers make landscapes, yes, but the degree
to which they have any control over the conditions of their productions is an empirical question.”
Another factor that complicates the narrative of labor agency is the fractured character of
labor as a social force in capitalist democracies. Structural divisions – common among all social
forces but particularly pronounced within labor – are central to any understanding of urban
production of space, and particularly those that involve seemingly contradictory strategic
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alliances (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980). A combination of structural factors under capitalism –
including geographically uneven development, and production of difference, and industrial
competition and job dependency – all produce fissures within the working class, broadly defined,
which ensure that labor’s production of space is more disunified than singular in focus.
Herod (2001, 257), the most famous theorist of labor geography, identified these fissures
early on but folded them into his theory of labor’s spatial agency. Different groups of workers’
“spatially-defined class interests” and “class-defined spatial interests,” he wrote, “may coincide
or collide” under varying conditions, resulting in divergent spatial strategies within the broader
construct of labor. In a later articulation, Herod (2017, 206) clarified that “different groups of
workers have quite diverse ideas as to how economic landscapes should be made” such that
“particular segments of capital and particular segments of labor may join together to fight for one
type of economic landscape, whereas other segments of capital may join together with other
segments of labor to ensure that a quite different landscape is enacted in place.” The result is a
form of spatial production that is usually characterized by “cross-class alliances and intra-class
conflicts.”
Castree, Coe, Ward, and Samers (2004), whose “geography of labor” is somewhat
different than “labor geography” and relies less on claims to spatial agency, point to instances
where this dynamic plays out in the form of “geographical dilemmas.” Castree et al. locate the
genesis of labor’s frequent fissures and inter-class dependencies on capitalism’s tendency toward
uneven development. Uneven development, they argue, complicates normative ideas of labor
solidarity and “insinuates real inequity into the landscape of labour” because it pits the direct
material interests of workers in different places against one another at least as often as it presents
opportunities for working-class cooperation (ibid, 236). Uneven development encourages a
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relationship to place wherein “the defence of local interests can… be achieved by internalizing
the competitive ethic of capitalism and acting against workers in other parts of the world” (ibid,
234). This leads workers and community members to “identify with those one works with day-in
and day-out” against those they do not, unless a more global class solidarity can “be actively
constructed in both thought and practice” (ibid, 234 and 236).
These dilemmas, however, are not dependent on great spatial distances. They can also be
“insinuated into the landscape of labour” within a single city, which will in and of itself display
characteristics of uneven geographical development (Castree et al. 2004, 236). Unions and nonprofits regularly seek spatial strategies that elevate one fraction of labor over their immediate
neighbors, such as by supporting rezonings or development projects that employ or house a
particular portion of labor while driving up costs for another. To further complicate matters, such
fractiousness can exist within the same individual as both a worker and a community member, as
when union members and non-profit supporters are encouraged to support a spatial strategy that
will enable one aspect of their social reproduction while constraining another – for example by
strengthening their organization while contributing to their neighborhood’s gentrification. The
boundaries of solidarity – what Ahlquist and Levi (2013, 2) term “communities of fate,” or those
with whom an element of labor sees its future entangled – are shifty and porous, and can stretch
or constrict from the scale of the body to the planetary.
In addition to uneven development, the production of difference is another structural
characteristic of capitalism that creates a fragmented landscape of labor (Lowe 1996; Roedeger
and Esch 2012). This is not to say that racial and gender diversity inherently challenges labor’s
cohesiveness, but rather that capitalism’s historical development has, from its very start, relied
on racial and gender distinctions to create hierarchies within and between aspects of labor
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(Robinson 1983; McDowell 2008). This differentiation is often suggested but rarely pronounced
in Marxist analyses of labor; as Wilson (2000, 2) argues, “a major failing of Marx’s account of
the working class as a historical subject was its inability to encompass the differentiated interests
and motives of this class.” Wilson, like Robinson in his history and theory of racial capitalism,
presents labor’s internal differentiation as a feature, not a bug, of capitalist development. This
confirms Hill’s (1996, 193) contention that “for the working class to have been ‘divided’ by
external agencies it would need to have had an original unitary existence, but working-class
identity does not exist before everything else; it is not primordial and it is always already divided
even as it is being formed.”14
These divisions are expressed geographically through multiple forms of segregation,
including the racial patterning of cities, neighborhoods, and blocks, and the gendered patterning
of spheres of domesticity and work (and with it the artificially disentangled spheres of social
reproduction and production) (Connolly 2014; Hayden 1980). Labor’s internal divisions are also
expressed through oppositional spatial strategies, including land use campaigns that reinforce
these artificial boundaries as a means of promoting the particular interests of one bloc over
others. Formal institutions of labor, including unions and non-profits, are often segregated by
race and gender, either by policy (in the case of non-profits representing one particular group) or
by reflection of racist and gendered industrial hiring practices (in the case of unions whose job
categories remain largely segregated). These divisions are not only expressed in labor
institutions, but sometimes also perpetuated through them, as in the case of unions that refuse to
organize and incorporate workers of a particular race or gender.

14

The problem Hill diagnoses in this seminal article should rightfully be named “racism,” not “race.”
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Finally, labor is structurally fragmented as a result of competition over access to jobs, and
the attachment of particular industries to particular geographies. Capitalism relies on an artificial
scarcity of material goods (perpetuated by maldistribution rather than underproduction), and a
“reserve army of labor” that remains unemployed despite the potential availability of wages for
all. This condition forces fractions of labor into defensive positions around what economic
protections they have been able to secure, which in turn shape the kinds of spatial strategies
fractions of labor pursue (Page 1998, 287). Through this vantage, unions and non-profits
themselves can be seen as spatial strategies to secure economic advantage amidst inequality. In
addition to job and issue types, US unions and non-profits are generally structured around turf: a
geographical catchment area within which they seek to establish a presence, elevate the
conditions of their members or constituents, and often push out others who seek to challenge
their territorial claims (Fitch 2006; Marwell 2007). This can lead to intensive spatial competition
within the broader category of labor, including: between competing unions; between union and
non-union workforces; between competing non-profits; and between those a non-profit serves
and those they do not.
This can also exacerbate frictions between unions or non-profits and community-based
organizations working in geographically-specific coalitions, as when one side (often the union,
given the transparently transactional nature of contract bargaining) secures their spatial demand
from capital or the state and leaves behind its coalition partners. As Luce and Lewis (2017, 73)
argue, these kinds of inter-institutional labor conflicts illuminate “the real limits to the partial,
member-oriented responsibilities and outlook of unions and the broader goals and needs of urban
communities.” Such a statement could easily include many membership-based non-profits as
well as unions. In either case, a mismatch manifests between an organization’s immediate need
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(the gain which, once secured, allows the group to declare victory and halt its oppositional
practice) and a coalition’s long-term strategy for transforming space and its social relations.
More inclusive campaigns, in which unions, non-profits, and grassroots organizations associated
with a given geographical area work together for the long term, are often misaligned with
particular union and non-profit temporal and budgetary horizons: “shrinking member resources
are expended in these campaigns, and the shorter- and even medium-term prospects for
institutional growth are not necessarily improved” (Luce and Lewis 2017, 77). Taken together,
these structural factors of capitalism – economic competition, production of difference, and
uneven development – frustrate, or at least complicate, the framework of working-class agency
in the production of space.
The question of agency also begs the question of consciousness: to suggest that labor’s
search for a spatial fix is evidence of its agency suggests that a particular working-class
consciousness guides its actions. Working-class consciousness under capitalism, however, is can
a complex factor. Mann (1973, 33), observing the transition from Keynesianism to neoliberalism
as it was happening, argued that Western labor consciousness fit neither with patterns predicted
by classical Marxism nor “end of ideology” neoliberalism. Instead, “forced to alienate [their]
own productive powers in return for economic rewards, the worker develops a dualistic
consciousness, in which control and money, work and non-work, become separated.” Mann
(ibid, 37) noted that European and US unions had, during the 1960s and early 1970s, engaged in
a fairly successful struggle over wages while largely abandoning the terrain of workplace
control. A similar argument can be spatialized by including the “right to the city” into the sphere
of production, and noting the ways unions trade increases in employment, wages, or benefits for
support for real estate-driven planning practices. This mode of bargaining, Mann argued, can
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“help close off alternatives to the worker, and thereby reconcile [them] more easily to [their]
deprivation.” Under these conditions, class consciousness can thus operate in a “circular, not
progressive” manner, producing a labor “collectivism” that “does not escalate into an aggressive
societal force but turns in upon itself” (ibid, 72).
This is a quite different picture than the idealized image of pure class consciousness: in
Katznelson’s (1986, 6) characterization, the rarely stated but often implied “essentialist
assumption that classes ‘in themselves’ will, indeed must, act ‘for themselves….’” The mode of
production may pattern the overall shape of class consciousness, but these factors are not just
“fixed by interests but shaped by relationships” that are embedded in space and time (ibid, 9). In
an earlier theorization, crucial to understandings of New York City labor and housing politics,
Katznelson – building on Gramsci – identified a contradiction in working-class consciousness
and spatial politics around the split between the spheres of home/community/ethnicity and the
politics of work/industry/class. Building on Gramsci’s (1971, 235) observation that “The
superstructures of civil society are like the trench-systems of modern warfare,” Katznelson
(1981, 45) dubbed this dynamic “city trenches,” which he defined as “the political dissociation
between work and home.” US labor’s consciousness, Katznelson argues, is deeply divided, such
that any militancy that might be exhibited in the workplace has historically been deeply
disconnected from the politics of home and neighborhood, wherein working-class communities’
political expression tends to be channeled through the political party machine, its networks of
patronage, and its dynamics of sexism and segregation. While the party machine has declined in
significance over time, a particular form of non-profit organization – often in concert with the
remaining elements of the machine – has taken over many of its neighborhood-level functions
(Marwell 2007; Stabrowski 2015).
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Home and work are not, in fact, purely separate terrains with naturally delineable politics,
cultures, and environments; the separation of these two spheres has been a historical project that
has had a tremendous impact on gender, class, and racial formation in capitalist society (Hanson
and Pratt 1988). Katznelson points to specific historical reasons, going back to the antebellum
era, for the particularly sharp divide in US labor-housing consciousness and spatial politics,
which is perhaps more pronounced in New York City than many other US metropolitan areas.
These historical factors included: a comparatively weak-centered government, which allowed for
the creation of both state-incorporated mass parties and local political fiefdoms organized around
exclusive claims to territory and ethnicity; relative legal tolerance toward union formation in the
early to mid-19th century (later drastically curtailed, then re-introduced in the New Deal era),
which established the precedent for workplace issues to be dealt with through the union rather
than the party or neighborhood mobilization; the historically early (relative to Europe) White
male enfranchisement, appearing alongside a relatively large pool of local elected offices
including direct mayoral elections, thus elevating and incorporating one racial and gendered
strata of labor into the political system rather than mobilizing a united labor against it; the
resultant territorialization of political formations within single-member, non-proportional
electoral boundaries, which solidified political affiliations based on neighborhood and ethnic
identities rather than union or class solidarities (Katznelson 1981, 58-65).
This division, once created, produced a geography of labor wherein, as Moody (2007, 1)
notes, “in the nineteenth century New York saw work and residence separated and
neighborhoods sorted out by class,” which was itself constructed through race and ethnicity. Into
the twentieth century, these boundaries largely held; workplace and union politics were mostly
separated from housing and community politics, leading to an increasing dissociation between
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the city as workplace and the city as home – even if a substantial number of workers lived in
close proximity to their workplaces. Aronowitz (1973, 259) suggests that by the mid-20th
century, surges in union membership had reinforced a cleavage in consciousness between
production and consumption, wherein rising wages were politically disconnected from rising
prices (including in the realm of housing and rents). Through a gendered division of paid and
unpaid labor, men were increasingly responsible for production, and women consumption (or, in
many cases, both production and consumption tasks). Where these trenches were breached, as in
the production of union-sponsored affordable housing, the particular form these developments
took, whether by displacing non-union workers or resisting residential integration, could often
reproduce the racial and gendered dynamics of workplace politics in the domestic sphere.
Returning to the primary site of Katznelson’s case study, northern Manhattan’s
Washington Heights neighborhood, McFarland (2014, 198) contends that by the early 21st
century, the trenches that divided labor’s spatial consciousness had begun to be breached. First,
he argues that “immigrant social networks and referral hiring among immigrants have generated
increasing overlap in the social ties among neighbors and coworkers” resulting in a “growing
overlap between networks of coethnics in the workplace and in the neighborhood.” Second, the
non-citizen (and thus non-voting) status of many of these worker-neighbors, coupled with their
political mobilization around issues of immigration and work, suggest that labor is no longer
easily “drawn into the ‘trenches’” (ibid, 199). Similarly, Savage (1998, 240) has argued that the
Service Employees International Union’s (SEIU) 1990s “Justice for Janitors” campaigns,
premised on getting workers to “expand the geographic scale at which workers identified
themselves” beyond the individual buildings in which they worked and up to the scale of the
city, broke down the geographical limitations of US labor’s urban spatial consciousness. As
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MacDonald (2011, 199) points out, however, if the labor organizations that many of these
immigrants are being incorporated into – like SEIU and its non-profit spin-off Civic Participation
Project – seek a spatial strategy that trades good jobs for expensive housing or a modicum of
affordable housing for an expansion of luxury housing, the contemporary mode of labor land use
politics further deepens the trenches that divide workplace and community politics.
In episodic bouts of collective action, revolutionary organization, and generalized (if
sporadic) “moments of madness,” these trenches are breached: labor unites as a political force
and challenges both capital and state forms of social containment and control (Zolberg 1972;
Fantasia 1998, 238). Far more commonly, however, the trenches remain, if in shifting
formulations. Workplace-based unions and neighborhood-based non-profits collaborate with
more frequency than ever, but usually form for particular campaigns that dissolve as soon as one
party (or, in rarer cases, all parties) achieve their goal. As Piven and Cloward (1977, 7) argue,
“only under exceptional conditions are the lower classes afforded the socially determined
opportunity to press for their own class interests.” More commonly, various fractions of labor
pursue separate and narrower agendas based on workplace or home, the result of which is a mix
of confrontational and collaborative relationships with elements of capital and the state, as well
as with other parts of labor.
Some organized fractions of labor prefer to see a fragmented landscape of capital: they
wish to see ownership broken up into a million tiny pieces, either in order to keep the capitalist
class from better organizing or because the proliferation of small capital can aid in the
production of local subjectivities and opportunities for working-class people to become smalltime owners. This is often part of the agenda of place-based working-class organizations that
have incorporated as non-profits, and advocate for small businesses, localized control of land
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use, and opportunities for small-time landlording. Other organized fractions of labor prefer the
opposite: the consolidation of capital into large groupings that can be partners in collective
bargaining. This is often part of the agenda (though not always publicly articulated) for many
large private-sector unions, which see the competitive dynamics of a fractured market as a wagedepressing force, and see enormous potential for large-scale representation in the consolidation
of economic sectors into just a few large firms. O’Connor (1973, 15) argues that such
monopolistic sectors are much more likely to be union than more competitive sectors, and also
tend to be more amenable to increased state spending on growth-stimulating programs and
infrastructures. Thus “monopoly capital and organized labor [i.e. unions] have supported the
growth of state-financed social investments” (ibid, 42) and in so doing “combined to socialize
the expenses of reconstructing the environment – the costs of ameliorating urban decay, reducing
pollution, and so on. Shifting these expenses to the taxpayers has permitted profits and wages in
monopoly industries to expand more rapidly” (ibid, 43). This alliance tends to fray when wage
gains rise slower than productivity, but this has not been the case for a very long time (Picketty
2014). In recent years, not only has productivity continued to outpace growth, but corporations –
including in the real estate sector – have moved away from conglomeration and toward
consolidation, posing a challenge as well as an opportunity to unions seeking to grow in great
leaps (Moody 2017, 49, 54).
Under the ordinary workings of capitalism, the spatial relationship between labor and
capital is characterized by a kind of co-dependent aggression. Capital exists because of the
productive capacities of labor, extracted in various forms including both surplus and rents. In
order to survive, however, most people must sell their labor power, creating a dependency on
capital as the purveyor of jobs and wages. Under capitalism, then, exploitation is present in the

60

means by which both capital expands and labor survives, creating a class antagonism in which
each side seeks to extract as much as possible from the other, and – if possible – expropriate
them entirely. The object that paid workers have at their command – their labor power – is, much
like private land, a complicated sort of pseudo-commodity. Its geographical relationship to
capital – the labor market – is therefore full of contradictions (Storper and Walker, 1983). As
Peck (1996, 40) argues, “labor itself is a fictitious commodity: it is not produced for sale, it
cannot be stored, [and] it cannot be separated from its owner.” In specifically spatial terms,
Harvey notes that “unlike other commodities, labor power has to go home every night” (Harvey
1989a, 19).
Once land, like labor power, is treated as a commodity, it becomes a generator of
exchange value, and thus both a means of labor exploitation and an opportunity for labor to
secure the means of its survival. While left radicals of various sorts, from Karl Marx to Henry
George to Malcom X, have looked to unlock land from its commodity status as an instrument
toward freedom, fractions of labor have also sought to turn land’s commodity status into a source
of economic stability for labor: from private homeownership opportunities (with the aim not only
of securing a place to live but maximizing resale value as a wealth-accumulation strategy) to
support for luxury development (with the aim of securing employment through construction,
maintenance and service or securing a number of homes through inclusionary housing
mechanisms). In this complex and contingent relationship, Angotti (2008, 25) argues,
real estate and community planning are inexorably tied to one
another and in conflict with each other just as capital and labor
are…. Conflicts between real estate and community are common in
global cities like New York because as major nodes for the
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transaction of global capital, they are repositories of an abundant
surplus, some of which is absorbed locally and invested in real
estate, which in turn creates pressures on communities.
Through struggle, however, some of that surplus is also passed on to workers in the form of
individual and social wages (i.e. jobs as well as property taxes that are put toward public
purposes), creating the opportunity for fractions of labor to benefit from real estate’s extraction
of value from land and community.
Labor relates to the state in similarly adversarial and accommodating ways. In capitalism
labor is structurally subordinate to capital, but in democratic republics labor has the structural
advantage of being the largest social bloc. If the source of labor’s economic power is located in
its central place in the production of goods and services, labor’s political power is located in its
numerical abundance in particular territories. Labor is antagonistic to the state insofar as the
capitalist state holds the regulatory and police power to enforce its discipline, but it is also reliant
on the state to fill the gap between what capitalist wages pay and what labor’s social
reproduction costs (Castells 1979). Barring regulatory controls, wages raises can be accompanied
by parallel prices increases, creating a constant source of enforced scarcity. In a capitalist
democracy, labor thus relies on the state to provide for many of those aspects of social
reproduction that capital will not (Law and Wolch 1993). The state, however, does not always
produce that which labor demands, and thus devolves a greater share of responsibility for the
means of social reproduction onto households and individuals.
Labor has a long history of direct involvement in US urban and national politics: the
formation of independent labor parties in the early nineteenth century, as well as participation in
the two dominant political parties, premised on the inherent threat of their numbers (as well as
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their collective financial resources and campaigning skills) to sway elections; the compilation of
data on individual politicians, first centralized by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) in the
early twentieth century, to use in supporting or threatening incumbents; the creation of
independent political lobbying organizations, first separately within the AFL and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 1940s following a proliferation of anti-strike legislation,
then together through the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education as well as myriad social
issue-based political action committees; and finally running the political campaigns for both
established and insurgent candidates with agendas aligned with elements of labor (Friedland
1982, 51). Labor’s unparalleled political capacities make it an essential ally of aspects of the
state, and enemy of others. Labor’s structural divisions, however, ensure that various fractions of
labor ally with competing fractions of the state, creating a chaotic set of spatial demands with
opposing long-term as well as short-term agendas at various territories of the state.
Securing the landscape of social reproduction is therefore no easy task in a capitalist
democracy. The structural division of labor, coupled with labor’s antagonistic but dependent
relationships with both capital and the state, frustrate simple formulations of a class for itself.
Labor retains agency in determining its spatial future, but that agency is constricted such that
most available options involve marginalizing some element of itself.

Capital and the Landscape of Accumulation
As its name betrays, under capitalism, the forces of property hold the greatest structural
power in the production of space. This is the result not only of the vast disparity in resources
between capital and labor, but the very character of land transmogrified into a commodity. While
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states continue to hold large quantities of land (despite historical trends toward privatization) and
laborers own parcels of land (through individual home ownership or cooperative development),
private land ownership by capitalists, either in the form of ground leases, bank mortgages, or
commercial real estate, is the predominant paradigm in most cities. While the state maintains the
power to determine use types and bulk through zoning, and labor is essential in transforming
abstract space into urban realities through manual work and cultural production, capital
maintains a great deal of power to determine the particulars of physical development, and thus
shape the landscape toward greater opportunities for private accumulation. Harvey (1973, 179
and 189) characterizes this power as “a class monopoly over land use,” insofar as exchange
values tend to determine land uses even before land uses determine exchange values.
Despite this power, capital’s relation to land – and urban land in particular – is
complicated by land’s status as a pseudo-commodity under capitalism (Harvey 1973, 157-158;
Rameau 2013). Like labor power, land does not quite conform to the rules of the commodity
form. The labor theory of value does not apply easily to land’s fluctuating prices, which have
more to do with the social and speculative value of various locations than the amount of work
put into a given plot. Land does not move around like any ordinary commodity, and thus cannot
travel elsewhere in search of favorable conditions and prices; if capital is “value in motion”
(Harvey 2018, 92; Marx 1867 [1976]), land as physical earth is the portrait of stasis. It is
propelled into a sort of motion, though, through so-called improvements, as well as the buying,
renting, and selling of land and the architecture atop it. Until the hyper-financialization of the
late 20th century, buildings and land were sold infrequently and through long-term mortgages,
meaning profit realization was extended over a very long time period. Land’s exchange value is
primarily determined not by what exists at the moment of sale, but by the amount of rent a parcel
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can be expected to generate in the future – including with improvement not yet made or even
allowed by law (Harvey 2012, 28). Urban land is fundamentally social in that its value is
produced collectively and is used by multiple people at any given moment, but its ownership is
primarily private, held either in the hands of a given individual or a corporation and its investors
(Foglesong 1986, 22).
These complications, along with the ever-present specter of popular expropriation,
explain capital’s dependence on the state to construct and maintain elaborate legal infrastructures
for private land and property ownership. Such laws enable capital to extract from land various
kinds of rent, including monopoly, differential and absolute rents (Harvey 1973). In the urban
context, monopoly rents are the prices a particular owner can charge simply because they own
the land, and no one else can compete with them for a lower cost on that particular parcel.
Differential rents are the prices landowners can charge because of the relative values of one
location over another, which are socially produced through the siting of infrastructure, the
location of jobs and industries, and the cultural life of communities. Absolute rents are the
generalized condition of monopolies, or the rents the landlord class can extract based on the fact
that neither labor nor the state have developed competing models for claiming and sharing space
within a particular territorial jurisdiction or market (ibid, 179-181). Urban property markets
contain elements of all three rent seeking behaviors, with a tendency toward the absolute.
Ghertner (2015, 29) reminds, however, that there is also an element of smoke and mirrors
involved in the production of capitalist land markets and the extraction of rents: “markets run on
hype and fear as much as fundamentals.” Since land’s exchange value is premised on “the
expectation of future rents,” as Harvey argues, capital’s relation to space is always speculative.
Rising future rents can be secured through “fundamentals” like locational value in proximity to
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fixed capital investments like mass transit or ornate parks, but they can also be premised on
“hype and fear” around aesthetic markers – in the case of formal and informal urban branding
campaigns, like the ones conducted in New York City’s post-fiscal crisis era (Greenberg 2009) –
or demographic bogeymen – as in the real estate industry’s use of “blockbusting” to convince
White homeowners to sell their properties out of fear of declining property values supposedly
associated with racial others (Thabit 2005). In this way, the production of hype around locations
produces dislocations for those pushed out by speculation (Angotti 2008, 42).
Whether by fear or fundamentals, capital seeks to devise an urban landscape that
functions as a site and source of accumulation: a strategy for absorbing and regenerating surplus
capital from land and labor. Cities are places where profit is produced in concentration, as well
as – and, increasingly, more as – a source of profit in and of themselves. They are the source of,
as well as the result of, the production and concentration of surplus capital. As Harvey (2012, 5)
argues, “capitalism is perpetually producing the surplus product that urbanization requires,”
while at the same time “capitalism needs urbanization to absorb the surplus capital it perpetually
produces.” This dynamic results in not just an abstract landscape of accumulation, but a literal
skyline as well. Sorkin (2018, 153) notes, “urban morphology maps the flow of cash with
concrete precision and the New York skyline is a literal bar graph of investment and return.”
This rush of investment into urban real estate – what Downs (2007) calls a “Niagara of
capital” – is clearly visible in the 21st century, as urban hyper-investment, speculation, and
gentrification have gone from exceptions to rules, but the groundwork was laid in earlier
decades. Lefebvre noted this in 1970 (155), when he wrote that “capitalism appears to be out of
steam. It found new inspiration in the conquest of space – in trivial terms, in real estate
speculation, capital projects (inside and outside the city), the buying and selling of space. And it
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did so on a worldwide scale.” Four years later, he added, “‘real property’ (along with
‘construction’) is no longer a secondary form of circulation, no longer the auxiliary and
backward branch of industrial and financial capitalism that it once was. Instead it has a leading
role, albeit in an uneven way, for its significance is liable to vary according to country, time or
circumstance” (Lefebvre 1974, 335). Harvey (1982) builds on this theory to show that a switch
has occurred in the dominant circuits of capital, such that in many places real estate has become
the leading – rather than the lagging – indicator of capitalist spatial strategy.
In addition to being the site and source of surplus production, capitalists also rely on the
city as their political staging ground. According to Friedland (1976, 106, quoted in Katznelson
1981), capital seeks to create urban opportunities “for the reproduction of a capitalist political
community, for the influence of metropolitan policy-making, and for access to national political
elites.” This, in addition to logistical advantages, management preferences, and inertia, is why so
many large corporate headquarters continue to locate in urban centers. Despite some significant
corporate relocations in the 1970s and 1980s, New York City has long held the densest
concentration of corporate headquarters in the US (Fitch 1993, 159). This is especially true in the
finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) sectors, roughly 40 percent of which’s national market
valuation is located in New York City (Moody 2007, 199). Collectively, they lobby the city,
state, and federal governments for policies that reduce property taxes and promote growth, both
in the Central Business Districts as well as in areas experiencing rent gaps or those where rent
gaps can be produced. Often they do so not only individually but through their own elite nonprofits, groups that present an image of respectability and civic allegiance while lobbying for
policies that starve the city and enhance profits. Some of the leading corporate non-profit groups
in New York include the Association for a Better New York, the Partnership for New York City,
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the Citizens Housing and Planning Commission, and the Citizens Budget Commission. These
elite non-profits stand alongside more straightforward lobbying groups, like the political
juggernaut Real Estate Board of New York (representing developers) and the Rent Stabilization
Association (representing landlords).
Together, they seek a skyline premised on a material as well as a symbolic economy. In
material terms, capital seeks to extract the greatest possible returns for land, and thus seeks land
use changes that maximize development capacity while minimizing tax levies or rent regulations.
This takes the forms of rezonings (in which the regulations governing the scale and use of
buildings are altered to allow for more intensive development) and “geobribes” (financial
incentives for capital to choose one location over another [Roy 2009, 79]). Additionally, capital
seeks growth opportunities through state-sponsored redevelopment and privatization schemes, as
well as opportunities to raise rents in existing buildings, such as through laws that supersede or
reduce the effectiveness of rent controls.
In symbolic terms, firms compete with one another for the appearance of domination,
innovation, and sometimes even beneficence. As Dovey (2014, 114) argues, high-rise
construction is meant to convey power – “strength, stature and strategy” – through location and
view. In terms of development, however, both location and view can be profoundly
contradictory. Location is often advertised through images of vibrant street life, which corporate
civic leaders universally extoll; the proliferation of luxury high-rises and corporate towers,
however, quickly kills that very vibrancy. The same is true of views; if high-rises cluster in
prime locations, they simply produce views of other high-rise windows. This helps propel the
economic imperative toward new rounds of “both height and dispersal,” as competitive
developers seek to expand both vertically (into the sky) and horizontally (into new
68

neighborhoods) (ibid.). Dovey’s study affirms Sorkin’s (2018, 153) contention that “money not
only talks, it designs.”
In addition to petty competition between developers, architects, and corporations,
capital’s spatial strategies also engender grander forms of conflict, as between manufacturing
and real estate capitalists. As Foglesong (1986) argues, for most of US history (and the history of
many other capitalist countries too), manufacturing and real estate pursued spatial strategies that
were largely in conflict with one another. The primary antagonism was over their relation to
land. For manufacturing capital, land’s value is primarily utilitarian: in addition to being
strategically located and infrastructurally interconnected, land should be as cheap as possible as
it is primarily a cost factor toward the production of a commodity, the cost of which’s sale must
cover, among other things, the price of land in the places it was manufactured. For real estate
capital, the relation is the opposite: land should be as expensive as possible, as it is the basic
force driving of the price of the commodities real estate capitalists build, rent, and sell atop it.
These conflicting economic positionalities create friction within the capitalist class, often
expressed through competing demands made to the state in terms of planning priorities. The
resulting landscape includes both low- and high- cost land, polluted and pristine neighborhoods,
and, most consequentially for the politics of gentrification, housing for both luxury and labor
consumption.
In addition to conflict between sectors of capital, there exists conflict within sectors,
leading to internally fractured spatial demands. The kind of small-scale production that
proliferated in 19th and early- to mid- 20th century New York City, for example, required a large
number of small factories, as it was premised on several spatial strategies: agglomeration,
whereby nominal competitors cluster into particular districts and share resources and customers;
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port accessibility, with easy means for quick distribution out of the congested central city; and
low land values, such that urban production was economically viable given the prices of the
goods being sold and the labor power required to produce it (Fitch 1993, 175). The resulting
landscape is notably different than that demanded by larger manufacturing concerns, which,
while also tending toward agglomeration (though of fewer, larger firms) and demanding cheap
land, generally seeks out wide open spaces for mass production.
Within the real estate sector, there are significant differences between corporate
developers and local small landlords. While both subsets seek to profit off monopoly,
differential, and, if possible, absolute rents, they nonetheless operate based on different
approaches to the urban landscape. As Angotti (2008, 26) argues, “underlying this division
between globalized and local real estate is a basic underlying economic tension between the
relatively fixed nature of real estate investment and the dynamic needs of flexible capitalism.”
Small landlordism is based on the long-term extraction of exchange values from an
investment in land and a building that the owning firm usually did not pay to design and
construct. Profiting entails sticking it out over the long term, often while limiting service
provision to a bare minimum (Teresa 2016). Ownership is generally dispersed, and sometimes
even shared within given buildings, as in the case of Manhattan’s Chinatown, where tenements
were frequently purchased by family, village, or language-based associations (Kwong 1996).
Their main concern is stability – something guaranteed to them by the rent stabilization system,
which provides steadily rising rents over time (Marcuse 1977). When faced with competition
from large, financialized competitors, many small-time property owners take the opportunity to
cash out and sell their land and buildings to the highest bidder. Those who remain, however, are

70

sometimes hit with prohibitively high tax bills due to the rising valuation of land in gentrifying
neighborhoods.
Large-scale corporate landowners, whose assets are often pooled from investors around
the world, are increasingly dominant within the real estate sector. These firms, which include
“predatory equity” buyers that leverage private equity finance to buy and bilk buildings, and
Real Estate Investment Trusts that allow investors to buy shares of portfolios and profit off their
increased revenues, demand extreme and rapid increases in revenue from the properties they
purchase or develop (August and Walks 2018). When buying existing buildings, they tend to
take on tremendous debt, which can almost never be repaid on time through the existing rent
roles. Instead, this model assumes – and often states outright in its proformas – that large
numbers of existing tenants must be evicted and replaced with higher-paying renters (Fields
2015). When pursuing new construction, such firms look for opportunities to buy either vacant or
occupied buildings, combine their lots, and build larger skyscrapers from which to extract more
and higher rents, while simultaneously providing clients with the symbolic capital that comes
from skyscraper occupancy. Many times, such firms seek and support rezonings, geobribes, and
redevelopment schemes that allow for this scale of construction.
While capital exhibits significant internal contradictions, these differences do not hinder
capital’s pursuit of landscapes of accumulation to quite the same degree as labor’s internal
fractiousness frustrates its pursuit of landscapes of social reproduction. This is the case for two
reasons. First, capital’s structural power in capitalism allows it to more easily impose its vision
on space, even if that vision is internally contradictory. The result is simply a contradictory
landscape – i.e. urbanity – that still manages to produce regular (though not guaranteed) profits
for various competing segments of capital.
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Second, pertaining specifically to the spatial conflicts over land values between
manufacturing and real estate capital, the declining political power of manufacturing in urban
politics changes the calculus in significant ways. Manufacturing has certainly not disappeared –
in fact it has continued to grow, and remains the single largest source of productivity in the US
economy – but it has largely moved outside the central city to places with cheaper land costs,
fewer environmental regulations, and lower wages in the peripheries of metropolitan areas, in
rural towns, and in manufacturing hubs throughout the global south. Where industrial activity
maintains a strong urban presence, it is often on public land, as in the case of the large-scale
logistics hubs that coordinate the international flow of goods through terminals like New York
City’s Hunts Point Market or JFK Airport. Because these private industrial clusters are sited on
state-controlled land, the industrial capitalists that run and depend on them make fewer spatial
demands of the state around the cost of urban land, and thus rarely come into direct conflict with
real estate capital (Moody 2017, 59-69). The departure of industry from central cities like New
York created three vacuums, each filled to a large extent by real estate capital and its aligned
industries: a spatial vacuum, with formerly industrial spaces converted into more profitable uses;
an economic vacuum, with the FIRE sectors and their associated service industries growing as
many cities’ primary economic driver; and a political vacuum, with the demands of real estate
capital on the state driving local planning priorities (Stein 2019).
The leading socio-spatial tension in the production of landscape, then, is not within
capital, but between capital and labor. Capital cannot actually produce a landscape without labor;
no matter how much money is invested, large numbers of people are still needed to build and
maintain. More generally, labor’s cultural production is what gives meaning to space and allows
it to become a desirable place for capital investment. Capital is thus utterly dependent on labor to
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produce space, just as capital is dependent on labor to produce value; without labor, there is no
surplus to expropriate. Capital requires that labor add value to raw materials – including land –
then expropriates the surplus it produces. As Chatterjee (2014, 60-61) argues, capital alienates
labor both through the employment process, in which labor is alienated from its productive
capacities, and through gentrification and displacement, whereby labor is alienated from the
landscape it socially produced. The result is both “estranged labor” and “estranged spaces.”
Capital will aid in labor’s production of landscapes of social reproduction only to the extent that
it reproduces the labor force upon which capital depends for its own reproduction and expansion
(Katz 2001).
For years in New York City, the result of this uneven class dependency and constant class
struggle was what Angotti describes as an unwritten pact between capital and labor, in which
capital allows and even endorses some forms of affordable housing. “As a consequence, New
York has the largest stock of public, cooperative, and municipally owned housing for lowincome people in the nation” (Angotti 2008, 27). To this list, we can also add rent regulated
housing, of which New York City also has the largest stock. While that housing “is constantly
constrained and under siege” (ibid.) it nonetheless exists. Notably, however, very little of those
forms of housing are currently being produced. Instead, as a result of the phenomenal growth of
real estate capital and the concomitant decline of central-city manufacturing as well as the turn
toward neoliberalism in urban planning, the kinds of new affordable housing being produced
offer far more in the way of benefits to the real estate and finance industries than they provide
meaningful opportunities for labor to maintain a foothold in the city. This suggests either a
declining dependence on labor on the part of capital – increasingly concentrated in real estate
and financialized in such a way that requires less human labor on an ongoing basis – or an
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increasing willingness to encourage labor to live outside the city and travel in for the kinds of
productive work capital of all varieties demands.
Toward its goal of landscapes of accumulation, capital must also retain a complex
relationship with the state. On the one hand, capital demands a great deal of the state, including
protection against expropriation by labor, first and foremost, but also: the construction of
infrastructure that makes industry possible and land valuable; regulations that create a
predictable climate for long-term investment, while also protecting the established turf of major
players against upstart competitors; securing the (very) basic social reproduction and mobility
needs of their workforce in order to tamp down demands for higher wages; and creating
successive rounds of opportunities to invest and build ever-more profitable landscapes. Joining
with large unions, US corporations have historically petitioned urban governments for policies
that, in Friedland’s (1982, 19) formation, “foster economic growth and maintain social control.”
Such collaborative lobbying can be seen in elements of labor and capital support for mid-century
urban renewal programs, as well as in curtailing the political movements that arose in opposition
to the displacement upon which those programs were premised. At the same time, capital bristles
against state actions it perceives as getting in the way, and thus fights back vehemently against
certain forms of taxation, preservation, and code enforcement.
Capital simultaneously demands action and inaction from the state, with various internal
fractions demanding competing interventions (Angotti 2008, 38). Manufacturing capital may
support deeper housing affordability, while real estate rejects such programs; real estate may
support stringent environmental standards, while manufacturing may push back against them
(Foglesong 1986). The relative decline of manufacturing and rise of real estate in New York City
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thus points to the changing demands capital makes of the state: rarely for deeper affordability;
often for more intensively profitable development opportunities (Stein 2019).
Labor institutions, through their own spatial strategies, have attempted to assert a claim to
land use, but labor’s structural position in urban capitalism denies these groups real control over
land use and planning. This then encourages them to petition the state to support (or at least not
oppose) extractive land use techniques that benefit landowners as well as their particular fraction
of labor. While the local state maintains political power over land use decisions, Prashad (2012,
194) argues that on a global scale, capital has maintained the upper hand in the production of
urban landscapes. “With liberalized finance, surplus capital sloshe[s] around in search of very
short-term returns, tipping over the applecart of planned development.”

State and the Landscape of Social Control
If, in a capitalist democracy, labor is the animating force in the production of landscape
and capital is the most powerful determinate of its contours, the state is the social force
responsible for maintaining the conditions for continued economic, social, and spatial production
and reproduction. This means protecting capital’s private property regime, providing fluctuating
amounts of aid to labor in order to maintain at least a bare minimum of welfare for survival, and
establishing legal, policy, and enforcement regimes that govern the parameters of development.
Like labor and capital, the state is a highly variegated social force, made up of competing
fractions. Some of these are foregrounded in political discourse, such as dueling political parties
or the geographical tensions of a federalist system. Other dimensions, however, are relegated to
the background of formal politics, including the state’s role in helping or hindering various
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fractions of capital and labor. Like the city itself, the state is both an object of struggle for capital
and labor as well as terrain through which these forces struggle.
Planning is one of the central means through which the state produces landscape.
Planning can take on multiple meanings, many of which extend far beyond the state. Gilmore
(2007a, 175 and 179) defines planning as the ability “to have some sense of how to secure the
future” by “pursuing particular kinds of change in order to produce the conditions under which
social and cultural reproduction might happen;” Angotti (2008, 7) defines it as “conscious human
activity that envisions and may ultimately determine the urban future.” Capitalists certainly plan,
albeit through chaotic means: individual firms create “business plans” that allow them to
strategize for future growth; the capitalist class plans through finance, insuring the survival of
some sectors while dooming others to undercapitalization (Mason 2016). Workers plan too:
individuals, households, and communities create formal and informal plans for their survival and
development, including strategies to strengthen the class or exit from it; institutionally, workingclass people plan through unions, community-based organizations, and non-profits, which plot
for their own growth and survival, as well as – or against – their broader class (Sandercock
1998). Both the forces of capital and labor petition the state to influence formal spatial plans,
through direct lobbying as well as party politics.
At its most fundamental, planning is a way to shape space through time. Often this
involves meeting the needs of a given population, and displacing another; securing the means for
expansion, as well as for exploitation. According to Roy (2009, 84), planning is the state’s
attempt “to ‘future-proof,’ to make existing land available for new uses, to devalorize current
uses and users and to make way for a gentrified future.” It is the means by which the state
coordinates – to greater or lesser extent in different times and places – the incredible flows of
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people, capital, energy, water, food, vehicles, and more that engender urbanity (Heynen et al
2006). Despite free marketeers’ claims to the contrary, capitalism requires a great deal of
coordination in order to keep the system from collapsing under its own weight. Such
coordination is generally geared toward generating opportunities for increased profits; under
current conditions, those profits are increasingly derived directly from land and the buildings
atop it. At the same time, however, planners also concentrate on providing those means for social
reproduction not offered by capital, including state-run or regulated services and monopolies
(Katz 1998).
Taken together, planning becomes the means by which the state seeks to produce a
landscape of social control, wherein people are encouraged or coerced into behaving in ways
conducive to the reproduction of the system in which they are situated. Both through the everchanging physical design of cities as well as the constantly rewritten rules that govern how
people live in, move through, and remake them, the state works nimbly to maintain this control
and adapt to changing circumstances and rising challenges. Wherever there is an attempt at
control, however, there is also a struggle: neither labor nor capital accepts the imposition of state
control without contest, and fractions of each align to construct strategies to either prevent,
circumvent, reshape, or redirect state control in a manner that fits with their understanding of
their own present and long-term needs. Planning is thus, among other things, the practice of
negotiating the competing demands of various fractions of capital and labor while reasserting the
validity of state power to mediate the balance of forces (Foglesong 1986).
While states practice planning at all levels, from the global to the neighborhood, in the
US planning is most commonly centralized at the municipal level, and focused on managing
growth in a way that is both politically palatable and economically productive. Some cities craft
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comprehensive plans that guide land use and development, but many – including New York City
– instead substitute for comprehensive planning the practice of zoning, a set of rules that govern
the height, bulk, spacing, and use of buildings, blocks and districts. As a means of shaping the
landscape, zoning presents two distinct advantages to the state over more wide-ranging or
democratic forms of planning.
First, zoning yields the kind of predictable terrain that capital prefers, which in turn helps
the state maintain social control while generating stable or rising revenues. Zoning creates a set
of rules that allow developers to project the value of land into the future, and limits the upward
competition between developers within particular geographical areas. By rezoning periodically,
the state can choose where and how to incentivize redevelopment and channel capital. In 21st
century New York City, both the Bloomberg and de Blasio administrations have used zoning to
encourage intensive redevelopment in working class and majority African American and
immigrant neighborhoods, while – especially in Bloomberg’s case – restricting intensive
redevelopment in wealthier, predominantly White neighborhoods (Angotti and Morse 2016).
Zoning creates a veneer of predictability and stability, while rezoning allows the state to rupture
that stasis and usher in a new round of capital investment and resultant gentrification.
Second, zoning is a way of imposing a distinctive form of rationality onto the city that
masks politics, and particularly in its class, race, and gender dimensions. Zoning is presented as a
data-driven technical exercise in which professional planners are tasked with balancing sets of
interests across two axes: the needs of the current area population against the needs of the city as
a whole; and the needs of the present against the needs of the future (Abram and Weskalnys
2013). According to Lefebvre (1974, 317), zoning conveys on the state “the rational capacity to
discriminate…. What is being covered up here is a moral and political order: the specific power
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that organizes these conditions, with its specific socio-economic allegiance, seems to flow
directly from the Logos – that is, from a ‘consensual’ embrace of the rational.” Under racial
capitalism, as Wilson (2000, 163) argues, zoning cannot function solely as a “tool for rational
land use planning” but instead becomes “a tool for accommodating the racial order,” the result of
which is what Woods (2002, 63) calls “racially defined zones of destruction.” Tellingly,
however, the absence of zoning does not in any way level the inequalities that zoning spatializes.
In a capitalist system, zoning’s abolition – a common demand of libertarian urbanists (Glaeser
2011) – simply abrogates responsibility for the shape of the city to capital, resulting in even
greater degrees of uneven development.
Zoning is just one tool by which the state uses planning to project apolitical rationality.
Applying a Foucauldian frame, Flyvbjerg (1998) argues that planning is an exercise in power
conducted through producing rationalities and mobilizing rationalizations: creating a hegemonic
set of ideas about how planning should be done and what its desirable outcomes might be, then
marginalizing those ideas and actions which depart from the stablished order. This mode of
planning is readily recognizable in the New York City context, where the state establishes an
extremely narrow set of planning and zoning tools as legitimate ways to approach spatial
conflicts, then persuades non-profits and unions of their very rationality as a rationalization for
continuing to promote the spatial needs of real estate capital. While many individuals within
these labor institutions recognize the ultimate illegitimacy of these rationalizations and the bald
power that hides behind them, the institutions they represent rarely engage in prolonged direct
confrontations, in large part because they do not believe labor is currently powerful enough to
force the state to yield. The state has thus produced social control by convincing potential
opponents of its planning regime that confrontation is irrationality or futile.
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O’Connor theorizes that the capitalist state must work toward two simultaneous goals,
accumulation and legitimization, in order to maintain its landscape of social control. These goals
are themselves contradictory in nature, making the capitalist state structurally prone to fiscal and
other crises. In order to establish legitimization, the state relies on social expenses, which have
been institutionalized through both the welfare state (government programs aimed at regulating
immiseration) and the warfare state (a constant state of military action that acts as both an
economic stimulus and a bulwark against radicalism). In order to promote accumulation, the
state relies on social capital, which comes in the form of social investment (physical or human
capital investments that increase labor productivity and profit rates) and social consumption
(goods and services or social insurance schemes that reduce the cost of social reproduction)
(O’Conner 1973).
When O’Connor proposed this model in 1973, he was depicting a system careening
toward crisis, which in fact arrived shortly after its publication. What O’Connor’s model did not
project, however, was the ensuing neoliberal state’s success in privatizing a great deal of the
state’s social expenses, thus shifting more of the cost of social reproduction from capital onto
labor. That dynamic did not necessarily reduce the overall amount the state spends to subsidize
social reproduction; in fact, the state’s share of socially reproductive spending has increased in
the neoliberal era (Moos 2019; Dickinson 2019). Rather, the state has shifted a significant
portion of its expenses toward more means-tested, time-bound, or emergency provisions, while
simultaneously reducing the tax burden for the richest of the rich. This is an important factor
behind New York City union and non-profit strategies around land use and housing, which in
many cases are neither premised on demands for direct provision of housing from the state nor

80

deep concessions from capital, but rather the production of enough capital such that a portion –
in the form of wages or housing units – can be set aside for elements of labor.
Despite the capitalist state’s neoliberal adaptations, O’Connor’s model remains a relevant
tool, not only because the dynamics of accumulation and legitimation are still visible (if
reformulated) in the work of the state but because such a differentiation implies that the state is
by nature fractal rather than unitary. The English-language quirk (displayed throughout this
dissertation) of naturalizing “the state” – a convention whose absurdity is revealed when applied
to other social formations, such as “the capital” or “the labor” – displays the commonality of
confusion around the state as a singular object rather than a compilation of contradictory forces.
The clearest ways the state is divided are in terms of territory and party: the US federalist
system creates national, state, county, city, and neighborhood-level governments, which act both
in concert and in conflict with one another; and the two-party system, which in the twentieth
century Republicans and Democrats managed to enshrine as a feature of the state itself, creating
opportunities for regular conflict amidst broad agreement. While New York City’s sub-municipal
counties and fusion voting system complicate these dynamics somewhat, they in no way discount
them altogether.
Witness, for example, the long-standing territorial and partisan dynamics around housing
and land use issues at work within New York. City Democrats, by far the electoral majority,
regularly rail against the harassment and displacement of rent regulated tenants by so-called
“unscrupulous” landlords. They point out the “loopholes” in the rent laws that, until recently,
strongly incentivized landlords to churn through tenants in order to raise rents. Since the mid1970s, however, City Councilmembers have not had jurisdiction over the rent stabilization and
rent control laws that govern the millions of New Yorkers’ tenancy. Those laws are controlled by
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the State legislature, which, thanks to bi-partisan gerrymandering, for decades retained
Republican control in the State Senate. Until the 2019 legislative session, when a new
configuration of power in the State Senate enabled a historic expansion of the state’s rent
regulations, the largely-Democratic politicians who represent city districts in the State
Legislature were often more vocal on issues of overdevelopment in their districts and the ensuing
displacement it causes. That issue, however, is controlled primarily by the Mayor and City
Council, who tend to prefer negotiating deals with developers, as well as unions and non-profits,
in support of rezonings that encourage luxury redevelopment. Each side tends to complain about
the part of the issue they cannot control, while failing to take definitive action on the part of the
issue over which they have more power. The result is a cynical system that exploits – indeed,
depends on – labor’s participation, while providing fairly well for the needs of capital, and real
estate capital in particular.
Within parties and territories, a corollary dynamic regularly takes place. The staff of
elected officials and the civil servants in government agencies regularly undermine one another
privately, even while supporting each another publicly. Agency staff will mire programs they
disapprove of for one reason or another – sometimes for issues related to labor (programs may
cause more work without remuneration or increased staff), sometimes for issues related to policy
(programs may favor a particular interest the individual or their agency does not seek to advance)
– in endless studies, the point of which is to delay implementation to the point of irrelevancy.
Similarly, Mayors and Governors will shuffle, divide or duplicate agencies and staff in order to
speed work on a particular front while impeding movement on another.
The state, then, is a complex social force, which, like labor and capital, displays both
structure and agency in its production of space. Surely, capitalist planners follow market forces;
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indeed, that is what they are trained to do, and what constitutes best practices within the
discipline. As Angotti (2008, 13) shows, “New York’s official planners rely not so much on any
comprehensive theory or strategy but instead a neoliberal faith in the magic of the real estate
marketplace.” Mitchell (2012, 258) argues, however, that recognizing the structural position of
the state under capitalism “does not require ignoring the specific actions and ideologies of key
players as well as low-level workers within the state; indeed, it necessitates an even closer focus
on their actions by insistently raising the question: why have the state agents acted the way they
have?” This is an essential part of the argument Gilmore (2007a) builds in tying the “prison fix”
to a set of four particular crises of overaccumulation: not that building prisons was the only way
the state could have resolved these crises, but that certain factors enabled and encouraged that
particular punitive political development. Katz (2011, 47-60) builds the same case around the
spatial fixes that capitalist states have adopted in order to respond to the crises of childhood
social reproduction under neoliberalism – not that treating childhood as “waste” is the inevitable
result of an overdetermined state, but rather that this is the particular fix that states have adopted
despite readily apparent alternatives.
The state’s paths are not predetermined, but they are constrained by various factors. For
one, the state depends heavily on support from labor. Like capital, the state has a great deal of
structural power in capitalist democracies, but it cannot in and of itself produce space. As
Mitchell (2012, 166) insists, “all the planning in the world makes no difference if there are not
physical laborers to put that plan into action.” One crucial task of the state, then, is to expend a
fair degree of effort and expenditure on ensuring labor’s survival and reproduction. This often
takes the crucial – if popularly maligned – form of “welfare,” including the spatially significant
subset of housing.
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The roots of New York City’s municipal welfare state go back to the mid-19th century,
when city government began to complement the work of benevolent societies – precursors to
some of today’s non-profit advocacy organizations, such as the Legal Aid Society and the
Community Service Society – by offering public food and shelter programs managed by stateappointed professionals (Varga 2013). These functions were further consolidated under the
control of party clubs, which, according to Katznelson (1981, 69), were “enmeshed in the ethnic
and territorial culture of the ward or precinct” and operated through “the communitarian basis of
the machine.” According to Shefter (1992, 20), “establishing a network of clubs that involved the
machine in the social lives of Democratic voters” was not only a way to deliver much needed
services, but also to incorporate the demands of the emergent independent labor movement that,
through the United Labor Party, began to threaten Democratic party rule. It was not only
important that services be provided to poor and working people, but that a particular fraction of
the state be seen as responsible for its delivery, which establishes a form of what Geary (2014)
calls “state intimacy” between government and labor.
The welfare function of the state, however, expands and contracts over time, including
periods of relative munificence and utter miserliness. Piven and Cloward argue that the capitalist
state’s fluctuating welfare function reflects two main impulses: to stabilize capitalism’s tendency
toward boom and bust; and to maintain as great a degree of social control as possible. “Relief
programs are initiated to deal with dislocations in the work system that lead to mass disorder,
and are then retained (in an altered form) to enforce work” (Piven and Cloward 1971, xv). In
addition to stability and control, some fractions of the state also use welfare provision (or, in the
case of what Gilmore [2007a, 245] call “the anti-state state,” its denial) as strategies to retain
electoral power. “It is this objective – the political ‘reintegration’ of disaffected groups – that
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impels electoral leaders to expand relief programs at times of political crisis engendered by
economic distress” (Piven and Cloward 1971, 41).
Welfare helps keep labor alive, working, and perhaps voting, but that is not all the state
needs from labor: it also requires labor’s limited but visible participation in the theatrical aspects
of democratic government. This formalized participation takes many forms, ranging from the
nominally decisive (like participatory budgeting, in which community members lobby one
another to support projects, including ones – like public school bathroom stall doors – that
should already be provided to all residents) to the purely advisory (such as community board
hearings, in which local residents, workers, and business owners lobby appointed neighbors to
vote a particular way on land use issues, even though the Board has no authority in the process)
(Su 2018). In many cases, the state emphasizes the participatory aspects of such processes when
what it truly seeks is popular endorsement of its plans (Checker 2015, 175).
Carr (2013, 112) argues that such processes allow political elites “to reframe their policy
preferences as the product of ground-level democratic processes, and open, fair, and impartial
technocratic decision-making…. By routing these decisions through participatory planning,
however, their profoundly distributive (and thus political) nature is largely occluded by a process
that both obscures and enables the workings of power in the city.” One exemplary means through
which this occurs is what Carr (2012, 433) calls the “shadow referendum”: a set of public
hearings and processes geared at making visible to the state which communities essential to its
electoral and governing coalitions will oppose a particular project or plan, and on which
communities considered marginal it can be imposed. Through these kinds of strategies, the state
performs what Katz (2005a, 55) describes as a strategic idealization of its subjects: “as with all
strategies of ‘othering,’ the creation of ‘local people enables planners, policy-makers, and
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practitioners to romanticize as they exclude, exploit, and marginalize those with the most at
stake.”
In addition to requiring some support from labor, the state also depends heavily on
capital. Through bond markets, tax revenues, political contributions, and private economic
investment, capital has the power to make or break the state – as demonstrated in the mid-1970s
crisis that nearly put the City of New York in bankruptcy (Tabb 1982). Local urban planners in
particular seek to maximize land values and development capacity in order in order to generate
revenue, create employment and housing for desired future citizens, and drive the perception that
their city is growing rather than declining. Wolf-Powers (2005, 381) argues that austerity
measures have only furthered this dependence, since the strategy “relies on private [rather than
public] investment, produces immediately visible results… and can be accomplished through
incremental, entrepreneurial planning….” While the state needs labor to do the work of spatial
production and political legitimization, it needs capital to sink its resources into land, and
practice the perpetual churn of development, demolition, and reconstruction.
This dependency is rarely discussed within the planning profession and its theoretical
mainstream, which, Marcuse (2009, 95) contends, tends to construct tools and solutions “as if
relationships of power did not exist.” In reality, capital holds enormous sway over planners. In a
strong version of this argument, Lefebvre (1970, 154) claims that planners “implement, they do
not control, space. They obey a social command that is not directed at any given object or any
given product (commodity) but a global object, the supreme product, the ultimate object of
exchange: space.”15 Taking that logic even further, Fitch (1993, 152, emphasis in the original)
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Lefebvre refers here to “urbanists” rather than “planners,” but tends to use the words more or less
interchangeably.
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states that “urban planning is the coordination of land monopoly,” rather than a force either
independent from or controlling capital. “Big changes in planning policy, which is to say big
changes in real estate values, are initiated by those who own real estate.” This developer-led
approach is largely backed up by Angotti and Morse’s summary of the planning – i.e. zoning –
process in New York City today, in which capital and the state agree to both the need for
intervention and the parameters for change before ever going public with their intention to
initiate a land use change. They write,
Developers understand zoning as the machine that must function
well in order to meet the needs for growth and development while
protecting the most valued real estate. While some developers may
grumble about the time and cost involved in dealing with zoning,
the larger and more experienced ones understand that it’s better to
have a predictable regulatory environment and pay established legal
and lobbying firms to make sure their needs are met (Angotti and
Morse 2016, 20-21).
This comports with the longer history of planning and the “city practical” movement of the early
20th century, in which arch conservatives like then-Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover argued
that municipalities should enact zoning codes and master plans in order to create a predictable
regulatory terrain for developers (Haar 1955).
One complication inherent in the state’s dependency on capital is that the state cannot
publicize this fact without jeopardizing its legitimacy to a public that is largely made up of labor.
This leads to a kind of purposeful unaccountability in planning, preferred by capitalists, that
takes the forms of appointed commissions (like the New York City Planning Commission, whose
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members are appointed by the mayor, borough presidents, and public advocate), public
authorities (like New York State’s Empire State Development Corporation and New York City’s
Economic Development Corporation, whose boards are appointed by both elected officials and
private lobbying organizations and are granted a great deal of financial and planning
independence), and public-private partnerships (like the federal “Rental Assistance
Demonstration” program that allows local Public Housing Authorities to lease their complexes to
private developers and financial institutions) (Fitch 1993, 84). These institutions allow the state
to work closely with capital in ways that present few venues for labor to intervene – and thus
challenge – the state’s work on behalf of capital.
Looking at the dependencies between the state, capital and labor, Foglesong theorizes
two contradictions that illuminate the function of state planning in capitalist democracies. First
comes the “property contradiction,” set off by capitalists’ conflicting demands for some
interventions but not others (Foglesong 1986, 21). As discussed earlier, real estate and
manufacturing capital have different demands of the state and its planners. Each side, however,
opposes the other’s preferred regulatory path, and both sides remain broadly skeptical of state
planning as a force capable of usurping some of their authority. The planner’s job, then, is to
balance the competing demands of manufacturing and real estate capital, while simultaneously
taking into account the social reproduction needs of labor. This leads directly to a second
contradiction, which Foglesong (1986, 23) labels the “capitalist-democracy contradiction.” The
state ultimately seeks to protect and expand capital’s ability to generate profits, but it also
requires participation from labor in order to maintain its legitimacy. To manage this
contradiction, planners can construct elaborate participator regimes through which popular input
is sought but not meaningfully considered. At times, however, popular movements push planners
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and other state actors to the point where the only means of maintaining the system’s legitimacy is
to curb capitalists’ ability to profit, such as by imposing rent controls or environmental
protections.
Foglesong’s contradictions remain the clearest explanation of planning in a capitalist
democracy, but they require two significant updates. First, with manufacturing capital largely
exiting central cities in the US and elsewhere, real estate has taken on incredible and almost
monopolistic power and influence within the planning system. Second, Foglesong’s theory, like
much writing on urban planning politics, recognizes the structural divisions of capital and the
variegated nature of the state, but presents labor as a more unified force. This misses an
important opportunity to understand not only the difficulties labor faces in achieving an
alternative urban landscape, but the complexities of labor as a social force in relation to capital
and the state. If labor too is divided, the “power geometries” (Massey 2012) of urban planning
are made much more complex, with alliances shifting on multiple levels within and between
labor, capital, and the state. Discounting this complexity is part of what allows planners to be
caught off guard by labor’s complicated and contradictory strategies around land use in New
York City and beyond, and thus what sometimes allows such strategies to work.

Machinery and Dependency
What does it look like when fractions of labor, capital, and the state join together in a
coordinated spatial strategy? At different times and in different places, and based on unique and
peculiar political considerations, these “regional blocs” (Woods 1998) or “regional class
alliances” (Harvey 2006, 103) – have taken on a multitude of forms, from social-democratic
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populism to “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) reaction. Spatial political blocs are dynamic and
often fragile assemblages, even if some patterns are replicated due to structural forces. One of
the most enduring forms of this coalition, however, is what Molotch (1976) – and later Logan
and Molotch (1987) – call “the city as a growth machine.” Angotti (2008, 39) provides colorful
imagery to describe its inner workings in the case of New York: “Real estate drives the growth
machine, government oils and repairs it, the building trades make the parts, and global and local
capital deliver the fuel.”
In their classic text Urban Fortunes, Logan and Molotch theorized the way in which
multiple and diverse political agents assemble together to form a permanent bloc for perpetual
growth, and specifically for transforming urban use values (the city as a place for living life and
building community) into urban exchange values (the city as a confluence of sellable parcels and
properties). Taylor (2019, 10) usefully delineates the difference between use and exchange value
in housing as “the difference between real estate and a home;” Logan and Molotch’s growth
machine exists to transform the latter into the former. The primary parts in their model machine
are politicians, local media, and utilities; listed among “auxiliary players,” (Logan and Molotch
1987, 75) however, is “organized labor.” They write,
Although they are sometimes in conflict with capitalists on other
issues, labor union leaders are enthusiastic partners in growth
machines, with little careful consideration of the long-term
consequences for the rank and file. Union leadership subscribes to
value-free development because it will ‘bring jobs,’ particularly to
the building trades, whose spokespersons are especially vocal in
their support of development. Less likely to be openly discussed is
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the concern that growth may bring more union members and
enhance the power and authority of local union officials (ibid, 81).
In the following paragraph, they add that “labor leaders are especially useful when the
growth machine needs someone to claim that development opponents are ‘elitist’ or ‘selfish’”
(Logan and Molotch 1987, 81). They conclude the section by arguing that unions’ participation
in growth machine politics reinforces capitalism’s tendency toward spatial inequality. “Labor
cannot serve the needs of its most vulnerable and best organized geographical constituency
because it won’t inhibit investment at any given place. The inability of labor to influence the
distribution of development within the United States (much less across world regions) makes
organized labor helpless in influencing the political economy of places” (ibid, 82). In this
analysis, unions support new development in order to grow their ranks, and in so doing provide
progressive cover to conservative politics and foreclose on that challenges uneven geographical
development.
Much of this behavior continues to be true today, and can be extended to certain nonprofits as well as unions when they join together in growth coalitions in order to fulfill their
mission as developers, expand or solidify their budgets or political relationships, or expand their
institutions. In order to bring this analysis up to date, however, a few adjustments must be made.
First, labor participation in the growth machine must be given greater emphasis and
closer analysis. As I discuss in Chapter Four, unions are playing an important role in promoting
urban real estate development in New York City, and are doing so with increasing strategic
sophistication; it would be hard to maintain Logan and Molotch’s (1987, 81) assertion that
unions are giving these campaigns and their effects “little careful consideration.” Unions are
hiring teams of researchers and land use experts to craft strategic campaigns in support of the
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kinds of development regimes they see as beneficial to their immediate interests, and against
those they perceive as threats to their unions’ stability and growth. These are complex
operations, with campaign calendars full of multiple moving parts and escalating tactical rollouts. In many cases these unions’ leaders are well aware of the potential negative outcomes of
value-free growth, but believe that gentrification and displacement are inevitable regardless of
their activities, and so seek to gain whatever benefit they can from the current arrangements of
real estate and state power.
Second, while the building trades continue to be important players in urban growth
politics, they are by no means the sole – or even leading – representatives of labor. In fact, in
New York City, some elements of the building trades have become more skeptical of growth
politics, while the ostensibly more progressive service and public sector unions – as well as some
non-profit housing organizations – have been important allies in supporting planning regimes
that accelerate high-end development in working-class neighborhoods.
Third, additional nuance can be added to Logan and Molotch’s claim that union support
for development helps the growth machine cast its opponents as “selfish” and “elitist,” or
NIMBYs. Unions’ embrace of inclusionary zoning programs that couch state-enabled
gentrification in the language of affordability and integration further strengthens the growth
machine’s progressive bona fides, and allows its supporters – including luxury developers – to
cast opponents as enemies of affordable housing and endorsers of racial segregation. This is a
politically potent rhetorical tool, which New York’s recent mayors and their supporters have
used with relish.
Finally, it would seem that labor institutions involved in growth machines are, in fact,
quite interested in “influencing the distribution of development within the US” (ibid, 82), but not
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necessarily in ways that challenge real estate capital. Instead, they might work with developers to
support policies that channel growth and investment towards areas that market has previously
left out – or, in other words, the places not yet racked with gentrification. The explanation for
this phenomenon cannot be that unions and other working-class institutions are simply unaware
of the broader problems of uneven development; they are, instead, attempting to extract
something from the segments of capital and the state which profit from it. The point of a growth
coalition – and labor’s participation therein – is not to produce an even amount of growth for all
people at all times, but rather to grow particular areas and not others, for the benefit of some
owners and workers and to the detriment of others.
Cox and Mair (1988) describe the force that pulls labor into coalitions with elements of
capital and the municipal state as “local dependence.” All three elements are “locally dependent”
in different ways, for different reasons, and to different degrees. Workers can of course move,
but doing so entails significant costs, and can mean leaving behind dense networks of social
bonds and place attachments; capital can divest from one place and invest in another, but has
often sunk enough capital into local operations that doing so is often undesirable – if not quite a
last resort. The state cannot exactly pick up and leave (though it can expand imperialistically), so
its local dependence is of a slightly different variety: states have sunk tremendous amounts of
debt into fixed infrastructure investments, and need labor and capital to stay put in order to pay it
back (ibid, 311).
As localities jostle with one another for investments, revenues, and tax bases (Harvey
1989b), Cox and Mair (1988, 307) argue that “competition among localities” leads to “muted
levels of conflict within them.” Capital and the state seek to incorporate labor into supporting
political programs for “the enhancement of ‘local business climates’” through such initiatives as
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“tax abatements,” “subsidizing cultural amenities,” “redevelopment projects,” “urban renewal,”
and “large scale rezonings” (ibid, 311). A local labor pool with high levels of political
consciousness might resist such overtures (ibid, 314), but ultimately capital holds the upper
hand: if they are denied opportunities to invest and grow, they will cut jobs and divest from
neighborhoods. “The high degree of traditional local dependence makes it hard for people to
move, yet they must have jobs. In this context business coalitions attempt to reconcile their own
strategies with the needs of local unemployed workers” – and, we must add, unions and nonprofits seeking growth in their own sectors – “by touting the jobs that will be created if the
strategies are followed” (ibid, 316). Under these circumstances, “local working class
organizations may have little recourse but to support business coalition projects in the hope that
they may at least provide some economic relief to those unable to move elsewhere” (ibid, 317).
One result of this pressure is a “local form of patriotism” that reinforces the coalition’s
hegemony, and inculcates the necessity of sacrifice – including suffering higher rents – for the
greater good of local growth (ibid, 317). According to Jonas (1998, 326), “it may be extremely
difficult for labor to promote local economic strategies and discourses that are inconsistent with,
or even pose a direct threat to, the projects of the growth coalition, legitimated as they often are
by the hegemonic discourse of capital mobility and place competition.”
These local dependencies are built into the US’s somewhat unique form of legally
establishing unions in shops located in particular places, rather than establishing sectoral
agreements that stretch over larger geographies. According to Clark (1989, 20), the US
“unionization process is distinctly, and inherently, a geographical one. Workers choose to be
represented by a union at the local (plant and sub-plant) level. Each representation election is
fought at the local level, whatever the general level of unionization in the industry or region….
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Overall national membership of any union is then the sum of workers who have voted separately
at the local level to be represented by that union.” Master contracts spanning entire companies’
portfolios have been fought for and won, particularly in what Milkman (2014, 7) calls “placebound industries such as services, hotels, trucking, and construction,” but unions still “remain
vulnerable to the peculiarities of local circumstances” (Clark 1989, 242).
National labor law – like national housing law – is structured to be highly decentralized
and deferential to local political-economic contexts, but with limitations on what local unions
(or, in the case of housing, local governments and public housing authorities) can do to expand
them. This leads to a political climate in which mobile capital can play localities against one
another, and local working-class institutions are incentivized to form inter-class coalitions in
order to create stable conditions for capital investment. During the passage of the Wagner Act in
1935 (discussed in the following chapter), pro-labor legislators argued that this decentralized
structure of unionization “threatened to localize unions, and thereby rob them of their ability to
operate as national organizations” (ibid, 242).
This territorial fragmentation and boundedness contribute to the production of a
fragmented and boundary-enforcing labor movement. In a scathing assessment, Fitch (2006, 47)
argues that in the U.S. model, unions seek “to find a rich territory and occupy it. Little incentive
exists for the occupiers to extend the benefits of the union to low-paid outsiders. Nor is there
much inclination for the union and the employer to fight each other for shares of revenue. For
one thing, the union monopoly depends on the employers’ monopoly. And a lot of the
employers’ strength comes from having an agreement with a union that monopolizes the labor.”
The AFL’s craft model of unionism was built on these assumptions, and many of the most
influential unions in New York City today come from the AFL rather than the industrial
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unionism of the CIO.16 The result is a labor movement in which “territorial limits… cut off
members from the concerns of others beyond their jurisdiction” (ibid, 329).
While these analyses (Logan and Molotch 1987, Cox and Mair 1988, Clark 1989, Fitch
2006) were written with unions and labor law in mind, they also apply to certain forms of nonprofits, whose geographical fragmentation can lead to turf wars between competing
organizations, as well as cooperation with fractions of capital and the state that strengthen one
organization’s base or bottom line. Some non-profit forms, like Community Development
Corporations, are specifically designed to enhance investment in particular geographies, and in
doing so can either join with or emulate the practices and politics of the growth machine.
In the politics of urban spatial production, working-class institutions are incentivized to
distinguish themselves from other similar organizations and join with elements of capital and the
state in order to secure local growth and development. Their leaders may follow this path in
order to secure their own members’, clients’, or constituents’ social reproduction, but in so doing
they increase capital’s capacity to develop landscapes of accumulation and the state’s power to
reinforce social control. The resulting regional blocs are fragile and ephemeral, but their effects
on the landscape are lasting, and the structural constraints they engender are persistent.
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The major exception to this rule is the Transit Workers Union, which comes out of the CIO. The American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the Service Employees International Union, the Laborers
International Union of North America, the United Food and Commercial Workers union, UNITE HERE (the
amalgamated needle-workers, hotel and restaurant union), and the Teamsters all come out of the AFL tradition.
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Chapter 2: Planning the Union City (1927-1974)

When discussing labor, planning, and housing in New York City, urban historians,
housing activists, union stalwarts, and policy wonks often choose one particular moment in the
city’s history as the center of conversation and, often, the object of nostalgia: the era of uniondeveloped limited-equity housing cooperatives. Roughly spanning the middle quartiles of the
20th century, from 1927 through 1974, New York City unions – with state support, commercial
financing, and non-profit coordination – planned, built, owned, operated and occupied 41,453
units of workers’ housing, spread out over four of the city’s five boroughs. This was a
monumental achievement, permanently altering the shape of the city and creating a form of
urban commons (Huron 2018) designed to aid in labor’s social reproduction. It stands as the
most visible and tangible manifestation of labor’s power to transform the landscape.
One key but often overlooked aspect of this movement, however, alters the meaning of its
accomplishments. Several of the cooperatives, including some of the most celebrated
developments, were built through so-called “urban renewal” and “slum clearance” programs that
displaced scores of working-class people – largely African Americans and immigrants – by
demolishing neighborhoods and rebuilding in ways that would not accommodate those banished
from their homes and communities. With a few key exceptions,17 this aspect is usually
downplayed in union coop lore: ignored, treated as an unfortunate detail, or understood as a
mistake from which unions learned and adjusted. This allows the union coop story to be framed
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Among the most notable exceptions are Schwartz 1993, Straus 2010 and Gold 2014.
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heroically, and to act as a counterpoint to more recent and dispiriting examples of labor
cooperation with neoliberal planning programs.
What happens, however, if we view the coop movement’s reliance on urban renewal as a
feature, not a bug, of mid-century labor planning politics? What if we treat the displaced
working-class tenants as equally entitled to the descriptor “labor” as the union workers who
planned, built and bought the coops? From that vantage, labor becomes both the emplaced and
the displaced; the bulldozer and the bulldozed; the cooperator and the cleared. Even at the height
of its power to reshape New York City’s landscape, labor was fractured, with its more powerful
elements partnering with fractions of capital and the state at the expense of those excluded from
that era’s social-democratic trappings. Madden and Marcuse (2016, 4) rightfully remind us that
“the residential is political – which is to say that the shape of the housing system is always the
outcome of struggles between different groups and classes.” As this history shows, housing
systems are also the outcomes of struggles within classes, including the working class.

Urban Renewal in the Keynesian City
In order to understand how the union cooperative movement arose, it is important to
understand the political context from which it emerged: a time of radical mobilization and
institutionalization for labor, crisis and reconstitution for capital, and “expert-intensive” (Carr
2012, 423) and interventionist planning from the state.
Coming out of the Great Depression, New York embraced what some have described as a
form of municipal social democracy, with extensive – but always demographically and
geographically uneven – public outlays for housing, transportation, healthcare and education and
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an expansive embrace of the role of unions in urban life (Freeman 2000). In both the city and the
country, the concept of “planning” was embraced as never before; according to Schwartz (1993,
71), the 1930s were “a decade where everyone dabbled in planning.”18 This enabled a number of
social and policy experiments, many of them in the realm of housing and aimed at shoring up
labor’s capacity for social reproduction. In Smith’s formation (2002, 432),
the Keynesian city of advanced capitalism, in which the state
underwrote wide swaths of social reproduction, from housing to
welfare to transportation infrastructure, represented the zenith of
this definitive relationship between urban scale and social
reproduction…. Equally a center of capital accumulation, the
Keynesian city was in many respects the combined hiring hall and
welfare hall for each national capital.
New York City’s turn toward social reproduction came as a result of radical organizing
by working-class residents, who were themselves responding to an intense housing crush. The
housing market was extremely tight; by 1950, the city’s vacancy rate hit its lowest point in
recorded history: 0.8%, with just 0.3% for rent or for sale (Freeman 2000, 105). This crisis was
fought in part on the terrain of labor, with unemployed councils19 organizing rent strikes, unevicting tenants, and pushing for housing reforms (Angotti 2008, 86). City planners and federal
legislators responded with a series of experiments in affordable housing, which would forever
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Roosevelt even proposed creating a federal “permanent planning board,” but such a move proved too far out of
step with national norms around market-led development (Radford 1996, 99).
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While some formed independently, many unemployed councils were organized by the Communist Party and
other affiliated (or competing) radical political organizations. Their main bastions of support were among African
Americans in Harlem and Jews in the Lower East Side.
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alter the landscape, including rent regulation, subsidized private income-targeted developments
and public housing.
Rent control was the most expansive intervention in terms of the number of units covered
and tenants affected. Long a demand of unions, tenant organizations and socialist parties –
particularly the American Labor Party in New York – the history of rent control is intimately
linked to the country’s military history. The US’s first rent controls were a part of a federal
program initiated during World War I to stabilize consumer costs on the home front (Radford,
1996, 17). During the post-war Red Scare, in which Socialists were purged from public office
and public life in New York and elsewhere, the New York State Senate passed a law to continue
wartime rent controls in order to stem left wing protests (Angotti, 2008, 85). Those laws were
then allowed to expire in 1929, but were brought back again at the federal level during World
War II. After the war, tenant, worker, socialist and civil rights groups fought to retain rent
control, and in 1950 the state took over the system once again, giving over two million tenants
predictable rents and guaranteed lease renewals (Freeman, 2000, 107) and functioning as a social
form of neighborhood preservation (Sorkin, 2018, 169).
In addition to rent control, New York State intervened into the private housing market
through tax incentives for limited equity cooperatives – discussed later in this chapter – and a
subsidy program for middle-income development. Known as “Mitchell Lama” for its sponsors in
the legislature, this program offered tax breaks, loans and bonds to private sponsors who would
build income-targeted rental and cooperative housing developments. This program, for which
labor unions and non-profit organizations were key supporters and at times sponsors, was
designed to simultaneously aid in labor’s social reproduction and real estate capital’s
accumulation. It was a response to demands from both labor and capital: predominantly
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unionized workers demanded new, high-quality housing, while real estate capitalists demanded
public aid for middle-income construction at a time in which the luxury market was
oversaturated and low-income housing became the provenance of government. According to
Angotti (2008, 73), “in the post-war era, the real estate oligarchy made below-market housing a
stable element in its policy agenda and growth machine and won significant public subsidies to
finance it.”
If rent control was the most expansive intervention and Mitchell Lama was the most
profitable, public housing was the most intensive: a network of government-built, owned and
managed developments that challenged the idea of housing as private industry. Rather than a
singular program aimed at aiding the poor or decommodifying housing, the history of US public
housing in fact comprises several different programs of different motivations, reflecting the
evolving conflicts and collaborations between various fractions of labor, capital and the state.
Marcuse (1995, 240) counts seven different programs at play in 20th century New York: “a
reformer’s program, a war program, a middle-class and veterans program, a redevelopment
program, a poverty program, a null program, and a centralized program.”
When the Public Housing Act was introduced in Congress in 1937 by New York Senator
Wagner, two visions of public housing competed for public support. On one side, the National
Public Housing Conference, representing non-profit reformers, called for a program of “slum
clearance” and government-run housing for the poor (Radford 1996, 185). This program was
also supported by powerful real estate organizations, such as the National Association of Real
Estate Brokers, which did not consider low-income government housing as an impingement on
their business model (González 2017, 58). On the opposing side, the Labor Housing Conference,
representing an amalgam of social-democratic unions and urbanists, called on government to
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support unions and other non-profit sponsors in building middle-income housing on vacant land
(Radford 1996, 186). Wagner and his allies opted for the former program, setting the stage for an
era of central-city bulldozing and redevelopment. This was coupled with a system of subsidies
for segregated single-family housing through the Federal Housing Administration (Loyd 2014,
28-34), an agency whose mission the Labor Housing Conference privately panned as “Fuck
Housing Altogether” for the ways it exacerbated urban inequities (Radford 1996, 115). The
country’s de facto housing policy, further codified in the American Housing Act of 1949, was
miserly public housing expenditures and expansive private development subsidies (Radford
1996). Rather than a dual housing market, Taylor (2019, 37) describes this dynamic as a
dialectic: “a single United States housing market that was defined by its racially discriminatory,
tiered access – each tier reinforcing and legitimizing the other.”
Title I of the 1949 Housing Act established “urban renewal,” one of the most
consequential urban policies in 20th century US history. Understanding urban renewal is key to
understanding the “power geometries” (Massey 2012) of the Keynesian era. The program
presented city planners with both generous federal funding and a great deal of local control over
redevelopment’s particular spatial and social dynamics (Pacewicz, 2016, 279). It thus established
a regime that is, in many ways, the opposite of the current neoliberal order, which is premised on
devolving funding responsibilities to the local level while maintaining political control over how
money is spent at the federal and state levels (Gilmore and Gilmore, 2016, 188). With these
elements in place, urban renewal was able to reinforce a conception of progress – including
progress for prominent segments of labor – that was premised on displacing and marginalizing a
large fraction of the working class, often marked through their racially-segmented position in the
labor and housing markets (Schwartz, 1993).
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Urban renewal had four basic components. First, city governments would identify an area
as “blighted,” a flexible and intentionally ill-defined category often put on industrial areas or
neighborhoods where poor people and people of color lived. Second, city planners would create
a master plan for new residential, commercial or infrastructural construction in the targeted area,
and begin acquiring properties using federal subsidies and eminent domain. Third, again with
federal funding, city governments would demolish enormous swaths of cities, scattering
residents and destabilizing communities. Fourth, in partnership with an institutional sponsor
(such as a public authority, private company, non-profit or union), something new would be built
on the cleared land. As practiced, the policy had predictably predatory effects. Hundreds of
thousands of people – a vastly disproportionate number of whom were African Americans or
recent immigrants – were displaced, with their lives uprooted, their social networks disrupted,
and the physical markers of their spatial production first devalued, then destroyed (Fullilove
2005).
New York City was particularly affected by this program; with just four percent of the
country’s population, the city sponsored 32 percent of its urban renewal programs (Fitch 1993,
141). In its first decade, 16 Title I projects displaced 100,000 working-class New Yorkers, 40
percent of whom were African American or Latino (Schwartz 1993, XV).20 Residents of urban
renewal areas fought back using a wide range of tools, from political persuasion to property
occupation. The program, however, maintained broad support, forming an overwhelming

20

This figure does not include those displaced to build public housing, as those were not “Title I” projects.
Schwartz estimates that “at least twice that number” of New Yorkers were displaced for those purposes. In
addition to residential tenants, Title I displaced over 5,000 New York City small businesses, and eliminated or
displaced hundreds of thousands of industrial jobs (Schwartz 1993, 295-296)
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common sense (Gramsci 1971; Fitch 1993, 98) characterized by Loyd (2014, 30-31) as “slum
reasoning.”
There were many motivating factors that propelled a powerful alignment of capital and
state actors to promote and perpetrate urban renewal, and they have been widely discussed in
critical accounts of the period. In Cold War logic, urban renewal provided an opportunity for US
cities to instigate a process of “creative destruction” (Weber 2002) and demonstrate that the US,
too, was capable of monumental planning (Zipp 2010). Fitch (1993 141) called this capitalist
take on Soviet-style planning “real estate Stalinism.” At a time of widespread urban panic over
the economic and demographic threat of federally-subsidized suburbanization (Teaford 2006),
urban renewal created enormous opportunities for highly profitable central city development,
with 90 percent of what was built in the 1950s through urban renewal going toward middle- and
upper-income households (Anderson 1964). In order to address the “particular needs of
monopoly capital and downtown business,” it facilitated the subsidized centralization of highly
coveted land into increasingly fewer hands (O’Conner 1973, 136) and sped the process of
planned deindustrialization coveted by neighboring landowners (Fitch 1993). It placated White
urban voters who sought government support for projects to stop the geographical expansion of
Black settlement (Piven and Cloward 1971, 241-242; Marwell 2007, 49). As long as public
housing could be seen as a containment strategy for the program’s refugees, urban renewal
allowed capital and the state to embark on a mission of urban reformation on a scale never before
seen in US history (Schwartz 1993; Taylor 2019, 41).
Scrutiny toward the elements of labor that supported – at times even sponsored – urban
renewal, however, has been far less robust. While the Labor Housing Conference had previously
rejected slum clearance as the basis for future federal housing programs, by 1949 many of the
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most powerful working-class institutions – including national union leaderships and many
prominent housing organizations – actively supported Title I (Botein 2007, 803; Loyd 2014, 3334). The emerging “labor lobby” and the AFL-CIO’s “unique level of access and influence”
allowed them to work closely with both affordable housing advocates (including settlement
house workers, planners and architects) and real estate industry lobbyists (including developer,
financier, and realtor associations) to lobby Congress and the White House for both the
legislative tools and the funding to pursue urban renewal demolition and reconstruction (Botein
2007, 800-801).
According to Friedland (1982, 80), housing non-profits largely lined up behind the law
because they “hoped that redevelopment would have positive effects on the city’s housing
conditions,” despite the bill’s limited provisions for low-income housing. Several factors,
however, made the bill palatable enough: the fact that Title I would create some housing; the
promise, later drastically curtailed, that a portion of the new housing would be affordable; and
the premise that urban renewal would demolish the tenements that many reformers understood to
be the root of the housing problem – rather than the economic and political system that had
produced those buildings – was enough to secure reformers’ support. Union leaders endorsed
urban renewal because it acted as an economic stimulus for already unionized sectors of the
economy (first and foremost the building trades), it produced at least some housing that union
members could afford, and it further solidified unions’ political ties with both the local (usually
Democratic) political leadership and the business establishment with whom they bargained (ibid,
95). While some union members would be displaced by urban renewal, the vast majority of those
who would be uprooted had already been excluded on the basis of race and/or gender from either
unionized job categories or, in some cases, from the unions themselves (ibid, 127; Wilder 2000).
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In what Schwartz (1993) identifies as “the New York approach” to development in the
mid-20th century, planners relied on liberal institutions – including unions and housing nonprofits – to both provide political support for urban renewal and act as sponsors for some of the
most consequential projects. Keynesian city planners may have prioritized labor’s social
reproduction and incorporated labor into the process, but they did so in dramatically uneven
fashion, casting some elements of the working class as displaceable and others as fit to be
housed.

Union Growth and Institutionalization
Alongside the growth and institutionalization of Keynesian-inspired “rationalcomprehensive” planning in the US, this period witnessed the growth and institutionalization of
unions – a process analogous to that of non-profits from the 1960s through the 1990s (described
in the following chapter). Unions and collective bargaining had existed in the US since the 19th
century (Maier 1987, 7), but a series of militant strikes and acts of sabotage during the
depression forced monumental political changes in the relationship between labor and the state
(Piven and Cloward 1977, 96-97). The result was the formalization of unions, organized by
industry and geography and recognized by both employers and the state.
Workers and legislators from New York played a key role in this transformation. In
response to labor militancy, Congressmember (and future mayor) LaGuardia sponsored the 1932
Norris-LaGuardia act, which reduced barriers to striking, picketing, boycotting and unionizing
(Viteritti 2017, 74). Two years later, Senator Wagner – another future mayor and sponsor of the
Public Housing Act – passed the National Labor Relations Act, a piece of legislation so
important to unions that it is to this day called simply as “the act.” The NLRA formalized the
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process for establishing and recognizing unions, and created the National Labor Relations Board
as the mechanism for state enforcement of workplace law and the arbitrator of labormanagement conflict. Piven and Cloward (1977) mark this as the moment at which “business
had lost control of the state” (133).
It was also, however, the beginning of a regime in which “it was government as much as
the unions that organized workers” (Piven and Cloward 1977, 147). Organizing flourished, but
militancy was curtailed. In 1947 the Taft Hartley act imposed harsh restrictions on workers and
unions, requiring Communist purges, mandating massive reporting requirements, outlawing
many instances of closed or union shops, curtailing certain forms of strikes, and limiting
“secondary” (or solidarity) boycotts (ibid, 168-169). By 1950, the US had entered a period Davis
(1986, 118) dubs “state organized corporate capitalism,” characterized by “decentralized
bargaining with extensive private superstructures supported by complex judicial review” and
“legislative regulation of right to strike” (ibid, 119).
This peculiar mode of labor regulation, specific to the United States, featured: a high
degree of state control over union organization; an administrative agency (the National Labor
Relations Board [NLRB]) with strong enforcement power over unions but weak enforcement
power over corporations; a high degree of territorialization, with state intervention into the
particular geographies of bargaining units; and strict limits on both strikes and explicit acts of
economic solidarity (Aronowitz 1973; Davis 1986; Fitch 2006). Unions were essentially granted
representational rights and regular wage and benefit increases, but were locked out of corporate
governance or shop floor decisions, and had to enforce a no-strike pledge for the life of contracts.
They became structurally dependent on close relations with the state, and sought to aid in the
development and expansion of the industries in which they were situated.
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This regime was highly segregated by race, both in terms of labor markets and labor
unions. Those dynamics are crucial to understanding not only the historical and contemporary
contours of the union movement, but also how unions could support urban renewal – a program
contemptuously called “Negro removal” (Baldwin 1989, 42) – and even use it produce
segregated housing complexes of their own. Racial exclusion was an early organizing principle
of the US labor movement, with what Du Bois (1935 [1992], 596-597) called “craft and race
unions” working in shaky coalition with “capitalist guild-masters” to instill a form of class
consciousness among White workers that classified Black workers’ interests as antithetical to
their own (Buck 2001). This landscape of exclusion produced a labor market – especially in the
increasingly unionized cities of the north – in which, according to Wilder (2000, 142), African
Americans
could be doctors and lawyers but not plumbers or builders; maids
and porters but not secretaries or clerks…. While European ethnics
displayed tremendous hostility toward each other – which explains
the peculiarly segregated labor markets of New York at the
beginning of the twentieth century, with its stereotyped Irish cops,
Jewish garment workers, and Italian laborers – exclusion was most
effective when African Americans were its victims. Unions often
found it necessary to include new European immigrants, but rarely
thought it prudent to reach out to people of color.
Following the mode of racial capitalism described by Robinson (1983), not only did capital use
racial distinctions to produce ethnically-specific job classifications, but mainstream White labor
institutions reproduced this strategy by maintaining racially exclusive or segregated unions (Hill
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1996). The result in New York was “not just discrimination, but total labor market segmentation”
(Wilder, 2000, 154).
Alongside these segmented organizations of labor was a small but influential non-profit
sector, which sought to reform city politics and uplift the poor. These organizations included
elite private charities, which channeled capitalists’ “conspicuous consumption” (Veblen, 1899)
toward a project of conspicuous philanthropy (Huyssen 2014), but also Progressive-era
settlement houses, which provided social services to the urban poor while inculcating their
political values.21 In New York, Progressive non-profits often focused on the physical elements
of housing, perpetuating what Angotti (2013, 4-6) calls the “urban fallacy” that social, political
and economic problems are best addressed by altering the city’s physical design. This took the
form of sponsoring tenement reforms, which mandated new building codes that made residences
safer but also more expensive, and, quite often, supporting “slum clearance” projects (Varga
2013).
During the mid-century period, labor institutions grew tremendously, reaching new and
since-unparalleled heights in terms of both size and influence. That growth, however, was
accomplished in part through institutionalization into partnerships with state and capital that
shaped these groups’ political horizons and influenced the programs they pursued.

The Union Cooperative Movement

21

Depending on the project, the values being taught could range from hosting tenant organizing projects (on the
left) to enforcing patriarchal and assimilationist norms (on the right), and often combined elements of the two
(Goldstein 2012, 15)
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Of all the grand projects working-class organizations undertook in mid-20th century New
York City, from coordinated mass strikes to political lobbying for expansive public services,
perhaps the most visible and tangible were the 21 limited equity cooperatives unions planned,
built and managed throughout the city. According to Freeman (2000, 105), “labor’s housing
program transformed the physical face and social geography of New York,” with unions building
more cooperative housing units in New York City than the rest of the country combined (ibid,
123). (See Table 1.) The coop movement carved out a home for labor in a city that – like all
others – was fundamentally a product of, and was daily reproduced by, labor.
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Table 1: Union cooperatives in New York City. All information compiled by Dave Hancock,
except displacement column (compiled by the author).

Name

Address

Borough

Zip

Units

Sponsoring

Years

Caused direct

Organization

Opened

displacement?

ACTWU and United
Amalgamated
Houses

Housing
98 Van Cortlandt Park S

Bronx

10463

1,435

504 Grand St

Manhattan

10002

235

Blvd

Queens

11367

2,500

530 Grand St

Manhattan

10002

807

Foundation

1927

No

ACTWU

1930

Yes

IBEW Local 3

1949

No

ACTWU

1951

Yes

1953

No

1955

No

1956

Yes

1958

No

1958

No

Amalgamated
Dwellings

Jewel Ave & Kissena
Electchester
Hillman Housing
Corporation
Harry Silver
Housing Coop

Amalgamated Meat
822 Midwood St

Brooklyn

11203

288

Mutual Housing
Association

Cutters
United Housing

3850 Sedgwick Ave

Bronx

10463

123

Foundation

East River
Housing
Corporation

United Housing
475 FDR Drive

Manhattan

10002

1,672

Foundation

Park Reservoir
Housing
Corporation

United Housing
98 Van Cortlandt Park S

Bronx

10463

273

Foundation

Earl Jimerson
Housing
Corportation

Amalgamated Meat
1407 Linden Blvd

Brooklyn

11212

423

Dennis Lane
Coop

Cutters
Amalgamated Meat

2141 Crotona Ave

Bronx

10457

280

Cutters

Prior
1959

condemnation

1961

Yes

Seward Park
Housing
Corporation

United Housing
413 Grand St

Manhattan

10002

111

1,728

Foundation

United Electrical,
Radio & Machine
Cedar Manor

116-11 157 St

Queens

11434

215

Workers

1961

No

1962

No

1963

Yes

1963

Yes

1965

No

1965

Yes

1966

No

Patrick E.
Gorman

Amalgamated Meat

Housing

1381 Linden Boulevard

Brooklyn

11212

240

Cutters
Typographical Local

Big Six Towers

59-55 47th Ave

Queens

11377

983

6
United Housing

Penn South

9th Ave and W. 26th St

Manhattan

10001

2,820

Concourse
Village

Foundation
Amalgamated Meat

775 Concourse Village E

Bronx

10451

1,883

Cutters

Amalgamated
Warbasse
Houses

United Housing
2800 W 5th St

Brooklyn

11224

2,585

Foundation
United Housing

Rochdale Village

169-65 137th Ave

Queens

11434

5,850

Foundation

Sam Burt

Prior

Houses

2675 W 36th St

Brooklyn

11224

147

Furriers

1966

condemnation

1971

No

1974

No

United Housing
Coop City

Coop City Boulevard

Bronx

10475

15,372

Foundation
1199 & United
Housing

1199 Plaza

2120 First Avenue

Manhattan

10029

1,594

Total:

41,453

Foundation

According to Schuman (2005, 2), the coop movement was organized around 7
principles,22 to which each coop abided with varying degrees of sincerity:

22

These are variations on “The Rochdale Principles,” the foundational creed of the cooperative movement
established in Rochdale, England by Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in 1844.
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1. “open membership”: cooperatives would be open to any worker who could afford the
down-payment and maintenance costs;
2. “one member-one vote”: coops would, to the greatest extent possible, be managed
democratically;
3. “savings returned to members in proportion to their patronage”: coops would be run
efficiently, with surpluses reinvested into other cooperative ventures;
4. “neutrality in religion and politics”: unlike previous New York City cooperative
developments – which were often organized around national, religious and party
affiliations (primarily Finnish or Jewish, and socialist or communist) – people of all
religious or political affiliations would be welcome in any coop;
5. “limited return on investment”: cooperators could only sell their homes for a set amount
– essentially what they paid for it, plus interest;
6. “constant education”: cooperatives would foster class consciousness, pro-union
sentiment and a culture of cooperation in all ventures;
7. “constant expansion”: the goal was to create as many units as possible, rather than to
perfect the model on a small scale.
These principles were embraced by the larger “modern housing” movement of the 1930s,
of which unions formed “a vital backbone” (Botein 2007, 802). Modern housers, who ranged
from working-class unionists to wealthy utopianists, sought to instigate the development of
large-scale cooperatives that would provide generous – even glorious – housing at an affordable
cost. Their model buildings would be designed to collectivize the often-atomized tasks of
socially reproductive labor by offering common areas for childcare, cooking, laundry, and more
(Reid 2013, 336). Building on models from Red Vienna and other early 20th century socialist
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experiments, urbanists like Catherine Bauer – who led the National Public Housing Conference
and later the Labor Housing Council – endeavored to challenge what they saw as Marxists’
defeatist attitude toward housing.23
Producing “modern housing” required four main components: 1) a sponsoring developer
willing to build without the expectation of exorbitant profits; 2) a population of residents
interested in participating in this type of social and economic arrangement; 3) a pool of money
for the initial investment in land and construction costs; and, 4) perhaps most vexingly in a
densely configured city like New York, a place on which to build. A group of New York City
unions – most prominently the garment workers (Amalgamated Clothing Workers [ACW] and
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union [ILGWU]) – were capable of securing the first
three of these conditions. First, they could sponsor projects that real estate capitalists might shun
as insufficiently profitable. Many of these unions had already been experimenting with unionbased healthcare projects, cooperative businesses, and labor banks, and were ready to embrace
cooperative housing (Radford 1996, 115).24 Second, they could educate and organize their
members to participate. Unions built a popular education program which promulgated the notion
that “only the labor movement could address workers’ needs and that housing should be top of
the list” (Aronowitz 2014, 149). Third, they could put their growing pension funds toward
cooperative development. According to ILGWU researcher Walter Mankoff (2012, NP), there
was suddenly “a large supply of funds in the hands of industry pension funds and insurance

23

According to Radford (1996, 80), “Bauer complained that Engels was so averse to what he regarded as ‘utopian’
thinking that he offered ‘not the slightest notion as to what new sort of environment the social revolutionist might
be fighting for… other than the abstract notion that the ‘contradiction’ between the city and the country must
eventually disappear” (Radford 1996, 80).
24

The ACW even ran the “Russian-American Industrial Corporation,” which operated 25 garment factories in the
Soviet Union during the New Economic Policy era (Radford 1996, 117).
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companies that needed investment opportunities…. Sponsoring housing and adding mortgages to
the portfolios accomplished two things for the union[s]. It made affordable housing available for
low and moderate income families, including ILGWU members, while the market interest rate of
5.5% doubled the pension fund income” compared to investments in treasury bonds. Cooperative
development, then, could act as a spatial fix for labor’s capital (Herod 2001, Ghilarducci 1992).
Once the pension funds got involved, local banks that owned mortgage debt in low-income
neighborhoods stepped in and provided further capital, hoping that redevelopment would shore
up their investments (Schwartz 1993, 30).
A series of public policies secured the final component that unions could not provide: the
land. In 1926, at the behest of union leaders like Stanley Hillman of the ACW and Modern
Housing movement figures like architect Clarence Stein25 (Schuman 2005, 2), the New York
state legislature passed the Limited Dividend Housing Companies Law. It not only provided tax
breaks for developers of low-income housing premised on less than six percent annual profits,
but also gave “condemnation rights” to coop developers, thus empowering sponsors to act as
agents of neighborhood clearance (Plunz 1990, 151). Sixteen years later, the state government
reupped their commitment to both the cooperative and the bulldozer with the Redevelopment
Companies Law, which encouraged the state to condemn buildings, sell the land to coop
sponsors, then provide a tax abatement for any increase in value post-redevelopment (Freeman
2000, 112). The 1949 Housing Act provided the final impetus for urban land clearance,
mandating that at least one home be demolished for every unit built in order not to increase the

25

No relation to the author.
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supply of low-cost housing and thus bring down local housing exchange values (González 2017,
59).
With these four components in place, New York’s most ambitious unions entered into a
long-term partnership with the New York slum clearance machine, including its chief architect,
Robert Moses. A particularly tight bond formed between Moses and the cooperative movement’s
leader, Abraham Kazan. Kazan – a garment unionist and president of the preeminent coop
development firm, the United Housing Foundation (UHF) – saw in Moses an opportunity to
secure large swaths of land for comprehensively planned cities-within-the-city. Moses – the
Parks Commissioner, public authority chairman, and all-around “master builder” (Caro 1976) –
saw in Kazan “a soulmate of sorts, a hard-driving closet utopian, willing and able to make deals
and overcome obstacles to get a job completed” (Freeman 2000, 114). In Schwartz’s (1993, 133134) explication of the partnership, liberals like Kazan were key to legitimating urban renewal
and securing public participation and approval:
Moses brought city officials, sponsors, and mortgage bankers
together, and he usually clinched Title I deals with last-minute tugs
on the Housing Authority for relocation units. But he could not
hammer the Title I’s and low-rent housing into the balanced
communities that local opinion required or supply community
advisors who would give their benediction to bulldozer clearance.
For this Moses needed liberal activists, who withstood the long,
thankless struggles for renewal…. Although his neighborhood allies
could never ignore the way Moses drove tenants off redevelopment
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sites, they closed ranks around what they believed were the decent
projects that would reclaim neighborhoods.”
Unions thus became a key force in the transformation of New York City and the
dislocation of a great number of working-class residents (Straus 2010, 199).
With this partnership between labor, capital, and the state established, the movement was
poised to grow at an astonishing pace (Gold 2014, 99). Toward this goal, in 1951 Kazan
organized the UHF, a non-profit corporation that consolidated labor’s sponsoring power into one
organization.26 UHF in turn created Community Services, Inc, headquartered in a Lower East
Side union coop building, to offer what Mankoff calls “‘one-stop’ services to plan, design,
relocate site tenants, build and help operate the UHF sponsored cooperative housing
developments” (Mankoff 2012, NP). Soon, new coops were emerging across the city.
Several union projects were built through urban renewal and neighborhood demolition, as
discussed later in this chapter. Others, like the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers’
Local 3’s sprawling Queens complex, Electchester, were premised on the opposite logic: the
expropriation of upper-class spaces (in this case a luxury golf course) for working-class housing
and social reproduction (Botein 2009, 179). Still other projects, like the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters’ Concourse Village in the Bronx, were built atop publicly owned infrastructure – in that
case a train yard. All were premised on securing a place for an element of the working class that
unions understood to be unserved by the dichotomous federal policies of public housing (for

26

Though led by garment union veterans, UHF at its peak represented 27 housing companies, 24 unions,
settlement houses, political and cultural clubs, and leading housing reformers (Mankoff 2012, NP; Schwartz 1993,
176).
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which their wages were too high) and suburban home ownership (for which their wages were too
low) (Botein 2009, 176), but who still desired to remain in the city.
Their mission, however, went beyond housing, and touched on many dimensions of
social reproduction. The coops aimed to create opportunities for as much worker-control as
possible, creating an expansive network of cooperatively run services for workers’ health,
development, and leisure, and fostering a culture of do-it-ourselves cultural and spatial
production. At various times and places, the union coops included: child care centers; nursery
schools; school bus charters; adult educational initiatives; social service support centers;
supermarkets and food coops, often linked to politically aligned upstate farms; furniture stores;
garages; bakeries; Kosher butchers; pharmacies and health clinics; sports teams; dance halls;
political organizations; energy purchasing (and later generating) schemes; libraries; music
rooms; recreation centers; auditoriums; theater clubs; tea rooms; bars; shopping centers; bowling
allies; office space; banks and credit unions; and, in at least one case, an auxiliary police force
(Aronowitz 2014, 149; Freeman 2000, 119-120; Schuman 2005, 2; Radford 1996, 18; Botein
2009, 178; Mankoff 2012, NP). Labor journalist A.H. Raskin, writing about Electchester,
described its union sponsor as “the operator of an industry-financed welfare state that supplies
cradle-to-grave protection for the families of 30,000 members” (quoted in Botein, 2009, 184).
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Figure 2: Photographs of cooperatively run services, including pharmacies (top left), furniture
stores (top right), power plants (bottom left), and eyeglass stores (bottom right) in union coop
developments (United Housing Foundation 1971).

In terms of physical design, the coops were almost entirely built on superblocks, several
parcels of land across city blocks combined into large, street-ringed spaces. While superblock
design would be roundly ridiculed by Jane Jacobs (1961) and those she inspired (Freeman 2000,
117), they were strongly preferred by coops designers because they allowed for both more
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expansive planning and less expensive costs (Radford 1996, 78). The vast majority of coops
were designed by one architect, Herman Jessor, who worked as a draftsman on the Amalgamated
Houses (1927) and an architect on union developments up through Coop City (1971) (Schuman
2005). Early projects were more architecturally ornate, with elaborate bricking patterns, water
features and winding pathways, while later projects tended to be more functionalist, with large
slab towers set at odd angles in large green spaces (Freeman 2000, 116). Plunz (1990, 286-287)
describes this shift as reflecting the UHF’s transition from “political progressivism” to “social
institutionalism.”
Another part of that social institutionalism was an attitude toward race and housing that
ranged from incrementally integrationist to staunchly segregationist, blatantly violating the
cooperative movement’s first principle of “open membership.” This reflected the racial
segmentation of the labor force, but also the segregation of many of the city’s unions and their
uneven commitments to civil rights in the residential realm. Perhaps the most extreme case was
Electchester, IBEW’s 103 acre, 38 building, 2,400 apartment complex. According to MidQueens Citizens Committee for Civil Rights (MQCCCR), which protested Black exclusion from
the development, Electchester was 99.99% White. In the mid-1960s, MQCCCR staged a
campaign for integration, targeting IBEW president Harry Van Arsdale, picketing outside the
Central Labor Council offices and filing complaints with the New York City Commission on
Human Rights, but the union never admitted guilt and the activists eventually ended their fight.
According to Botein (2009, 186), Van Arsdale’s analysis of their membership reflected
Katznelson’s “city trenches” thesis: “his members might accept integration at work, but
demanded insularity at home.”
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It was not just the more conservative Van Arsdale, however, that held this position. The
garment workers, often considered among the more social democratic New York City unions,
also upheld segregation in some of their cooperatives (Freeman 2000, 118). East River Houses –
the country’s first Title I project (ibid, 115) – was 97.6 percent Jewish (Turner 1984), prompting
a civil rights lawsuit from Black, Latino, and Asian ILGWU members who sought entry (Gold
2014, 99). According to an interview with former ILGWU Associate Research Director and
current Penn South treasurer Walter Mankoff, later garment union projects like Penn South
(discussed below) were more racially integrated, but still primarily Jewish in their early years
(Mankoff 2018). UHF’s Rochdale Village was an attempt to do things differently, but even that
project – which was promoted as a model of integration – started out 85 percent White (Freeman
2000, 119). For the movement’s leaders, residential desegregation was either not prioritized or
actively resisted, leading to a landscape of racially unequal opportunities for spatial selfdetermination.

The Battle of Chelsea
Union-sponsored urban renewal was a form of intra-class conflicts – a process by which,
as Purser (2016, 396-397) describes in another context, “the vertical conflict between landlord
and tenant is subtly transmuted into a lateral context” between workers. Of the 22 union
cooperatives, 7 were built through union-sponsored urban renewal, and 2 were built on the sites
of previous city-sponsored “slum clearances.” In those locations, union workers were able to free
themselves from landlord exploitation through a process that ensured that other, poorer workers
would suffer even more extreme exploitation. This dynamic can best be understood through a
close look at one particular struggle around urban renewal and union coop development. Perhaps
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the best documented fight took place in Chelsea around the development of UHF’s Penn South
coop, the project that, Mankoff told me in an interview, required the greatest amount of
demolition and the largest number of tenant relocations of any union cooperative in New York
City.27
Penn South undoubtably stands among the movement’s greatest successes. With 10
buildings averaging 22 stories and comprising 11,350 rooms, stretched out over more than 20
acres of central Manhattan, it is an impressively large-scale development. For over 50 years, it
has maintained its limited equity model, even as other coops have opted to move toward market
rates, and thus remains a pillar of affordability in a neighborhood now known for hypergentrification (Moss 2017). It even managed to maintain electricity during hurricane Sandy,
when the rest of the neighborhood went dark, because of its unique and far-sighted cogenerated
energy system. While these achievements have been rightfully lauded, few now recall the
concerted struggle that took place over the coop’s founding: site tenants vociferously opposed
UHF’s urban renewal plan and protested the indignities they suffered during the relocation
process. To view the history in full, it is necessary to consult two sets of archives: the oft-told
narratives presented in the UHF’s papers, as well as the lesser known histories told in the site
tenants’ papers.28 Through this juxtaposition, a fuller picture emerges, which highlights the
internal contradictions of labor’s production of space in the Keynesian city.

27

At various times, the project has also been known as Penn Station South, Mutual Redevelopment Houses,
ILGWU Houses, and International Union Houses. For simplicity’s sake, I will only refer to the project as “Penn
South” – the name in most common use today – unless quoting a source that used another name.
28
The UHF archives are primary held by the Kheel Center in Cornell University’s Catherwood Library, though a
growing body of materials is being archived online through the Herman Liebman Memorial Fund
(http://www.hermanliebman.coop/). Materials on the site tenants’ fight against UHF were largely culled from the
Metropolitan Council on Housing’s papers in the Tamiment Archives, housed in New York University’s Bobst
Library. Straus 2010 is one of the only sources to tell both sides of this story.
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Penn South was one of three large Title I projects planned to remake the Chelsea area,
which collectively comprised 22 blocks and 24,597 units of housing (Bennett 1959). These three
developments would soon be joined by two public housing projects, Fulton and Chelsea Houses
(Ennis 1959). Backers of these clearance projects included not only ILGWU and UHF, but also
housing reformers like the Hudson Guild Neighborhood House (a progressive-era settlement
house) and their spin-off non-profit organizations, such as the Chelsea Committee for
Neighborhood Development. In a retrospective review of foundation involvement in Chelsea
non-profits, Tjerandsen (1980, NP) tellingly wrote, “In general, those institutions with limited
local membership strongly supported the idea. They included, in addition to Hudson Guild, the
Sloane YMCA, General Theological Seminary, French Hospital and the Episcopal churches. The
only ones who were against it were the people.” Other prominent Title I supporters included
those the New York Times euphemistically called “old Chelsea families” – i.e. wealthy White
property owners – who feared they were being replaced by “Puerto Rican and Negro families on
the bottom of the economic ladder” (Ennis 1959).
While supporters of “slum clearance” depicted the neighborhood as dirty, dangerous and
darkening, many Chelsea community organizations attempted to reframe their neighborhood as
worthy of preservation. In organizing material and press statements, they depicted the
neighborhood as a culturally rich, multi-lingual, diverse, affordable, working-class stronghold
whose physical infrastructure could use some work but deserved to be defended. These groups
included ethnic, religious and political clubs, churches and synagogues, tenant associations, and
more. They combined into ad-hoc coalitions – at times harmonious, and at times competitive –
such as the Alinsky-advised Chelsea Community Council (the largest and most internally
fractious coalition), the Chelsea Save Our Homes & Businesses Committee/ Comité de Chelsea
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Para Proteger Nuestros Hogares y Negocios (supported by and affiliated with the American
Labor Party and Metropolitan Council on Housing), Chelsea for Chelsea, Inc (a newly formed
organization of vulnerable tenants, small business owners and building owners), and the Chelsea
Tenants Center (a leftist tenant organizing project). A characteristic headline from the New York
Times in 1958 described the fight to reframe Chelsea as: “Chelsea Likes Its Melting Pot, Fights
for Middle-Cost Housing” (Benson 1958). This mode of defense foreshadowed the findings of
scholars like Fried and Gleicher (1961) and Gans (1962), who highlighted the life of so-called
“slums” over the perception of “blight.” In a letter written to Robert Moses criticizing his
seeming fixation on Chelsea for slum clearance projects, the Chelsea Save Our Homes and
Business Committee wrote in defense of their neighborhood:
it is hard to understand how the Slum Clearance committee can
propose a luxury housing project which would wipe out the entire
community and cause untold hardship on the residents and
businessmen who feel that they have a right to remain in Chelsea.
Furthermore, we feel that any planning concerning slum clearance
or rehabilitation should be a joint action between residents,
businessmen and organizations within the area and within the
neighborhoods involved and the governing bodies of our City, State
and Federal Governments (Chelsea Clinton News, 1/7/1960).
UHF, however, stuck to the standard urban renewal framing of poor neighborhoods as
slums that needed to be demolished in order to be saved. In their original “starter” document, the
booklet distributed to the first cooperators at Penn South, Kazan wrote in the introduction, “One
of the most persistent and complex problems in the City of New York is how to eliminate its
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slums and replace them with housing that families with modest incomes can afford. This is the
story of how a slum was eliminated and how 2,820 families helped to provide themselves with
shelter at a reasonable price” (United Housing Foundation, 1966, 2). The document goes on to
describe the Chelsea in grim terms:
This area, commonly known as part of the old Chelsea district, did
not enjoy the reputation of being the most pleasant residential area
of the city. Except for three or four residential buildings that were
ten or fifteen years old, the site was occupied by a mixture of loft
and factory buildings, a number of warehouses, garages, parking
lots, wholesale establishments and a large number of three story
brownstone buildings. Most of these brownstones, remnants of
better days of a period almost gone and forgotten, were transformed
into furnished rooming houses. That does not imply that these
rooming houses were occupied only by single people. The acute
shortage of housing in the city and the large influx of minority
groups made it financially attractive for the owners of these
buildings to house, in these small, single rooms, families with
children (United Housing Foundation 1966, 3-4).
In the conclusion, UHF wrote to Penn South cooperators: “The construction of the development
has been completed. A deteriorating area in the city has been eliminated. The slums have been
replaced with good housing. Six thousand persons have the opportunity to live in decency, to
have sunlight, fresh air, to enjoy gardens, trees, and flowers” (ibid, 33). It was taken as a given
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that vanishing few of those six thousands persons enjoying Penn South’s beauty were those who
had suffered through the poor conditions the development eliminated.

Figure 3: Imagery of pre-Penn South Chelsea and justifications for demolition (United Housing
Foundation 1966).
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The candor with which UHF, and Kazan himself, spoke about neighborhood clearance is
remarkable. This document was the first thing new buyers would see, and its first section – as
well as a significant portion of Kazan’s introduction – is devoted to a discussion of the
neighborhood’s demolition and the former residents’ resettlement. This suggests both that “slum
clearance” was a point of pride for UHF and a time when that mode of development was
becoming an increasingly polarizing political issue in the city and throughout the country.29
While their initial defense of “slum clearance” was moral – that they swept away the bad
and built up the good – the document goes on to provide a more prosaic explanation: it was
economical. High central-city land values would make acquisition expensive and carrying
charges high. It would be far cheaper to raise funds under the banner of a Redevelopment
Housing Company, which could then petition the city to condemn the site and auction it back to
them. ILGWU pledged to invest $20 million in pension funds to the project, which brought in
further investment from the Teachers’ union pension fund as well as Chemical Bank and the Dry
Dock Savings Bank (Straus 2010, 205). With this financial commitment secured, UHF petitioned
the city’s Slum Clearance Committee to approve the project under Title I, which enables them
“to acquire the property at a write down price, the loss being absorbed by the Federal
government to the extent of two-thirds and the State and City sharing the balance of one-sixth
each” (United Housing Foundation 1966, 5). The Slum Clearance Committee was swayed. On
August 18, 1957, Moses’s committee affirmed with UHF’s economic arguments against low-

29

Frequent references to the site tenants’ alleged impermanence suggests that the latter was an important factor.
For example, UHF claims they could not substantiate the site tenants’ racial demographics because “a large part of
the population was always on the move” (United Housing Foundation 1966, 4)
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income housing, as well as their characterization of the neighborhood as “blighted”30 (New York
Times, 1957).
The Slum Clearance finding was followed by Planning Commission hearings that UHF
(1966, 5) describes as “long and protracted,” and a roiling set of hearings at the Board of
Estimate (BOE). According to accounts in the neighborhood newspaper Chelsea Clinton News
(12/18/1958), about 500 “tenants, barristers, businessmen, landlords and other interested
persons” attended – half in support of Penn South, and half in opposition. The protestors carried
signs in English and Spanish reading, “Save Our Homes,” “Defeat Penn Station South,” and
“Don’t Wreck Our Communities,” while supporters’ signs read, “We Need Penn Station South.”
Dozens of opponents spoke out. In their testimonies, they emphasized the tight housing market,
particularly given the urban renewal projects that were reducing the affordable housing stock
while creating competition among those they called urban renewal “refugees,” they decried the
prejudice of displacing this largely Puerto Rican community and cutting its social ties, they
claimed the new “affordable housing” would not be affordable to them, and they emphasized the
need to improve existing housing while preserving communities (Chelsea Clinton News,
12/18/1958).
Those testifying in favor of Penn South included Kazan, H. Daniel Carpenter of the
Hudson Guild settlement house, and Roger Starr, then Executive Director of the City Housing
and Planning Council of NYC and future pro-displacement City Planning Commissioner.31
Representing non-profit housing reformers, Carpenter espoused the logic of urban renewal: Penn

30

The only evidence of “blight” cited in the committee’s report were two five-story tenements in need of repair
(New York Times, 1957).
31
As discussed in the following chapter, Starr famously advocated for “planned shrinkage,” or a policy of starving
services in poor neighborhoods in order to encourage their residents to leave the city (Wallace and Wallace 1998).
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South, he rightly argued, would create a beautiful and affordable environment with “more safe
and dignified living conditions” for those who bought into it; stopping the project, he more
dubiously asserted, would perpetuate “the trend of deterioration which, if allowed to continue for
another decade or two, would result in a segregated neighborhood and segregated schools and
instructions” (Chelsea Clinton News, 12/18/1958).The solution for Carpenter, Kazan, Starr and
others, then, was to push out poor workers and demolish their homes in order to create a new
environment for a preferred strata of labor.
Following the BOE hearing, 60 site tenants, organized with Chelsea for Chelsea and with
legal representation from Robert Martin Davis, filed a temporary injunction to stop the Title I
project in the moments before the properties were to be auctioned to the UHF and ILGWU. The
injunction called into question “the truthfulness and adequacy” of surveys used in the relocation
process. The site tenants claimed that Penn South’s “proponents have failed to conduct an
accurate survey and, not having discharged this statutory duty they are totally unequipped to
appraise the possibility – let alone predict the likelihood – of relocating the families who would
be displaced” (New York World Telegram, June 29, 1959).
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Figure 4: Posters for an anti-Penn South rally. Tamiment archives, Tam 173, Box 28, folder 30
(“Penn Station South”).

The tenants’ legal strategy, however, did not find favor in the courts, and the BOE voted
to support the project. The federal and city governments then spent approximately $18 million
purchasing the land and buildings (New York Times 6/13/1959), and, on June 30, 1959,
auctioned them off to UHF (United Housing Foundation 1966, 5). From this point onward, UHF
assumed responsibility for resettling each resident of their future development site.
According to their own survey, UHF found that as of July 1, 1959, there were 2,646
families and “over 900 single transients” in 361 buildings on the site, few of whom would
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qualify for apartments in Penn South (United Housing Foundation 1966, 6).32 In order to manage
this substantial movement of low-income workers off the site, UHF established a management
office within the project’s boundaries; that same day, they sent a letter to all residents saying
they were about to be displaced (ibid, 6). According to neighborhood organizers, this letter – sent
in English only, despite the large Spanish-speaking population – used confusing language and
timelines to suggest tenants had to move immediately, when in fact no demolition would take
place for one to two years (depending on tenants’ location on the site) (Chelsea Community
Council, ND, “Penn Station South”, 2).

32

This was about 40% more families than the slum clearance committee had counted (New York Times,
8/19/1957).
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Figure 5: Photograph of the United Housing Foundation’s relocation office, exterior. Kheel
Archives, collection number 6129, box 01, folder 47.
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Figure 6: Photograph of site tenants meeting with a relocation coordinator at the United
Housing Foundation’s relocation office. Kheel Archives, collection number 6129, box 01, folder
47.
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Figure 7: Photograph of site tenants meeting with staffers at the United Housing Foundation’s
relocation office. Kheel Archives, collection number 6129, box 01, folder 47.

In their starter document, UHF describes the Penn South relocation process as smooth,
comprehensive, and equitable, with all tenants finding a suitable new home inspected by the
city’s Department of Real Estate and deemed to be of high quality (United Housing Foundation
1966, 6). Stories from site tenants, however, belie this tidy narrative. In one report, a
neighborhood coalition alleged that after taking ownership of the buildings, ILGWU hired
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“unskilled, non-union maintenance men” for the buildings they had taken, and immediately
diminished the level of service and maintenance in order to compel tenants to leave immediately.
ILGWU sent fake rent increase notices in order to spur people to visit the relocation office, and
issued 30-day eviction notices that did not make any mention of the union’s responsibility to
relocate tenants (Chelsea Community Council, “Penn Station South.” ND, 5). Once site tenants
agreed to visit potential new apartments, many found them to be substandard and overpriced.
Following complaints, a city representative conducted an inspection of an apartment that had just
one week prior been inspected and approved by the city’s Real Estate Department. The inspector
determined, “It was miserable. There were broken windows, the floor was bare and splintered,
the toilet had no seat and there was no electrical outlet there, only the old gas one used in 1900”
(Haddad, 1959).
Site tenants organized around these indignities, taking their outrage to the streets, the
churches and the state. On August 19th, 1959, about 11 months before the first round of
demolitions was set to occur, 500 Chelsea tenants rallied at St. Columbia Roman Catholic
Church. They had telegraphed President Eisenhower about their plight and the planned action,
and in response Eisenhower sent two Federal Housing and Finance Agency representatives to
monitor the event. According to the New York Post, “the sponsors were accused of not
inspecting listed apartments resulting in ‘wild goose chases’ to substandard apartments, to
housing in the worst sections of the city and to generally unacceptable places.” Site tenants also
alleged that since the ILGWU took over their buildings, they regularly suffered hot water
outages, their halls were not swept, and repairs were haphazard. 50 children chanted “save our
homes!” as they marched down 25th street. The tenants ended the night by hanging an effigy of
ILGWU president David Dubinsky from a nearby lamppost (New York Post, 8/20/1959).

136

As these actions escalated, Chelsea organizations sought to collect data they could use in
building their case against displacement. The Chelsea Residents Committee organized site
tenants to demand proper maintenance in their own homes before participating in the
resettlement process, identify and reject substandard apartments they were being offered, and
speak up if ILGWU was re-renting apartments after site tenants had relocated (Chelsea Residents
Committee, ND, “Fact sheet for site tenants of Penn Station South Area”). Meanwhile, Chelsea
Save Our Homes and Business Committee (ND) created a survey instrument to collect data on
the conditions of buildings, apartments and families on the site.
With this data in hand, 30 site tenants filed affidavits with Manhattan Borough President
Hulan Jack about improper relocation policies. Several families protested that they had been
moved to worse neighborhoods, and that ILGWU had failed to maintain the buildings during
relocation – a form of harassment known as constructive eviction. Several site tenants reported
that they were already urban renewal refugees: they had been displaced by prior urban renewal
actions, including at least one sponsored by ILGWU, and were then sent to Chelsea, only to be
displaced to make way for Penn South. One site tenant, John R. Palmer of 361 West 27th street,
wrote about being relocated to the Penn South area after being displaced by ILGWU’s unbuilt
Seward Park project the prior year:
I was forced out of that site when I was served with a dispossess
before being offered another apartment. When I told the relocation
authorities that they were sending me into another area where the
buildings were going to be demolished, they told me it was the best
they could do for me (New York Times, 8/24/1959).
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These affidavits are remarkable not only for the individual predicaments they describe,
but as a representation of the crisis cities willingly entered into by embracing large-scale urban
renewal schemes. According to the New York Times, “the spate of protests indicated that project
developers were being confronted with a growing problem of finding new homes for families
uprooted by the Title I Program” (New York Times, 8/24/1959). Across the city, low-income
working-class tenants, overwhelmingly African American and Latino, were going through a
complex, chaotic and rapid spatial reshuffling, throwing families and communities into turmoil,
re-mapping the race and class dynamics of the city, and creating investment opportunities and
spatial fixes for elements of both capital and labor.
The site tenants’ actions highlighted this crisis, forcing Mayor Wagner to leave his
vacation early and claim responsibility for oversight over resettlement practices from Borough
President Jack. Wagner then promulgated a pair of rule changes that aimed to smooth – not stop
– Title I displacement: the Department of Real Estate would inspect replacement housing before
tenants moved in, and no tenant would be moved to a site already under consideration for
another Title I project. There was no guarantee, however, that resettlement areas would not
become future Title I projects. At the same time, Borough President Jack announced that he was
creating a watchdog group to monitor the Penn South resettlement process.
The city did not, however, seek to stop the displacement machine from churning onward:
that same week, the City Planning Commission granted Moses’ Slum Clearance Commission
$10 million for relocation funds on eight additional Title I projects (Crowell 1959). Days later,
Davis – the lawyer representing the aggrieved site tenants – reported receiving a call at 2:10 am
on the morning of August 28, 1959: a “telephone death threat if I do not shut up about the Penn
Station South project” (NY Times 8/29/1959).
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Days later, 500 site tenants attended a meeting, conducted in Spanish and English, to plan
the next phase of the struggle. They booed Wagner and Jack’s recent reforms, saying that until
there were enough low-rent apartments in the neighborhood for them to move into, the project
should be halted. After pledging to file a court injunction to that effect, the site tenants voted to
initiate a rent strike against the ILGWU (Alden 1959).
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Figure 8: Rent strike leaflet distributed by the Chelsea Community Council. Chelsea Community
Council. “Boycott Rent Strike Now.” No date, Tamiment archives, Tam 173, Box 28, folder 30
(“Penn Station South”).

In order to quell the emerging rebellion, Borough President Jack visited the neighborhood
with the Chelsea Community Council, a group that was internally divided over Penn South, with
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the Hudson Guild settlement house leading the pro-clearance fraction. Hoping to be greeted as an
ally, he was instead meet by what the New York Times called “jeering, embittered tenants.” In a
cold rain, Jack set out on a media tour of apartments in the area, where he was trailed by site
tenants carrying signs and chanting. One tenant proclaimed, “We lived here for years and we’re
being treated like refugees” (Burks 1959).
The demonstration pushed Jack, but not far enough; the Borough President walked away
from the event calling on the city only to take “greater care” in relocation, and endorsing the
establishment of a central relocation agency (Burks, 1959).33 Two months later, the “watchdog
group” Jack empaneled fell apart. While most of its members agreed that site tenants were being
mistreated, a minority – led by the Hudson Guild’s Carpenter – refused to sign on to any such
statement, and instead red baited the site tenants’ leadership, claiming that Chelsea Tenants
Center leader Robert Wood was a former member of the Communist Party (Phillips 1959). This
foreclosed yet another avenue of protest for the site tenants.
Still, site tenants continued with a form of community-based planning – likely far too late
in the process to be implemented, but an important organizing strategy nonetheless. While
records of the plans themselves could not be located, pamphlets advertising the process remain,
and suggest an intensive and creative process aimed at posing a positive vision for the area that
contrasted with both the status quo and the urban renewal plans on offer. The Chelsea
Community Council organized “block committees” that would conduct house by-house surveys
of conditions and demands, and compile them into a plan for the area. In a CCC flyer aimed at
encouraging participation in their alternative planning process, the group proclaimed:

33

This would eventually become the Department of Relocation, where a young Carl Weisbrod – future City
Planning Commissioner during de Blasio’s first mayoral term – would get his start in managing displacement.
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“Now, TODAY, you can join with others to not only oppose this
Title I project, but develop a plan for your own block. It’s not
enough to fight against a project, but we and our neighbors must be
FOR something else. This is the purpose of the block committees:
TO FIGHT THIS PROJECT AND TO DEVELOP AN
ALTERNATIVE PLAN” (Chelsea Community Council flyer,
marked “received 10/8/1959”).
Around the same time, the Chelsea Tenants Center was also circulating a plan opposing
Penn South and calling for a “series of ‘vest pocket’ low and middle income public housing
projects” and an effort to “improve existing Chelsea housing by a ‘remove violations’ campaign”
aimed at the worst of the neighborhood’s landlords. In contrast to UHF’s vision, they alleged that
Penn South
will drive out the heart of the Chelsea neighborhood over two
thousand low income families, pack most of them into other
neighborhoods, already over-crowded, and replace them with
middle and high-income families who now have comparatively
good housing right where they are.
In a sign of things to come, the Chelsea Tenants Center also began calling out the
Chelsea Community Council for failing to fully oppose Penn South (Chelsea Tenants Center,
ND, “THE CHELSEA TENANTS CENTER Is Opposed To The Construction of The ILGWUPenn Station South Project.”). Soon thereafter, the internal contradictions of the Chelsea
Community Council caused the group to explode. On January 8th, 1960, the CCC issued a fourpage document entitled IT IS TIME that made public the internal political debates and differences
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among Chelsea residents and organizations, with ILGWU and their Settlement House partners
the Hudson Guild on one side and the Chelsea tenant community on the other. For years, the
documents’ authors wrote, they were attacked unfairly by “Mr. H.D. Carpenter, of the Hudson
Guild Neighborhood House, with his clique and claque” of supporting organizations (Chelsea
Community Council, 1960, 1). They remained silent, however, not only because they respected
the work of the settlement house and the union, but because in 1956 Carpenter had “applied for
the funds for the development of this Chelsea Community Council” from the New York
Foundation and the Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation, and they feared criticizing Carpenter would
jeopardize the coalition’s funding. After Carpenter secured $180,000 in funding ($1,695,485.82
in 2018 dollars), he made himself half-time director and hired a staff. While the CCC was
supposed to be a democratic organization that represented all of its members, the document
alleges “it is quite clear that Mr. Carpenter saw a so-called community organization as nothing
more than a sophisticated extension of his neighborhood house,” resulting in “a net of conflicts
of interests” (ibid, 2). Carpenter is then alleged to have sabotaged the group, using procedural
actions to stymy effective mobilizations against Penn South. Father Dunn of St. Columba’s
church took over the Council and tried to pursue a more democratic and confrontational path,
though at such a late stage it was difficult to make a dent in the project.
In late January, 1960, the New York Times reported: “Chelsea Project on Unity Splits
Up” (Brewer 1960). The Hudson Guild and allied groups left CCC, claiming the coalition “is no
longer representative of the community, nor can it be as at present constituted administered.”
Upon their departure, an unidentified source told the Times the question driving the split was
“should an indigent section of the community be allowed to block desirable development just
because it can muster a majority vote?” This was a telling admission: a majority of the
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community fell into the category of “indigent,” and therefore ineligible for the “desirable
development” that was slated for their neighborhood. Nevertheless, opposing their own
displacement was framed as beyond the pale. The CCC went on, attempting to self-fundraise, but
was a shadow of its former self. Rather than continue to fund the group, the foundations upon
which it had relied instead funded an NYU sociologist, Dan Dodson, to study what had happened
to the CCC (ibid.).
From this point until Penn South’s inauguration, the opposition’s archive goes silent:
there are no records from 1960, when the CCC disbanded under the weight of its own
contradictions, to 1962, when Penn South opened. In that time, the entire area – save four
churches the city considered as having “roots deep in the community” – was demolished. As
Straus (2010, 211) points out, the city thus put UHF in the position of having “preserved
institutions for a community that it forced to leave.”
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Figure 9: The Penn South construction site, mid-demolition. Kheel Archives, collection number
6129, box 01, folder 47. The photo appears to have been taken from the roof of the Morgan
North Postal Facility on the corner of 9th Avenue and West 29th street, facing southeast.

By the UHF’s count, 73 percent of site tenants stayed within the city, and 45 percent of
those who remained in New York City moved within Manhattan. 59 households (2.2 percent of
those displaced) left for Puerto Rico, three more left the US altogether, and – without further
elaboration – five were “institutionalized” and four died before being resettled. According to the
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document, almost two thirds of tenants (1,686 families out of 2,646) “self-relocated,” or found
apartments to move into, with a buyout from the UHF based on the size of their old apartment
and moving expenses paid for by the city’s Department of Real Estate. The UHF interpreted this
as “indicative of their cooperative participation in the program” (United Housing Foundation
1966, 6, emphasis added). This language is deeply ironic: “cooperative” is the defining selfidentifier of the coop movement. For this language to be deployed in describing those
dispossessed by that very movement requires a particular ideological construction which
formulates the displaced as part of the community of workers engaged in the project of building
a worker’s city. Perversely, of course, these cooperators cooperated by getting out of the way,
and would not get to enjoy any of the benefits the union coop movement produced.
Of the third of site tenants who did not – or, we might infer, refused to – self-relocate,
596 households were relocated to apartments found by UHF, 106 went into public housing, 244
moved “without going through the established procedures,” and 15 were evicted for nonpayment of rent to UHF during the period of UHF receivership (United Housing Federation
1966, 8). Of roughly 2,600 site tenant households, 300 – presumably those with relatively high
paying jobs and cash on hand for a down payment – eventually moved into Penn South (ibid,
31).
All in all, UHF claims to have spent nearly three quarters of a million dollars34 on tenant
relocation. In their starter document, UHF explicitly relates the cost of displacement to the cost
of land, as was standard practice in urban renewal planning, noting that the $742,317 they spent
on relocation amounted to 12 percent of overall land costs. This kind of accounting illustrates
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Accounting for inflation, this amounts to over $6 million in 2018 dollars.
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Chatterjee’s (2014) theorization of new-build gentrification as a process by which labor is
alienated from the spaces they produce, in a corollary process to the alienation of labor from the
product of their waged work. In the case of Penn South, it was one strata of labor alienating
another from the spatial product of the latter’s labor. Once completed, 2,820 families moved in to
Penn South, of which 715 were ILGWU members. Others included “plumbers, taxi drivers, city
employees, federal civil service workers, painters, printers, salesmen, furriers, accountants,
dentists, and people with many other applications” (United Housing Foundation 1966, 32).35
They were workers, to be sure, but no more so than those displaced to make way for the project,
whose trades were not recorded.

Figure 10: Chart of Penn South land costs (United Housing Foundation 1966, 28).

35

The document does not stipulate what percentage of these residents were union members.
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During the final months of construction, the battle for Chelsea reemerged on the pages of
the New York Times editorial and letters sections. In February 1962, the Times published a Jane
Jacobs-inspired editorial entitled “How to Tame a Bulldozer” in support of new rules by the
Housing and Redevelopment Board that would require: 1) more oversight by the Board over
developers’ plans; 2) a mixture of taller and shorter buildings; and 3) some degree of
neighborhood preservation. “At last the crying in the bulldozed wilderness has been heard,” the
editors wrote (NY Times, 2/26/1962). This provoked supportive comments from Wagner aide
Warren Moscow and advocacy planner Walter Thabit.
Seeing the tides of opinion changing, Kazan joined the fray with a letter entitled “The
Necessary Bulldozer” that reads, in retrospect, as a desperate defense of his, UHF’s and Moses’s
historical legacy (Kazan, 1962). He frets that “Effective slum clearance in the City of New York
has come to a virtual standstill as a result of the campaign against the ‘bulldozer’ and the hue and
cry over relocation, usually referred to by ivory tower planners as dislocation.” After recognizing
that there are, indeed, places in the city worth preserving, Kazan argues that the preservationists
had gone too far. “We are unmoved by those who, like Mr. Moscow, emphasize preserving the
character of neighborhoods at all costs. In reality this means preservation of the miserable
conditions in which vast numbers of people live” (ibid, 1962).
As ever, Kazan fell back on “slum reasoning” (Loyd 2014, 30-31) by calling for the
demolition of poor housing without rehousing the poor. On this point, he was challenged weeks
later by tenant attorney Robert Martin Davis, who in a letter of his own, reminded readers that
the area cleared for Penn South contained over 30 “sound, habitable, rent-controlled residential
buildings housing hundreds of families. These structures were of the type to which governmental
and private agencies now relocate people who are scheduled for dislocation from other
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redevelopment areas” (Davis 1962). Davis notes that the bulldozer method does not solve the
problem of housing for the poor, but rather displaces the most vulnerable elements of the
working class while creating space for those the market is ready to serve – in this case, union
members and others who could afford to live in union-sponsored developments. It was, however,
too late for the Penn South site tenants. They had already been displaced, evicted, resettled or
incarcerated, and now the cooperative was ready to open atop the blocks they had once called
home.
Held on a scorching May 20th, 1962, the inauguration of Penn South was a triumphant
affair. On the dais sat President Kennedy36, New York governor Nelson Rockefeller, New York
City mayor Robert Wagner, former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, AFL CIO president George
Meany, David Dubinsky, Abraham Kazan, and, sitting beside him, Robert Moses. In his speech
to a crowd of 10,000 (Straus 2010, 197), Kennedy three times referred to Penn South as
representing “the unfinished business” of the New Deal, and described it as a model assemblage
of “labor, with good, effective, progressive leadership, and the city, and the state, and private
groups, and the federal government, together in cooperation” (Kennedy, 1963).

36

The UHF proudly noted that this was the first presidential attendance for a private housing project inauguration
(United Housing Foundation 1966, 33).
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Figure 11: New York Times advertisement for Penn South dedication. No date. Tamiment
archives, Tam 173, Box 28, folder 30 (“Penn Station South”).
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In fitting form, the project’s dedication was also a site of struggle. Outside the
celebration, former site tenants distributed 5,000 leaflets, demanding to be remembered and
calling on Kennedy not to repeat this “tragedy,” which pushed working people out to “worse
housing at higher rents than before.” Endorsed by Chelsea Save-Our-Homes and Business
Committee, the Committee to Save the West Side Village, the Lower East Side Tenants Council,
and the Metropolitan Council on Housing, the pamphlet blamed the federal government for
funding displacement projects, and demanded the president support projects designed for current
tenants and built on vacant or commercial sites, instead of prioritizing middle-income housing in
so-called slums (“Tenants to Kennedy: ‘Stop the Bulldozers,’” May 22, 1962). Even in the
UHF’s celebratory moment, those workers displaced to make way for other workers’ housing
were present, insisting they be remembered and fighting to prevent their history of displacement
from repeating.

“Tenant Against Tenant, Worker Against Worker”
Cooperatives built through urban renewal enabled one strata of labor to secure spaces for
their social reproduction by displacing and creating insecurity for another. Gold (2014, 100) calls
this “the paradox of postwar labor.”
Trade unions, which at least espoused solidarity with the working
class writ large, built self-identified ‘communities of working
people’ for their own members at the expense of working people
further down the ladder. They pitted tenant against tenant, worker
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against worker, and it was the relatively secure tenants and workers
who won out.
Those displaced were often granted first access to what was constructed, but this was an empty
offer: vanishingly few site tenants could afford to buy into union cooperatives (affordable though
they may have been compared to costs for comparable apartments built on a for-profit model),
and their monthly carrying charges were often significantly higher than prior tenement or
rooming house rents. This discrepancy could have been addressed through a set of cross
subsidies, with higher-waged workers paying more to enable prior site tenants to pay less, but
such a model was explicitly rejected by union leadership. A statement made by UHF vice
president George Schechter makes this quite clear: “We are opposed to rent supplements in a
cooperative because we believe each individual must make his own commitment. We will not
have people who are tenants of the Housing Authority” (quoted in Schuman 2005, 4).
This statement also points to an important fallacy of the system: most displaced site
tenants would not be relocated to public housing. In New York City, 15 percent of tenants
displaced by Title I projects qualified to move into the newly constructed buildings; another 35
percent would be placed in New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) developments; fully
half would move to other private housing, often in even worse conditions than they left (Freeman
2000, 114). Liberal urban renewal sponsors like UHF, however, clung to “an elaborate system of
denials about relocation” in order to frame their projects as heroic, and in line with generalized
working-class uplift and New York City’s reputation as a budding social democracy (Schwartz
1993, xix; see also Gans 1962).
Once unions cleared a space for themselves within the city, their “slum reasoning” (Loyd
2014, 30-31) dictated ever more expansion. According to Eisenstadt (2010, 39), “Kazan had long
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subscribed to the contagion theory of housing, that cooperatives had to be separate from the
baneful influence of the slums” that supposedly encircled them. This line of thinking was useful
to the banks that had made investments in those areas. The Bowery Savings Bank, for example,
provided the mortgage for UHF’s first Lower East Side project, the Amalgamated Dwellings.
They then encouraged UHF to dramatically expand the footprint of the area in order to protect
their assets, creating the sprawling complex of “Cooperative Village” by displacing 878 Puerto
Rican families (Schwartz 1993, 177). UHF then expanded even further into the Seward Park
Urban Renewal Area, displacing 2,099 families, of which 80% were low income and a majority
were Latino, African American and Asian (Turner 1984). That project, however, fell through,
leaving the land vacant for over 40 years – in part as a result of lobbying by union cooperators
who did not want to see public housing built on the site (Buettner 2014). Brutal as this mode of
development was, union leadership, financiers and state representatives deemed it both superior
to and more politically palatable than developing on vacant (or at least non-residential) land. By
the 1950s, homeowner associations, particularly in Queens, had formed effective blockades
against nearby union development on vacant land, relying on both narratives of overtaxed
infrastructure and red-scare fears of communist encroachment (Freeman 2000, 113-114).
When criticisms of urban renewal gained some prominence, unions engaged in Title I
clearance at first doubled down on their defense. Kazan accused urban renewal skeptics like Jane
Jacobs of harboring a bourgeoise consciousness “far-removed from the actual conditions under
which people in blighted areas spend their days.” This rhetorical framing skillfully occluded
those actually displaced from the discussion, recasting them as supporters of their own
dispossession, misunderstood by detached reformers. Kazan then pivoted toward mocking those
who argued for neighborhood preservation, casting them as sentimentalists and architectural
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determinists. In a UHF newsletter, he argued, “It seems to us that history has always been made
by people, not by buildings, and there certainly is not much point in saving old relics” (as quoted
in Freeman, 2000, 118). This charge of architectural determinism was ironic given UHF’s own
slum clearance logic, which positioned poor people’s housing as a pox on otherwise healthy
neighborhoods.
Jessor, the architect of most of New York’s union coops, was similarly defensive. He
responded to some mild criticism of Coop City37 in the journal Progressive Architecture with
furious indignation:
“The ‘social fabric’ so dear to the hearts of Jane Jacobs and her ilk
does not exist. The people living in the miserable slums are not there
by choice.... The people have no “grass roots” in these foul
rookeries. They live there because it is the cheapest place they can
find, horrible as it is. The only solution is large scale urban renewal
– the “Bulldozer Approach.” United Housing Foundation has been
very successful with this approach.... All of the families residing in
the area prior to demolition of these old rookeries were relocated to
habitations superior to the ones they had formerly occupied (quoted
in Schuman 2005, 6).
Jessor’s defense of urban renewal is an odd ideological stew, combining a pinch of
historical materialism with a heaping tablespoon of magical thinking. It was clearly true that
people who lived in poor conditions would have opted to live in better housing if they could

37

Notably, Coop City was not built on a former residential site, in recognition of the trouble such projects were
bringing UHF
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afford to do so; it was patently false, however, that the UHF “Bulldozer Approach” produced
new housing that most “foul rookery” dwellers could then move into.
In light of these full-throated defenses of “slum clearance,” it is worth recalling that New
York City unions’ turn toward urban renewal was, in fact, a strategic turnabout from earlier US
labor positions on housing. Catherine Bauer and the Labor Housing Conference vehemently
opposed “slum clearance” as the basis for union cooperative development, not out of sentimental
nostalgia for old buildings, or even out of solidarity with the poorest tenement dwellers, but
because they saw it as real estate hijacking planning in order to get bad properties off their
books. Lewis Mumford saw the state’s embrace of slum clearance as a sign that “the government
has temporarily given in completely to the demands of the financial and the realty interests and
has no serious intention of lending money for any modern community housing whatever”
(quoted in Radford 1996, 101). Unions’ embrace of slum clearance, then, suggested that the most
powerful aspects of labor were also implicated in this concession to real estate.
Unions were not alone in this turn. By 1937, most city housing organizations, from the
radical City-Wide Tenants Council to the reformist Citizens Housing Council, had come together
as part of the united front to embrace neighborhood clearance as the fastest and best way to
create space for public housing, their ultimate goal (Schwartz 1993, 77-79). By the end of World
War II, however, the radicals among them – and most forcefully African American and Puerto
Rican civil rights activists (Angotti 2008, 90) – came out against large-scale redevelopment
projects because of the massive and discriminatory displacements they produced. Unions and
reformist housing organizations did not follow suit; in fact, this growing anti-displacement
sentiment had the contradictory impact of further bonding Moses’s slum clearance machine with
the city’s liberal institutions. Among union and non-profit leaders, Title I became “the way to
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define their neighborhoods as forward looking and to isolate their opponents as destructive
nihilists” (Schwartz, 1993, 304). For a time, this proved a potent force in marginalizing those
who directly confronted and protested urban renewal. Eventually, however, the fallout from
urban renewal overwhelmed even its supporters, creating the conditions for new forms of
working-class neighborhood institutions – including most prominently the Community
Development Corporation – to rise as the predominant voice of urban community development.

Afterlife of the Coops
Penn South was the largest slum clearance project sponsored by a New York City union,
but it was also one of the last. Two more union coops, both in Coney Island, would be built
through urban renewal, but they were smaller projects, and in the case of the Sam Burt Houses,
the block had already been cleared for a never-built public housing project. Civil rights protests,
including those of Chelsea site tenants, made neighborhood clearance sufficiently unpopular that
unions felt they could no longer sponsor it (Straus 2010, 198-199). Instead of bulldozing
neighborhoods, union planners sought out large tracts of developable but non-residential land: a
train depot, in the case of Amalgamated Warbasse Houses; a racetrack, in the case of Rochdale
Village; a swampy amusement park, in the case of Coop City; and an industrial area, in the case
of 1199 Plaza.
Completed in 1971, Coop City would be by far the largest union development, and thus
the movement’s trophy. It was also, however, a site of pitched struggle. The project was of a
scale never before attempted anywhere in the United States, comparable to British and
Scandanavian “new towns.” It was built on the site of the failed “Freedomland,” a theme park
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owned by William Zeckendorf, the country’s biggest Title I developer (Angotti 2008, 72). Coop
City would thus bail out Zeckendorf, a major supporter of Moses and Governor Rockefeller,
while providing Kazan and UHF with an enormous building opportunity. Building on
swampland, however, was challenging; the buildings kept sinking and the costs kept rising,
resulting in higher carrying costs than either the union or the residents had expected (Freeman
2000, 120).
Once completed and occupied, the cooperators organized a “rent strike” and sparked “one
of the most extraordinary tenant struggles in United States history” (Freeman 2000, 120), not
least because the residents were joint owners, rather than renters. This baffled union leadership,
who framed residents’ protests as a false consciousness that had held over from their time as
slumlord tenants. Led by printers’ union and Progressive Labor Party member Charlie Rosen38,
the strikers withheld their carrying charges and demanded both a cap on rising costs and control
over the coop board (which was largely determined by UHF). With 80% participation, the
strikers held strong for 13 months, becoming the longest US rent strike of any comparable size.
Ultimately, the UHF balked and handed control of Coop City over to the State, which acceded
the cooperators’ demands (Freeman 2000, 121-123). UHF never built another project.39
While the acrimony at Coop City put a damper on the coop movement, it was far from
the only cause of the UHF’s decline. First and foremost, there was a growing gap between wages
and housing costs (Schuman 2005, 8). Both as a pretext for and as a result of urban renewal
(Fitch 1993), the city’s economic base was moving from manufacturing to services, and wage
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UHF leaders simply called him “that Maoist” (Schuman 2005, 8).
UHF was in the process of developing a final swampland project in Brooklyn called Twin Pines. In light of the
Coop City crisis and other factors, UHF sold the unfinished project, which became Starrett City, to a group of
private developers that included Fred Trump (Freeman 2000, 123).
39
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levels dipped (Botein 2009, 177). At the same time, with “slum clearance” off the table
(politically unpalatable by the late 1960s, and officially ended in 1974), the price of remaining
land was excessively high. Without new subsidies, producing sufficiently affordable housing was
a challenge. Inflation and a tight money market also made the cost of borrowing prohibitive;
Mankoff explained in an interview that Coop City started out with a 5.5% mortgage interest rate,
but it ended up ballooning to 13%.
When UHF stopped building, they also ceased providing the distinctive services that
distinguished union coops from other affordable housing projects. If they wanted to keep the
additional cooperatively managed elements of their developments, so crucial to labor’s collective
social reproduction, residents would have to take them on themselves, pay a private manager, or
let them go; most were forced to choose the final option.
In the years to come, some union cooperatives voted to exit their affordability programs
and become market-rate developments, creating an enormous amount of wealth in the hands of
working-class residents but diminishing the city’s affordable housing stock (Gold 2014, 240241). Penn South, however, has resisted such temptations, as have Coop City and many other
union coop projects. While they remain affordable, according to Mankoff, “labor has very little
to do with [them] currently.” They retain their identity as projects built by and for labor, but they
are no longer run with unions’ active support.
From a contemporary vantage, in which New York City labor is largely integrated into
the hegemonic pro-real estate mode of planning and the pain of prior displacements is largely
unmemorialized, the union coop movement can seem like an almost utopian model of urban
spatial production. Leveraging their own social and economic power, labor quite literally built a
home for itself in the heart of the country’s biggest city and developed an alternative model of
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development that stressed sociality and cooperation over isolation and competition. It did so,
however, at the expense of another group of workers: workers whose wages did not afford them
a home in the new cooperatives; Black, Latino, and Asian workers who were excluded from the
industries the unions represented, and often from the unions themselves; workers whose poor
housing conditions were not fixed by new development; workers who actively fought back
against their own displacement at the hands of “official labor” (Fitch 2006, 52).
These two sides of the story must be understood together: even in its glory days, New
York City labor’s pursuit of a landscape of social reproduction was a contentious process that
was premised on dispossessing structurally disempowered workers. This suggests a continuity in
capitalist planning politics, with labor self-divided and its more powerful elements incentivized
to partner with aligned fractions of capital and the state in pursuit of an urban spatial strategy.
Ultimately, the Keynesian City’s reliance on urban renewal as a development strategy
could not be maintained. It produced far more displacement than its meager provisions of public
and affordable housing could contain (Schwartz 1993), and the new housing Title I produced
was of little consolation to those it pushed out. As the following chapter will demonstrate, the
political tumult caused by slum clearance produced a political and economic crisis. Labor,
capital and the state needed to develop another strategy for spatial production, ultimately creating
the conditions for the rise of the non-profit housing industry and a new institutional form of
working-class movements for urban space.
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Chapter 3: Community and Development (1961-2001)

The displacement urban renewal inflicted sparked a tremendous resistance: opposition to
displacement was a key plank of the northern civil rights movement (Theoharis and Woodard
2003; Angotti 2008, 90); displaced people and those fearing displacement staged disruptive
demonstrations, sit-ins, and insurgent electoral campaigns (Muzio 2009); in cities across the
country, residents rioted, often explicitly pointing to the inequities of their own displacement and
– for some – rehousing in inadequate public housing (Fullilove 2005; Newman 2004). These
militant mobilizations, reminiscent of the strike waves in the 1930s, produced a generalized
“urban crisis” to which both the state and capital were compelled to respond in order to instill a
new form of social control and secure renewed rounds of accumulation (Friedland 1982, 125).
These mobilizations also produced a more specific political crisis for the Democratic
party. African Americans in northern cities, including many who had relatively recently arrived
during and following the great migration, were becoming an increasingly important component
of the party’s electoral strategies. By the late 1940s, the Democrats’ liberal-Dixiecrat coalition
was straining, with southern Democrats increasingly challenged by rising Black political
power.40 Meanwhile, as southern states shifted toward Republican voting majorities, northern
White working-class households were increasingly taking advantage of Federal Housing
Administration and GI Bill mortgage subsidies to leave central cities and move into exclusionary
suburban areas.41 City-level Democrats continued to view electoral-patronage machines that
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Piven and Cloward (171, 252) quote one Georgia Democratic Congressman declaring in frustration, “Harlem is
wielding more influence… than the entire white south.”
41
By 1960, White borrowers made up more than 98 percent of FHA loan recipients (Taylor 2019, 35).
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largely excluded African Americans as essential to maintaining political power, while nationallevel Democrats recognized that African American voters – including those displaced by urban
renewal – would be key to their continued hold on power.
In light of these dynamics, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations put forth a set of
policies that sought to undermine local leadership, incorporate African American voters, and
maintain the party’s hold on power. According to Gregory (1988, 87),
Just as the New Dealers had used the PWA, WPA, and other federal
programs to mobilize underrepresented constituencies such as urban
industrial workers, architects of the Kennedy-era New Frontier and
ensuing Great Society initiatives utilized these programs to harness
a rapidly growing black and largely urban electorate, which by 1960
numbered more than five million.
Federal anti-poverty funds would be allocated to groups and areas targeted for urban renewal,
with programs that “attempted to absorb the political participation of non-white and poor
communities within the new bureaucratic structures without increasing their political power”
(Friedland 1982, 130).
This political development set in motion a transformation in urban life and politics in New
York City and beyond, the effects of which continue to shape the contemporary landscape. In the
early-1960s, the federal government supported community-based mobilizations that challenged
urban power structures, in order to maintain Democratic legitimacy amidst an urban crisis; soon
thereafter, national and local Democrats worked to curtail those very dynamics by formalizing
and placing restrictions upon the non-profit housing and organizing sector. At the same time, the
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state expanded its welfare capacities, and in so doing helped grow the unionized public sector
workforce. By the 1970s, capital was crying bloody murder, and the state – New York State in
particular – rolled back social expenditures and disciplined unions, all while expanding the
infrastructure for non-profit proliferation. During the 1980s, the pace of both austerity and nonprofit professionalization accelerated dramatically, and by the 1990s the structural ties between
non-profit development, capitalist accumulation and political stability were firmly – though not
definitively – established. The solution to the 1960s urban crisis became firmly enmeshed in the
solution to the mid-1970s fiscal crisis, and the political-economic order that has since governed
the city.

From Urban Renewal to Community Development
One factor driving the militancy of mid-century anti-urban renewal politics in New York
was African Americans’ exclusion from the Democratic machine, as well as many of the city’s
most significant unions (Wilder 2000, 141; Viteritti 2017, 72). While this exclusion produced
serious material consequences in terms of lower wages in secondary sectors and fewer direct
means to affect city policy or access the benefits of patronage, it also enabled African Americans
to pursue more creative and confrontational modes of urban politics. Rather than be channeled
into the “city trenches” of separate work and neighborhood struggles, Black – as well as Latino
and Asian – community-based organizations fighting urban renewal and other abusive policies
could conjure a level of militancy that would force immediate state action (Katznelson 181, 114115; Marwell 2007, 25).
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According to Allen (1969, 70), writing in the late 1960s, widespread urban rebellions
forced the political and corporate elite “to conclude that direct white administration of the Black
ghettos, at least in some instances, was no longer operating satisfactorily. Some new form of
administration was clearly called for if the ghettos were to be pacified and ‘law and order’
restored.” While calling for a military response, Washington liberals also “hoped to find a
panacea in government-sponsored social welfare programs” of a kind never seen before: direct
government sponsorship of local central city urban organizing and development projects. Urban
housing was a key part of this program: Taylor (2019, 17) characterizes national Democrats’
strategy as assuming that “property ownership could tame the Black rebellion coursing through
the cities across the country” and “curtail their demands for entry into white suburban
communities.”
This domestic agenda fit closely with mid-1960s Cold War doctrines of participation and
containment (Roy, Schrader and Crane 2015).42 US policymakers were concerned with
expanding markets while pacifying leftist/anti-colonial movements domestically and
internationally, and they used many of the same approaches to achieve both ends (Rubin 1969).
This was not an accidental convergence, but rather a conscious example of policy mobility (Peck
and Theodore 2010). Citing telegrams from the United States Information Agency, Goldstein
(2012, 7) argues that US federal policy makers exhibited “a keen awareness of the bad publicity
that US civil rights abuses had generated over the past decade,” and understood that the
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This should be understood alongside the fact that urban renewal was also part of Cold War image-management,
with the U.S. trying to prove to both domestic and international audiences that capitalism, too, was capable of
producing large-scale modernist development (and specifically housing blocks) (Zipp, 2010).

163

“participatory strategies championed in the field of community development, an approach that
was in vogue around the world, during this period,” would be an effective countermeasure.
This was a project of the highest levels of the state, as well as organized capital and the
most powerful segments of labor. In 1967, for example, the National Urban Coalition was
founded to bring together corporations, unions and liberal leaders to resolve the urban crisis by
funding local non-profit initiatives. The Coalition’s board included several corporate luminaries,
including aerospace (i.e. military-industrial) executive Roy Ash (Litton Industries), Henry Ford
II (Ford), David Rockefeller (Chase), Frederick H. Close (Aluminum Company of America), and
Andrew Heiskell (Time, Inc.) (Allen 1967, 214). The New York City branch was run by
Christian A. Herter Jr., Vice President of Mobil Oil, with Roy Innis of CORE serving on the
board of directors. Once established, the Coalition went on to set up a Coalition Development
Corporation to advise business owners in Black neighborhoods, and a Coalition Venture
Corporation to fund new Black-owned businesses. The goal of these programs was to develop
Black capitalism as an alternative to the growing civil rights and Black power movements that
challenged the urban status quo (ibid, 234).
More than any other representative of organized capital, the most active promoter of nonprofit – and particularly African American – community development was the Ford Foundation.
Established in 1936 and fully operational by 1947 (Kohl-Arenas 2016, 20), Ford would grow in
the 1960s and ‘70s to become a key driver of this mode of urban development, matching taxsheltered profits (Gilmore 2007b, 46) with federal government grants to resolve the urban crisis
and, ultimately, safeguard capitalist control over the production of urban space. Through the
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promotion of Ford-selected leaders43 and investments into both community organizing and
physical development projects, the Foundation became a central player in promoting and
proliferating non-profit development – and particularly housing schemes – throughout the US,
with New York its “high-profile testing ground” (Ferguson 2013, 16). Doing so would, in
Foundation president McGeorge Bundy’s words, bring “new levels of investment to both the city
center and the southern rural slum” (as quoted in Allen 1969, 71). Bundy was also clear about
the threat of inaction: if the cities burn, “the White man’s companies will have to take the loss”
(ibid, 72). In their assessment, local Democratic political machines were unwilling or incapable
of securing the cities, and particularly their property investments, and so devised a counter
program “to activate local professional and political elites, and to induce them to be more
responsive to the urban Black populace” (Piven and Cloward 1971, 232).
Ford’s initial forays into funding urban initiatives included their Great Cities School
Improvement Project, Mobilization for Youth (MFY), and Gray Areas program in 1961 and
1962. These projects stressed participation from the poor as a key element of their methodology.
While Ford may have been imagined this as a containment strategy – and their programming was
later refined to be more effective in this regard – it initially released a burst of activity that
exceeded both Ford’s expectations and comfort zone. MFY, for example, was created to organize
Lower East Side residents and push the welfare, housing, and education agencies to be more
responsive to their demands.44 Growing out of the neighborhood’s settlement house movement
(Goldstein 2012, 122) – a Progressive Era precursor to contemporary service and advocacy non-
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The Ford Foundation preferred to call them “public entrepreneurs” (Ferguson 2013, 212), anticipating the
centrality of entrepreneurship to neoliberal urban governance (Harvey 1989b).
44
Francis Fox Piven and Richard Cloward – cited frequently in this dissertation – were both involved with MFY.
Cloward was one of its founders, and Piven was an early research associate.
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profits – the theory behind MFY was that, if effective, disenfranchised Lower East Siders would
develop trust in and attachment to the system (Marwell 2007, 25-26). Fairly quickly, however,
the group moved beyond this reformist horizon, and was pushing for bigger structural changes
and utilizing more disruptive tactics including rent strikes and school boycotts (Goldstein 2012,
124). By 1963, the FBI was covertly monitoring their operations, and the following year the New
York Police Department’s Bureau of Special Service opened its own investigation. This
prompted Mayor Wagner to contact MFY’s board president to complain that their organization
was “filled with Communists, from top to bottom,” and provided a list of 150 staff members
engaged in “undesirable” political activities (Goldstein 2012, 125).45
While these actions clearly scared law enforcement and city politicians, the model
remained of great interest to the Johnson administration as a means to stem the growing urban
crisis that posed a pressing economic and electoral threat. In 1964, Congress passed the
Economic Opportunity Act (EOA), jumpstarting the War on Poverty and scaling up some of
Kennedy’s prior “New Frontier” initiatives. Title II of the EOA created the Community Action
Program (CAP), which in turn spun off Community Action Agencies (CAAs) that funded local
groups modeled after Ford-funded projects (Marwell 2007, 26; DeFilippis 2004, 41). In New
York City, for example, CAP began funding both new CAAs as well as community-based
organizations that retrofitted their operations to fit the new funding stream, including
Mobilization for Youth in the Lower East Side and HARYOU-ACT in Harlem (Marwell 2007,
30).
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Around the same time, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was then seeking the City Council presidency, publically
stated that “an ex-Trotskyite friend” had confirmed to him that MFY was “full of communists” (Goldstein 2012,
125).
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These new programs and offices reshuffled US urban politics in important ways.
According to Applegate (2007, 61), “community organizations reached an unprecedented status,
officially tied to the nation’s economic growth machine.” Non-profits were recognized and
developed as a crucial sector in establishing political order and promoting economic
development. But these programs also changed the political landscape in which community
organizations would operate.
In a 1966 speech, Sargent Shriver, who ran the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
and oversaw the new programs, drew a parallel between New Deal labor laws that provided a
channel for organizing militant workers into state-recognized unions and Great Society programs
that provided a channel for organizing unruly urbanites into federally- and foundation-funded
non-profits. The Economic Opportunity Act, he argued, would be “for the poor what the
National Labor Relations Act was for unions” because “it establishes a new relationship and new
grievance procedure between the poor and the rest of society” (as quoted in Piven and Cloward
1971, 270-271; see also Wagner 2000, 150). A new, formal channel for urban politics was thus
opened, creating a distinctive set organizing opportunities and constraints for another segment of
the working class: a segment that overlapped somewhat with the strata of labor then organized
into unions, but was in general either employed by “the declining sector of small capital”
(Katznelson 1981, 112) or was unemployed, included far more women, and was comprised
predominantly of African Americans, Latinos, and Asians who had been largely excluded from
both the unionized job sectors and from many unions themselves.
The language of the EOA legislation called for funded groups to pursue a mandate of
“maximum feasible participation.” This was not new legislative language – participatory clauses
were almost boilerplate in federal rulemaking – but it was taken up by grantees in a more serious
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manner than ever before, and pushed beyond the service provision and light advocacy the
policies’ sponsors had imagined (Gregory 1988, 96). Gregory demonstrates, for example, how
the Library Action Committee of Corona-East Elmhurst not only pushed for a Black communitycontrolled library and cultural center in their neighborhood, but chose as its site a former
Woolworth’s Department Store that the owner had no intention of giving up. They then staged
daily pickets that drew not only from local residents but from the Black Panther Party and the
Nation of Islam as well (ibid, 97).
Much of the new organizing, however, was targeted at newly created agencies and
bureaucracies, rather than the established channels through which city politics ordinarily
operated. In this way, while funding radical activity, the state maintained social control by
diverting newly empowered and financed community-based organizations away from the
established levers of power (Piven and Cloward 1971, 276). According to Friedland (1982, 131),
The agencies with some control over the location and nature of
private investment within the city, as well as its fiscal contribution
to the public weal – notably urban renewal, water boards, planning
agencies, infrastructural bureaucracies of all types, the finance board
– remained unaffected. Non-whites were given new kinds of jobs
and services rather than better access to existing ones, new forms of
participation rather than more power over those agencies with some
leverage over private investment and thus demand for labor.
The model, however, was based on the federal government funding groups over which it
had little control, creating opportunities for funded groups to move beyond these limitations.
While community-based organizations were not funded to contest urban renewal, for example,
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they often did so anyway, leading to delays, cost increases, redesigns and sometimes even
cancelations (ibid, 134). Over time, however, the narrow funding streams available to groups
would encourage community-based organizations to conform to “the narrow program priorities,
guidelines, and service delivery strategies of their sponsors” (Gregory 1998, 98) and view the
source of their power as their emerging connection with political elites rather than a mass base
(Applegate 2007, 64).

Participatory Planning Paradigms
The War on Poverty’s politics of scale were quite novel in US politics. According to Piven
and Cloward (1971, 266), “local officials were flabbergasted; one level of government and
political party was financing the harassment of another level,” and organizing political support
for the national Democratic party’s agenda in the parts of cities that local Democratic parties had
most neglected (Marwell 2007, 27). One way municipalities responded to the pressure coming
from community-based organizations was by redesigning their development institutions to be
more responsive to grassroots movements for community-based planning. In so doing, they
created channels for freshly funded non-profits to become enmeshed in the formal planning
process. Carr (2012, 423) describes this as a partial shift from a “expert-rational” model, in
which planning elites collected large quantities of data to produce allegedly value neutral
comprehensive plans, to a “procedural-participatory” model, in which public agencies conducted
elaborately staged procedures that contained structured mechanisms for public input.
New York City had already begun to undertake such a process as a means to challenge the
resurgent Tammany machine (Katznelson 1981, 143). In 1953, Mayor Wagner established
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Community Planning Boards around the city, made up of five to nine local residents appointed
by the borough presidents. The boards were then formalized into the City Charter in 1961, the
same year City Planning rezoned the entire city of New York to significantly expand its real
estate development capacity (Angotti 2008, 73). When Lindsay became mayor in 1966, facing
increasing political mobilization from those people and places largely left out of the New Deal
corporate-labor pact, he greatly expanded these participatory planning programs, creating what
he called “little city halls” as well as decentralized school boards and neighborhood service
offices (Katznelson 1981, 135). The goal was not only to meet local needs, but to incorporate
dissidents into the formal channels of government and transform their vision of state from the
source of the problem to the source of the solution.
In 1969 the Lindsay administration expanded the purview and membership of Community
Planning Boards (henceforth called simply Community Boards), though they remained
underfunded and without veto power on land use decisions. By 1970, Lindsay released a “Plan
for Neighborhood Government,” which reshaped the jurisdictional boundaries of city agencies
around those of the community boards while retaining central authority in City Hall’s new Office
of Neighborhood Government (ONG), and created a new Neighborhood Action Program (NAP)
to hear complaints and disperse $500,000 in capital funds to community groups to solve them
(ibid, 144). This allowed the Lindsay administration to collect information on community
concerns through the NAP and distribute services through the ONG, functionally incorporating
contentious actors into the city’s political institutions (ibid, 149). By the 1970s, in New York and
elsewhere, participation “had become a necessary component of legitimate authority” in urban
planning and governance, though its institutional mechanisms were often drawn in such a way as
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to “make participation safe for use as a component of the authority of elites” (McQuarrie 2013,
147).
When new planning tools and procedures were rolled out, like contextual zoning (wherein
areas are rezoned to more closely match their existing built environment), special zoning districts
(small areas of the city marked by particular features deemed worthy of preservation by
extraordinary means), environmental review (technical and legal procedures for quantifying
planned developments’ impacts) and the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP, the
multi-stage and multi-scalar process by which city- or developer-initiated land use changes are
publicly evaluated), they offered new tools for neighborhood control, but in the absence of a
city-wide plan. As a result, the neighborhood-by-neighborhood nature of planning and
development in New York City, though offered in the language of community empowerment,
expanded capital’s opportunity to establish radically uneven patterns of development and
divestment. They also set the stage for highly technical negotiations between developers, city
planners and representatives of the community – often well-financed non-profits and, especially
in more recent years, unions (Angotti 2008, 105-107).
Gregory argues that by channeling New York City’s Black working-class organizations
not only into the state but into labyrinthine systems and separated silos, the city and federal
governments’ new models of political participation effectively undermined Black radical politics
in the city (Gregory 1998, 99-105). The new structures of participation, including especially
Community (Planning) Boards, gave residents a voice in city decision-making, but encouraged
individual votes on particular issues rather than systematic analysis or action on the mechanisms
of racial capitalism. “Issues of racial and economic inequality were fragmented and reformulated
as administrative problems of bureaucratic service coordination” (ibid, 100). Much in the same
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way the party machines and unions had incorporated predominantly White workers and
neighborhoods into the system of “city trenches” (Katznelson 1981, 177), the participatory
governance reforms of the 1960s and ‘70s managed to incorporate those previously excluded
into the planning system.

Interlude: Unions and Planning Politics in the 1960s
Parallel to the expansion of the urban community development sector was an expansion of
the unionized public sector. The War on Poverty and Great Society relied on the creation of new
arms of the state, which in turn required a substantial new workforce (Piven and Cloward 1971,
276; Katznelson, 1981, 180). Those workers would organize to become the biggest and most
stable arm of US unionism. While local histories vary, the public sector union movement’s
overall trajectory was one of initial combativeness, which developed in the 1960s and peaked in
the 1970s, followed by one of austerity-driven retrenchment, which turned toward “growth
machine” politics in the 1980s (Johnston 1994). At times this segment of the labor movement
challenged city planning and development priorities, and at times they formed a base of support
for the status quo.
Municipal union history did not start in the 1960s; in New York, as early as 1896, the
Knights of Labor were organizing sanitation workers. The city recognized unionization as
inevitable, so opted to recognize a more conciliatory union instead of the Knights – a pattern that
would continue into the following century (Maier 1987, 11).46 By the 1950s, the city had
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The transit workers were organized into a militant union early on, but they did so when the subways and
streetcars were private. As a result, the Transport Workers Union maintains a somewhat different culture than
other public sector unions, and is one of the few prominent New York City unions to emerge out of the more
radical CIO rather than the more conservative AFL (Maier 1987, 11; Freeman 1989).
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developed a system of aiding favorable unions by strategically expanding or contracting the size
of various bargaining units and retaining control over union election timing, while
simultaneously accusing disfavored unions of harboring Communists (ibid, 9).
Mayor Wagner (1954-1965) – son of Congressmember Wagner, originator of the National
Labor Relations Act as well as the 1949 Housing Act – oversaw an expansion of municipal
unionization through means that simultaneously increased representation rights and decreased
bargaining power (ibid, 47). Viteritti (2017, 81) marks this as a way to both fulfill his ideological
commitment to unions and to secure his third term, as municipal unions (rather than county party
machines) for the first time formed the core of his get-out-the-vote mobilization. From that point
on, New York City’s public sector unions would frame their fates as directly entangled with the
mayoralty (Ahlquist and Levi 2013). Under Mayor Lindsay in 1967, municipal bargaining was
further formalized through the establishment of the Office of Collective Bargaining. In doing so,
the city also reduced the number of bargaining units and restricted the scope of bargaining to
bread and butter issues. That same year, New York State passed the Taylor Law, which
dramatically increased the penalties for public sector strikers. The law “narrowed the scope of
bargaining, reduced strikes, increased orderly contract administration, and generally moderated
the outcomes of bargaining” (Moody 2007, 51). These policies ensured that public sector unions
would grow, but their disruptive power would shrink.
From 1960 to 1976, the national public sector workforce expanded by 89 percent (Moody
2007, 50) and the number of unionized public sector workers jumped from 1 million to 3 million,
encompassing 80 percent of union growth during that period (Maier 1987, 9). Public sector
unionization’s “epicenter” (Moody 2007, 22) was New York, with two unions – American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees District Council 37 (DC 37) and the
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United Federation of Teachers (UFT) – forming the biggest and most mobilized groups.47 These
unions served as footholds for Black workers, and especially Black women, but, as Wilder notes,
even most Black public sector union members were, at first, frequently confined to “semi-skilled,
clerical, service or labor jobs” rather than “the pool of better-paying positions” largely reserved
for White workers (Wilder 200, 225-229).
Union housing politics during this era evinced a number of contradictory tendencies. In
the 1960s, as New York City unions associated with Kazan’s United Housing Foundation
pursued union built, owned and operated cooperatives as a solution to the housing crisis, the
national AFL-CIO sought, in Botein’s (2007, 801) terms, “to represent its members’ interests by
working within the housing market, rather than challenging it.” Their goal was less to bring
down housing costs or remake the shape of the city than to use housing development as a means
to stimulate the economy and produce union jobs. This, however, put the AFL-CIO, and
particularly the building trades, on a collision course with New York City’s self-identified
“brownstoners” – the city’s first recognized wave of gentrification – who sought to preserve and
reinvest in older buildings and rejected the kinds of modernist development projects that unions
supported as job stimuli and housing for their membership (Osman 2011, 52-81). While not
strongly committed to participatory planning or community-based development, the AFL-CIO
did lobby hard for the War on Poverty, then fought for union representation on the local program
boards that determined how the money would be allocated. By the late 1960s, more than 500
union officials were members of such boards (Friedland 1982, 132).
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In the 1950s, DC 37 had 20,000 members; by 1975, it had 106,783. In 1961 UFT had 5,000 members; in 1974, it
had 71,000 (Moody 2007, 22)
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In New York City, there was some overlap between the early militancy of the public
sector unions and the neighborhood revolts and civil rights movements. The Social Service
Employees Union, for example, had earlier been purged of its communist leadership, but had
reformed with New Left sympathies, and for a time in the early 1960s made securing greater
rights and services for welfare recipients a key part of their collective bargaining agreements
(Krinsky 2001, 395; Maier 1987, 69-70). Their solidarity was always tenuous, but it was
stretched to a breaking point during the teachers’ strike of 1968 (Mayer 1969; Podair 2008). This
epochal conflict pitted largely African American Ocean Hill/Brownsville parents’ desire for
community control over their school system – a program endorsed by civil rights organizations
including the UFT member-founded African American Teachers Association as well as the
Lindsay administration and the Ford Foundation – against a largely White teachers union that
saw such changes as an encroachment on hard-fought work, tenure and collective bargaining
rules (Ferguson 2013, 130-166). The strike lasted nearly two months, and created a deep and
lasting rift among working-class New Yorkers, sometimes shorthanded as a split between “labor
and community.” Since this was a conflict internal to the working class, however, it might more
accurately be characterized as a mutual mistrust within labor between unions and neighborhood
organizers, often along racial lines.48
Also in 1968, the federal government passed the Housing and Urban Development Act,
based on the recommendations of the Kaiser Committee, an 18-member panel that included 3
union representatives (George Meany, Joseph Keenan and Walter Reuther). The bill called for
massive private action on the part of bankers, brokers, and builders to, in President Johnson’s
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While some studies coming from both the political right and left question teachers’ place in the working class
(Pandey 1990, 104-105), this dissertation does not draw such distinctions and instead embraces a more inclusive
use of labor and the working class.
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phrase, harness “the genius of private industry” (Taylor 2019, 56) to construct or rehabilitate 26
million housing units over the next 10 years, with 6 million targeted toward working-class
households. It also offered low-interest loans to non-profits interested in buying buildings, and
encouraged homeownership through subsidy and insurance schemes. Johnson dubbed it a
“Magna Carta for cities” (ibid, 88), echoing the Wagner Act’s “Magna Carta for unions”
nickname from three decades prior; Meany characterized the HUD act as “the single best
housing bill in history,” and the AFL-CIO supplied crucial political support (Botein 2007, 804). .
The law and the politics behind it, however, established the precedent that unions would seek
housing growth through the private sector. According to Botein (2007, 804), it solidified the
“strategic alliance between the labor movement and the housing industry” in a way that
continues to reverberate today.

The Non-Profit Fix
By the mid-1960s, the system of federally funded community-based organizing and
advocacy was starting to come under greater scrutiny. The programs had succeeded in
invigorating parts of the national Democratic coalition that had been targeted for dispossession
by local urban political machines, with groups like “The Real Great Society” in New York City
emerging out of Puerto Rican street organizations and getting OEO funding to squat landlordabandoned buildings in the Lower East Side (Bockmeyer 2003, 178-179). Governors and Mayors
particularly resented the radicality of many CAAs, which they saw as a threat to their own
electoral viability and their area’s economic competitiveness (Marwell 207, 27). In 1965 urban
political machines struck back against what they perceived as a federal war on their fiefdoms.
Mayor Wagner joined with the Conference of Mayors to sign a statement accusing the OEO of
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stoking “class struggle” and insisting that municipalities have greater control over the how the
funding was distributed (Viteritti 2017, 89). Over the following years, a series of changes to the
OEO and strategic decisions between philanthropists and federal agencies would reshape the
terrain of organizing, and helped produce the non-profit political landscape we see in New York
City today (Kwong and Mišcevic 2005, 287-293).
In 1966, Congress passed OEO amendments that prioritized service provision over
organizing (Goldstein 2012, 249). That same year, Johnson pushed forward the Model Cities
program, which reasserted city control over large-scale urban redevelopment schemes
(DeFilippis 2004, 42) – including projects in Harlem, the South Bronx, and Central Brooklyn –
while serving as an outlet for protesting residents to participate in planning decisions (Angotti
2008, 95). In 1967, another amendment required that CAAs received approval from local
governments (i.e. mayors’ offices) in order to be eligible for federal funding, thus re-empowering
urban political machines, cutting out organizations that threatened established power, and
incentivizing non-profits to pursue agendas in line with mayors’ desires (Marwell 2007, 28;
O’Connor 2001, 167-173). It also required that CAA boards be comprised of an equal mix of
elected officials, business owners, and residents. In Applegate’s (2007, 64-65) analysis, “topdown, local-level control over operations was joined with top-down, federal-level control over
programming. Together these formed the ultimate terms under which community organizations
were incorporated into the economic development system.”
Also in 1967, Robert Kennedy’s Special Impact Program (SIP) was added to the OEO to
encourage the proliferation of Community Development Corporations (CDCs), a new form of
non-profit that would combine housing development, business support and community
organizing under one roof (DeFilippis 2004, 42). One year later, new OEO guidelines were
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promulgated to specifically bar federally funded groups from pursuing political activism
(Goldstein 2012, 249). In 1969 CDCs got another big boost with the Federal Community SelfDetermination Act, which increased federal funding to local CDCs (DeFilippis 2004,42). The
bill enjoyed bi-partisan support, as well as an endorsement from the Congress on Racial Equality
(Allen 1969, 221). While they used the language of self-determination, the programs they sought
to fund were more in line with the notion of self-help (Goldstein 2012, 25). The result was often
a space “between bootstrap capitalism and radical self-determination,” which funders – public
and private – were comfortable supporting (Kohl-Arenas 2016, 8).
According to DeFilippis (2004, 41), the CDC “was, and is, the principal institutional
vehicle for community development in the United States.” As a political organizational form, it
emerged from both below (grassroots politics) and above (state and foundation sponsorship).
From below, it brought together three strains of political thought and movement-building that
had been percolating in the mid-1960s: “Black power and Black capitalism;” “direct democracy
and neighborhood government;” and “co-ops, communes, and collectives” (ibid, 44-45). From
above, it was enabled by legislation pushed by Robert Kennedy (in part as a challenge to his
political rival, President Johnson) and funding provided by the Ford Foundation (Ferguson 2013,
214). Calling the block grants that funded CDCs a form of “public philanthropy,” Ford and
Kennedy sought to shift away from the Great Society’s “maximum feasible participation” maxim
and embrace instead a more business-like operating structure (ibid, 233).
After a much-heralded 1966 visit to Brooklyn’s Bedford Stuyvesant,49 Kennedy and Ford
set up a model CDC, Bed Stuy Restoration, made up of two corporations: Bed Stuy Renewal and
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Kennedy first wanted to visit Harlem and establish it as his case study for the merits of the CDC; his aides,
however, told him its local political leadership would view this as a challenge, and encouraged him to look instead
to Bedford Stuyvesant (Ferguson 2013, 220).
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Rehabilitation Corporation (R&R) and Bed Stuy Development and Services Corporation (D&S).
D&S was run by corporate leaders and government veterans selected by Kennedy and Ford;
R&R was run by deputy Police Commissioner and former Lindsay aide Franklin Thomas, upon
the recommendation of Robert Morgenthau. Until 1974, D&S and its power-broker board
controlled everything R&R could do (Ferguson 2013, 221-223). This CDC would serve as a
demonstration project for both the Ford Foundation and the federal government. Between 1966
and 1981, Ford provided the CDC with $11 million, more than any other grantee, and the federal
government gave Bed Stuy Restoration a full third of federal SIP funds (ibid, 243).
While most early CDC leaders saw grassroots community organizing as their most
important mission, their funders viewed CDCs as vehicles to lure private capital back into
disinvested neighborhoods. Initially the idea was to provide jobs – either by promoting Blackowned businesses, or, more commonly, by luring big corporations to inner-city sites. Nixon fully
supported this approach, arguing that what the country needed was “imaginative enlistment of
private funds, private energies, and private talents, in order to develop the opportunities that lie
untapped in our own underdeveloped urban heartland” (as quoted in Allen 1969, 230). Black
homeownership, at first a secondary issue for CDCs, was also a priority for Nixon, who
derisively quipped, “people who own their own homes don’t burn their neighborhoods” (ibid,
230). All of this fit with Nixon’s push to privatize recently expanded public services, including
the provision of housing and the process of urban planning (Marwell 2007, 32).
Under Nixon, the role and reach of CDCs grew. In 1970, the Community Corporation Act
allowed for the proliferation of multiple CDCs within a given geography, as well as for larger
CDCs to invest beyond their turf, creating new competitions between community groups. Two
years later, Title VII of the EOA expanded CDC’s role in housing rehabilitation and
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construction. In 1975 the Community Services Act provided a new stream of federal funding,
and the Community Service Administration replaced the OEO. In 1978 the Office of
Neighborhood Services was created to administer Community Development Block Grants
(CDBGs) to the states, a turn away from direct federal-to-urban spending. By the 1980s, the
federal government was spending $500 million on around 2,000 CDCs (Stoecker 1997), the
largest concentration of which were in New York City (Angotti 2008, 103). The CSA, however
was dismantled under Reagan, leaving CDCs to seek funding primarily from the private sector,
including religious organizations as well as the growing FIRE sectors (Goldstein 2017; Stoecker
1997).
Following these legislative changes, and building on neighborhood organizing
momentum, a second wave of CDCs were created, with housing taking precedence above job
growth and business promotion. Increasingly CDCs moved toward residential development,
ownership and management. Developer fees, as well as steady rents, became key funding
mechanisms. As Stoecker (1997, 11) notes, many CDCs replaced organizing with advocacy, a
slippage that can allow CDCs – with all their contradictions as both landlords and tenant
representatives – to speak on behalf of a community or neighborhood, and in the process push
aside more militant or grassroots groups that continue to do organizing work. Some stopped
practicing advocacy altogether. According to Botein (2007, 817), “as part of this transformation,
many [CDCs] have cut back or eliminated their advocacy and organizing work, and thus have
become more closely aligned with real estate interests than with workers and unions.”
Harlem’s Abyssinian Development Corporation, a church-based CDC, presents a
particularly acute example of the slippage from organizing to real estate. As Goldstein (2017,
231) recounts, the CDC hired a staffer to organize tenant unions and block associations in the
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area surrounding Abyssinian Baptist Church, which serves as the CDC’s anchor. Once the
organizer started making progress, however, he was told by his supervisors that his task was not
so much to build power among Harlem tenants as to assess the tenants’ “stability” so that, in the
organizer’s words, “ADC could determine whether or not these buildings would be worth
pursuing for acquisition.” Similarly, Bed Stuy Restoration became almost singularly focused on
the physical rehabilitation of buildings in their catchment area, while “enforc[ing] an eviction
policy so strict that it rivaled any other landlord in the community” (Ferguson 2014, 233).
This second wave of CDCs was split between two competing types: clientelist CDCs
linked to particular politicians or machines; and technocratic CDCs focused on managed and
efficient service delivery and housing production (McQuarrie 2013). Many – though certainly
not all – underwent a professionalization process that reframed CDCs as ostensibly apolitical
suppliers of housing, social services, and economic development (Graham 2012a, 7). Newman
and Lake (2005, 45) frame this shift as a corollary toward the broader political-economic shift
from Keynesian redistributive growth politics toward neoliberal accumulative growth politics.
Local manifestations of the movement that originated in the 1960s
as a struggle for cultural identity, political empowerment and
collective consumption were, by 2000 (and depending on local
circumstances), either simply defunct, transformed into rear-guard
defenses against gentrification and displacement, or reformulated as
development or service-delivery arms of the (usually local) state.
DeFilippis (2004, 42) stresses that this change should not be understood as natural evolution or
free will, but rather the result of a financial bind: CDCs that maintained their political identity
risked defunding. Once professionalized, however, many former activists became “deskilled” in
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terms of their capacity – or at least flexibility – to analyze and attack the roots of issues they took
on (Gilmore 2007a, 242; Woods 2017, 281), and “defang[ed] of oppositional practices and
positions” (Katz 2005b, 623)
This transformation was directly in line with funders’ preferences. One 1987 Ford
Foundation study (as quoted in Goldstein, 2012, 250) read,
during the 1960s and 1970s, CDCs focused largely on trying to start
their own businesses. Many failed. Few ever became very profitable
or produced the hoped-for levels of jobs. Today’s CDCs, by
contrast, are more likely to supply equity capital, loans, incubator
space, and technical assistance in support of home-grown private
entrepreneurs and businesses in their midst.
Another, titled Corrective Capitalism, was even bolder: “with rare exceptions, the 1960s are now
as much history for [CDCs] as for the rest of American society. One can’t very well hurl his
body into the path of an oncoming bulldozer when he (or she) is the developer” (as quoted in
DeFilippis 2004, 53). This logic directly recalls capitalist support for home ownership during the
depression, which was premised on the notion that workers burdened by mortgages were far less
likely to go on strike (Karolak 2000, 67).
As developers in low-income neighborhoods, CDCs were also forced to contend with
gentrification as it became a growing dynamic in their communities. As Gans wrote in a 1982
update to his anti-urban renewal classic The Urban Villagers, “Gentrification is basically a
private version of urban renewal,” which CDCs were established to contest (Gans 1994, 217).
Rather than either embrace or oppose gentrification, however, most CDCs “chose to occupy a
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middle ground, attempting to manage change in the neighborhood” by housing the poor while
welcoming higher income residents (Goldstein 2017, 211-212). This too jibed with funders’
priorities, which were stressing “economic integration” and using an oversimplified version
William Julius Wilson’s (1987) “underclass” theories of urban decline as justification for their
program (Goldstein 2017, 212). It also matched New York City planners’ and politicians’
programs, which saw CDCs as a means to supply grassroots support for an urban vision that
included gentrification as a key feature. According to Angotti (2008, 103), in the 1980s New
York’s “CDCs grew out of a convergence of two trends – grassroots efforts to take control of
neighborhoods and City Hall’s interest in washing its hands of responsibility for neighborhood
renewal. Devolution met revolution. And real estate stood to benefit.”
As many CDCs moved from building power to building housing, another form of nonprofit emerged to fill this vacuum: advocacy and community organizing groups that mobilized
working-class constituencies. For decades, the most prominent of these was the Association for
Community Organizing and Reform Now, better known by the acronym ACORN. ACORN built
on Saul Alinsky’s organizing model, in which community organizations (usually territorially
bounded) pulled together neighbors around common, winnable, issue-based campaigns, and built
power to push elites into taking a particular action (Alinsky 1971). ACORN and other similar
groups often took on housing and land use issues, building on a precedent established by the first
African American Alinskyite organization, Chicago’s The Woodlawn Organization, which
organized to transform an urban renewal process into a plan more in line with community needs
and desires (Applegate 2007, 60). ACORN, founded in Arkansas in 1970, brought this model to
the national scale, building a network of neighborhood-based branches that could both take on
hyper-local issues as well as conduct nationally coordinated campaigns around housing,
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education, healthcare, voter registration, welfare, and wages (Atlas 2009). While ACORN would
thus take on many of the issues CDCs no longer emphasized, their New York branch eventually
also became an affordable housing developer and property manager, forming the Mutual
Housing Association of New York (MHANY) in 1986.

Austerity City
As CDCs slipped from organizing to development, New York City slouched toward
bankruptcy. The fiscal crisis that culminated in 1975 and the political reaction to it reshaped the
political economy of New York City, and the role of non-profits and unions in its planning and
development apparatus.
There are many explanations for the New York City’s mid-1970s fiscal crisis. The
mainstream narrative is that the city was spending beyond its means on ameliorative social
reproduction measures, and adjusting to this reality with a disastrous accounting trick: using debt
financing to fill gaps in the city’s operating budget. From the right, this line of thinking is linked
to a criticism of New York City’s growing welfare state – including public housing, public
college, and public hospital systems – and the expanding role of unions and poor-people’s
organizations in municipal politics (Starr 1987, O’Connor 2008). From the left, the cause is
perceived to be less the welfare expansions themselves, but a capital strike on the part of banks
and bond holders, who – fed up with a city that seemed to be prioritizing the poor over the rich –
pulled their cash from the city’s coffers and demanded the city’s governance be restructured
according to their needs and desires (Tabb 1982, Lichten 1986). In a 1971 Chase Manhattan
Bank report, CEO David Rockefeller – brother of the Governor – wrote, “it is clear to me that the
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entire structure of our society is being challenged,” and they were ready to do something about it
(as quoted in Moody 2007, 17). Both left and right explanations also point to budgetary pressures
caused by a national recession, the beginnings of devolution policies, and the long-term
outcomes of redlining.
One cause often sidestepped in this debate is the role of massive public subsidies for
Manhattan office buildings and middle – to-high income housing (Fitch 1993). Between 1967
and 1973, developers added 66.7 million square feet of office space to the Manhattan market,
with two thirds of the construction between 1970 and 1972; a huge amount of this development
was financed with public bonds and was tax-exempt. The result was a drastic increase in land
costs, property values, and rents, without any commensurate increase in tax revenues (Moody
2017, 13, 54). Meanwhile, major corporations quietly but competitively – and largely
successfully – petitioned the city to decrease the assessed value of their properties, causing real
estate tax revenues to fall 42 percent between 1961 and 1975 despite an incredible building
boom (ibid, 58).
The crisis came to a head in 1975, when the Bankers Trust refused the city’s bond
issuance request and the federal government refused to intervene. At Governor Rockefeller’s
urging, the state legislature passed the Financial Emergency Act, which called on the State to
“undertake an extraordinary exercise of its police and emergency powers under the State
constitution, and exercise controls and supervision over the financial affairs of the city of New
York” (as quoted in Moody 2007, 31). In short, New York State – via the authority of the
Emergency Financial Control Board and the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) – took
over many of the city’s essential functions, thus constraining its abilities to control its own tax
and rent control laws, while mandating massive layoffs. Public sector wages were frozen, over
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60,000 workers were laid off, and service cuts were mandated to sanitation, transit, education
and fire departments. Unemployment hit a peak level of 11.1 percent (Marwell 2007, 151). Many
pinpoint this moment as the model upon which future neoliberal restructurings, including the
International Monetary Fund’s “structural adjustment” programs, would be based (Katz 2004,
181; Harvey 2007, 44-48,).
The response to the fiscal crisis, however, was not just a bankers’ coup; New York City
unions – and public sector unions in particular – played a crucial role in this austerity regime. In
so doing, they formed a historical regional bloc (Gramsci 1971; Woods 1998) that transformed
the relationship between labor, finance and government in ways that continue to resonate in
contemporary planning politics today, both through direct relations and historical echoes.
At first, New York City unions took a more aggressive stance against layoffs and
neoliberalization, staging demonstrations against the proposed austerity. David Rockefeller,
however, passed along an urgent message to Harry Van Ardsdale – Central Labor Council
president, leader of the electricians’ union, and the force behind the Electchester development –
telling him to convince Victor Gotbaum (DC 37), Albert Shanker (UFT) and Barry Feinstein
(Teamsters) to “tone down the rhetoric” (as quoted in Moody 2007, 44). Beyond language,
Rockefeller wanted these unions to start committing their own financial reserves – namely
pension funds – into the effort to prevent municipal default. Gottbaum switched sides to become
a forceful advocate for the crisis regime.
There are many factors behind this turnabout, but perhaps the most potent was his fear that
municipal bankruptcy would have put city contracts before a federal judge, who would have the
power to nullify existing union contracts (Viteritti 2017, 94). Another factor of great significance
was a quid pro quo: in exchange for the union’s bailout of the State, the legislature in 1976
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passed legislation giving municipal unions “agency shop” status.50 This allowed unions to
represent everyone in the workforce rather than require them to sign up individual members
(Moody 2007, 47).
By the fall of 1975, New York City unions had agreed to put $3.8 billion (or almost $18
billion in contemporary dollars, accounting for inflation) of pension funds into MAC bonds
(Moody 2007, 46), accounting for about 38 percent of municipal unions’ capital (Maier 1987,
190). From a bankers’ perspective, this was a sound investment; the bonds paid back well, thus
securing the city’s finances and keeping the pension funds whole. From a labor perspective,
however, the deal was less desirable; the bonds provided a high yield in large part because the
unions accepted layoffs and contract givebacks (ibid.).
Turning unions into bond investors in the crisis regime marshalled a sea change in city
unions’ political positionality. Municipal workers were now aligned with the finance sector in
that “it was their members who stood to lose in the event of default or, more likely, a drop in the
secondary market value of MAC paper. By becoming the city’s prime banker, the unions
internalized the limits imposed externally by the state, MAC, the EFCB, and soon the U.S.
Treasury Department” (Moody 2007, 46-47). But by taking on capital’s demands as their own,
they were also signing off on a program that would limit labor’s capacity to radically reshape
city planning policy, and setting off on a path of extracting concessions from capital’s gains
rather than militating for a program of their own (Viteritti 2017, 95).
By 1976, Van Ardsdale and David Rockefeller were co-chairing the Business/Labor
Working Group on Jobs and Economic Revitalization in New York City, calling for an end to
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Public sector agency shops were declared unconstitutional in the 2018 anti-union Supreme Court decision Janus
v. AFSCME.

187

rent control, state withdrawal from low-income housing and services, and fewer regulations on
private real estate development (Botein 2009, 187). Public sectors unions followed suit and
formed the Municipal Union/Financial Leaders working group, which collectively lobbied for
developer tax breaks and public-private partnerships (Moody 2007, 48--49).51
In a mode of management common under capitalism, the state perpetuated many of the
causes of the crisis in the name of finding a solution; in this case, the strategy included
diminishing and decentralizing funding for low-income housing. It was the start of an era of neoconservative planning in New York, and in the country as a whole. In 1973, Nixon imposed a
moratorium on new federally-funded public housing construction, and began the shift toward
“section 8” vouchers and subsidies for private developers and landlords housing low-income
residents (González, 2017, 17; Taylor 2019, 250). The Nixon and Ford administration’s “New
Federalism” policies ended or defunded many Great Society programs while introducing more
“revenue-sharing” block grants that allowed for greater control by local political machines and
the corporate interests that influenced them (Gregory 1998, 101). According to Piven and
Cloward (1977, 357), “under the guise of the urban fiscal crisis, in short, local and national
business interests joined to reassert control over the municipal level of the state apparatus, for it
was on the municipal level that popular struggles by working-class groups had forced some
concession in the 1960s.”
“New Federalism” was a way to “brand” (Greenberg 2009) a combination of devolution
and centralization that would shape planning futures for decades to come (Gilmore and Gilmore
2016, 195; Weber 2002, 531). Devolution describes downward scalar pressure on politics.
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That same year, Penn South and six other union coops chose to prepay their taxes without taking the 8% benefit
allowed for doing so, thus making a generous donation to the city’s finances (Straus 2010, 217).
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Specifically, it meant that the federal government would pay for less, and cities would pay for
more. Centralization, however, meant that the federal and state governments would impose strict
limitations on city actions regarding taxation, rent controls, public housing and many other facets
of governance and spatial regulation. This double bind “represents in part a generally reactionary
move to reexternalize, or keep external, such social burdens and fiscal costs” (Gilmore 2007a,
42). As federal-to-urban links frayed, mayors and planners turned increasingly toward
partnerships with developers to fund city projects and address housing crises. The Carter
administration’s Urban Development Action Grant made this linkage explicit, investing only in
city projects if there was already a substantial amount of private investment (Viteritti 2017, 105).
At the same time, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), meant to undo years of redlining,
also incentivized banks to finance development in disinvested areas, providing a funding stream
for non-profits but failing to distinguish between community development and gentrification
(Hum 2010). One manifestation of this turn was the promotion of a model of Black
homeownership premised on what Taylor (2019) calls “predatory inclusion,” or giving the racist
real estate industry a primary role in low-income housing provision. “The turn to inclusion was
only allowable by maintaining other forms of exclusion,” including restriction of Black
homeownership opportunities to struggling neighborhoods and substandard housing. “Credit
inclusion became possible by holding the line on neighborhood exclusion” (ibid, 254), resulting
in increased racial segregation as well as the more deeply disparate mortgage terms.
This pattern intensified in the 1980s, during which time federal-to-municipal payments
dropped from 20 to 3 percent of city budgets (Pacewicz 2016, 4), and were more frequently
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premised on competitions between cities for federal dollars (ibid, 20).52 HUD suffered
particularly, with its budget slashed from $30 billion to $8 billion (Viteritti 2017, 105), even as
homeowner subsidies (in the form of mortgage interest tax deductions) soared to a cost of $50
billion annually (Radford 1996, 2-3). In 1980, New York City received $19.8 billion in federal
funds, but by 1989, it got $8.7 billion; in 1980 one in five city budget dollars came from the
federal government, but by 1990 it was one in ten (Moody 2007, 69). Both non-profits and
municipal-scaled policies became increasingly central to the US housing regime (Goetz 1993).
Rather than directly finance public housing, a program of “Low Income Housing Tax Credits”
(LIHTC, discussed in greater depth later in this chapter) became the bipartisan consensus model
for affordable housing development in 1986. Meanwhile, as HUD budgets were being slashed
and private development was being subsidized, the National Labor Relations Board was
increasingly being used as a tool to stymy union growth, rather than facilitate it (Clark 1989, 31).
With less confidence in their ability to run elections, unions would turn more toward agreements
with employers to facilitate unionization.
At the city level, planners pursued an explicit strategy of segregation and uneven
development under the banner of “planned shrinkage,” a program often associated with – but
certainly not limited to – planning commissioner Roger Starr (Wallace and Wallace 1998). This
model of planning, only named briefly in the mid-1970s but exemplary of an approach that both
preceded and surpassed that period, deprived outer borough neighborhoods – and especially
working-class neighborhoods with large African American, Puerto Rican and recent immigrant
populations – of city services, while concentrating investment in the city’s so-called “core”

52

This dynamic continues to the present; during the Obama years, Congress cut NYC HOME grants by 52%, CDBGs
by 23%, NYC section 8 payments by $37 million, and NYCHA funding by $81 million (Viteritti 2017, 204-205).
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(Manhattan south of 96th Street). While touted as a new model of fiscal realism and RANDsponsored data-driven policymaking, the program had the effect of worsening fires, landlord
abandonment, homelessness and racial segregation in the city (Flood 2010). It was a clear
example of “organized abandonment”53 (Gilmore 2008), and during the 1970s, 10 percent of
New Yorkers left the city (Marwell 2007, 1).
At the same time, city politicians initiated another round of cutbacks on expenditures to
local organizing projects. In 1978, Mayor Koch’s first executive order restructured the
Community Action Program to eliminate the city’s Council Against Poverty (which funded
organizing projects) and formed instead the mayoral-controlled Community Development
Agency, which could support the mayors’ chosen non-profits (Gregory 1998, 103). This had the
effect of depoliticizing many community-based organizing, and specifically of forcing recipients
to reconsider challenging the mayor on planning priorities (Moody 2007, 65). As austerity
became the political logic for New York City, a disciplined and professionalized corps of nonprofits rose to fill the gaps left by the state and address people’s immediate needs.

Housing Labor in Neoliberal Times
During the 1980s and 1990s, New York City – and the country as a whole – gradually
shifted from neoconservative austerity to neoliberal corporate welfare, involving both rollbacks
of public services and rollouts of public subsidies for real estate (Peck and Tickell 2002; Gilmore
2007b, 44). By 1981 the city had re-balanced its budget and the economy and public sector were
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This phrase originates with management consultant Peter Drucker in the 1990s, who encouraged corporations
and non-profits to drop less profitable or successful elements of their portfolio in order to focus on others. It is
used here as Gilmore does to describe the purposeful aspects of large-scale spatial and racial disinvestment.

191

growing again, but priorities was increasingly geared toward private real estate development,
both for-profit and non-profit (Gregory 1998, 103). A “revanchist” (Smith 1996) regime was on
the rise, pushing back the advances of the civil rights movement (Woods 2007) and replacing the
service-oriented arms of the state with non-profit provisions (Immerwahr 2015, 162). According
to an interview with Ismene Speliotis, the executive director of MHANY who has worked in
New York’s non-profit housing sector for decades, non-profits stepped in to do the work the state
would not, and ultimately created value for the real estate industry.
You could say, the non-profits save[d] the city, right? I mean, they
went places that no one else was willing to go and they organized
people. Then people demanded attention and the city had to pay
attention. And then it turned out to be beneficial to the city and to
the real estate market and to the banks, and so suddenly it became a
commodity, it became of interest to the rest of the world after the
non-profits had kind of broken ground, so to speak.
This outcome was no accident: it was, in fact, exactly the intended result – not of the non-profits,
necessarily, but of the elements of capital and labor that organized New York’s neoliberal turn.
At the federal level, following massive cuts to HUD during the Reagan/Bush era, public
housing policy shifted toward demolishing public housing projects, supporting smaller, mixedincome, non-profit redevelopments, and limiting cities’ capacities to build or acquire new public
housing. Under the Clinton administration, HOPE VI provided funding for local Public Housing
Authorities to tear down their buildings and replace them with a smaller number of non-profit
units, mostly geared toward people of higher incomes than prior public housing residents
(Hackworth 2007; Arena 2012). Notably, New York City did not participate in this program
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(Bloom and Lasner 2016), but it shaped the structures of opportunity that non-profit developers
chased in the 1990s and onward (Graham 2012b). In 1998, Congress added the Faircloth
Amendment to the Financial Services Act, which stated that the federal government would not
financially support any net increase to a local Public Housing Authority’s portfolio. There was
not a great deal of enthusiasm among many planners or politicians for increasing New York
City’s public housing stock, but this legislation both formalized that opinion and gave city
leaders an excuse for promoting private solutions to the working class’s permanent housing crisis
(Madden and Marcuse 2016, 4). Meanwhile, CDBGs came to be awarded on a more competitive
basis, forcing cities to bid against one another for much-needed funding. This encouraged an
anti-political partnership approach between business, non-profits and city government to pitch
their places as worthy of federal investment on the basis of their cross-class collaboration
(Pacewicz 2016, 127; Stabrowski 2015, 1125).
At the state level, the rent stabilization and rent control laws that governed the city and
some of its surrounding suburbs were severely weakened. In 1971 the City Council then the State
Legislature introduced “vacancy decontrol” to ensure that when apartments reached a certain rent
threshold, upon vacancy they would exit the regulatory system and could rent for whatever the
landlord decided.54 A series of other loopholes were added to the rent laws in the 1990s that
enabled landlords to claim permanent and rising rent increases for either property investments or
vacancies. This combination of policies incentivized landlords to churn through tenants, claim a
“vacancy bonus” upon each turnover, and engage in intensive – and often pointless – so-called
“improvements” to apartments (Mironova 2019). While some housing non-profits, like Tenants
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Vacancy decontrol was then overturned by the 1974 Emergency Tenant Protection Act, but reinstated first by
the City Council in 1994 and then by the State Legislature in 1997.
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& Neighbors and the Metropolitan Council on Housing diligently organized and challenged this
regulatory retrenchment, many other non-profits focused their attention exclusively on
development and management.
At the city level, Koch’s multiple candidacies (1978-1989) were funded by business
donors, who were rewarded with a massive subsidized building boom, paid for in part by
municipal labor austerity (Moody 2007, 64). During a time when the homeless population rose 7
percent, transit, education and healthcare faced cuts, the municipal workforce was reduced by 20
percent, and city workers lost real income and went without contracts, 60 new office buildings, 6
luxury hotels, a convention center, and an entire new neighborhood – Battery Park City – went
up south of 96th Street. Meanwhile, asking rents rose over 200 percent (ibid, 74). During this
period, encouraged by planners motivated by an “allegiance to property-led economic
development policies as well as from a conviction that it is unproblematic to imagine an urban
economy based entirely on tourism, advanced services, and retail” (Wolf-Powers 2005, 380), the
city went through a dramatic deindustrialization and rise in service jobs (see also Pulido 1996,
142). Between 1960 and 1989, manufacturing jobs dropped from almost 1 million to 369,000
(Wolf-Powers 2005, 382). The number of union members remained fairly constant, but shifted
dramatically from ILA and ILGWU (shipping and industrial) to DC 37 and 1199 (public and
healthcare) (Moody 2007, 80-81).
Meanwhile, Koch set off a program of turning over public land and tax-foreclosed
properties to non-profit housing developers (often in direct and uneven partnerships with forprofit firms) in what would become – according to future city Housing Preservation and
Development (HPD) and federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) commissioner Shaun
Donovan – “the largest privatization of housing anywhere in the country” (Hevesi 2004, 1), as
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well as a major turning point in New York City’s planning politics. The roots of the program
were in 1972, when HPD’s Community Management Program began contracting with CDCs to
take over landlord-abandoned buildings (Marwell and McInerney 2005, 15), but the program
expanded dramatically in the 1980s as a result of several factors: the city’s financial crisis and
economic bust meant more landlords were abandoning their buildings just as the city had fewer
resources to maintain them; the dual binds of devolution and centralization provided the city with
fewer options as to what to do with the properties; and the non-profits themselves had grown to
the point where they could feasibly manage larger portfolios.
The latter factor proved self-reinforcing: while the growth of non-profits made them
reasonable receivers of this property, the process of large-scale housing transfers also helped
build out the network of professionalized non-profit building managers (Perine, Shultz, and
Marazzi 2010). Working with a “patchwork financing” (Keyes et al. 1996, 208) model that
combined multiple scales of government grants, developer fees, LIHTC, CRA payments from
banks, and foundation grants, CDCs had to demonstrate a high degree of financial mastery in
order to remain viable, particularly as the field itself became increasingly competitive
(Bockmeyer 2003). Each source required different reporting requirements, deadlines, accounting
standards and more, requiring a significant shift in resources away from organizing and toward
fiscal management (Kohl-Arenas 2016, 9). This tendency was also abetted by the fact that
organizing and advocacy often failed to produce the kinds of “demonstrable results” funders
demanded to see, and – significantly – did not in and of themselves bring in money the way
development would, both through rents and fees (Bockmeyer 2003, 183). Those CDCs that
maintained a strong organizing focus tended to lose out to more development-oriented nonprofits, which grew to dominate the field and absorb available funding streams. The result can be
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“a radically conservative politics disguised as liberal pragmatism” (Graham 2012a, 22); or, as the
CDC trade organization the National Congress for Community Economic Development put it in
a 1998 report, CDCs were “making capitalism work in poor communities” (as quoted in Thibault
2007, 882).
This program received support from non-profits, the state and capital based on separate
but interlocking logics. The non-profits saw takeovers of “in rem” (tax foreclosed or
government-seized) properties as a way to meet neighborhood housing needs and secure the
resources to ensure their own institutional survival and growth. Planners and politicians,
meanwhile, saw non-profit developers as palatable pathways toward the return of the city’s
growth machine in neighborhoods capital – private and public – had long neglected (Marwell
2007, 48). The real estate industry largely supported the program as a way to prepare
neighborhoods for future reinvestment, and as an ideological commitment from government to
housing in private hands (Angotti 2008, 99).
By the end of the 1970s, New York City had taken possession of over 40,000 in-rem
buildings, concentrated in low-income and majority Black, Latino, and Asian neighborhoods
(Marwell 2007, 46). Harlem, for example, contained just 2 percent of New York City’s housing
stock, but one fifth of its tax-foreclosed buildings (Goldstein 2017, 204). This crisis continued
into the 1980s, when Mayor Koch released a 10-year, $5.1 billion plan to preserve, rehabilitate
or build 252,000 units of housing, largely reliant on CDCs to do the actual work. As with many
housing plans, it was really 15 simultaneous mini-plans, with various local, state, federal and
private funding sources (including the Rockefeller-founded NYC Housing Partnership) (ibid,
224-225). The Koch plan established an ongoing paradigm in which “affordable housing would
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have to proceed in the context of a growth agenda, and that required costly concessions to the
business sector” (Viteritti 2017, 122).
The plan included many income levels, from the extremely low-income and homeless to
middle- and moderate-income households; as constructed, however, the housing tilted toward the
latter, rather than the former (Moody 2007, 79). This was the case in large part because of the
mostly private nature of the financing and development. Following his populist campaign, Mayor
Dinkins attempted to rebalance the plan toward lower income households, but faced opposition
from MAC and the Fiscal Control Board, which threatened a takeover if housing and social
services were not cut (Viteritti 2017, 111). Meanwhile, following developers’ demands, Dinkins
expanded the J-51 and 421-a tax breaks (for property renovation and development, respectively),
and increased corporate development subsidies (Moody 2007, 123).
In a revanchist reaction against the first (and thus far only) Black mayor of New York City, the
Giuliani administration cut back on social spending even further, cutting back on the number of
affordable housing units the city would finance and selling off in rem units to for-profit firms
(Moody 2007, 177). The municipal workforce was reduced by 21,000 jobs, and welfare rolls –
with the aid of Clintonian “reforms” – declined by more than half (ibid, 132 and 139). According
to a Giuliani aide, their goal was “making the city inhospitable to the poor;” nevertheless, most
unions supported Giuliani’s reelection in order to remain on the mayor’s good side (ibid, 130 and
144). In 1995-1996, HPD suffered a 28% budget cut, further increasing the mutual reliance
between city government and housing non-profits. The only blue-collar job class that grew
during this time was construction, as gentrification and luxury development increased with city
and state assistance (ibid, 152).
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Meanwhile, many non-profits were managing large portfolios of housing and, in some
cases, a surfeit of financial assets. This led to what Stoecker (1997, 6) calls the “capitalcommunity contradiction:”
CDCs manage capital like capitalists, but do not invest it for a profit.
They manage projects but within the constraints set by their funders.
They try to be community oriented while their purse strings are held
by outsiders. They are pressured by capital to produced exchange
values in the form of capitalist business spaces and rental housing.
They are pressured by communities to produce use values in the
form of services, home ownership, and green spaces. This is more
than a ‘double bottom-line.’ It is the institutionalization of the
capital-community contradiction and it leads to trouble. If there
were no contradiction between capital and community, these would
not be problems. But because that contradiction lies in the
background, presenting itself at every eviction, every housing
protest, every strike, every layoff, every foreclosure, every
bankruptcy, and every development deal, the CDC is caught
between worlds.
As New York’s CDCs became more comfortable in their role as landlords, they also
expanded their mission to include “economic integration,” both by seeking higher-income (and
thus higher rent-paying) tenants and pursuing commercial developments, such as big box stores
and shopping malls (Goldstein 2017, 250-275). Often this was achieved by seeking zoning
variances to build bigger, mixed-use and mixed-income properties on their land. While this
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might have been a legal challenge for for-profit developers, non-profits were exempt from the
“reasonable return finding” that can sometimes stymie commercial developers who seek zoning
variances (Gruber 1986).
As non-profits were becoming an increasingly potent force in urban development, unions
(via the AFL-CIO) began founding new mechanisms to invest pension funds in private housing
(Botein 2007, 805). The first venture was the Mortgage Investment Trust, later replaced by the
Housing Investment Trust (HIT), which went on to finance approximately 500 projects (Herod
2010, 123).55 They also created a Building Investment Trust for commercial investment
(Ghilarducci 1992, 124), which, in its first five years, produced nearly 3 million square feet of
office and industrial space (Herod 2001, 291). Through their National Partnership for
Community Investment with HUD, the AFLC-CIO joined $660 million in pension funds with
$550 million from government and finance sources to invest in real estate, largely in disinvested
neighborhoods.
In a sympathetic reading, Herod (2001, 291) describes this as an effort to “help renew
these transitional areas of cities.” This language, however, too easily elides the distinction
between community development and gentrification. While some of what the AFL-CIO builds
through these funds is low-income housing, their investments have to be profitable – not only
because pension funds are supposed to grow, but because government mandates that funds invest
like finance firms (McCarthy 2017). According to Botein (2007, 807), “The HIT makes
investment decisions primarily on the basis of securing returns for its investors, so most HITfinanced projects are market rate.” Distinguishing this practice from past efforts to build union-
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housing (Graham, 2012).
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sponsored cooperatives or encourage state investment in public housing, she continues, “the arc
of national housing policy in the postwar period thus depicts a shift in the labor movement’s
involvement, from a stance in which it was in a position to establish and implement policy, to
one in which not-for-profit organizations have appropriated that position, and, in collaboration
with the private sector, drive the agenda for affordable housing” (ibid.). Like non-profits, unions
involved in urban housing pursue development models that include elements of both
affordability and profitability.

Non-Profits and Profits
While non-profits had been growing in terms of both numbers and power since the 1960s,
by the end of the 20th century there was a quantitative leap. Ferguson (2009, 168) calls this “an
extraordinary swarm of [Non-Governmental Organizations], voluntary organizations, and private
foundations” emerging to meet the social needs abdicated by the “anti-state state” (Gilmore
2007a, 245). Many activists and scholars labeled this growth of non-profits and their
entanglements with private foundations and neoliberal governments a “non-profit industrial
complex” (INCITE! 2007). Between 1970 and 2000 non-profits grew at four times the speed of
the overall US economy, and came to employ 1 in 9 US workers. By 2000, US non-profits held
over a trillion dollars in assets, or 10 percent of US GDP (Wagner 2000, 119-120). Between
1998 and 2008, the number of non-profits grew an additional 60% (Arena 2012, xxvii). Only a
fraction of this growth was in the housing sector – far more was in private healthcare and
university systems – but as rising urban housing prices vastly outpaced wage growth in cities
across the country, housing non-profits grew to address this worsening crisis.
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During the same period, the state was increasingly central to the promotion of
gentrification (Hackworth 2007; Sites 2003), particularly new-build gentrification (Davidson and
Lees 2009). At the federal level, new rounds of deregulation and tax policies both encouraged
speculation in real estate and allowed for new modes of housing-based financial derivatives, and
policies like the Clinton-era repackaging of Thatcherite “Empowerment Zones” repositioned the
role of government as stimulating private real estate investment in places the market did not
already favor (Dávila 2004; Goldstein 2017, 241-242). According to Weber (2002, 531), this led
municipal government to grow “increasingly active in creating landscapes amenable to the quick
excavation of value.” In this atmosphere, with real estate capital the dominant voice in municipal
politics, planners were encouraged to do little that did not result in rising land and property
values (Stein 2019). Even when pursuing goals that had little to do with – or indeed were in
conflict with – real estate profits, planners often pursued policies dependent on continuous land
value inflation (Wolf-Powers 2005). In this context, gentrification must be understood “as
mutating, as parasitic, as attaching to and living off other policies (e.g., mixed communities
policy, the creative city thesis, modernization policies in cities of the Global South and indeed
poorer cities of the global North)” (Lees 2012, pg. 163).
Luxury consumption exploded with the first tech (“dot com”) boom and continued
shortly after its bubble burst. From pop culture signifiers to public policy, condominiums and
high-end hotels became the visual markers of urban success (Sherman 2007, 4-5). In this luxury
city, real estate capital sets the rules (Harvey 2006, 89), and the market for “super-prime” real
estate drives planning priorities (Madden and Marcuse 2016, 36). Labor institutions adapted to
the changing times (MacDonald 2011). As capital became increasingly concentrated in real
estate, and real estate became increasingly concentrated in a few hands, some New York City
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unions adapted to take advantage of this monopolization. The city’s property service union
(SEIU 32BJ) and Hotel Trades Council (HTC) proved particularly effective at organizing entire
portfolios, then supporting those companies’ growth while challenging non-union competitors.
According to Speliotis, as New York City government became more “transactional,” non-profits
grew more “reactive” to the politicians, who were in turn following real estate’s command. Nonprofits became increasingly financially sophisticated, largely with the aid of institutions known
as Community Development Financial Intermediaries (CDFIs) designed to bridge the gap
between global finance and local development.
CDFIs were key to the process of non-profit financial sophistication. The first CDFIs,
NeighborWorks, Local Initiatives Support Corporation, and Enterprise, were funded by a mix of
corporate and foundation funds and between 1979 and 1982. According to Graham (2015, 514),
their mission was to ‘rationalize’ the [CDC] sector and minimize risk for urban investors,” and
their effect was to further emphasize “finance, land use planning, real estate development, and
housing management” as the most important elements of CDCs’ work. As non-profit
development funding streams became increasingly complex, and as finance itself became
increasingly labyrinthian, national-scale CDFIs stepped in to help local CDCs secure needed
funds, lobby for CDC political priorities (as they framed them), and represent CDCs to
investment banks, pension funds, and other holders of colossal capital (Bockmeyer 2003, 184).
One of the most important functions for CDFIs is to act as a syndicator for Low Income
Housing Tax Credits. As discussed earlier, LIHTC emerged in a context of cuts to HUD and
public housing, and a general push to place housing in the private domain (Madden and Marcuse
2016, 137). It also came after the Reagan administration slashed personal income taxes for the
wealthiest households from 70 percent to 28 percent, and in the process inadvertently put a
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damper on the practice of wealthy patrons financing affordable housing construction to avoid
taxes (Alyssa Katz 2018, 58). LIHTC received bipartisan support, and was framed as both good
for business and good for working-class urbanites. A key piece of LIHTC’s ideological
infrastructure, introduced during the Reagan era but made permanent during by the Clinton
administration, was the neoliberal axiom that private sector investment would lead to better
affordable housing management and outcomes.
Today, LIHTC-financed non-profit development is by far the most common form of
affordable housing production in the US (Landis and McClure 2010). Between 1987 and 2015,
LIHTC has produced 2.97 million housing units in 45,905 projects at a cost of roughly $8 billion
per year in subsidies, with a majority of the units built since 2000 sited in the one-third of US
census tracts with majority non-White populations (Abello 2017). The system is a Rube
Goldberg machine of housing finance, whose very complexity serves as one of its political
safeguards: it involves so many different players, with so many different resources,
constituencies, and specialties, that changing it – let alone replacing it – is becomes a daunting
task.
In simplified terms, this is how the system is structured:
•

First, the US Treasury issues two kinds tax credits to states: an inexhaustible number of
credits that cover 30% of construction costs and can be used on top of tax-exempt bonds
(often for mixed market-rate/income-targeted developments); and a limited number of
credits that cover 70% of construction costs (often used for fully income-targeted
developments).

•

Next, states make “qualified action plans” (QAP) that set standards for what kinds of
groups and projects are eligible for the latter type of credits.
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•

Developers – largely CDCs – then apply for competitive credit grants, and are judged
based on their organization’s or project’s fit with a given QAP.

•

Once awarded, the developers sell their credits to investors – who receive a corporate tax
credit equivalent to the money they pay the developer – and use the sale money to fund
construction.

•

After 10 years, the tax break expires and investors can pull their financing, thus forcing
non-profits to find other subsidies or transfer their buildings to Section 8. Fully financed
developments are allowed to transfer to market rate after as little as 15 years, but can also
last 30 years.
LIHTC is an incredibly complex, inefficient, largely private, and quite regressive way to

fund affordable housing. Alyssa Katz (2018, 57) calls it “a better-than-nothing gimmick that
helps the poor by rewarding the rich” and creates “a vast industry of financial companies in
symbiosis with for-profit middlemen and community-based non-profits.” While a good deal of
LIHTC housing is truly affordable for those most in need, the system allows CDCs to make their
dollars stretch farther by offering apartments to higher rent-paying tenants, up to 60 percent of
Area Median Income. This is not an exorbitant wage, but it stretches the notion of “low income”
beyond the population of greatest need. The program also constructs ticking time bombs, as it
creates affordable housing that is built not to last: at some point it needs another source of
subsidy, or the CDC will sell it. Rodrigo Santos, an anonymous CDFI worker who asked not to
have his employer identified, explained to me in an interview that this can incentivize non-profits
to allow their subsidies to expire so that they can sell their portfolios at market rates. LIHTC, like
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many other affordable housing programs,56 thus operates as an example of what Roy (2009, 83)
calls “calculated informality,” and Aalbers (2016, 570) refers to as “regulated deregulation”:
state policies which allow private actors to undermine the program’s stated purpose.
As Graham (2015) explains, LIHTC effectively ties the dominant form of non-profit
housing group – the CDC – to the dominant mode of capitalist urban investment – the FIRE
sector – in two ways. First, LIHTC is a cyclical market: when the corporate sector is making the
most profits, it looks to LIHTC to diminish its tax responsibilities; CDCs are thus wedded to
continuous corporate profits as keys to their own growth and successes. In times of economic
collapse or depression, when low-income housing would presumably be a priority, these credits
are nowhere to be found. Second, in large part because of CRA lender requirements, 90 percent
of LIHTC investors come from the FIRE sector. CDCs are therefore not just dependent upon
corporate profitability in general, but the specific gains of the economic sector most responsible
for gentrification. LIHTC therefore creates a strong structural tie between the FIRE and nonprofit sectors. This goes a long way toward explaining non-profit housing politics in the US,
particularly surrounding urban planning and gentrification: it is not in CDCs’ immediate
economic interest to support planning programs that would directly take on real estate profits and
negate gentrification.
Another program that can link non-profits to real estate industry growth is inclusionary
zoning. Inclusionary zoning has taken many different forms in various times and places, but is
reducible to a program of income-targeted private housing, linked directly to market-rate
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Penn South treasurer Walter Mankoff explained to me in an interview that in New York, several of the affordable
housing types created by the Private Finance Housing Law – including Limited-Profit Housing Companies, Limited
Dividend Housing Companies, Redevelopment Companies, and Housing Development Finance Companies – are
self-expiring, as can be Mitchell Lama. As public sector unionist Joshua Barnett told me, “anything with a sunset
clause is a killer.”
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development, which is made available through a city’s land use laws. Community-based
organizations advocated for inclusionary zoning in the late 1960s as a way of undoing suburban
segregation by mandating that some portion of new developments be targeted at those who could
not otherwise afford suburban housing. By the 1980s, however, it was more commonly used in
gentrifying cities (Stabrowski 2015, 1122).
Inclusionary zoning was first instituted in New York in 1987 under the Koch
administration in the form of a “density bonus,” or a zoning rule that allows developers to build
more than the zoning would otherwise allow in exchange for their provision of some public
good. In certain areas, developers could build bigger buildings if 20 percent of their apartments
rented at below-market rates. Developers could also get the bonus if they paid into a fund for
affordable housing, or built some off-site and often far away from their market-rate development.
Much of this was done through the Community Preservation Corporation, a consortium of banks
and insurance companies that both contracts with the city and funds housing non-profits. This
made it more difficult for non-profits to oppose rezonings, even if they opened up rent gaps and
encouraged gentrification, as those non-profits sought to retain the good graces of both city
leaders and the CPC (Paul 2011).
According to Norman Marcus (1991, 722), former General Council to the New York City
Planning Department, inclusionary zoning was an ineffective policy but a highly effective
ideological tool:
At no point in the process did the City pretend that [inclusionary
zoning] would solve its serious affordable housing crisis….
Inclusionary zoning did, however, help perpetuate the myth that all
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social problems are susceptible to a zoning solution, by adding a
new, alternative entrée to the City’s zoning menu.
Despite its poor track record for producing affordable housing – or perhaps because of it –
inclusionary zoning became a major part of both the Bloomberg and de Blasio administrations’
rezoning regime. As discussed in future chapters, this allowed upzonings to be sold as conveyers
of affordable housing, and it brought into the fold some non-profits who would benefit from
developer linkages (Stabrowski 2015).
Though inclusionary housing ensures that all development built as a result of a rezoning
has the potential to include below-market rate housing, as practiced in New York – both in its
voluntary density bonus iteration as well as its contemporary mandatory form – it always results
in far more market-rate development. Moreover, it has been implemented in areas that are either
currently affordable or undergoing the process of gentrification, even while wealthier and
predominantly White neighborhoods are granted protective contextual zonings (Angotti and
Morse 2016). Though touted as a means to foster integration and affordability, inclusionary
zoning as practiced in New York has been a crucial mechanism to increase real estate
profitability and plan gentrification. It thus represents an example of how “the discourse becomes
independent of the movement” (Frasier 2009, 114; Peake and Rieker 2013, 7), moving from a
demand to integrate segregated White neighborhoods to a program to bring wealthier Whites into
working-class and majority Black, Latino, and Asian neighborhoods. The movement, in the form
of New York’s housing non-profits, has held a wide range of views on inclusionary zoning, from
wholehearted embraces to skeptical takes on its particular implementation. Nonetheless, the
potential benefits that come to non-profits from inclusionary zoning, as well as the potential risks
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of opposing it when it is supported by state and FIRE sector actors, makes the policy easier to
negotiate than to fight.

From Fix to Fixture
Surveying the landscape of contemporary urban development politics, non-profits are
ubiquitous: big non-profit institutions (like universities, churches and hospitals) that own
enormous swaths of land; advocacy organizations that aim to represent popular interests in elite
institutions (legislative chambers, courts, media, etc.); Community Development Corporations
that build, own, and/or manage housing, while in many cases simultaneously engaging in
community organizing around housing issues; and activist groups that incorporate as non-profits
for legal protection and financial security. Non-profit proliferation, however, has not been
coincident with a decline in for-profit activity: a majority of the world’s capital is in real estate,
with housing forming 75 percent of that investment (Farha 2017); private equity firms and Real
Estate Investment Trusts are increasingly large and powerful forces in urban housing markets
(August and Walks 2018); and the real estate industry continues to maintain a strong hold over
urban planning and development politics, with developer president Donald Trump the clearest
signal of real estate’s political ascendency (Stein 2019). The two have expanded simultaneously
– corporate developers alongside non-profits – suggesting that one modality is not necessarily a
threat to the other’s survival, but in fact they may be symbiotic.
While non-profits have been a part of US society since the 17th century, and their (and
their funders’) influence over urban politics has been analyzed by critical scholars since at least
the 1940s, the current state of non-profit urban development politics is most clearly derived from
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the crises of the 1960s (Gilmore 2007b, 41 and 45). Funding community-based initiatives,
including militant movements for community control, was part of the national Democrat’s
strategy for maintaining power in light of the chaos caused by urban renewal (among other racist
urban policies and practices); and forming formal non-profits was a way of containing that
militancy and increasing city control over groups’ programs. Turning non-profits into receivers
of state authority jibed with the demands of fiscal crises and austerity regimes; and having those
resources enabled non-profits to grow in both size and power, but simultaneously limited their
political horizons and created new bonds between them and the FIRE sectors. This saga is not a
straight line from grassroots to grasstops, or from radical to conservative; it is, instead, a
complex history with multiple contingencies and varying outcomes. In other words, the outcome
was not predetermined, but rather overdetermined by the structural power of capital and state to
define urban futures.
Today’s non-profits form an important part of the legacy of 1960s programs that
encouraged community development and advocacy. Such programs undoubtably produced
vehicles for low-income housing production particularly, and working-class social reproduction
generally, but they also produced political actors whose programs and sources of funding were
increasingly tied to the ongoing and increasing profitability of the very economic and political
sectors most responsible for gentrification, displacement, predatory lending, and cultural erasure.
The “urban crisis” of the 1960s was resolved in part through the promotion of non-profits as
community developers; in the contemporary crisis of gentrification, non-profits are strategically
situated to negotiate the parameters of capital’s reinvestment in low income and predominantly
Black, Latino and Asian neighborhoods, pushing back against its worst aspects. While some
groups organized as non-profits maintain the initial 1960s spirit of disruptive activism and
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grassroots organizing, many find such an orientation to be counter-productive or untenable given
their management responsibilities and financing demands. This leads to a political landscape in
which some of the city’s most powerful working-class organizations are strategically oriented
around extracting concessions from – rather than seeking to undermine and undo – capital’s
growth through real estate, and city planning policies aimed at securing that mode of
development.
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Interlude: Planning in 21st Century New York City

Thus far in 21st century New York City, real estate imperatives overdetermined urban
planning priorities (Stein 2019). Under two mayors with opposite public profiles, Michael
Bloomberg and Bill de Blasio, the city has pursued zoning and development schemes that
opened rent gaps and expanded opportunities for private development in working-class areas,
while largely preserving the protections afforded to wealthy neighborhoods. Using many of the
same mechanisms but little of the same language, Bloomberg and de Blasio wielded state power
to enhance real estate values.
Michael Bloomberg ran for mayor in 2001 with a background in finance and media, and
no political experience whatsoever. His explicit pitch to voters was that he would run the city as
a corporation: Bloomberg would preside as Chief Executive Officer over a city he described as
“a luxury product” for the consumption and enjoyment of an urban elite (Brash 2011, 112). He
“personified the age of plutocracy” (Viteritti 2017, 130), and publicly proclaimed, “If we could
get every billionaire around the world to move here, it would be a godsend that would create a
much bigger income gap” (Colvin 2013).
Bloomberg’s housing program, “New Housing Marketplace,” aimed to build or preserve
68,000 units, largely through private CDFI funding, while cutting spending by the city’s Housing
Preservation and Development agency by 10 percent (Moody 2007, 171). Most of the housing’s
affordability would be temporary; a third of it would be built for people earning more than the
city’s median income; and in half of the city’s neighborhoods, a majority of the “affordable
housing” would be unaffordable to local residents (Viteritti 2017, 145).
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Far more ambitious and significant than the mayor’s housing plan was his zoning
practice, which constituted less of a plan than a pattern. Over the course of his three terms in
office,57 Bloomberg’s administration rezoned over 11,000 city blocks, covering 37 percent of the
city’s land mass in over 80 percent of community districts. This was not a single citywide act or
even five borough-based actions, but rather 122 individual neighborhood rezonings that varied in
size, intensity, purpose, and local engagement. It is therefore difficult to characterize them in any
one way: most included both upzonings and downzonings along different streets; some were in
predominantly commercial or industrial districts, while others were in mixed-use or residential
areas; some targeted already dense areas, while others focused on the city’s internal suburbs.
While there was no comprehensive plan guiding these rezonings, there did emerge a
fairly clear pattern of practice: more than any other factors, race and class composition
determined which blocks would be rezoned for more intensive development, and which would be
selected for scalar preservation (Furman Center for Real Estate & Urban Policy 2010). Blocks
with a higher concentration of working-class Black, Latino, and Asian residents tended to be
upzoned, while blocks comprised primarily of upper-class White residents were downzoned or
contextually zoned. Quasi-suburban areas of the city like Staten Island’s South Shore were
protected, while already-dense areas like Harlem were threatened. The result intensified the
city’s gentrification and presented a one-way vision of integration in which White people are
encouraged to move into Black, Latino, and Asian neighborhoods, but the opposite is made more
difficult (Angotti and Morse 2016).

57

Bloomberg’s third term was enabled by a controversial vote to expand term limits for both the mayor and the
City Council.
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To make these rezonings more palatable, Bloomberg intensified the city’s reliance on
voluntary inclusionary bonuses. The numbers differed in various times and locations, but in
general the program offered residential developers the ability to build 20 percent more than the
zoning would otherwise allow if they dedicated 20 percent of the units to “affordable housing.”
Often the incomes targeted were far too high for local residents to qualify, and only a small
number of eligible developers opted to participate. The possibility of new affordable housing
development in a city becoming ever more expensive, however, helped secure a modicum of
local support for even the most divisive land use decisions (Larson 2013).
At the same time as Bloomberg pursued his rezonings, his administration supported a
series of “megaprojects,” or large-scale private developments with public subsidies, public
bonding, or public land (and often all three). These included: mixed-use projects centered around
public rail yards, as in the case of the Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park and Manhattan’s
Hudson Yards; retail projects on former industrial and institutional site, like the Gateway and
proposed Kingsbridge Armory mall projects in the Bronx58; replacements of the city’s two
remaining major league baseball stadia in the Bronx and Queens; as well as numerous middle- to
upper-income waterfront housing developments in neighborhoods like Long Island City, Queens
and Williamsburg, Brooklyn (Moss 2011; Larson 2013). While the state’s rent laws and
development tax schemes were beyond the mayor’s purview, Bloomberg did not protest the
repeated retrenchment of the city’s rent stabilization and rent control laws, and supported the
continued showering of tax abatements and exemptions onto for-profit developers.
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The Kingsbridge Armory project, discussed in the following chapter, was later redesigned as an ice hockey
stadium.
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During Bloomberg’s time in office, inequality deepened. New York City came to hold
the widest wealth gap in the country (Warren 2013). By the end of his third term, 15 percent of
New Yorkers (1.7 million people) lived below the federal poverty line, even as incomes for the
city’s highest earners kept climbing. During his final year in office, Michael Bloomberg saw his
own net worth rise by $6 billion – a billion more than all of the 1.7 million poorest peoples’
incomes combined (Jones 2013). Despite these dynamics, the mayor managed to secure
reelection endorsements from nearly every major private-sector union in the city (MacDonald
2011, 206), as well as several of the biggest public sector unions (Moody 2007, 193). Though
many non-profits protested particular neighborhood actions, the Mayor’s philanthropic largesse
dulled the opposition he may have otherwise faced (ibid, 163; Viteritti 2017, 204).
The election that brought in de Blasio after three terms of Bloomberg was most definitely
a “change election.” All of the Democratic candidates – including even Christine Quinn, who
was closely aligned with Bloomberg for most of his tenure – promised a major break from the
billionaire mayor and an emphasis on reducing inequalities. De Blasio was particularly
persuasive in hammering home this message, and – following the implosion of Anthony
Weiner’s candidacy, and recognizing the depth of Quinn’s tarnished political reputation – found
a winning slogan in his “tale of two cities” take on New York’s past twelve years. He beat the
crowded field in the primary, and easily won the general election on his promise to change the
city’s priorities in favor of its working class. At his first inauguration, de Blasio declared, “We
are called to put an end to economic and social inequalities that threaten to unravel the city we
love. And so today, we commit to a new progressive direction in New York” (Cassidy 2014).
Much of De Blasio’s inner circle of staffers and advisors came out of the intermingled
world of New York City unions, non-profits, and reform parties, but they always also included
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key real estate players. His transition committee included former ACORN chapter leader Bertha
Lewis and SEIU 1199 president George Gresham, as well as Real Estate Board of New York
leader John Banks (Viteritti 2017, 169).59 His cousin and major donor, John Wilhelm, was the
longtime leader of UNITE HERE, the merged garment, hotel, and restaurant workers union
(Lestch, Fermino, and Smith 2014). Many of his top staffers and appointees had worked at 1199,
UFT, ACORN, the Working Families Party (ibid, 172; González 2017, 43, 81, 91), and several
were involved with the public relations firm Berlin Rosen, which advises both progressive
organizations and real estate developers (González 2017, 85). De Blasio was therefore steeped in
the city’s culture of union and non-profit politics, including its entanglements with real estate
capital.
In his first term in office, De Blasio was able to achieve a number of significant
legislative and policy changes that Bloomberg would never have contemplated, including
universal pre-kindergarten education, an increase in the minimum wage, paid sick leave for most
workers, low-income tenants’ right to counsel, and the appointment of a Rent Guidelines Board
that approved two consecutive years of rent freezes for rent stabilized apartments (González
2017). His approach to zoning and development policy, however, contained important echoes of
Bloomberg’s approach.
In an interview, affordable housing advocate Ismene Speliotis60 said she had believed de
Blasio “was interested in doing [development] differently instead of just building, building,
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Despite this choice, my sources indicate that de Blasio was in fact closer to the largely for-profit New York State
Association for Affordable Housing (NYSAFAH) than REBNY.
60
Speliotis was considered for the position of Housing Preservation and Development commissioner under de
Blasio but passed over in favor of the more developer-friendly Vicki Been at the behest of NYSAFAH (González
2017, 196). Been would later replace Alicia Glen as Deputy Mayor for Housing and Economic Development. For a
critique of Been’s earlier academic work, see Pulido 2000.
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building” like his predecessor. In advance of de Blasio’s mayoralty, her organization produced a
report demonstrating that this approach had left out those least served by the existing housing
stock. Speliotis continued sardonically, “If the mayor was a progressive mayor, he would look at
where need was and then he would adjust the resources accordingly, and he would then build
less units but more for people who had been left out of the prior 20 years of administrations,
right? But that just isn’t very sexy, and so that didn’t happen. It was really much more fun to just
keep building.”
De Blasio’s primary development plan, Housing New York, was – like any big city
housing plan – a combination of several smaller components: a promise to preserve existing
affordable housing and fund new non-profit development; a series of small changes to the zoning
code that would enable slightly more development in contextually zoned areas; and, most
controversially, a proposal to upzone at least fifteen neighborhoods and create a new “Mandatory
Inclusionary Housing” (MIH) program for the city. MIH would make the voluntary
“inclusionary housing” program mandatory in any residential development that is the product of
an upzoning.61 It also tweaked both the percentages of units that would have to be incometargeted and the income bands that would be allowed in those apartments. After negotiations
with unions, non-profits, and councilmembers (discussed in the following chapters), MIH
ultimately included various options from which a developer or city council representative could
choose: on the low end of the income scale, developers could set aside twenty percent of their
new buildings for households earning up to 40 percent of the Area Median Income (AMI). On
the higher end of the income scale, developers could set aside thirty percent of their buildings for

61

Although the amount of upzoning required to trigger MIH is not codified into the law, planners generally believe
the inclusionary requirement should kick in if a developer is allowed to build more than 30 percent more floor area
than would otherwise be legal.
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households making up to 115 percent of AMI ($115,000). None of these options would house the
populations that were most in need of affordable housing: households making 30 percent of AMI
($31,000). At the time of MIH’s legislative passage, this group (those in the greatest need)
included minimum wage workers, the median single mother-led households, and the majority of
the exceedingly long public housing waiting list. Most egregiously, MIH’s income targets left
out fifty-seven percent of Black New Yorkers and sixty-two percent of Latino New Yorkers
(Durkin 2016).
MIH is designed to produce more market-rate housing than affordable units – in no
scenario does the developer build mostly affordable units, and cross-subsidize that construction
with a smaller number of high-priced apartments. In fact, as implemented, even some of the
“affordable” units rent for as much as or more than local asking rents, straining the definition of
“affordable housing” beyond recognition. If sited in wealthy areas, however, the program would
add units that rent for less than the local average. Though there exist plenty of low-density,
transit-rich, wealthy, and predominantly White neighborhoods in the city – including many that
received favorable treatment during the Bloomberg era – none were proposed for MIH rezonings
(Gates 2015). As of this writing, city-initiated MIH rezonings have been exclusively targeted
toward working-class neighborhoods that were either not yet gentrifying (as in East New York,
Brooklyn, Jerome Avenue in the Bronx, and Bay Street in Staten Island), or were beginning to
undergo a process of gentrification (as in Downtown Far Rockaway, Queens, and East Harlem
and Inwood, Manhattan). MIH has therefore been more likely to widen rent gaps and accelerate
new-build gentrification than to act as an alternative to the processes displacing working-class
New Yorkers from their neighborhoods, or from the city altogether (Stein 2018).
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At the same time as de Blasio pursued MIH rezonings, his administration pushed for a
development agenda that included generous opportunities for private development on public
land. While these projects have attracted less attention than Bloomberg’s megaprojects, they
nonetheless represent a significant transfer of public land into the private domain (Stein and
Mironova 2018).
The most significant move toward privatization has occurred in the city’s public housing.
Through de Blasio’s “NextGen NYCHA” plan, New York City’s massively under-funded public
housing authority is seeking to reduce its deficit by encouraging private construction on public
housing campuses, transferring air rights from public housing to private development, and
moving at least a third of the city’s public housing into the federal Rental Assistance
Demonstration (RAD) program (Schwartz 2017). Through RAD, a HUD program created under
the Obama administration, the city offers private property managers (non-profit or for-profit) a
long-term lease on their developments; the private managers then convert the public housing into
a project-based voucher system and obtain access to sources of capital which are largely
inaccessible to public housing authorities. Though the state retains ownership of the land beneath
the projects, the buildings are handed over to private managers. These private managers have
thus far been far more aggressive in evicting tenants than NYCHA had been: despite being of
comparable size, the first NYCHA project to undergo a RAD conversion, Ocean Bay
Apartments, saw more than double the number of evictions (80 between 2017 and 2019) than the
next highest NYCHA evictor (Brownsville Houses, 39 over the same time period) (DiPrinzio
2019).62 De Blasio did not create this crisis; the public housing authority’s budget calamities
derive primarily from HUD’s long-term divestment. The solutions he has presented, however,
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Ocean Bay contains 1,378 apartments, while Brownsville Houses contains 1,319.
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are in line with the federal government’s long-standing push to put public housing into private
control, and to create opportunities for real estate to profit off of public resources.63
Aside from public housing, the de Blasio administration oversaw the sale of over 200
publicly owned vacant lots for $1, often to for-profit developers (Dovey 2018). On several sites,
like Crown Heights’ enormous Bedford Union Armory, the administration brokered deals that
brought together for-profit developers and non-profit organizations to turn publicly owned
buildings into high-end private developments. In other parts of the city, the administration
oversaw the sale of restrictive deeds on particular lots, which had previously limited their use to
affordable housing, healthcare, or the arts. In the most controversial use of this long-standing
program, a developer paid to have the deed restriction on a Lower East Side AIDS hospice
removed, then converted the building into luxury condominiums (Goodman 2016). These kinds
of actions have contributed to the escalating cost of housing in the city while creating manifold
opportunities for real estate profits off of public assets.
Planning in 21st century New York is a case study in continuity despite change. Though
the tone, tenor, political base, and governing coalitions changed from conservative Bloomberg to
liberal de Blasio, many core assumptions about development and land use persisted. In both
cases, even as other elements of city life improved – from deeper commitments to “complete
streets”64 under Bloomberg to significant expansions of public education under de Blasio – the
city’s approach to planning and growth has remained gravely imbalanced toward the demands of
real estate capital.
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Notably, several of these proposals were first proposed by Mayor Bloomberg, but were ultimately defeated due
to popular disapproval.
64
The phrase “complete streets” is used by planners to describe a program of redesigning public streets to
prioritize transit, bicycle, and pedestrian safety and speed over that of cars.
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As the following two chapters demonstrate, working-class institutions displayed a range
of attitudes toward this agenda. At various times and places, unions and non-profits protested this
mode of planning and demanded that the city plan in a way that ensures long-term affordability
for workers and low-income residents. It has not at all been uncommon, however, for unions and
non-profits to either embrace Bloomberg or de Blasio’s programs, or to negotiate their
parameters rather than oppose them outright. The explanations for this behavior are multifaceted
and vary dramatically among organizations depending on their industrial location, funding,
political ties, and more. While the contingencies of leadership are surely an important factor in
how these decisions are made, deeper structural forces bind some of the city’s most powerful
working-class institutions to planning agendas that reproduce the luxury city.
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Chapter 4: Unions and Planning Politics in 21st Century New York

Unions in the United States are fundamentally workplace organizations, in that they are
organized around a job site, an industry or a craft. They are also, however, spatial organizations
in that they represent workers in a given territory, be it a particular shop for the smallest unions
or a constellation of countries for the largest among them. Their political actions, then, cannot be
understood as ever either just about the job, or just about the geography; it is always both – the
job in a geography – though often in a complicated and sometimes intentionally mystified form.
When unions do their most basic task and represent their members on the job, they are
also engaged in a form of spatial politics by determining the rules by which accumulation does
and does not occur – and for whom – in a particular area. When they step beyond that role to
participate in a broader politics by getting involved in electoral campaigns, legislative lobbying,
or solidarity struggles, they rarely do so without an acute sense of how that engagement will
affect their members’ economic position, be it through the union’s ability to hold on to its
existing membership, to grow its ranks, or to enable greater revenue for their employer which
can accrue to workers (in always diminished form) through collective bargaining. Workplace
politics and urban politics, then, are not separate arenas for unions, but rather co-dependent and
mutually co-constitutive modes of political engagement.
This dynamic is clearly displayed in the way New York City unions engage in planning,
land use and housing politics. There is no one union planning program. The city’s various unions
get involved in such struggles to greater and lesser extents, with more and less regularity, and
with higher and lower stakes, depending on the union, its leadership, its history, and its industrial
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sector. They do so in four primary ways: by supporting or opposing particular real estate
projects, and the political efforts needed to ensure or deny their construction; by investing
pension funds into real estate development of various sorts; by supporting or opposing particular
parcel-level, neighborhood, or citywide rezonings, and other regulatory land use actions; and by
supporting or opposing legislation relating to taxation and regulation of developers and building
owners.65 This activity is an advanced example of what Schraeger (2016, 149) terms “land use
unionism,” or unions’ “use of the local land development process to extract concessions from
large employers, or prevent the entry of certain kinds of employers altogether.” By using local
planning power to regulate an industry and their union’s place in it, land use unionism bypasses
both the national NLRA election system for forming, merging, and expanding unions, as well as
state-level preemptive laws that restrict local governments’ ability to mandate unionization in the
private sector.
As working-class organizations with generally left-of-center political cultures, unions
often present their engagement in planning politics as representing a “double bottom line,”
language used to describe capitalist firms with self-proclaimed social commitments: unions are
looking out for their members’ economic interests, as well as the broader needs of the city’s
working class. In most cases, however, union land use politics can be better described as a solid
and dotted line. The solid line represents the union’s own interests (as understood by its elected
leadership) while the dotted line represents what might be good for labor as a whole. As in what
transportation planners call a “passing permitted in direction having single lane” scenario, most
union leaders believe they can cross the dotted line, but not the solid: if a particular planning
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Additionally, unions can relate to land use through their non-participation in planning politics. As important
institutional players in urban political affairs, their silence on particular issues can be deafening.
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outcome is understood to be good for both labor and their particular union, they will support it; if
the action might be good for labor as a whole but is not understood as being in their particular
union’s interest, they will not. Similarly, if a planning action is understood as being in their
union’s interest but not in the interest of labor as a whole, union leaders often see it as their
responsibility to support it.
Every union draws those lines somewhat differently, but those are the general dynamics.
In making decisions around their involvement in planning issues, unions form strategic alliances
– some temporary, others longer lasting – with other elements of labor, capital, and the state
toward a spatial strategy. In New York City, this has led many unions to embrace, negotiate
around, or only partially oppose land use changes that result in rising land values, gentrification,
and ultimately displacement. In this sense, as Arena (2016, 326) argues, “unions have become
deeply implicated in revanchist agendas at the city level” even as they act in what they
understand to be their members’ interests. Often, union leaders justify these actions by venting
their frustrations with tenant and anti-gentrification movements, which they understand as
insufficiently concerned with the fate of workers – particularly those whose jobs are connected to
real estate.66 These stances, however, not only reinforce rifts (or “trenches” [Katznelson 1983])
between unions and other left formations, but reproduce a form of capitalist spatial production
that could alienate and ultimately displace those very unions’ members. This chapter draws on
the experiences and analyses of current and former union staffers, members, and consultants
(frequently anonymized) who, in interviews, described the challenges and constraints their
unions face and explained the logics guiding their institutions’ strategies and decisions.
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See, for example, Berman 2019.

223

Origins of the Modern Union Land Use Campaign
The form of union land use politics recognizable in New York City today comes out of
developments in the union movement during the 1990s. In Los Angeles, unions – and
particularly service workers’ unions, such as the SEIU local 1877, which represented janitors and
other building service workers in the city’s downtown – conducted an extensive growth
campaign. This famously included organizing non-union immigrant workers and leading one of
the city’s biggest strikes during its “Justice For Janitors” fight, but also involved building out the
union movements’ research, media, legal, and political capacities (Milkman 2006). LA unions
became increasingly involved in the city and state’s intensive regulatory regime around land use
and development in order to pressure owners, contractors, and developers to build in ways that
fit unions’ strategic goals. Meanwhile, during the same decade, the Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees union (HERE) was building out a similar infrastructure in San Francisco
and Boston, with the unions’ research staff growing from 10 to 80 between 1998 and their 2004
merger with the UNITE.67 According to an interview with former researcher for multiple unions
Larry Mendoza (a pseudonym), HERE made “a big bet” that “virtually their entire growth”
would come from securing deals with developers to represent workers in new developments,
rather than by organizing workers in existing hotels – a proposition they no longer operate under,
but which pushed the union into intensive campaigns around urban land use planning politics.
Around the same time, as former organizer Jeffrey Eichler told me in an interview, the Retail,
Wholesale, and Department Store Union (RWDSU) was becoming increasingly involved in land
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UNITE is the successor to the garment workers’ unions most active in the mid-20th century union cooperative
housing movement – ILGWU and ACTWU.
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use campaigns aimed at keeping Walmart – the anti-union retail behemoth – out of their
jurisdictions in order to protect their union density and wage and benefit standards.
Organizing and making claims around development issues has long been a part of some
unions’ culture in the US. Often this has been done under the framework of “total person”
(Bussel 2015) or “whole worker” (McAlevey 2012) unionism, in which the union attempted to
reach workers and even represent them in spaces beyond the workplace. In addition to the New
York City history of housing cooperatives discussed earlier, the St. Louis Teamsters in the
1950s, for example, aimed to take over the city’s public housing authority and run it as a tripartite labor/management/state authority (Bussel 2015). If the impulse to get involved in
planning politics is not new, however, the role, purpose, and emphasis of land use campaigns is.
As Mendoza emphasized in an interview, “what is sort of unique is the turn to using it on an
institutional basis or as the main lever of growth.”
While some of this change can be explained by internal factors within unions (discussed
later in this chapter), it cannot be understood outside of its political and economic context. In the
US, union density decreased from 20.1 percent in 1983 to 10.5 percent in 2018, the legal
landscape for unions has grown increasingly hostile, corporations have waged ongoing wars
against further unionization, and economic productivity has increased while wages have largely
remained stagnant (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019; Fantasia and Voss 2004). In this climate,
unions are increasingly isolated, not only by capital and the state but also from other left
formations, which no longer tend to put unions at the center of their visions for change.
“As unions have declined in terms of their labor market coverage,” MacDonald (2017a,
3) argues, “they have expanded the scope of their activities to take on roles previously assumed
by governments and even corporations.” Corporate bosses, he continues, have taken on – and
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been bestowed by state actors with – the rhetorical mantle of “job creators,” even as they have
relied increasingly on part-time workforces and passed on the responsibility for actually
employing people to subcontractors, consultants, and temp agencies. Public sector employment
has held steadier, thanks in large part to the higher density of public sector unionization, but the
state in the late 20th and early 21st century has certainly not embraced its role as employer by
offering new large-scale public works projects or jobs guarantees. MacDonald (ibid, 12) argues
that by mobilizing around land use and development issues, as well as other arenas of urban
public policy, “now it is unions that are demanding, negotiating, and mobilizing for employment
as intently as they used to bargain for better wages and benefit standards. In a world turned
upside down, unions have stepped into the role of good job creators, a role that is both more
social and more entrepreneurial than traditional business unionism.” This shift from the
workplace to the urban implies not only a different terrain of struggle for unions, but also a
different set of alliances and allegiances, both with other segments of labor and with elements of
capital and the state. The result is a politics that favors “one group of workers over another in all
of the ways in which workers are segregated and sorted into urban space,” and therefore is
unlikely to produce universal benefits across the class (ibid, 12).
At the same time as unions have intensified their role as “job creators,” they have largely
abdicated their role as housing providers (Botein 2007). The last union cooperative in New York
City was built in the early 1970s, and while the AFL-CIO’s HIT still finances new development,
it is generally only involved as an investor rather than as a planner. Instead, “today’s unions have
conceded housing to the real estate developers, landlords, and other private contractors”
(Aronowitz 2014, 128), including Community Development Corporations that are usually
antagonistic toward unions for raising the cost of construction (Botein 2007, 806-807). This does
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not, however, mean that unions are less involved in the planning; in fact, the politics of private
development and its public regulation has only grown in importance to many New York City
unions seeking alternative means to advance their interests.

Why Land Use Matters for Unions
Planning politics, like workplace politics, is inherently conflictual: just as workers and
bosses would never seek the same results in a collective bargaining agreement, tenants and
landlords, homeowners and developers, transit riders and drivers all seek different kinds of land
use changes in order to secure very different – and often oppositional – results. Unions
representing a particular workforce in a given geography also seek particular planning outcomes,
which may or may not align with those of area tenants or workers in other sectors. Unions may
thus strategically align with elements of the capitalist class and state against the interests of other
working-class residents in order to produce a desired planning result (Herod 2001).
While there are many motivations for unions to engage in planning politics and form such
alliances, their leadership’s most basic intention is to promote policies that they understand to be
helpful – directly or indirectly – in some combination of the following goals: protecting existing
union jobs; producing future union jobs; holding or gaining ground in current or future collective
bargaining negotiations; maintaining or increasing their political power; and increasing the value
of pension fund investments. Unions engage with questions of urban density in order to increase
union density. They alter the housing market in order to secure the labor market. They remake
the built environment in order to shape the political environment. In so doing, “a procedure for
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public review of land use is transformed into an auxiliary institution in the city’s labor-relations
regime” (MacDonald 2014, 205).
In the most direct sense, land use changes that promote intensive real estate development
can put a lot of people to work. De Blasio’s housing plan, for example, promised to create
194,000 construction jobs and 7,100 building service jobs (Viteritti 2017, 206). The production
of jobs as such, however, is not usually enough to secure wholehearted union support. As several
informants shared with me, what unions really want is some sort of assurance that these jobs will
be union, and that non-union contractors and developers will be disfavored through the process.68
Under US law, however, it is difficult – arguably unconstitutional – for local governments to
mandate that buildings be built with union labor, or that workers in new buildings be represented
by a union (Macdonald 2017c, 46; Schrager 2016, 150). Building trades unions have historically
been the most likely to support construction of any type (Logan and Molotch 1987, 81-82), but
given the declining share of union construction in New York City such unconditional support for
new development is no longer a given.
The closest unions can come to securing future unionization through policy is to push for
laws that guarantee “prevailing wages” (the most common wage for a given job in a particular
area – generally union scale) in development projects that are publicly financed or enabled by
public action (such as a rezoning). If such a guarantee is secured, the state essentially ensures
that union contractors are not underbid by low-wage competitors. Such universal provisions are
highly sought after by unions, but without a great deal of success. While federal subsidies
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This is perhaps analogous to the mainstream tenant movement’s demand for affordable housing, rather than
the production of housing as such (as demanded by the pro-market “YIMBY”, or “Yes In My Back Yard” movement)
(McElroy and Szeto 2017).
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(increasingly scarce though they are) can trigger prevailing wage requirements for construction
workers, many state and local development incentives do not.
As a result, unions find themselves fighting for or against projects or rezonings on a caseby-case basis. In such cases they must frame their arguments in ways that have little or nothing
to do with their own concerns, but rather are presumed to resonate with planning commissioners,
community board members, or elected officials. According to Mendoza, this usually takes the
form of “high road” campaigns that push for planning best practices around “smart growth,”
traffic reduction, environmental improvements, or affordability. Sometimes, however, unions
take the side of conservative forces and join with wealthy homeowners to block non-union
construction. Mendoza described one such campaign in Huntington, Long Island from his time
as a researcher at SEIU 32BJ, the city’s property service workers union. Avalon Bay, a nonunion developer that SEIU was fighting across the country, was trying to build a “transit-oriented
development” in Huntington, Long Island, with the support of groups like Progressive Long
Island and the local school board. There was, however, a “NIMBY crowd that didn’t want it
because they thought it would bring people from the city to live in their own and ‘illegals’ to
work on the building who would then end up in the school system and they’d be paying for them
– so that’s the side we were on.” The arguments unions make and the alliances they form are
thus less a matter of political principle or class solidarity, but rather tactical decisions around the
desired fate of a particular developer or development.
When a union’s demands line up with those of working-class neighborhood residents,
either in supporting or blocking a planning initiative or new development, their support – with its
relatively lush budgets, large member base, and political power – can be a tremendous boon to
community efforts. Jane McAlevey (2012, 56 and 65) writes about instances in Stamford and
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Pittsburgh where SEIU fought to protect subsidized housing and stop displacement caused by a
non-union hospital. The problem lies, however, if and when a union engaged in oppositional
planning politics succeeds in its primary objective and strikes a deal with a non-union employer.
In such cases, unions are likely to break with their community partnerships and suddenly support
(or at least decline to continue opposing) plans or projects they had previously railed against.
In addition to cleavages between unions and neighborhood groups, land use issues can
drive wedges between unions based on which are or are not likely to be represented in future
developments.69 For example, when Amazon sought to build a new headquarters in Long Island
City and was offered $4.6 billion in public subsidies (Dayen and Cohen 2018), unions were split
in their response. 32BJ and the Building and Construction Trades Council (a confederation of the
various trades) vigorously supported the deal, in large part because they had already secured
deals with a key building owner (Plaxal) and developer (TF Cornerstone) (Anuta 2018a).
Meanwhile, RWDSU and the Teamsters, whose workforces would be employed directly by the
anti-union Amazon, vocally opposed the deal, and hoped to use the leverage of their opposition
to push the company to stop blocking unionization efforts in their massive warehousing and
distribution operations (Jorgensen et al. 2019). This produced an ugly spectacle of inter-union
tension, and put unions that supported the deal in the position of defending an anti-union
corporation’s right to state subsidies.70 On the day of the second City Council hearing on the
Amazon headquarters, 32BJ organized a rally in support of the deal on the steps of City Hall.
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Attempts have been made to build networks of solidarity between unions coming from different sectors, but
they have faced challenges. In her interview, Rohmer recounted the story of Build Up New York, a recent project
that brought together two of the service unions most active in planning politics – the building service workers’
union SEIU 32BJ and HTC – with the Building and Construction Trades Council. The unions, however, had parallel
agendas, and often signed side agreements that excluded the others. HTC left the coalition, and Build Up is now
largely dormant.
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This dynamic was also present within the realm of tenant organizations, with public housing resident council
leaders coming out in support of the project while many tenant rights groups came out in opposition.
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Then, inside City Hall, an Amazon representative testified that the company was committed to
continuing its fight against the unionization of their direct employees (Goodman 2019).
Ultimately, opposition to the deal was sufficient to convince Amazon to back away from their
plans to move to New York City; this, however, did not stop Governor Andrew Cuomo, who
mobilized the presidents of 32BJ, HTC, SEIU 1199 (the powerful healthcare workers union),
UFT, and several Community Development Corporations and Settlement Houses – along with
bankers and corporate CEOs – to sign a letter asking Amazon to reconsider (Featherstone 2019).
This Amazon letter, however, brings up an important additional dimension as to why
some unions get involved in land use politics. 1199 and the UFT were not going to get any jobs
out of this deal; why, then, would they put their presidents’ names on this Bezos-begging letter
beside those of Citigroup CEO Michael Corbat and conservative Partnership for New York CEO
Kathryn Wylde? In all likelihood, these unions cared little about the Amazon deal per se, and
instead signed the letter in order to strengthen their favorability with the governor, who has the
power to make other legislative or policy changes that directly affect their contracts. 1199 is
highly dependent on state lawmakers, and was at the time seeking Cuomo’s support in blocking
proposed Medicaid cuts, which would have put some of their members’ jobs at risk. UFT,
meanwhile, had recently won the revisions to teacher evaluations that it had long sought, thanks
in part to the Governor’s support. Supporting the Amazon deal despite the backlash from other
unions and tenant organizations was a way for these unions to publicly demonstrate their loyalty
to a governor who has substantial power over their workers’ contracts and conditions. This
reinforces MacDonald’s (2017b, 29) observation, in describing an HTC-led rezoning fight, that
“the overriding concern of labor strategy was less about employment than reproducing the
union’s relationship with unionized employers and bolstering its credibility with real estate
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developers and the local government.” The goal, then, is to use land use politics to retain
influence – not necessarily to build buildings.
Unions with strong market share can also use land use politics to engage in what Gordon
(1994, 87) calls “regulatory unionism,” or an arrangement in which “employers and workers
alike [see] unionization as a means of regulating labor costs across an industry, building
aggregate demand in an underconsuming economy, and rationalizing job structures and job
hierarchies within firms” while excluding low-wage competition that undermines such
agreements. Perhaps the most successful example of regulatory unionism in contemporary New
York City land use politics is HTC, which lobbies for types of rezoning that make non-union
hotel development far less feasible (discussed later in this chapter). Fighting competitors’ land
use aims can also be a way to tie up non-union firms in protracted battles, while union firms
expand their market share. As Mendoza recounted in an interview, UNITE pursued such a
strategy against the non-union laundry company Cintas in order to provide space for the
unionized company Aromark to expand. Rohmer, a former 32BJ researcher, stressed in her
interview the quid pro quo nature of these kinds of arrangements: unions that ally themselves
with a fraction of capital (unionized firms) expect to be greeted with more favorable bargaining
conditions during the next round of contract negotiations.

Where, When, and How
There are several factors that go into union staff and leaderships’ decisions around
whether and how to engage in campaigns around planning, land use, and development. First, the
union must believe that they either have the power necessary to influence the outcome, or that
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they can summon the appearance of such power. In both union and non-profit settings the latter
is referred to as “smoke and mirrors” (Fisher 2012, 287; Brill 1971, 14; MacDonald 2011, 210).
Florentino, a former researcher for 32BJ, insisted that his union – like many others in New York
City – had developed such tactics because its leadership believed that workers in their sector
lacked the “industrial power” or “disruptive power” to directly affect production. Though that
union came into existence through citywide strikes71, the leadership now believes that their
members are too easily replaceable by strikebreakers – a major weakness in US labor law that
has pushed unions toward political compromise over disruptive action (Fitch 2006 21, 38-39) –
and thus their security and the union’s growth must be achieved through political maneuvers.
While unions’ economic power derives from their real or potential ability to threaten production
by collectively withholding their labor, their political power tends to be based on their ability to
determine elections – primarily through their direct and in-kind donations, independent media,
and get-out-the-vote volunteering, but also through their members’ combined voting power and
the persuasive power of a union endorsement for voters generally. Politicians pay attention to
their demands because the more powerful unions can threaten or secure their reelection or future
electoral aspirations. When they weigh in on land use politics, unions can “turn out” large
numbers of members to otherwise sparsely attended hearings and provide crucial cover for
decisions they support – especially if that decision is opposed by other working-class formations
(MacDonald 2017a, 14).
According to Larry Mendoza, a former researcher for a number of politically active
unions, New York City unions weighing participation in campaigns to support or block either a
particular development or a rezoning look primarily for three forms of leverage: geographic,
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economic, and political. In terms of geographic leverage, unions seek situations where
developers cannot easily pick up and go somewhere else should the union win its demand, and
where there are limited places where the type of development a developer is proposing makes
sense. For example, developing a new full scale, class A hotel only makes economic sense in
certain parts of New York City; if HERE organizes to demand public actions that will increase
the likelihood of unionization (as discussed in greater detail below), the union knows the
developer cannot easily move to another neighborhood where the union has less power or
influence. In terms of economic leverage, unions favor conditions of tight demand for land
(relating to the previous point about capital immobility as a strength for unions), close to full
employment (because municipalities desperate for jobs and/or development are less likely to
place any conditions on growth), and – whenever possible – public subsidies (which create
opportunities for pro-union stipulations, and enable the union to argue that public dollars should
go toward creating quality jobs). In terms of political leverage, unions are most likely to engage
in places where they have political strength, which can be measured and demonstrated in
multiple ways, including a mass of membership in a particular district or a long-term relationship
with a given politician (whom they may have endorsed in the past, or may come from a union
background prior to running for office). If a union is a political outsider in a given geography,
they may still be able to secure a victory, but doing so will be significantly more difficult and
thus incur much higher risk and cost.
In addition to assessing their own leverage, unions are likely to assess the presence or
absence of conditions that may encourage a developer to make a deal with a union. They look for
situations in which they believe developers need something from the state that a politically
powerful union can help procure. This dynamic can manifest in a number of ways. The
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developer may need a land use change in order to build the project to the scale and on the site
they desire, and unions can help shepherd it through the public review process. This was the case
when Jamestown Properties – which has a great deal of investment capital from German pension
funds – asked 32BJ for help in securing land use permissions to build near their Chelsea Market
development. The developer may need (or want) public money for their project, and some unions
can help them secure it. As discussed in the introduction, when the luxury developer Extell
sought access to 421a tax abatements in an area of the city normally restricted from the program,
32BJ quietly lobbied the state legislature to sneak a specific parcel-level expansion of the
abatement into a bill renewing another, separate landlord tax break.72 Alternately, developers
may seek pension fund investments, either for what they intend to build in the immediate future
or for projects further down their pipeline. For example, Mendoza conveyed to me one such
complex deal between a developer, a union, and the state Comptroller: one of the developers of
Hudson Yards sought 32BJ’s help in increasing state pension fund investments in infrastructure
projects, on which the developer intended to bid in the future. Finally, the developer may need a
public relations boost after a controversial action or statement. Such was the case after G&M
Realty demolished a popular site for graffiti art in Queens known as “Five Pointz” in order to
build a luxury condominium, and sought support from 32BJ to shift the gaze from their
demolition of public art to their provision of well-paying jobs. The presence of any of these
developer-side conditions, coupled with a source of economic, geographical, or political
leverage, increases the likelihood that a union will engage in a land use campaign.
Once unions decide to dive into a land use or development issue, their leaders, staff, and
members take on multiple modes of engagement: prepping representatives to read public
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testimony; hiring technical experts to conduct studies that support the union’s position; forging
tentative coalitions with other actors who take the same position on the issue; mobilizing
membership to attend hearings or rallies with coordinated clothing, signs, and chants; placing
advertisements in newspapers and public spaces; and publishing op-eds or letters to the editor.
Often such operations are waged in the context of a “corporate campaign,” or a multi-pronged,
carefully planned, and staff-intensive assault on a given target.
The corporate campaign was a key feature of the growth strategy favored by “New
Labor,” a group of reformist union principals who led some of the fastest growing unions in the
1990s and early 2000s. Its origins draw from Saul Alinsky and his Industrial Areas Foundation,
through the United Farm Workers, and on to SEIU and UNITE-HERE (McAlevey 2015, 424).73
Two union consultants active in New York City, Michael Locker and Ray Rogers, claim to have
brought the framework to popularity among unions; both have been conducting such campaigns
since the 1980s.74 Its popularity rose as traditional avenues for union growth – particularly union
elections – grew increasingly fraught, with labor laws being turned against unions and NLRB
appointees regularly interpreting regulations in pro-corporate ways. The goal of the corporate
campaign is for the union’s efforts to become so troublesome, annoying, and – most importantly
– costly to a corporation that the employer will sign a “card check neutrality agreement,”
agreeing not to impede unionization and committing to bargaining as soon as a majority of a
workforce signs cards saying they wish to be represented by the union. The elements of a
corporate campaign vary widely, but often include: worker organizing and agitation, sometimes
referred to simply as “the worker piece” (ibid, 424); political pressure; legal action; negative
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press; pension fund leveraging (Ghilarducci 1992, 121); and, when possible, land use campaigns
that threaten a major investment from being realized. The title of an anti-union screed against the
strategy accurately captures the intent of the corporate campaign: Death of a Thousand Cuts
(Manheim 2000).
The strength of the corporate campaign is its ability to secure unionization rights for large
numbers of workers at once. Not just entire worksites but entire corporate portfolios can be
brought into collective bargaining through what unions call “wall to wall” agreements.
McAlevey, a prominent critic of corporate campaigns and New Labor politics, argues that this
emphasis on the corporation points to the strategy’s greatest weakness: it “made employers, not
the workers or their community, the primary focus of new labor’s energy” (McAlevey 2015,
416) and thus “rationalizes the shift in focus away from workers as the primary source of
leverage against employers to all other actors as the primary source of leverage” (ibid, 423,
emphasis in the original). In this context, in which the union’s relationship to the employer (as
either adversary or partner) takes precedence over its relationship to the worker, unions can
justify decisions around land use that prioritize the impact on the employer (positive or negative)
over the impact on local residents, even when those residents include their own members.
Community Benefits Agreements, discussed in the following chapter, can alter this calculus, but
have so far in New York served largely to legitimate high-end developments facing significant
opposition from working-class residents.
While there are generalizable trends around the reasons and circumstances New York
City unions engage in land use politics, there is also a great deal of particularity around unions’
relationships to other fragments of labor, capital, and the state around development issues. While
each union is different from others, and while every union changes over time, broad patterns are
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recognizable around the employment sectors in which unions are situated. Building trades, public
sector, and service sector unions are the predominant actors in contemporary New York City
labor-land use politics, and each engages according to its own logic.75

Building Trades Unions
Among unions, the building trades – which represent the various types of workers who
physically construct the city – are perhaps the most intimately affected by the politics of
planning the built environment. For this reason, the iconic and paradigmatic view of unions and
planning politics is that of construction workers in hardhats demonstrating in support of new
development (Angotti 2008, 39). Aside from a brief mention of the United Auto Workers, the
only element of “organized labor” analyzed in Logan and Molotch’s (1987, 81-82) seminal work
on the “urban growth machine” are construction unions. Even Engels singled out building trades
unions as supporters of the urban luxury development. In describing Haussmann’s planned
reconfiguration of Paris, Engels (1935 [1872], 74-75) defines Haussmann’s method – reproduced
in cities across Europe – as
breaking long, straight and broad streets through the closely-built
workers’ quarters and erecting big luxurious buildings on both sides
of them, the intention thereby, apart from the strategic aim of
making barricade fighting more difficult, being also to develop a
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Notably absent from this list is industrial unions. Given the city’s deep deindustrialization over the past forty
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industries have grown in part through deindustrialization.
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specifically Bonapartist building trades’ proletariat dependent on
the government and to turn the city into a pure luxury city.
This image of the building trades is grounded in material reality: building trades unions
really are crucial parts of the city’s real estate-driven political economy; they really do constitute
a crucial part of the urban growth machine; and often they really have been incorporated into
state-led gentrification planning projects. And yet this image can also become an overbroad
caricature, reliant on the trope of the “hardhat” as class traitor (Lewis 2013). It was, after all,
building trades unions – not the city’s ostensibly more “progressive” public and service sector
unions – that joined with tenant organizations in the Real Affordability For All campaign
(discussed in greater length below and in the following chapter) to challenge de Blasio’s
citywide rezoning.
While the building trades’ citywide leadership continues to support almost all
development, arguing that even a climate of non-union development is better than one of
declining construction, it is not at all uncommon to find members of individual building trades –
particularly the Laborers local 79 and Ironworkers local 46 – testifying at public hearings against
luxury construction, while building service union members speak up in support of the plan or
project. At a June 20th, 2017 Community Board Hearing on a proposed East Harlem rezoning
that I attended and recorded, for example, a member of 32BJ read a carefully crafted testimony –
and added his own commentary – tentatively supporting the rezoning, and was heckled by the
largely oppositional members of the public in attendance.
Felipe: My name is Felipe from Local 32BJ, and I’m here to testify
on behalf of my union, Local 32BJ. We were also at the public
hearing for the project that [was] held last month. We are back
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because we want to make sure that the Community Board hears our
message. One of my top priorities for the rezoning is to make sure
that quality jobs get created in this community. Alright?
Audience: boo! [claps]
Felipe: East Harlem is a diverse community of working people like
me.
Audience: That’s right.
Felipe: I know many of my neighbors are struggling with low wages
and unemployment. People are seeing their rent increase while their
wages stay the same. That shit can’t happen anymore.
Audience: [applause] Yeah!
Felipe: New development that includes affordable housing for a mix
of incomes and creates jobs that pay decent wages is the only way
working people will be able to continue to live in East Harlem.
Audience: Boo, fuck that!
Felipe: Let me tell you something right now: I’ve got a lot of
members that live in Franklin Plaza,76 I have family members that
live in Franklin Plaza that pay decent wages over here. What I’m
saying is they’re gonna be over here trying to make these buildings–
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Franklin Plaza is a Mitchell Lama cooperative in East Harlem.
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Audience: Boo, don’t make the buildings. No rezoning! No
rezoning! (chanted repeatedly)
Felipe: [inaudible]
Shortly thereafter, a member of the Laborers’ Local 79 delivered a rebuke to 32BJ in language
that drew surprised hollers of support from zoning opponents in attendance.
Local 79 member: I’m union labor, ok? Unlike 32BJ – I can call ‘em
out.
Audience: Yeah! Call their asses out, they sell outs! Are you gonna
stand with the working class?
Local 79 member: I just want to be clear: I don’t care, ok? This is
what I do.
Audience: They sell outs!
Local 79 member: So. This is not the final version, or the final vote,
so we have to be aware, people. I want to really explain something
to you guys. Please. This rezoning is taking place all around New
York City.
Audience: Talk it!
Local 79 member: I’m involved in every last one of them. Right?
Every last one of them. Brooklyn yesterday, I’m involved with the
Bronx. But you know what’s crazy? East Harlem as well, as well as
East New York, and Queens as well. And the crazy thing about it all
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is: it’s just nothing but Black and Brown people, though. You know
what I mean? So when you look at type of things – these
neighborhoods was quote unquote, you know, “unsavable” type of
neighborhoods –
Audience: “Underutilized.”
Local 79 member: – but now they’re total prime real estate
neighborhoods now –
Audience: Racism!
Local 79 member: – everybody wanna come and get it. But what I
want everyone to know is this: we’ve got to be aware to be alive.
Audience: Boom.
Local 79 member: You know some people, they disagree in terms
on 100 percent [affordable], 30 percent [affordable], listen:
whatever you want, I’m with you. But let’s not fight against one
another, though, because they distracting us though. So you know
Karl Marx, right?
Audience: [applause] Oh shit!
Local 79 member: Sounds good, right? Karl Marx, he’s a famous
fool. ‘Cause I’m really one of those intellectual Laborers?
Audience: [applause]
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Local 79 member: Not to mention that I represent so many families
in this district. But I’m one of those guys that rise above the masses.
Audience: Holla!
Local 79 member: I’m not an anomaly because there’s a lot of us
out there that exist –
Audience: Thank you
Local 79 member: – let’s not get this twisted. However, you know,
Karl Marx, Karl Marx: primitive accumulation, right?
Audience: Yes! [applause]
Local 79 member: He talked about – and you know, me being a
union guy, it’s like, there’s a conflicting interest but me, I gotta call
it like I see it because when the serfs took the land from the lords –
what they doing now, so to me: let’s take the baseball fields, 126th –
everybody know what that is, the bus terminal?
Audience: Yeah! African burial ground.
Local 79 member: Ok, so, African American burial ground that was
buried by Blacks, was created by Blacks, that was buried by –
Blacks were buried there, right? So they want to tear that down and
actually build mostly slave labor too, right? Cuz they gotta, like, you
know – but anyway, listen.
Community Board Member: Time’s up.
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Local 79 member: I’m not gonna disrespect you guys. What I want
to say to the people is this: this is not the final vote. Please, this is
just a process, it’s an ongoing process. Do not fall for the okey-doke.
Please. Everybody in this community stick together, I’m telling you.
It’s getting ugly around New York City.
Audience: Word up!
Local 79 member: It is ugly and it’s scary. Please, I promise you.
Please, stick together guys.
Audience: That’s right! [applause]
This was something of an exceptional exchange; it is not common for the words “primitive
accumulation” to be used in Community Board testimony. It does, however, demonstrate the
difference between the perception and reality of building trades and service unions in local
development politics, as well as the gulf that can arise between rank and file political
consciousness and the leadership line on land use.
The trades today operate in context of continued construction but declining union density.
For decades, leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, the trades had a virtual monopoly on labor
and contractors for big projects; REBNY members, therefore, could not build without them. This
created the conditions for a mutually dependent, if not quite cozy, relationship between big
developers and the building trades. Following the financial crisis, however, the building trades
began to lose their monopoly. When construction slowed and unemployment increased, nonunion firms started to gain ground over union standard bearers. The building trades by and large
refused to organize non-union workers – many of whom are undocumented immigrants and
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others long shut out of the unions’ apprenticeship systems – while their own senior members
were without work. This perpetuated a long tradition of reluctance to engage in external
organizing, which the trades saw as only undermining the income and employment status of
those they already represented (Fitch 2006, 19).
According to Robert Guinn (a pseudonym), a consultant to multiple unions who
conducted an analysis of new construction job filings with the Department of Buildings, between
2016 and 2017, the building trades’ density in their core market (Manhattan residential and
hospitality buildings over 300,000 square feet) plunged from 79 percent to 37 percent. Most of
the remaining union work is either in large-scale midtown and downtown projects, in
government-contracted work, or in projects with federal subsidies. Non-commercial residential
work is almost entirely captured by a large number of non-union contractors, and large projects
outside the central business districts are increasingly built either non-union or “open shop” (a
scenario in which a mix of union and non-union contractors is permitted). According to Safford
and Lock (2001, 9-10), the “open shop” movement – like “right to work” before it – moved from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, starting in suburban municipalities then moving into union
strongholds. Today in New York City, even the most expensive commercial development in
United States history – Hudson Yards – is proceeding open shop, despite the large amount of
state and city subsidies that enable its creation (Mirtz 2019). At the same time, new technologies
have increased productivity and decreased the number of workers required per site. Meanwhile,
construction industry consolidation has proceeded from the regional scale (where many trades
long held close relationships with leading contractors and politicians) to the national or
international scale (where non-union firms predominate and building trades’ power is weaker)
(Figueroa 2017, 128).
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Ultimately, as Engel’s posited, the trades are highly reliant on the state to create
conditions favorable to union contracting. As Richard Walters, an anonymized journeyman and
activist underscored in an interview, there is a “tight connection between state and city politics,
our working conditions, and how much work we get.” This is not done through direct legislation
mandating union contracting, but rather through regulations requiring a certain pay scale
(“prevailing wage”) or a certain amount of training. Federal Davis-Bacon and Jones Act
protections, for example, ensure that prevailing wages are paid to workers on projects receiving
federal funding, greatly increasing the likelihood that such contracts will go to union signatories.
A 2017 city regulation, known as Local Law 196, required that by the start of 2019 workers on
city-funded projects must have obtained a higher level of OSHA training than was previously
mandated. Union members are far more likely to receive this degree of safety training than nonunion workers. This provision was far less than what building trades unions lobbied for – a
Project Labor Agreement (PLA, or pre-construction collective bargaining agreement) with the
city’s Housing Preservation and Development agency for all future work – but it was intended to
secure them a leg up in the context of open shops.77
In return for this kind of legislative and regulatory assist, the building trades have repaid
New York City and State politicians – Democratic and Republican alike – with contributions,
election volunteers, and support for major development initiatives. During his interview, Walters
shared with me an anecdote about his early years as an apprentice. Once a year he was required
to do a day of “picket duty” – usually actually picketing somewhere, or else attending a rally or
electioneering. One day his union offered him a day off to ride a bus from the union hall to the
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Non-profit developers are currently lobbying for an exemption to this law, arguing that it would unduly increase
the cost of building new affordable housing and maintaining their existing stock.
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state capital for a rally. When he and about two hundred other workers arrived, they learned they
were there to support 421a, a multi-billion-dollar developer tax subsidy. The trades were
supporting the law’s renewal, joining with the developer lobby – the Real Estate Board of New
York (REBNY) – in opposition to tenant activists, who were at that very moment lobbying to
reform or eliminate it (Waters and Bach 2015). According to Walters, “It was an excuse to get
out of the city, get our picket duty done, and basically hang out with other trade union people.
We bullshitted, got free lunch, cheered when we were supposed to cheer, and jeered when we
were supposed to jeer.” Picketing, in this case, meant standing with REBNY against tenants, and
giving political cover to politicians who did the same.
The relationship between the building trades and REBNY, however, is no longer as rock
solid as it long was, opening the trades to a somewhat more assertive and at times oppositional
approach to land use and development politics. For those unions, the breaking point was a fight
over the renewal of 421a in 2015 and 2016. The developer tax break, which periodically sunsets
and must be regularly renewed by the state legislature, was coming up for a vote, and REBNY
joined with Mayor de Blasio and the New York State Association for Affordable Housing
(NYSAFAH) – the staunchly anti-union and largely for-profit affordable housing developers’
lobby – to support a version of the bill that did not include prevailing wages for projects that
received the abatement (Viteritti 2017, 209). Union opposition effectively held up the legislation
for over a year, but ultimately a version of the law passed with labor requirements that fell short
of prevailing wages. REBNY’s turn away from the trades was jarring and demonstrated to many
union locals that they needed to build up their offensive strategies and find new allies.78
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This information was conveyed to me by several anonymous interview sources: former New York Communities
for Change staffer Diane Stephenson, union consultant Simon Frankel, and union consultant Robert Guinn.
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This position has, in small but significant ways, brought some building trades locals into
coalition with housing non-profits and CDCs in opposition to REBNY, NYSAFAH, and de
Blasio’s housing plans. According to a longtime union strategist, the building trades feel the need
to secure two separate and sometimes contradictory alliances: one with developers in the form of
PLAs, and another with non-profits and community-based organizations to expand their political
base and build solidarity. The latter is seen as a means to the former; in other words, as multiunion consultant Simon Frankel (a pseudonym) explained in an interview, aligning with nonprofits to oppose a rezoning or planned development creates a situation in which the city or
developer might negotiate with the union and offer them a PLA or other favorable condition if
they withdraw their protest.
Non-profit developers, however, have long been hostile to the building trades, and many
remain so. Unless they receive federal funding (such as a CDBGs), the vast majority of nonprofit housing developers do not hire union contractors, and it is not at all uncommon for nonprofit leaders to publicly decry union wage and benefit standards as major impediments to
housing affordability (Figueroa 2017, 135; Figueroa, Cabrera and Blair 2012). Federal policy has
certainly abetted this turn, by moving from direct financing (which comes with demands that
workers be paid prevailing wages) to tax credit and bond financing (which does not) (Botein
2007, 806-808). Unions have attempted two tactics to break into the affordable housing market: a
tiered wage structure in which workers take a lower rate for affordable housing jobs than
commercial projects; and deals with CDCs that offer local hiring and apprenticeship programs
for wages that are higher than the non-profit average (but still lower than the typical union rate)
(ibid, 808-809). These proposals, however, have not generally caught on in New York City,
causing the trades to favor bigger, more expensive developments (which can marshal the capital
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to pay union scale, and require the kinds of technical skills union workers can offer) over lowincome housing developments. In this intra-class struggle (Purser 2016), non-profit housers and
construction workers fight over conflicting visions of urban spatial production; meanwhile, it is
state policy that keeps affordable housing from being subsidized at a rate that could cover a
construction workers’ full needs.
That dilemma, however, was precisely what lead several building trades locals to join
with housing non-profits to challenge Mayor de Blasio’s housing plan. In 2014, building trades
locals including Laborers Local 79, Plumbers Local 1, the District Council of Carpenters, and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 3 joined together with housing advocates
and CDCs such as New York Communities for Change (formerly ACORN), Make the Road
New York, Voices of Community Activists and Leaders New York (VOCAL NY), Los Sures,
and Community Action for Safe Apartments (CASA) to form Real Affordability for All (RAFA,
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter) (Wishnia 2014). Through joining in coalition
with groups with whom they had often butted heads over the non-union status of affordable
housing construction, and in standing up to a plan largely supported by REBNY and the mayor,
these trades locals challenged decades of building trades support for the city’s proposed
development programs. They hoped that by opposing the mayor’s plan and proposing an
alternative that offered both deeper affordability and stronger worker protections, these unions
could convince the city to revise its plan in order to attach “responsible contractor” standards
(pay, benefits, safety, and training) to city subsidies and encourage “local hire” programs to run
through the unions’ apprenticeship programs (rather than non-union non-profit programs
discussed in the following chapter). The RAFA campaign ended poorly – the city refused to
significantly revise its plan and councilmembers refused to vote against it, so at the last minute
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RAFA simply endorsed the plan they had formed to oppose – but some alliances between the
building trades and housing advocates have endured. In 2017 and 2018, several trades locals
opposed the rezoning of Jerome Avenue in the Bronx and the private redevelopment of the
Bedford-Union Armory in Brooklyn.
The building trades’ more confrontational approach to the real estate industry continued
with its #In campaign, focused on uniting workers against the turn to open shop status on big
projects like Hudson Yards (Mirtz 2019). Hudson Yards, a mixed-use development sited on top
of a midtown train yard, was started by Mayor Bloomberg after his attempt at siting a football
stadium failed to garner political support (despite significant support from the building trades
unions) (Brash 2011, 225-227). Despite its enormous size and complexity, its generous public
subsidies, its initial support from the building trades, and the fact that it is largely financed by the
Ontario municipal workers’ pension fund, the second phase of Hudson Yards construction is
proceeding open shop. Building trades locals organized to establish a united front against this
move and picketed outside the construction site for months, threatening to delay construction
until a deal was reached. Ultimately, however, the coalition cracked: the Carpenters split and
signed an agreement with the developers, perhaps related to the fact that the union had also
invested its own pension funds in the project and saw its delay as a threat to their retirees’
incomes (Geiger 2018); and the Ironworkers local 46 saw their president trusteed (or forced out)
by the Ironworkers’ national leadership, which had a standing agreement with the developer, in
order to install a more developer-friendly leader (Goldenberg 2019).
The building trades’ shift in politics around development – partial though it may be – is
historically significant, but it has not yet been terribly effective. Density continues to decline,
and the trades have not yet demonstrated that they can stop a rezoning or development project.
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By November 2019, the Building and Construction Trades Council and REBNY announced an
agreement to form a “joint industry advancement committee” to promote increased development
and “identify ways to harmonize political and legislative objectives in the mutual interest” of
both the building trades and REBNY (Brenzel 2019), suggesting that the building trades’
oppositional turn may be coming to an end. While this could result in increased building trades
density in new luxury construction, there is no certainty that such gains will manifest from this
partnership. There are many reasons why the building trades – unlike service sector unions,
discussed below – were unable to turn an activist approach to land use into sustained gains for
their union.
First, as Guinn and Frankel explained to me in their interviews, when the New York City
building trades were in a stronger position, they failed to demonstrate their power as an
oppositional force in land use politics. Guinn shared a story of a project he had worked on where
such power could have been expressed but was not. In 2014, the developer Two Trees was trying
to build Brooklyn Academy of Music South on public land and with minimal affordable housing
and wished to do so completely non-union. The Ironworkers campaigned against the project, and
Letitia James, then City Councilmember running for Public Advocate, was willing to kill the deal
on their behalf. Mayor Bloomberg, however, asked City Council speaker and mayoral candidate
Christine Quinn to intervene. Quinn contacted Gary LaBarbera, the longtime president of the
Building and Construction Trades Council of Greater New York, and told him that if he let the
project move forward, she would ensure that when she is mayor the developer’s next big project
(the Domino Sugar redevelopment in Williamsburg) would be built union. LaBarbara told the
Ironworkers to pull back, and they followed his command. Quinn then lost the mayoral election,
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and neither project was built union.79 By failing to stop a rezoning when they had the power to
do so, the building trades undermined their reputation to both politicians and developers as a
serious force in city planning politics.
Second, as the preceding anecdote illustrates, New York City’s construction unions are
extremely divided, both internally within unions and between unions under the umbrella of the
Building Trades Council. As Guinn underscored in his interview, the trades are “not one union,”
but rather a constellation of at times competing unions with divergent alliances, relationships,
and priorities. This makes internal cohesion around what to support and what to oppose highly
fraught, since any given job site will require the skills of multiple trades, and each union may
have differential relationships to a given developer or politician.
Third, despite recent efforts to reform and diversify, the trades are often characterized as
White unions that prioritize preserving their members’ status over organizing more heavily
exploited immigrant and African American workers. According to a 2017 analysis, the New
York City building trades are 44.9% White, 30.5% Hispanic, and 21.2% Black, figures that show
significant improvement compared to prior compositions but are still disproportionately White
compared to the non-union construction workforce (Mishel 2017). Recent shifts toward local
hiring as part of Community Benefits Agreements and other political arrangements have begun
to alter this dynamic, but the results are uneven between unions, and create a stark generational
divide that is exacerbated by more senior workers’ better access to high paying jobs.80 By
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Due to a structurally complex design, Two Trees ended up hiring union ironworkers for the BAM South project,
but all other contractors were non-union.
80
As one trades worker, Richard Walters (anonymized) described the dynamic at union gatherings, members over
50 are entirely White men and live largely outside New York City; middle-aged members are a touch more diverse;
and only members under 40 start to resemble the demographics of the city they are building. When I worked for
the Laborers’ union in 2010, I was told that the union was unlikely to diversify because its most senior membership
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maintaining such a segregated workforce, the building trades have reaped scorn from many
working-class organizations that otherwise fully support unions.
Fourth, the building trades have not invested in the kind of research staff necessary to
stay abreast of political developments around land use. 32BJ and HTC, for example, have
extensive research departments that track every single Uniform Land Use Review Procedure
application, whether initiated by the city or a private developer. As discussed below, they
intervene early and often to try to ensure their position (supportive or oppositional) is considered.
The building trades tend to track the ULURPs they care about, but do not maintain the kind of
diligent presence necessary to become a major force in New York City land use politics.
Finally, many building trades leaders continue to maintain close ties to the real estate
industry, despite locals’ turn toward a more oppositional stance. Gary Labarbara, for example,
continued to represent the Building Trades Council at the annual REBNY gala even as the 421a,
RAFA, and #countmein campaigns drew the organizations apart. As several sources intimated,
there is also a long history of corruption at the nexus of labor, real estate, and organized crime
(Goldstock 1991) which has diminished but never fully disappeared. Fitch (2006, 141), for
example, unveils the sordid story of the Mason Tenders’ mob influence, in which union president
(1975-1989) and Genovese associate Gaspar Lupo funneled millions of union dollars into
“crooked real estate deals. The purchase of the West Eighteenth Street Mason Tenders
headquarters building, according to prosecutors at that time, produced one of the biggest thefts in
pension fund history.” Lupo’s successor then funneled four times as much money into real estate
schemes: “first, the trustees would buy a property at inflated value from mob-connected sellers.

– which is almost entirely White men – had a 30 percent unemployment rate, and so all future work their
contractors secured would first go to them before the unions ranks could be expanded.
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Then they would renovate the property in order to get kickbacks from the contractors doing the
work” (ibid, 151). The ties between New York’s building trades leaders and the real estate
industry are deep, unseemly, and complex, and thus hard to unwind when conditions changed
and a more oppositional stance was demanded.

Public Sector Unions
New York City’s public sector unions represent the opposite image of the building trades
in the public imagination: whereas the building trades are disproportionately White and male,
and are best known for their most conservative policy positions, government workers are largely
women and people of color (59 percent and 62 percent respectively [New York City Department
of Citywide Administrative Services 2017]), and their unions are known for taking activist
positions on social issues, from supporting civil rights and opposing wars to expanding welfare
and mass transit.81 As Aronowitz (2014, 96) has emphasized, “public employees are statebuilders,” and thus their interests can align directly with calls for a more robust public
infrastructure and against privatization and austerity.
As organizations of workers employed by the state, rather than by capitalist firms, some
aspects of public sector unions are fundamentally different than private sector unions. According
to Johnston (1994, 4),“They depend for power less on their market position and on coalitions in
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The major exceptions to this image are the Police, Fire, and Corrections workers’ unions, which are not known
for leftist policy stances and, in the case of Police and Firefighters, are far less racially and gender integrated than
most of their public sector counterparts. These unions are not considered in this analysis because in New York City
they are not taking notable public stands on issues of land use and development. The major exceptions to this are
the Correction Officers’ stance in favor of retaining Rikers Island, and the Firefighters’ advocacy on issues of
building codes and fire safety.
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their labor market than on their political position and involvement in the coalitions that govern
public agencies. These movements are involved not only in collective bargaining and lobbying
over wages, benefits, and working conditions but also in broader political conflicts over the
public agendas that guide and fund public sector work.” The type of political unionism that the
building trades have practiced, in which they support particular politicians in exchange for
legislation that gives them a leg up against employers, is not directly applicable to public sector
unions, as their employer is the state, and they bargain directly with people appointed by
politicians. This does not, however, mean they cannot practice political unionism; in fact, the
question of how political positions – including on development, land use, planning, and housing
– shape future bargaining positions with mayoral and gubernatorial administrations is a key
strategic question for public sector union leaders. While public sector unions may be less directly
affected by changes to the built environment than the building trades, they nonetheless have
several motivations for becoming involved in planning politics, and particularly to support a
growing real estate sector.
One motivation is an economic growth imperative. According to Yates (2009, 118),
“Municipal employees’ unions naturally try to build alliances with local politicians, because
these will ultimately set the budgets out of which wages will be paid.” While the relationships
between labor, state, and capital are different between public and private sector unions, both sets
of institutional relations incentivize unions to pursue plans and policies that encourage growth
for their employer as a step toward their own bargaining advancement. When the employer is the
city, that growth often comes in the form of real estate development, and the higher the value the
more lucrative for the state. Intensive luxury real estate growth can shore up municipal budgets
in a way that can be redistributed to public sector workers.
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Another motivation for supporting a pro-real estate agenda is that like the Carpenters at
Hudson Yards, many public sector union pension funds are major investors in commercial real
estate ventures. In recent years some of the biggest pools of public sector pension dollars in the
city have been indirectly financing “predatory equity:” private equity firms that buy up currently
affordable apartment buildings at tremendous prices and with enormous debts, which can only be
repaid if they can evict tenants and raise rents manifold (Fields 2015; Theresa 2016). For
example, the New York State Common Retirement Fund and the New York State Teachers
Retirement System poured millions of dollars into Madison Realty Capital, which in turn
financed landlord Raphael Toledano’s 16-building East Village eviction spree. The same two
funds put $105 million into the Rockpoint Group, which then bought the Harlem rent stabilized
complex The Rivington with the intention of raising rents and flipping tenants. They also
invested in Blackstone, the world’s largest landlord and a major beneficiary of post-2008
housing speculation. In 2018, almost one third of the world’s largest private equity investors
were public pension funds. These funds are “limited partners” in such deals, meaning their fund
managers put their capital into the private equity firms, and the union does not necessarily know
the details of what happens thereafter. Nonetheless, New York City unions have taken some
action to prevent certain kinds of exploitation from resulting from their investments, such as the
“Responsible Contractor Policy” mandating wage and benefit standards for some real estate
projects. There has been no such action, however, for preserving or developing low-income
housing (Whitford 2019a).
In addition to budgetary and fiduciary concerns, a third and perhaps strongest motivation
behind public sector union’s engagement in development politics is the imperative to stay on an
administration’s good side. By supporting a given mayor or governor’s real estate-driven agenda,
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union leaders hope to maintain close ties that can lead to growth and more favorable contract
negotiations. In recent years, for example, municipal unions largely supported Bill de Blasio’s
initial mayoral candidacy in the hopes that he would bargain favorable contracts after years of
impasse with the Bloomberg administration. Within his first six months in office he settled
contracts with 60% of the city’s workforce, then bargained for the next 39.8 percent over the
next 18 months (Viteritti 2017, 178-179). According to González, (2017, 192), “The union
leaders clearly understood the need to cooperate with de Blasio, the first labor-friendly mayor in
twenty years,” and have remained loyal throughout his two terms.
This alliance between public sector workers and administrations can certainly be fruitful
in terms of elections and wage standards, but it can also drive wedge between union leadership
and the rank and file, and between public sector unions and other city residents. This is no
coincidence: over decades of conflict and cooperation between public sector unions and city
administrations, successive mayoral administrations have managed to limit the scope of
bargaining (in order to prevent unions from bargaining directly for different or better public
services) and put union leaders in a position of suppressing strikes and enforcing punitive work
rules. “Thus, official city policy strengthened divisions between union leadership and the rank
and file, as well as between the union and the community at large” (Maier 1987, 9). When union
leaders have attempted to challenge this dynamic, the city has engaged an arsenal of attacks,
which Maier (ibid, 160-161) characterizes as:
•

“favoritism toward unions with the least militant outlook;

•

“favoritism toward union leaders least accountable to their
members;
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•

“introduction of exclusive representation to assure continued
dominance by those favored unions and union leaders;

•

“introduction of large bargaining units, which often meant a
union leadership out of touch with union membership;

•

“uniform citywide personnel practices mandating bargaining
with only large unions;

•

“a limited scope of bargaining preventing unions from forming
coalitions with service recipients;

•

“no-strike provisions and productivity deals promoting union
leadership cooperation in enforcing management rules.”

The result of all of this is a corporatist labor regime in which unions are encouraged to grow, but
militancy – including around issues of planning, gentrification, and public space – is closely
contained (Krinsky 2011; MacDonald 2014). The original “adversarial” period of public sector
militancy from which public sector unions are formed is often accompanied by antigentrification politics, but the eventual “associationlike” patterns later established tend to bind
public sector unions to administrations’ pro-real estate agendas (Johnston 1994, 178).
These factors – rather than the actual content of the policy – were likely the most
powerful drivers behind some of the city’s largest and most politically active public sector
unions’ (DC 37, UFT, and the Communications Workers District 1) decision to vocally endorse
mayor de Blasio’s housing plan, according to an interview with Guinn. Those unions joined with
several of the most powerful service-sector unions (32BJ, HTC, and RWDSU) and the American
Association of Retired Persons to form United for Affordable NYC, which lobbied and rallied to
ensure the housing plan’s legislative passage (Goldensohn 2016). Three years later some of these
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same public sector unions joined in the Upstate Downstate Tenants Alliance to demand a
significant expansion of the state’s rent regulation system, suggesting that the public sector
unions’ housing politics may be more fluid than their counterparts in the service sector, which
largely stayed out of or stood against tenants in the 2019 fights around expanding the state’s rent
stabilization laws (Wishnia 2019).
DC 37 retains a long-held reputation as a socially active union, with leadership taking
positions on questions of civil rights and war and peace, but on issues of development and
housing their participation has been markedly uneven. According to Maier (1987, 167-168), “To
the outside world, DC 37 is a model citizen, lending its name and funds to a variety of causes
that affect the union only indirectly…. Yet when it comes to cooperation with New York City
community groups or service recipients, DC 37’s zeal is remarkably diminished.” These
relationships were further strained when, in 2006, the union’s contract expanded the area in
which city workers can live to include six suburban counties, “recognizing that the union’s
members could no longer afford to live in the city” (Botein 2007, 815). Necessary as this move
may have been for individual union households, the contract negotiations signaled that the union
was ready to trade wages for rents, and it decreased the likelihood that DC 37 members would
bear the social and economic brunt of real estate friendly city politics.82
In an interview, Joshua Barnett, an architect for NYCHA and union activist, called DC 37
“the labor wing of the democratic party,” its longstanding ties to the real estate industry
notwithstanding. The union has a housing committee which holds regular seminars, but they
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It also came just two years after an audit found that $4.5 million had been looted from one division’s treasury
and used to purchase a slew of buildings in the Bronx (Fitch 2007, 165). That division – Local 375 Civil Service
Technical Guild – happens to be the union representing workers in the Department of City Planning. This is not to
suggest that the union’s recent decisions are corruptly self-interested, but rather to display the continuity of
corruption histories between the building trades and the public sector unions.
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focus more on attaining home ownership than strengthening tenants’ rights.83 Policy decisions
(like endorsing de Blasio’s housing plan) are made with little member input, and the leadership’s
top consideration is the political fallout in relation to future contract negotiations. While the
union will still take hard lines on contract issues, they see housing and gentrification as outside
the scope of their core concerns. This does not mean, however, that they would oppose further
left housing policies, such as new public housing; in fact, they would likely support such a
program as in line with their own growth goals, as they did with the city’s recent move to
provide lawyers to tenants in housing court.84 They are simply not willing to get in front of the
politicians in demanding such a program.
One major planning issue where public sector unions might be expected to make a more
significant intervention is preserving public housing. The financial and material peril of New
York City’s public housing should be an issue of dire concern to DC 37 and the Teamsters 237,
which represent large numbers of maintenance and administrative workers in the public housing
system. Thus far, however, those unions have not rallied behind a program to counter the city’s
predominant approach: the development of private buildings on NYCHA land (which would not
employ their members) while shifting management of public housing to private firms with
histories of non-union employment relations. This transition has already begun: according to
Barnett, NYCHA is privatizing community centers, transferring the workers elsewhere, and
replacing them with non-union non-profit staffers.
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As an organizer for Tenants and Neighbors in the early 2010s, I was once invited to set up a table at one of the
committee’s education events, and found that my organization was the only tenant representative among a sea of
banks.
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Many of these lawyers are likely to be union members, though not necessarily DC 37.
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The primary legal mechanism for privatization of public housing is the federal Rental
Assistance Demonstration (RAD) program. Though at first tentative about moving in such a
direction, de Blasio has, in his second term, embraced RAD conversions and plans to convert
more than a third of the city’s public housing stock (62,000 units) to private management (FerréSadurní and Frank Runyeon 2018). Under RAD, public housing buildings are converted to
private Section 8 status, while the land below remains under public ownership. Ramona Russo, a
staffer at a non-profit housing organization overseeing RAD conversions, compared in an
interview the neoliberal logic of RAD to that of LIHTC because it involves “handing over public
resources to the ‘free market’ and monetizing what should be a public good.” RAD, she
continued, “seems like a godsend to residents because NYCHA is that broke and corrupt,” but
ultimately puts those residents’ fates into the hands of private entities beholden to investors.
Similarly, Barnett related RAD to the rise of parks conservancies, as well as private management
for libraries, museums, and cultural institutions: in each instance, the state backs away, and
wealthy tax-dodging patrons are presented as the people’s saviors (see also Katz 2005b, Krinsky
and Simonet 2017). The program has not, however, been met with serious opposition from any
of the unions representing NYCHA workers, even though, according to an interview with a
communications consultant to multiple unions referred to hereafter as Jeanne Goldberg, “RAD
was set up as a way to privatize” public housing.
According to Mendoza, public sector unions’ minimal response to RAD is “institutional
as opposed to structural”: DC 37 is so big that they are unlikely to challenge this policy, which
affects a only small percent of their membership and is highly important to the mayor;
meanwhile, the Teamsters local is too small to take on such a campaign. Barnett sees DC 37’s
lack of leadership on this issue as emblematic of his union’s refusal to get out in front of the
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Democratic party, even when a segment of its own members’ jobs are at stake. DC 37’s noninvolvement in countering RAD thus demonstrates New York City public sector unions’ strong
bonds to city and state administrations, and the potential peril of such tightness for both workers
and tenants in the long run.

Service Sector Unions
The building trades represent workers who physically produce the built environment;
public sector unions represent workers whose labor enables the state to function. Both are central
to a political economy premised on rising land and property values. By comparison, service
sector unions might seem disconnected from the politics of the real estate state. This, however, is
not the case; service workers unions’ involvement in New York City planning politics is the
most savvy, active, and politically effective of any branch of the city’s union movement.85 Their
involvement manifests in multiple ways, including lobbying for and against both city and
developer initiated land use changes, and lobbying for legislative and regulatory changes
perceived in their union’s – or their employer’s – material interest.
While there are many factors that go into service sector unions’ decisions around whether
and how to engage in planning politics, one issue is of particular importance to the question of
gentrification: rent gaps, and the role of the state in aiding their production. A rent gap is the
difference between the amount of ground rent a plot of land currently generates versus the
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Saito and Truong (2015, 269) note a similar pattern in Los Angeles, where the building trades had dominated in
the 1970s and 1980s. While this resulted in a spate of union construction projects, it left out the workers in those
buildings once completed, setting the stage for the city’s famous and influential Justice for Janitors campaign in the
1990s.
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amount it could potentially yield if the building atop it were renovated, rebuilt, privatized,
deregulated, or converted to a new use type or bulk level through a rezoning. If the gap is large
enough that the amount of money required to make such a change is understood by investors,
financiers, landlords, or developers to be quickly recoverable through increased rents or sale
prices, then the investment is likely to be made and gentrification is able to occur (Smith 1979).
While rent gaps can certainly be generated without affirmative state action, the state can
play an active role in creating rent gaps where they do not yet exist. Land use policies that
change the economic calculous of investment, renovation, development, and expected returns –
and thus can produce rent gaps wide enough to produce gentrification in places previously
ignored or starved by capital – can include rezonings that allow for more intensive bulk (by
increasing a lot’s or a neighborhood’s development capacity) or for more lucrative use types (by
changing a manufacturing zone into a commercial or residential area), and geographically
targeted tax breaks that decrease investors’, developers’, and landlords’ cost factors. Bloomberg
and de Blasio’s racially targeted upzonings can be understood as aiding in the production and
expansion of rent gaps in parts of the city that would have otherwise been less attractive to real
estate capital investment (Angotti and Morse 2016; Stein 2019). Similarly, many developerinitiated upzonings – in which a landowner petitions the city planning bureaucracy to change the
zoning on a lot to allow for a more intensive use – represent cases when the city has sided with
landowners to help encourage investment and enable profits. Upzonings do not in and of
themselves create rent gaps and enable gentrification. They are also necessary to turn
exclusionary homeowner neighborhoods into areas where working-class residents can afford to
live. But the kinds of upzonings prevalent in New York City thus far in the 21st century have
been those that stimulate gentrification rather than create opportunities for working-class
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residents. Through these actions, the state directly aids capital in extracting greater profits from
the urban landscape.
At the moment when the state is contemplating such an intervention, capital is in a
vulnerable position: the decisions of a mayor, councilmember, and planning commission will
shape the amount of money investors will be able to reap from a particular geography. Such
decisions are inevitably controversial, as they often have the effect of raising housing costs and
potentially causing displacement for many working-class and poor residents. This can draw a
great deal of public action, as well as a swell of media attention.
Given capital’s dependence on state action, and the ubiquity of neighborhood
consternation around such actions, New York City service sector unions have come to view these
land use actions as major opportunities for interventions that can expand their union’s position,
power, or ranks. When such an action lines up with the interests of neighborhood groups (most
often non-profits), these unions will often join in what is commonly referred to as laborcommunity partnerships (Greenberg and Lewis 2017, 15; Tufts 2009, 983). Under these
circumstances, however, the union’s ultimate goal is to extract for their members some share of
the profits unleashed by the rezoning. MacDonald (2017a, pg. 16) elucidates this crucial
distinction between opposing gentrification and negotiating the distribution of its surpluses:
The range of concessions available to labor and community groups
is shaped by how much land value is likely to be unlocked by the
rezoning process…. The wider the rent gap, the greater the leverage
labor-community coalitions bring to bear against developers, and
the higher the value of concessions they are likely to extract. The
union’s leverage is greater if its members are residentially located
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along the advancing edge of the development frontier, and the rent
gap is widest when neighborhoods that have undergone long periods
of disinvestment are transformed into luxury-oriented spaces. While
the value of concessions extracted from developers can vary
according to the political leverage of the coalition, and the
distribution of this value can be shifted among coalition partners in
the form of subsidized housing or higher wages, any strategy that
seeks to maximize developer concessions cannot at the same time
seek to prevent gentrification. There are choices and trade-offs
involved in these strategies, and the result in some cases may be a
form of ‘negotiated gentrification.’
As discussed in the following chapter, non-profits also engage in this project – what Goldstein
(2017, 197) called a process of “managing change” by affecting the parameters of gentrification
rather than contesting it outright. As Nancy Peterson (a pseudonym), an anonymous staffer at a
non-profit advocacy and technical assistance organization86 told me in an interview, non-profit
leaders in many parts of New York City “feel like they're already at a point in the gentrification
process where they want to get something out of it – as opposed to trying to slow or stop it,
because they don't really see a way to.” Regardless of the accuracy of that assessment, it is
incompatible with an approach that seeks to prevent such rent gaps from opening and halt the
spread of gentrification throughout the city.
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Peterson requested that her employer not be named in this work.
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The union that best demonstrates this approach to New York City land use politics is
SEIU 32BJ, a regional union representing many of the workers who maintain larger residential
and commercial buildings along the east coast, including janitors, apartment building workers,
window washers, and security officers. 32BJ’s New York metro district includes 80,000
members, a large majority of them immigrants, and bargains contracts covering thousands of
buildings in Manhattan and beyond (Berman 2019). Describing the city’s political economy and
32BJ’s role in it, union consultant Simon Frankel emphasized, New York City is “a company
town. The business is real estate, of course, and so that makes [32BJ] the union.”
32BJ maintains a leftwing political profile, sponsoring May Day and immigrants’ rights
protests, and supporting organizing outside their industry (including fast food workers, taxi
drivers, and farm workers) (Turner 2014). But when it comes to state actions regarding real
estate, 32BJ has often found itself on opposite sides from the city’s tenant and anti-gentrification
movements. The union has been moving more into the affordable housing world – including
representing workers at buildings owned by the major non-profit Phipps Houses after a
successful corporate campaign that stopped a development of theirs in Sunnyside, Queens
(Goldenberg 2018) – but they have had difficulty forming durable relationships with housing
non-profits and tenant advocates (with the exception of large groups like Make the Road and
New York Communities for Change that also have substantial workplace-based projects). 32BJ’s
leadership has argued this is because tenant advocates push for lower rents without concern for
the potential impacts on building service workers, whose wages are dependent on those rents
(Berman 2019). A former 32BJ researcher, however, argued that the cause was something else:
they are simply not afraid of a tenant movement to their left. Speaking in 2018 – before the
tenant movement made significant legislative progress in the state rent law fight – I asked former
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32BJ staffer Florentino during his interview whether the union was concerned about consistently
angering the tenant movement. In a brutal response, he replied, “There’s not a strong tenant
union culture anymore. I think it’s very –” He stopped himself, paused, and deadpanned: “32BJ
power maps really well,” implying that the tenant movement had little power to speak of.
“There’s actually no benefit for them at the moment to align themselves with these much less
influential groups that are not actually succeeding in their sector in terms of protecting tenants.”
According to Guinn, “32BJ is just doing what the building trades used to do” in terms of
supporting their industry’s real estate agenda. Frankel went a step farther, comparing 32BJ’s
willingness to stand against tenants to building trades unions that were, at the time of our
interview, defending their right to work on the Dakota Access Pipeline against the demands of
indigenous protesters and their supporters at Standing Rock.87 Frankel was not the only source to
make this comparison. In his interview, Barnett also compared 32BJ and other unions’ housing
and land use politics to supporting a pipeline, calling such actions “politically suicidal.” No one,
however, claimed the union was ineffective in securing benefits through this process of
“negotiated gentrification” (MacDonald 2017a, 16).
32BJ engages in three distinct modes of land use campaigns. The first mode is engaged in
when a union antagonist is seeking regulatory relief from the state. When the union is conducting
a corporate campaign against a non-union building owner or developer, 32BJ will, as part of a
multi-pronged campaign, fight to block that firm’s land use priorities from finding state
approval. While the issue at hand for 32BJ may be jobs – including, most of the time, jobs at an
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Invoking the stakes of that moment, Nick Estes (2019, 49) writes, “It was unionized pipeline workers who clocked
in while Indigenous people formed a picket line. The Indigenous marchers who showed up that day were working
to protect their lands and waters – they were Land Defenders and Water Protectors. Workers who cross picket
lines, on the other hand, are called ‘scabs’ because they undermine working-class solidarity.”
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entirely different work site than the parcel in question – the union’s staff will construct
campaigns around issues of greater saliency to the planners and politicians who have ultimate
say over the land use process. This includes arguments that the proposed development would
harm the environment, increase traffic, close small businesses, raise neighborhood housing costs,
or cast long shadows. Since the union is not known to be an especially vigilant voice on any of
these issues, they must employ planning consultants to conduct studies that demonstrate their
case, and they must join with community-based organizations (including both informal groups
and established non-profits) in ad-hoc coalitions against the proposed development. While the
expert testimony may be diligent and the community’s opposition serious, the union’s goal is not
necessary to halt the development per se, but rather to demonstrate to the target of their
campaign that it would be cheaper, faster, and easier for them to negotiate with the union than to
continue fighting them. If 32BJ succeeds in such a campaign, they must either drop their
opposition to the land use action (and thus leave their coalition behind), or, in some cases, even
turn around and support it publicly.
The second mode of land use campaign is engaged when a union firm initiates the
regulatory action. Whenever a member of the Realty Advisory Board (RAB) – REBNY’s labor
negotiating arm and the union’s bargaining counterpart – requests a rezoning, 32BJ will support
it regardless of the content, context, or fallout, unless the union is involved in an active dispute
with that owner. In these cases, the standard process goes something like this, according to
Florentino: first a lobbyist for the developer contacts the union’s political department, asking for
support; then the political department contacts the research department, asking for draft
testimony in support of the project and a list of members who live nearby; the researchers then
contact the union representatives to ask them to talk to the members about testifying in support
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of the project; the representatives then reach out directly to the members and ask them to read the
testimony at a public hearing. Members often agree to participate in this type of action, either as
a testifier or as an audience member in visually identifiable union attire, in order to maintain
good relations with their union representative, who might aid them in filing future grievances or
becoming a shop steward. Florentino calls this a “performative” action because the members are
performing their union’s support to politicians on behalf of the industry.
The third mode is deployed when the city initiates a land use change. 32BJ rarely outright
opposes such city-initiated land use changes, unless it is being done for the clear benefit of a
particular developer with whom the union has not secured an agreement. Instead, they seek to
extract terms from the rezoning that are friendly to the union and are likely to result in the kind
of development that employs their members. Such development must bring in enough money in
rents, sales, and fees to pay full-time workers at union scale and with extensive benefits, or
secure subsidies to cover the gap between rent revenues and labor costs. Fully affordable
developments, then, are not part of the union’s major market, and are therefore not their
development priority. In the case of an alienation of public land, in which the city generates a
request for proposals (RFP) for private development on city-owned parcels, Mendoza explained
that 32BJ aims to strike agreements with as many developers bidding on a major public RFP in
order to ensure that whoever wins the bid has already agreed to union representation for future
workers.
The most famous example of a city-initiated rezoning strategy supported by 32BJ in the
Bloomberg era was the Williamsburg/Greenpoint rezoning of 2005, which resulted in luxury
residential construction along the northwest Brooklyn waterfront and hastened that
neighborhood’s iconic gentrification (Susser 2012, 3-69, Stabrowski 2014). In partnership with
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Brooklyn Democratic party boss Vito Lopez, 32BJ secured a guarantee that all buildings
receiving public subsidy would need to pay 32BJ’s wage scale (Moody 2007, 237). While the
rezoning protected building service workers’ wages, it is also widely understood to have resulted
in a high level of displacement, particularly for working-class Latinos (Morse and DePaulo 2016;
Marwell 2007, 89-91).
When de Blasio released his housing and zoning plan, 32BJ quietly negotiated a deal
with the city to guarantee that buildings over 30 units and receiving city subsidies would pay
prevailing wages, thus making them far more likely to be union. The initial secrecy of this deal,
however, is significant in demonstrating the performative nature of 32BJ’s land use politics.
Despite having secured this deal, 32BJ testified at numerous public hearings around rezonings in
East New York, East Harlem, Jerome Avenue, and elsewhere, saying they would only support
the rezoning if assurances could be made that they would result in good (i.e. union) jobs for
permanent maintenance staff. That assurance, of course, had already been privately secured, but
by framing their testimony this way 32BJ created the impression that they were not automatically
in favor of such controversial rezonings. As the rezonings moved through the ULURP process,
wage guarantees would be made explicit, making it seem as if it was the union’s advocacy
during the rezoning process (rather than in prior negotiations) that secured the jobs guarantee.
This makes both 32BJ and the local councilmember look favorable, as the rezoning appears to
have improved over the course of the ULURP process (Anuta 2019).
In addition to these three varieties of land use campaigns, 32BJ is also heavily involved
in city and state-level legislative politics around real estate development, finance, and regulation,
seeking actions that both increase the chances developments will be union and actions that
insulate industry profits (under the theory that wage and benefit standards can only be
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maintained in highly profitable operations). In so doing – as with many of their campaigns in
support of union signatories’ rezonings – the union also inculcates itself as a politically useful
ally to REBNY, and thus seeks to secure a favorable position for future bargaining.
One of the most visible manifestations of this mode of political intervention was 32BJ’s
lobbying around 421a, the massive state real estate tax abatement program. In 2007, when I
worked at the union as a researcher, 32BJ ran a media and political campaign decrying the
abatement as a luxury giveaway. Their goal, however, was not to abolish the tax abatement (as
tenant organizations have long called for) but rather to secure prevailing wage standards for
buildings that receive it. They succeeded in that effort, immediately making it easier to strike
agreements with the developers of 250 buildings then under construction (MacDonald 2014).
The program, however, continues to be a massive subsidy for new-build gentrification. Arena
(2016, 326) calls the union’s support for the luxury tax break “a paradigmatic case of the
neoliberal incorporation strategy,” with the union lending its credibility to a program that, while
now friendlier to building service workers, continues to stoke gentrification while starving the
city of tax revenue. When the tax abatement was up for renewal in early 2016, the building
trades demanded prevailing wages for construction jobs to match those guaranteed for service
jobs. In her interview, Rohmer recalled a meeting at this time in which 32BJ president Hector
Figueroa related to the union’s staff that REBNY had told him that if 32BJ supported the
building trades’ demand, 32BJ would pay for it when their residential contract expired. 32BJ
then lobbied for the version of the 421a extension that excluded the building trades’ demands.
32BJ also succeeded in convincing Mayor de Blasio in his first term to sign a major
executive order on building service workers in city-subsidized private development. The order
mandated labor neutrality agreements in buildings that receive over $1 million in city subsidies
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and are either bigger than 100,000 square feet (if commercial) or have over 100 units (if
residential). This virtually assured that all projects developed through the city’s public-private
Economic Development Corporation (EDC) – which structures subsidy and land use deals on
behalf of corporations making major investments in development projects – would have the
support of one of the city’s most powerful unions (Goldenberg 2016a). Controversial examples
of such projects include the proposed Amazon headquarters and the rezoning of Industry City in
Brooklyn’s Sunset Park.
Through all of these modes of land use interventions, 32BJ seeks to retain their high
levels of union density while simultaneously demonstrating their value to both politicians and
real estate industry players. There are still non-union buildings in the city, and some developers
and building owners have pulled out of the union contract, but the union leadership has decided
that, with some exceptions, it would not be a worthwhile use of resources to organize those
workers in a building-by-building manner and conduct union elections. Instead, they put their
staff to work guaranteeing that future development will be union.
According to two former staffers, Rohmer and Florentino, the large number of shops and
high level of pay in 32BJ’s residential buildings make the residential division the greatest
contributor to the union’s coffers. This means that the residential division has the most power
within the union, thus constraining the union leadership from taking a more confrontational
approach with the real estate industry.88 It also means, however, that even those uncomfortable
with the union’s political profile on questions of planning and development depend on the flow
of money from the residential division. This camp seeks to put that money to use on new
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The union’s other New York City divisions are commercial, schools, airports, security, theaters and stadiums, and
window cleaners.
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organizing campaigns and on broader left political projects like the Fight for 15 campaign to
raise the minimum wage or the United NY campaign to support Occupy Wall Street-style
organizing following the 2008 financial crisis (Turner 2014).89 In this sense, 32BJ’s approach to
real estate mirrors that of planners in the real estate state: some planners reluctantly support the
real estate industry’s agenda because their cities have become dependent on constant real estate
growth, and their budgets will fail if the industry starts to flail; others support the real estate
industry’s spatial agendas in order to channel the proceeds from such growth toward more
publicly-oriented measures. In either case, real estate growth is seen as indispensable to the
urban future (Stein 2019).
In this orientation to planning politics, then, REBNY is more a partner than an enemy for
32BJ. This was a point several sources with work experience at 32BJ emphasized repeatedly.
While the union and the real estate lobby may play up their differences in public, particularly
around the time of contract negotiations, they maintain what Mendoza called – four times in a
single interview – a “tight embrace.” Florentino went a step farther in saying that 32BJ is
“locked in this deadly embrace” with the real estate industry. Rohmer called it “a Faustian
bargain with the real estate industry” that trades union support for REBNY’s political agenda for
an easier time bargaining contracts. Given their ability and willingness to mobilize their
members around developer-friendly political issues, Rohmer characterized 32BJ as “the field
team for REBNY.”
In recent years this “embrace” has been formalized in binding contracts between the
union and developers. 32BJ’s New York City master contracts contain provisions declaring that
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One source, however, insisted that 32BJ and 1199 had to be dragged into funding Fight for 15 (Frankel 2018). My
reading of these contradictory accounts is that the leadership of those unions were internally split over whether or
not and how much to fund the campaign.
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32BJ and REBNY will jointly lobby for policies that further real estate growth in the city. Since
2012 the union’s general contracts with the RAB have contained a clause establishing a “Joint
Industry Advancement Project.”90 As described in the most recent contract,
The Union and the RAB recognize that they have a common interest
in pursuing efforts that will promote development and growth in the
real estate industry, as growth and development (1) create a
favorable business environment for real estate industry employers
and provide enhanced job opportunities; (2) strengthen communities
and New York City’s economy; and (3) provide a path for a viable
future for New York City (Realty Advisory Board on Labor
Relations Incorporated and Service Employees International Union,
Local 32BJ 2018, 65-66).
The Project is tasked with “monitoring of and/or involvement with issues of mutual interest to
the industry and union in legislative, governmental or regulatory forums, at the local, state or
national level (“Mutual Issues”) as well as education, research, advertising, and/or publicity for
the purpose of enhancing development and growth of the real estate industry” (ibid, 67). Both
sides are compelled to “refrain, insofar as practicable and except as warranted by a change of
circumstances, from taking positions on issues contrary to the positions taken by the Project”
(ibid, 67). Later, the contract adds, “Neither party shall propose any legislation or regulation
(including without limitation any amendment or revision to existing legislation or regulation) on
Mutual Issues to any governmental body of any kind” without checking with the other first “in
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The Joint Industry Advance Project is a body of five union and five RAB representatives, plus co-chairs from each
side, who meet at least four times a year. Voting is conducted in blocks, with the union representatives casting one
collective vote and the industry casting another. No decisions are made unless both sides vote the same way.
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order that they may solicit and endeavor to accommodate the views of the other party” (ibid, 68).
These contracts not only establish wages, benefits, working conditions, and labor peace, but also
a political alliance that explicitly binds labor to capital around the promotion of a profitable
growth orientation toward planning and development.
When determining which candidates to endorse in the 2014 mayoral election, REBNY
and 32BJ conducted joint mayoral interviews under the premise that the best candidate would
satisfy both union and industry demands (Paybarah 2013). In a more recent manifestation of this
joint political orientation, 32BJ joined with REBNY to lobby against a package of reforms to the
state’s rent laws, which limited rent increases, ended apartment deregulation, and expanded the
regulations’ geographical scope to cities around the state. The real estate industry responded to
the tenant movement’s legislative agenda by setting up a front organization, “Responsible Rent
Reform,”91 which paid for advertisements, mailers, and lobbyists to claim that such regulations
would destroy the city’s real estate market. One video they produced featured members of 32BJ,
and claimed that “thousands of good union jobs depend on a healthy New York rental market”
(Wang 2019). In a tweet tagging the union, Responsible Rent Reform claimed that “Thousands
of good, @32BHSEIU union jobs rely on a healthy rental market. If Albany’s proposals pass,
salaries and benefits for doormen, supers and cleaners are at risk.” This was an extremely shaky
case – the bill might have slowed the pace of profits, but would not push buildings into crisis. It
was a much greater threat to predatory equity firms intent on deregulating units than to landlords
who planned to keep their buildings in the system.92 Nonetheless, 32BJ publicly backed REBNY
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This name was likely an intentionally confusing play on the tenant coalition known as “Real Rent Reform.”
It is far more likely that REBNY’s opposition was rooted in the provision of the bill that ended vacancy decontrol,
which was important to developers receiving the 421a tax abatement. In the latest round of 421a renewals, in
exchange for finally guaranteeing some (sub-prevailing) wage standards for construction workers, the state
allowed developers to opt out of rent regulation if their apartments’ rents surpassed a certain rent threshold. The
new laws foreclosed on this option, and thus gained REBNY’s ire (David 2019).
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over the Housing Justice for All coalition, which included both tenant organizations and public
sector unions.
At other times, the relationship between REBNY and 32BJ – like that between many
employer associations and unions – is less public-facing. In such cases, intermediaries become
key channels for communication and negotiation. Often the intermediaries are a powerful group
of political and media consultants whose clients include unions, politicians, and developers. The
most famous such group is BerlinRosen, which advises unions, developers, and the mayor alike.
While these consultancies provide plenty of useful advice and services, one of their most
important but underreported functions is to act as an arbiter between sectors of labor, capital, and
the state around issues of interest to a set of their clients. Large law firms can also fulfill a similar
function. When Major League Soccer controversially sought permission to build a professional
soccer stadium in Flushing Meadows Corona Park, and in the process displace non-professional
ballfields where many residents played the game in informal leagues (Stein 2013), the League
found that they, REBNY, and the 32BJ pension fund all used the same lawyers. Mendoza
recounted in an interview that the law firm then quietly constructed a deal agreeable to all parties
– even though some of the leading protestors against the proposed stadium were 32BJ members.
It is currently impossible to quantify how many union members have been adversely
affected by 32BJ’s – or any other union’s – strategic involvement in land use campaigns that
accelerate gentrification. While 32BJ, like any well-run union, keeps careful records of where
their members live, they never release such data in full to the public. We do, however, know that
large numbers of union members live in the places directly affected by their campaigns because
this is a key rhetorical element in their campaigns: as Florentino explained in his interview,
whenever union members, staff, or leaders testify in rezoning processes or legislative hearings,
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they emphasize how many of their members work and live in the district in order to establish
their stake in the geography, while simultaneously signaling to officials that their members can
help or hinder their electoral futures. It is undoubtable, then, that the very land use strategies
32BJ uses to keep their members’ wages rising could also place their housing costs along a
similar – if not more precipitous – upward trajectory.
32BJ stands out among service sector unions when it comes to their involvement in New
York City planning politics, but it is far from the only actor behaving according to such
calculations. As MacDonald has shown in multiple analyses (MacDonald 2011, 2013, 2014,
2017a-d), HTC, a significantly smaller union representing hotel workers (predominantly at large,
expensive Manhattan hotels known as “full service” operators), is just as active, influential,
savvy, and strategic as 32BJ around questions of land use. HTC represents about 40,000 workers
in 300 hotels, accounting for almost 75 percent of the city’s hotel workforce (Hotel Trades
Council 2019).93 The union views the land use process as one of their greatest sources of
leverage in maintaining and expanding their density.
Like 32BJ, HTC retains a sizable research staff, though their agenda is dictated by the
union’s powerful and well-connected political department.94 They track all ULURP and preULURP applications and seek to ensure that any land use change strengthens – or at least
maintains – their market share. In a strong case of “regulatory unionism,” HTC seeks to protect
their collective bargaining counterpart’s (the Hotel Association of New York City [HANYC])
market position by preempting the proliferation of non-union hotels, be they budget operations
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It is noteworthy, however, that the percentage of hotels they represent is far smaller than the percentage of
workers overall. This is because of the large workforce in union hotels and the comparatively small workforce in
non-union operations.
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This information was conveyed in an interview with Guinn, and conforms to my own understanding of the union
as well.
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catering to less wealthy visitors or high-end boutiques that operate outside the union’s
established purview (MacDonald 2012, 202). Of course, an alternative strategy would be to
organize the workers in those sectors, but the union has settled into a project of vigorous political
lobbying to protect the model of hotels within which their union currently operates. To this end,
the union and its members have donated millions to both city and state electoral candidates,
including mostly Democrats but also Republicans in the State Senate who have supported some
of the union’s and the industry’s legislative priorities (Goodman 2020). HTC has three main
mechanisms and campaign types to work with to achieve this goal: public land and subsidy
campaigns; “special permit” campaigns; and general rezoning campaigns.
Through an effective lobbying campaign, HTC managed to secure language written into
the 2009 Public Authorities Act establishing that any future Request For Proposals to build a
hotel on public land would have a labor peace agreement listed as a requirement for all bidders.
In other words, as former HTC staffer Lou Hammond (a pseudonym) explained to me in an
interview, any future private hotel development on public land is virtually guaranteed to be
union.95 Following this victory, HTC would be incentivized to support any private development
done on public land as long as it included a hotel, regardless of any other considerations around
privatization, gentrification, or labor conditions in other aspects of the development. The Public
Authorities Act therefore ensured that the hotel component of the high-end Brooklyn Bridge
Park development, which was not constructed with building trades labor, was supported by HTC.
Second, the union has successfully developed a technique to use a quirk of the land use
process to further HTC’s market regulatory project. Mendoza explained in an interview that this
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The exception to this rule, which HTC unsuccessfully contested, was for places where the state determined
unionization would be cost prohibitive. Hammond told me in his interview that this exception was only used
upstate in areas outside HTC’s normal representational zone.
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model, first developed in the 2005 fight over midtown Manhattan’s Garment Center rezoning,
involves intensive intervention from the union into a ULURP process, as well as partnerships
with community groups opposing a rezoning for various reasons. Contrary to the assumptions of
many planners, community board members, or less-savvy politicians, HTC’s goal is not to
promote the proliferation of hotels, but rather to control or even limit their construction. When
they engage in a land use change, HTC may initially oppose the rezoning along public interest
lines (such as housing affordability or neighborhood preservation), but they intimate to
politicians that what they really want is for the rezoning to proceed with a caveat that any future
hotel development require a “special permit” to move forward. The union is counting on the fact
that their political power is strong enough to ensure that non-union hotel operators will see their
permits denied, while union hotel developers will see them approved. According to former HTC
staffer Hammond, no hotel construction or conversion projects have even been proposed in these
rezoned areas since the special permit requirement has been imposed. Once HTC secures a
“special permit” process, the union will switch sides and support a rezoning. The union has
become involved in a great number of rezonings, large and small, simply to assure that such
control is retained (MacDonald 2011, 2013, 2017d), and has – mostly through Borough President
appointments – secured seats on several community boards for HTC staff and members. In
August 2019, it was reported that de Blasio had requested that the Department of City Planning
produce a proposal to require special permits for hotel development anywhere in the city, which
would constitute a major victory for HTC (Geiger 2019).
Often HTC’s preference for a highly particular development agenda has gone against the
stated goals of both Mayors Bloomberg and de Blasio, but the union has proved impossible for
either mayor to ignore. Bloomberg attempted to sidestep the union’s demands in his proposed
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Midtown East commercial upzoning, and in response HTC effectively killed the rezoning by
ensuring it would not pass through the City Council. This was a rare defeat for Bloomberg’s land
use agenda and became a major piece of unfinished business when his third term expired. De
Blasio appeased the union’s special permit demands, and the Midtown East rezoning – the only
upzoning of a wealthy neighborhood passed thus far in the de Blasio administration – sailed
through the land use review process. Guinn recounted in an interview that while de Blasio
routinely maintains that the city needs more housing of all types, HTC nevertheless managed to
strike enough fear into him that, early in his mayoralty, de Blasio told his planning staff to come
up with a policy justification for opposing future hospitality-to-residential conversions. The
union then succeeded in securing City Council legislation to place a temporary moratorium on
any such conversions, which has since been renewed (Goodman 2020). HTC then went on to
become a major backer on de Blasio’s housing plan and helped assure its eventual legislative
victory. As Hammond explained in an interview, the union “always calculates what would be
useful to the mayor – that’s why they endorsed him for president!”96 HTC was the first (and
ultimately only) union to endorse the mayor’s unsuccessful campaign, and its staff and members
represented 70 percent of his initial donors (Marsh and Lerner 2019). This allowed HTC not only
to cement their relationship with the mayor, but also demonstrate to future mayoral and City
Council candidates their ability to summon a significant amount of small-dollar donations from
their members (Goodman 2020)
HTC’s strategic positions around rezonings have sometimes caused tensions with
neighborhood groups who felt betrayed when the union switched from opposing a project to
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When asked by a New York Times reporter whether the union discussed with de Blasio what legislative action
they expected in return for their endorsement, HTC president Peter Ward replied, “I mean, Jesus Christ, how
stupid would you be to have that conversation?” (Goodman 2020).
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wholeheartedly supporting it once their goal was met. There is one way, however, that HTC and
the tenant movement’s interests are wholly aligned: both see Airbnb as a major threat and seek
stiffer regulations against the company and its business model. For the tenant movement, Airbnb
extends the hyper-commodification of housing by turning every renter into a potential landlord,
and – most perilously – enables landlords to take apartments off the market and instead reserve
them for short term rentals (Stabrowski 2017). For HTC and hotel owners alike, Airbnb
represents a competing hospitality model that neither employs anyone nor pays hotel taxes.97
HTC, HANYC, and tenant organizations have joined together to form an anti-Airbnb advocacy
group, Share Better, that pushes for stronger regulations at the state and local level. In keeping
with de Blasio’s tight relationship with HTC, the Mayor empaneled a special task force to go
after building owners and Airbnb hosts who flagrantly violated the city’s regulations (Giambusso
2019).
In addition to HTC and 32BJ, the service sector union that has seen some of the greatest
success in New York City planning politics is RWDSU. With over 12,000 members concentrated
in department and chain stores, supermarkets, and commercial food production facilities
(Milkman and Luce 2019), the union is not terribly large, but, Guinn asserted in his interview,
they aim to be seen as both powerful and progressive. Most recently, their conditional opposition
to Amazon’s headquarters, premised on the company’s anti-union warehouse policy as well as its
ownership of the non-union Whole Foods chain, helped scare the company away from western
Queens. Previously, during the Bloomberg era, RWDSU (along with 32BJ and other unions)
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In 2014 former Attorney General Schneiderman negotiated an arrangement with Airbnb that would have forced
the company to pay both retroactive and future hotel taxes as well as investigate potentially fraudulent users. HTC,
however, sensed that this move would legitimize Airbnb in a way that could threaten the New York City hotel
model. The union stepped in to scuttle Schneiderman’s plan in order to retain Airbnb’s pariah status. A $200,000
donation to the mayor’s non-profit preceded the deal’s downfall and may have helped secure the Mayor’s private
backing (Goodman 2020).
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supported and funded a successful campaign to keep Walmart stores out of the city. In 2009, they
helped lead a labor-community coalition that achieved what no other anti-rezoning group had
during the Bloomberg era, or has since: they convinced the City Council to vote against a cityinitiated rezoning plan that did not conform to their demands.
The fight was over a plan to turn the Kingsbridge Armory in the central Bronx into a
retail hub. According to Jeanne Goldberg (a pseudonym), a consultant who worked on this
campaign, RWDSU’s involvement in the rezoning began as “a rearguard action to protect small
retailers on Fordham Road that had RWDSU contracts. There was one big grocery store there
especially. It was really a campaign to protect the RWDSU’s employers.” Of course, the union
also hoped to gain representation rights for future workers in the mall, but their first impetus was
defensive, and, in Goldberg’s telling, it was framed around protecting the union employer.
According to Jeffrey Eichler, a former organizer for RWDSU, the non-profit organization
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC) approached the union about
forming a united front to negotiate on behalf of the neighborhood and establish a Community
Benefits Agreement. While Eichler was excited about the idea, he remembers others in the union
expressing doubts: they saw their interest as limited to keeping out a competing grocery store
and potentially increasing its membership, whereas NWBCCC brought a number of issues of
their own. To make matters more complicated, the building trades and 32BJ also joined the
coalition, with each union in a position to split at any moment if they secured a deal with the
developer. Nevertheless, RWDSU spent a great deal of time and money on the campaign, and
hired a community organizer working under the umbrella of NWBCCC.
After the Bloomberg administration put out a Request For Proposals and selected as the
developer Related, the coalition drew together a CBA proposal. They met with the developer, but
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Related rejected the framework outright. The Building Trades Council then signed a side deal
with Related and backed out of the coalition. The Steel and Ironworkers locals, however, refused
to show up to hearings to testify for the project against the wishes of their coalition partners.98
Following the building trades, 32BJ signed a deal with Related to use a union janitorial
contractor on the future mall site, and split from the coalition at the last minute. While the
prospects were far from certain, RWDSU and the coalition managed to convince a key
councilmember that if he voted for the project, he would lose the endorsement of the Working
Families Party when he ran for reelection. He voted against the project, the council voted with
him, and the rezoning was killed, dealing a defeat to Related, Bloomberg, the Building Trades
Council, and 32BJ.
From there, RWDSU went on to run a legislative campaign to demand living wages for
any new development with city financing. According to Broxmeyer and Michaels (2014, 73),
“the core strategy was to build enough political momentum behind the living wage demand to
force future mayoral candidates and undecided city council members to take the issue into
account as part of their electoral calculations.” Bloomberg and Council Speaker Christine Quin,
however, crafted a version of the bill that was narrowly targeted to protect only 32BJ members,
rather than RWDSU members, underscoring the overall power differential between the unions
despite RWDSU’s recent victory. Once elected, de Blasio extended the coverage to retail
workers by executive order, largely as a result of the momentum and success of the Fight for 15
campaign to raise the minimum wage. According to Luce and Lewis (2017, 74), RWDSU
“argued that since these retailers almost always get major economic development assistance and
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According to an interview with Walters, however, the Carpenters union maintained its public support for the
project.
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special zoning allowances, they should contribute to the well-being of workers by paying
employees a living wage.” By securing this victory, however, RWDSU was now incentivized to
stop fighting against city subsidies for corporate retailers, and instead promote such subsidies as
a means to trigger higher wage standards and thus make it easier for the union to secure
representational rights.
Whereas RWDSU’s influence in New York City land use politics is bigger than its
membership size and type would otherwise imply, the city’s largest healthcare union – SEIU
1199 – plays a smaller role than its numbers and general political influence might suggest. Like
DC 37, 1199, which mostly represents workers in non-profit hospitals and other health facilities,
is famous for taking bold political stands. In 1968, Martin Luther King told 1199 members and
leaders, “if all of labor would emulate what you have been doing over the years, our nation
would be closer to victory in the fight to eliminate poverty and injustice” (Gresham 2011). The
union was the last to develop large-scale cooperative housing, and did so without displacing
poorer tenants in the process. In recent years, however, 1199 has a decidedly more mixed record
on housing and development issues (Botein 2009).
The union leadership’s primary political concern is maintaining the state-level support
necessary to secure funding for union hospitals, nursing homes, and other health care facilities.
As such, 1199 has oriented its politics around whatever governing coalition ensured the funding
and regulatory status quo. In the 1990s and 2000s, that meant supporting a Republican State
Senate – and, for a time, Governor – that, while supportive of 1199’s budgetary, regulatory, and
legislative priorities, gutted rent regulations and promoted developer-friendly tax incentives
(Hauptmeier and Turner 2007; Phillips-Fein 2003). While they participated in campaigns to
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strengthen rent laws at the state level, they also helped secure the legislative conditions for those
very movements’ failure.
Like many New York unions, they are closely tied to Governor Andrew Cuomo. 1199
endorsed his first run for the office, despite his anti-public sector union campaign rhetoric; after
some initial anti-union actions, such as creating a new and diminished tier for public sector
pensions, Cuomo came around as a reliable ally of their legislative agenda (Wang and McKinley
2018). In deference to the governor, 1199 and UFT withdrew from the Working Families Party
in 2014 for wavering in their decision to endorse the governor before finally approving the
endorsement.99 In addition to cementing close ties with state government, 1199 maintains a
strong partnership with the League of Voluntary Hospitals (LVH), the union’s primary
bargaining counterpart. According to a source familiar with their operations, union consultant
Robert Guinn, 1199’s “political program is more or less jointly managed” with the LVH. Even as
hospitals around the city are converted into luxury real estate developments (Hughes 2016), 1199
has not made their preservation a key political priority (whereas the smaller but more aggressive
New York State Nurses Association has).

“The Solidarity of Capital and Labor”
Despite the diversity of factors guiding union behavior, the strategic imperative of unions
and land use in New York City ultimately comes down to this: unions use their political leverage
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Over the course of the next four years, 32BJ, Communications Workers of America District 1, RWDSU, HTC, and
the Transport Workers Union would all exit the party over similar conflicts over the party’s supposed failures of
loyalty to establishment Democrats. As of now, the State teachers union (New York State United Teachers,
including PSC-CUNY), Amalgamated Transit Union, United Food and Commercial Workers, New York State Nurses
Association, and United Automobile Workers remain New York State Working Families Party members (Lewis
2018).
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to secure or reproduce conditions that would enable their own social, economic, and political
position to endure or expand, regardless of the overall impact on the city as a whole or the
working class in particular. At times this entails taking an oppositional stance toward particular
developers or pro-developer policies, but the ultimate intention of such campaigns is not to
damage the forces of real estate capital as such but rather to secure a share of its surpluses for a
particular segment of labor. Once such an assurance is gained, most unions will then use their
political power to support their industries and their interests. Such a politics helps expand wages
and benefits for workers covered through these class compromises, but also ensures that housing
costs for many of those workers – and far more who are not covered by union contracts – will
continue to rise. Unions are responsible for crafting strategic campaigns toward this end, but they
are not responsible for the conditions that encouraged such actions in the first place. Instead,
unions are responding – often with great creativity and surprising success – to the constraints of
contemporary capitalism and labor law.
Analyzing a very different but nonetheless recognizable circumstance in England during
the early 20th century, Rosa Luxemburg posed a question that resonates today through the issue
of union participation in land use politics. Luxemburg (1937 [1908], 17) asked and answered:
“What does the active participation of trade unions in fixing the
scale and cost of production amount to? It amounts to a cartel of the
workers and entrepreneurs in a common stand against the consumer
and especially against rival entrepreneurs. In no way is the effect of
this any different from that of ordinary employers’ associations.
Basically we no longer have here a struggle between Labor and
Capital, but the solidary of Capital and Labor against the total
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consumers. Considered for its social worth, it is seen to be a
reactionary move that cannot be a stage in the struggle for the
emancipation of the proletariat, because it connotes the very
opposite of the class struggle.”
This withering critique of “the solidarity of Capital and Labor” rings painfully true today, as does
Luxemburg’s insistence that such a politics is not mistaken for class struggle, even if they are at
times waged through that language. Just as union cooperatives built through displacement
ensured that one fragment of labor could secure its social reproduction through means that
denied such freedom to another group of workers, contemporary labor land use campaigns that
advance the interests of one particular union by forming a bond with the real estate capital and
their state allies ensure that housing costs for labor as a whole will take up a greater share of
household budgets and induce displacement for those who can no longer hang on.
Labor geography’s most prominent theorist, Andrew Herod, has interpreted the kinds of
politics Luxemburg decries as assertions of labor’s agency within and against the structures of
capitalism. Contemporary labor’s relative immobility compared to capital “leads businesses and
workers in these places to come together to form geographically defined, cross-class, growth
coalitions designed to foster investment in their own communities” (Herod 2001, 100). The fact
that this benefits an element of capital does not, for Herod, diminish “the fact that workers are
engaging in such spatial praxis for purposes of achieving their own geographic goals” (ibid,
101), even if such goals are “to the detriment of workers located elsewhere” (ibid, 215). In such
cases, “workers may, in fact, gain more in real terms (e.g. continued employment opportunities)
by organizing around spatial concerns than around class ones…. Many workers, then, see such
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cross-class coalitions as very real opportunities to shape local economic geographies… [and]
play an active role in shaping the landscapes of capitalism” (ibid, 66-67).100
Clearly, there is agency in unions – or, more accurately, union leaders – making strategic
decisions to align with the real estate state in the pursuit of their own bargaining power, and thus
their members’ earning power. But while Herod focuses on the agency of workers in one place to
act against those in another, or for workers in the same place to act against one another based on
their industrial sector, he does not analyze how spatial strategies that empower a particular union
and aid in its members’ pursuit of steady and remunerative employment might also cause
housing prices for those very same union members to rise, ultimately leading to higher rent
burdens for many and, for some, displacement. As MacDonald (2011, 216) explains,
The rights to city services and decent employment, including the
right to form unions, is bargained in exchange for a say in
determining how the city changes, the right to residential tenure, to
not be pushed out of the city to make way for those with the income
levels that, increasingly, are required to enjoy it. Neoliberal
urbanism may invite labor’s agency as a geographical actor, only to
throw that agency back on itself.
Union land use campaigns continue what Madden and Marcuse (2016, 105) call “the
traditional privileging of industrial over residential politics” in a way that not only fails to benefit
the class as a whole, but expands the gender and racial inequities built in to the contemporary
housing system. While its particular manifestation in land use is somewhat new, the problem of
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privileging the sources of wages over the places those wages must eventually be spent is much
older. Selma James (1974, 16-17) uses the example of food costs rather than housing costs, but
her analysis nonetheless points to the limitations of union land use politics that secure higher
wages while raising housing costs. In making the case for wages for uncompensated socially
reproductive labor (“housework”), James built on Luxemburg’s theorization of productionconsumption dynamics to argue that unions had failed to represent the needs of all workers, “first
because they only deal with the money we get and not with what we have immediately to give
back; and second because they limit their fight – such as it is – only to that workplace where you
get wages for being there, and not where your work involves giving the money back.” This may
be beyond the scope of unions – formations within a capitalist economy whose core mission is
not necessarily to aid those outside of its membership – but James demonstrates why a program
which raises wages on the premise of raising other household costs (i.e. housing) ultimately
burdens waged and unwaged workers alike.
James was writing mostly in the context of industrial unions, a sector not represented in
the above schema because of the extent of New York City’s deindustrialization and the resultant
decline of the city’s industrial sector unions. While we could thus call the remaining unions
“post-industrial,” MacDonald (2017a, 2-3) argues that we should instead consider them “urban,”
for the value they produce is indelibly linked to the production of urban space – and, often of, the
luxury city (Brash 2011; Sherman 2007). Greenberg and Lewis (2017) assert the same in the
provocative title of their collection on contemporary urban unionism, The City Is the Factory.
Given these dynamics,
The highest-growth industries of our age continue to cluster in cities
and profit from their growth – including retail, commerce, tourism,
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media, finance, real estate, and high-end services…. Some of the
most powerful labor organizations globally – including SEIU and
UNITE HERE in the United States – are based in these industries
and take advantage of metropolitan locations in their choice of labor
actions, from exurban warehouse districts and logistics headquarters
to the hotels and office buildings in redeveloped downtowns (ibid,
9).
If the city is the factory, however, then all the traditional union politics of the factory – including
the contradictions James illuminates – are equally embedded in the union politics of city-making.
The campaigns urban unions take on, Tufts (2009, 980) argues, “can be interpreted as not only a
reaction to, but also constitutive of neoliberalism and the re-scaling of capital and the state” at
the municipal level.
Consider, for example, the politics of union pension investments in urban development
projects. Money amassed from individual workers then pooled into collective investment funds
form what Ghilarducci (1992) calls “labor’s capital.” Some of this capital is directed toward the
production of affordable housing using union labor, as with the AFL-CIO’s HIT. In New York
City, two percent of city workers’ pension funds are invested in “economically-targeted
investment” programs, which are then used by the Community Preservation Corporation to
finance affordable housing development (Abello 2018). Overall, however, recent union pension
investment in affordable housing has achieved “very spotty results” (Aronowitz 2014, 185). Far
more significant has been the impact of union pensions in funding housing only affordable to
those with far more wealth than their members. This tendency has manifested in New York, as
discussed earlier in the case of teachers’ pensions, but has been especially pronounced in
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California. That state’s public sector pension fund, CalPERS, has invested significant quantities
into Blackstone Equities, the global private equity firm and world’s largest landlord. Blackstone
then used some of those funds to buy out buildings and evict residents who could no longer
afford the new rents, including CalPERS pensioners (Brady 2017). In order to protect such a
model, Blackstone also funneled California state and university employees’ pension funds into a
campaign to oppose a public referendum that would have enabled municipalities to pursue
stronger rent control regimes (Sirota and Perez, 2018).
If labor’s capital is being invested in the built environment in ways reflective of the logic
of neoliberal finance capital, the very mode in which most union land use campaigns are
conducted also mirrors the mode of investment set off by municipal rezonings. As MacDonald
(2012, 215) argues, there is a “fictitious character” to both the value the state creates through a
rezoning (in that the state only creates potential future profits for land owners upon the sale or
redevelopment of their property, rather than immediate cash in hand) and the “union that is
formed prior to the formation of a workforce” (i.e. the potential future unionization of a
workforce that has not yet been hired). Ironically, the apotheosis of New York City union land
use politics, wherein a union – generally from the service or building trades sectors – secures a
neutrality or representational deal with a developer for a future workforce, involves a significant
amount of risk. While more often than not such value is realized and such members manifest, the
land use-driven deals that unions strike with developers are not always realized in the ways
initially imagined by union leadership.
According to Mendoza, there are four conditions that can prevent union status in future
developments, despite deals between a union and a developer. First, after a deal is struck, the
developer can sell the land to another owner, who may not recognize the validity of the original
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agreement. Second, given the long timeline for many developments, the staff at both unions and
developers can change, and the new personnel may not be aware of deals made years prior.
Third, there is no regulatory enforcement for such deals if the developer refuses to abide by the
terms, and unions are unlikely to go on an illegal strike to enforce them to. Unions have been
largely unwilling to sue based on developers’ abdication of deals because they fear they would
lose, and thus establish a precedent for future developers to repeat this bait and switch. In his
interview, Florentino confirmed each of these scenarios and added one more factor. Neutrality
agreements are usually time-bound, affecting only the building’s first year of operation. If the
union misses its window to organize, the developer will use all the usual anti-union tactics to
make such organizing much more difficult for the union. In such cases, Florentino says unions
tend to take a “live and learn” attitude toward their errors.
While the union representation may thus fail to manifest, the luxury development unions
endorsed surely will. The landscape will be altered in order to secure continued and intensified
accumulation, but the labor relations housed within them may not improve. In such cases, capital
heartily accepts labor’s support, then haughtily denies reciprocity. Clearly, the solidarity of
capital to labor has its limits.

292

Chapter 5: Non-Profits and Planning Politics in 21st Century New York

Non-profits have become an increasingly important set of players in urban housing
politics. They have surpassed both federal and local governments as providers of low- and
moderate-income housing (Bratt 2009, 67) and have largely eclipsed radical political parties and
unincorporated social movements as the predominant voices for housing and planning reform in
New York City. To be sure, public housing in New York is still operational (though RAD
threatens to privatize its management) and independent political movements and radical parties
(or party-like formations) continue to organize around housing, planning, and land use issues.
Non-profits’ status, size, and staff (though meager in comparison to some of the bigger unions),
however, have afforded them a central place in the city’s political life, particularly around the
shape and price of its built environment. The non-profit sector has grown so large across the
country as to warrant an adaptation of Eisenhower’s famous formulation – the “non-profit
industrial complex” (INCITE! 2007) – and Ferguson (2009, 168) has characterized their
international proliferation as “an extraordinary swarm.” Even among those with roots in the
working class – the kind under analysis in this work – the non-profit sector encompasses a
tremendous political range, from workers centers incorporated as non-profits on the left (Fine
2006) to local housing developers with conservative ideologies on the right (Graham 2012, 22).
The greatest number of organizations, and those with the strongest influence in New York City,
tend to be those that exist between these poles, including CDCs with organizing arms and
advocacy organizations that also engage in community organizing.
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Non-profits’ involvement in New York City land use, planning, and development politics
is fundamentally different than that of unions. Though both represent organizational forms of
urban working-class politics, their structures, membership, and missions differ significantly. In
contemporary union politics, land use is ultimately a side issue – an alternative channel through
which to grow or maintain power. For housing non-profits, however, land use issues are
fundamental to their core missions as providers of affordable housing, community organizers,
and advocates for working-class communities. For many non-profits, housing is the biggest
single issue, and planning politics are key to their daily work. Union membership is defined by
where people work, and it is up to a union to inculcate a class (or at least union) consciousness in
their members. In contrast, membership in housing non-profits is generally defined by where one
lives, and draws a voluntary membership of individuals with a shared or overlapping set of
interests, ideologies and commitments to place. Unions aim to affect the city’s landscape in a
way that helps their members secure social reproduction through higher wages and stronger
benefits via their employer. Non-profits aim to secure social reproduction through the direct
provision of housing, or through lobbying and organizing aimed at the state’s regulation and
taxation of housing and property. Whereas unions are fully funded by their members, non-profits
gather their finances from a variety of sources, which may include membership dues or
donations but tend to rely more heavily upon grants from the government (local, state, and
federal) and private foundations, development fees, and – in a few cases – from donations from
unions.101 As a result, housing non-profits maintain a complex set of allegiances: they are
private, non-state actors, but are dependent upon and accountable to the very state actors they
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New York Communities for Change and Make the Road New York are two of the most prominent non-profits to
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though Make the Road has received a good deal of government funding.
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seek to influence; they serve and speak on behalf of a working-class membership or client-base,
but they are also dependent upon and accountable to wealthy donors and development partners.
When pursuing spatial political strategies that align with real estate capitalists and their
state enablers, union leaders can argue that land use and housing are peripheral concerns for their
organizations, and they are compelled to act in what they understand to be their members’ best
interest in relation to their employment. Non-profit leaders can make no such claim: the rules
around what can be built where and the effects of that development on their constituents is a
central part of their work. Non-profits in New York City are therefore far less likely than unions
to support “value neutral growth” (or development for development’s sake) and tend to take
positions that are closer to the goals of tenant and anti-gentrification movements (Wu 2012).
They do not, however, always take stands that are fully or directly oppositional to the real estate
state, and can instead seek compromises aimed at “managing change” (Goldstein 2017, 197) – a
stance that is compatible with unions’ pursuit of “negotiated gentrification” (MacDonald 2017a,
16). In this sense, as Stoecker (1997, 10) argues, their work “remains limited to the possibilities
dictated by capital.” Like unions, non-profits are certainly not the driving force behind the city’s
planned gentrification, but they are structurally limited in their means of opposition. As such,
they can thus help shepherd or provide political cover for plans and policies that accelerate rising
land and housing costs, even while creating opportunities for some members, clients, or
constituents to secure affordable housing.
Building on interviews with current and former non-profit staffers and executives (often
anonymized) as well as the literature on non-profit politics, this chapter focuses on the
circumstances that drive some housing non-profits toward less-than-oppositional relationships
with real estate capital and the real estate state. This account should not be read as discounting
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the times and places where housing non-profits have played important roles in anti-gentrification
campaigns – a circumstance that became increasingly common during the course of this research,
culminating in the 2019 rent law reforms and rezoning challenges in which some housing nonprofits played important roles – but instead as an account of the less triumphant but all-toocommon cases where such oppositional practices were not pursued.

Mismatched Missions
Times have changed for New York City’s housing non-profits. When many of them and
their forebears were established through the Great Society programs of the 1960s and during the
CDC boom of the 1970s and 1980s, the neighborhoods they represented were subject to an
ongoing process of disinvestment. The role of CDCs and other housing non-profits in planning,
land use, and development politics was to compensate for the absence of capital in these spaces
and ultimately to facilitate capital’s return. This orientation reflected the ideology whereby, as
Stoecker (1997, 5) argued, “poor neighborhoods are seen as weak markets requiring
reinvestment rather than as oppressed communities requiring mobilization.” In recent years – in
part thanks to their own activities in maintaining the areas – many of those same neighborhoods
have experienced a tremendous turnaround. Capital has most definitely returned, and now
gentrification threatens the stability and tenure of long-term residents, as well as similarly
situated recent arrivals. According to Fields (2015, 146), “urban community organizations are
not contending with the effects of disinvestment so much as the consequences of opening
‘underserved’ central-city markets to mobile and under-regulated global capital.” As Marwell
(2007, 37) demonstrates through the case of Williamsburg, Brooklyn, non-profits’ success
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“helped draw the growth machine back,” and thus helped create a situation in which “finding
poor people places to live became much harder.”
Many non-profits, however, continue to reproduce their original missions despite the
changing circumstances. In an interview, longtime leader of the Cypress Hills Local
Development Corporation Michelle Neugebauer largely agreed with this analysis, stating that
while there are plenty of exceptions (including her own organization), “the model hasn't
changed, it seems, like in 35 years.” Many non-profits, and particularly CDCs, continue to see
their mission as attracting capital into their neighborhoods, even though the predatory nature of
such investment may be their constituents’ greatest concern. This begs the question Bratt (2009,
72) frames as the “classic people versus place debate”: is the CDC’s “role to rejuvenate an area
or is it to rejuvenate an area with the existing residents as their prime constituents?”
In response to these changing economic circumstances, these non-profits have attempted
to reposition themselves as organizations that manage the flow of capital into hyper-invested
spaces, including through interventions into land use and development politics (Stabrowski 2016,
1124). For some non-profits, making this adjustment was a matter of organizational survival.
According to Goldstein (2017, 285), writing about Harlem CDCs, “Community-based
organizations had once wondered about the feasibility of attracting middle-income residents to
the neighborhood, but now that they had done so, they wondered if they would be able to
manage the rapid change under way and, indeed, maintain the influence they had gained.” Lesley
Fitzsimmons (a pseudonym), a staffer at an affordable housing developer in northern Manhattan
told me their non-profit “started during a period of disinvestment, and tried to use city programs
to fix abandoned buildings. Now that the neighborhood has been rezoned and is quickly
gentrifying, we’re now preserving housing and acquiring properties that are about to deregulate
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and go on the market.” This transition, however, has been a challenging and often contradictory
process. While the organization works to preserve affordable housing in the context of a
controversial rezoning, its Executive Director sat on the steering committee for that
neighborhood’s planning process and enabled the rezoning’s passage.
In this climate, many non-profits take on a more “market-based approach” and put their
resources “toward territorial development programs intended to enhance physical appearance and
support real estate values in hopes of capturing secondary investments by private capital” (Yin
1998, 155). In this way, non-profits can mimic the interests of private real estate firms in order to
stay in the game, but in so doing create conditions that make it harder for them to operate.
Marwell (2007, 94) describes this shift as it played out in Williamsburg as a necessary but
ultimately self-impeding adaptation: “The public interest represented by government takes on a
more private character when the growth machine moves into high gear, and if CBOs are to
protect their own constituents’ interests, they too must become more privately oriented.” In
Harlem, Goldstein (2017) demonstrates how CDCs pushed not only for affordable housing
development and preservation, but also for the cultivation of middle- and upper-class housing
and commercial areas. According to Atlas (2009, 161-162), the leaders of New York City’s
chapter of ACORN believed they “had a responsibility to steer gentrification to benefit poor and
working-class residents” and supported mixed luxury-affordable development as part of a belief
that “expanding the overall number of market-rate and subsidized housing units in the area
would help end the tug-of-war between the poor and the professional class for the existing
housing stock.”
Ironically, as some non-profits come to behave more like for-profits, they undermine
their own position by creating the impression among state actors that non-profits are simply
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smaller and less efficient versions of their for-profit counterparts. According to an interview with
long-time affordable housing developer Ismene Speliotis, the de Blasio administration has
chosen for-profit NYSAFAH members for lucrative and large-scale development deals, while the
non-profits that “have survived and have really done good work, stepped up, taken the most
difficult project with the least developer fees” are shut out of the system. When it comes to
contracts, “the private guys get all the top shelf candy” while “the nonprofits continue to get
these scattered sites, very small projects, with very small developer fees” that are “really hard to
do, and take a long time.”
Marwell and McInerney (2005, 9) frame this as the outcome of a system by which
housing non-profits “sow the seeds of their own destruction by developing innovative solutions
to social needs,” only to be replaced by for-profit companies fulfilling the same functions at a
lower cost and with fewer restrictions. They describe this process through a five-step model.
First, non-profits identify a low-income and disinvested market in which to operate. Second, they
grow, formalize, and establish themselves as voices for the community. Third, as the non-profits
grow and take on more functions, government support shrinks while the cost of land rises – in
part due to the success of the non-profits in drawing capital investment back to the
neighborhood. Fourth, the prices of goods, services and rents rise as a result of gentrification,
which is in turn encouraged by state privatization schemes. Fifth and finally, for-profit firms take
over the role of redeveloping the neighborhood, turning the non-profits into rearguard
preservationist organizations or community brokers (ibid, 9-18). If non-profits first sought to
attract capital, then shifted slightly to manage its flows, they now must maintain a foothold in an
increasingly hostile economic and political climate.
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Securing Jobs, Securing Space
In addition to supporting the return of capital to disinvested spaces, some non-profits
have also come to see increased real estate development as a means to secure two important
needs for their organizations and their constituents: jobs and space.
So-called “workforce development” programs have long been a central part of many
urban non-profits’ missions, going back to the first CDCs and their predecessors in the
Progressive era settlement house movement. With large-scale developments and high-end
businesses moving into working-class neighborhoods, non-profits’ training programs have
become increasingly geared toward landing jobs in construction or, even more commonly,
service jobs in new developments. A few non-profits have repeatedly supported high-end
development schemes on those grounds. For example, two anonymous sources – Community
Board member and non-profit leader Richard Ross (a pseudonym) and settlement house worker
Claudia Hernandez (a pseudonym) – pointed to the example of Urban Upbound, which operates
job training programs based around the public housing developments in western Queens. That
non-profit lobbied in support of the state’s subsidy package for Amazon as well as the
controversial Brooklyn-Queens Connector, a proposed streetcar whose financing would rely on
rising property values and closing rent gaps in waterfront neighborhoods. Many more trainingoriented non-profits have taken far lower-profile positions on development issues. According to
Nancy Tsui (a pseudonym), a staffer at a job training non-profit geared toward public housing
residents in a neighborhood with a great deal of high-end construction activity, these non-profits
aim to secure partnerships with developers during the initial planning stages of a project. While
their leaders and members do not necessarily testify in support of rezonings or development
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schemes, the presence of such deals becomes an important talking point for the developer, helps
secure the support of key politicians, and makes the project more palatable to constituents.
It is important to note, however, that often non-profits cannot guarantee that their clients
will actually receive jobs in the new development. In contrast to union apprentice programs,
which can offer people work on construction sites and teach a potentially lucrative set of skills,
these programs tend to prepare low-income long-term residents for jobs serving wealthy new
arrivers. According to Tsui, the programs are less about the development of a trade and
more about language, presentation – you know, like “teamwork”
and “professionalism” – a lot of which you can't train for, but you
can assist in nurturing out in people. And also a lot of the inhibiting
factors come from poverty, you know, the effect that poverty has on
cognition, diet, nutrition, all these things that can really suppress
someone's ability to be personable, hospitable, service-oriented, and
we do offer a plethora of services that can help people with those
circumstances.
Another source whose organization offers similar non-profit job training programs in a fastgentrifying neighborhood, Carla Hernandez, corroborated in an interview that their employment
targets are non-union service jobs in high-end developments. Reflecting a larger shift in nonprofit activities from activism for job creation to job readiness training (Purser and Hennigan
2018), Tsui insisted that her organization “from the very founding… made the explicit decision
to be operators and not advocates or organizers.”
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Another segment of job training non-profits explicitly seeks to compete with the building
trades’ apprenticeship programs, which have not accepted new members comparable to the
demand, and have an uneven track record in terms of using these programs to address their past
histories of racial exclusion. One such example is Positive Workforce, a construction job training
non-profit run by an East Harlem Community Board member (who does not live in the
district102). As Marina Ortiz, founder of the volunteer organization East Harlem Preservation,
recalled in an interview, during the hearings on the 2017 East Harlem rezoning, Positive
Workforce brought large numbers of clients to demonstrate in support of the land use change and
to counter the voices of protesting building trades’ members. To compete with these operators,
the building trades have tried to be more aggressive in pursuing training programs as part of
PLAs with developers or state agencies, and many of the trades have sought to recruit more
racially diverse apprentices. At NYCHA, for example, the building trades signed a PLA to train
public housing residents doing work in public housing developments, as required by HUD
Section 3 guidelines (Susi 2005). According to Guinn, however, the agreement is quite vague
and only requires that 20 percent of new apprentices doing work in NYCHA be public housing
residents. Barnett characterized many of the jobs residents ultimately land as “drudge work” in
security or clerical positions.
Not all non-profit job trainers have tacitly or enthusiastically supported rezonings and
upscale developments in working-class neighborhoods. Michelle Neugebauer, executive director
of the Cypress Hills Local Development Corporation, said in an interview that her organization
also does job training, but rejects the idea that her neighborhood’s upzoning will create
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District residency is not a requirement of Community Board membership. Members must only have a significant
interest in the district, which can include residency, employment, business ownership, or some other
demonstrable stake.

302

employment opportunities for residents. One of the main job training sectors in which her CDC
operates is transportation, and Neugebauer believes the local bus and paratransit operators who
currently hire her organization’s clients are unlikely to remain in the neighborhood once their
land values rise as a result of the rezoning. As she explained to me, “I just know they're going to
leave because why would you keep parking your minivans and paratransit vans [in East New
York] when you can go to like, I don't know, Rockland County or something? They’ll do the
math, they’ll figure it out, and they'll sell for millions and millions of dollars. It’s real estate.”
Though the city promised that the East New York rezoning would bring job opportunities,
Neugebauer worries that it will in fact cost them.
While some non-profits aim to secure job training opportunities, others are looking for an
increasingly scarce and overpriced necessity for any organization: space. For-profit developers
have courted many non-profits by offering them office or program space in their future
buildings, thus placing non-profits in partnership with the very types of firms responsible for the
shortage of affordable space in the first place. This has become a fairly common tactic,
especially when non-profit developers lose out to for-profits in the actual construction bids. In
the controversial redevelopment of the Bedford Union Armory, which several tenant and labor
organizations wanted to see turned into fully affordable housing built with union labor, the forprofit developer BFC Partners gained the support of several local non-profits by guaranteeing
space in the future largely-luxury development for the Local Development Corporation of Crown
Heights (LDCCH), which in turn would provide space to six smaller community-based
organizations (Sugar 2017). This support helped the developers gain a local base for a project
that was the subject of intensive protest from groups like the Crown Heights Tenants Union, the
Democratic Socialists of America, and several building trades locals. It was later disclosed that
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the director of the LDCCH received direct payment from these kinds of development deals – 10
percent of the non-profit’s annual earnings, plus 20 percent of its developer fees (Anuta 2017).
Similarly, Astoria community board member Richard Ross recalled in his interview a
recent occasion in which a developer sought an upzoning from the city, and the board sought
concessions from the developer in order to add more affordable and family-friendly apartments
to their plan. In a subsequent meeting, the developer returned to the board with the leader of
Urban Upbound, who testified in support of the project because it would include space for his
non-profit. The board member asked Urban Upbound’s director whether he had any connection
to the developer, and he replied that they are “professionally engaged.” The board member then
pulled Urban Upbound’s tax filings and found that not only had they been paid by this smaller
developer, they had received funding from Durst and Alma, the largest luxury developers in that
area.
In the case of both jobs and space, real estate capital and their state supporters have
presented high-end development as the means by which non-profits can access scarce resources.
That very mode of development, however, is directly culpable for the scarcity of both quality
jobs and affordable space: the high-end FIRE economy depends on a large-scale low wage
workforce and seeks to raise rents throughout the city. The very cause of the problem is then
presented as its solution. When non-profits engage with the question of whether to join with a
high-end developer to secure jobs and space in a working-class neighborhood, they face a
dilemma. If they accept this framework, they legitimate the very forces that are pushing down
wages and gentrifying the city; if they reject it, however, they persist in a state of economic and
spatial precarity. Good options are hard to find.
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Structuring and Sweetening the Deals
The state has a prominent and direct role in structuring the circumstances under which
non-profits support privatization projects and upzonings in working-class neighborhoods. Often
non-profit participation in such projects is a precondition set by the state. In large-scale private
development projects on public land, RFPs usually require bidders to include both for-profit and
non-profit entities. These deals are often structured by the city’s EDC, an amalgam of state and
corporate power with a board comprised of a mix of mayoral appointees and appointees of the
private lobbying group the Partnership for New York City. As discussed in the prior chapter,
thanks to 32BJ’s lobbying, almost any EDC project is now required to abide by a labor peace
agreement for permanent employees (i.e. building staff in completed projects) (Goldenberg
2016b). In drawing together state, corporate, union, and non-profit actors, EDC represents a
powerful coalition in support of large-scale private redevelopment.
This formalization of relations between non-profits, commercial developers, and the state
encourages non-profits to participate in schemes they might otherwise oppose in order to give
them an opportunity – real or potential – to play a part in a future project, either as a codeveloper or as a major tenant. This dynamic has a chilling effect on dissent. Not only might
non-profits opt not to protest a particular project because they are bidding to be a force in its
development, but they might think twice about protesting any such projects in order to be seen
by both developers and the state as a reasonable and reliable actor (compared to those movement
or non-profit actors who engage in protest). According to Goldstein (2017, 228), funders and
state actors came to see non-profits as useful in “removing potentially disruptive political
barriers” in order to “smooth the path” toward the completion of controversial plans and projects.
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Returning to the case of the Bedford Union Armory, CAMBA, a Flatbush-based social
service and housing non-profit, initially filled the role of the non-profit partner to the primary
developer, BFC Partners, and is now set to operate the development’s recreation center (Anuta
2017). In the case of Essex Crossing, an enormous development project on a failed urban
renewal site (originally slated for a union cooperative development), Grand Street Settlement
was the non-profit partner that enabled the for-profit L&M Partners, BFC Partners, and Taconic
Investment Partnership to secure the winning development bid (Bagli 2013).103 In both of these
largescale EDC-sponsored developments, a more confrontational coalition of groups organized
not only to oppose the plan, but to present an alternative with far-deeper affordability and greater
community control. By partnering with non-profits in these high-profile projects, the for-profit
developers buttressed the criticisms they receive from more confrontational elements of the nonprofit sector and community-based organizations.
A more complex arrangement has now become commonplace between some CDCs and
for-profit developers, in which the developer secures a tax exemption for a new development
while the CDC secures a lucrative one-time fee. In this procedure, a for-profit developer buys a
piece of land or a building from a third party; they then pay a “nominee fee” to a CDC so that the
non-profit will create a Housing Development Fund Corporation for the building, thus
substantively reducing their tax bill while limiting household incomes for occupants to 165
percent of the Area Median Income. In many neighborhoods, however, the rent for such
households corresponds to (or is even higher than) market rates. The CDC then becomes the
nominal owner of the building; the for-profit entity manages the building and collects the
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In both examples, the for-profit sponsors for these projects (BFC and L&M) are exactly the types of firms the
deBlasio administration has been favoring in contracts over non-profit developers.
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revenue, all the while paying little in taxes. This practice has long been undertaken by the New
York Housing Partnership, a pro-landlord non-profit that is housed inside NYSAFAH’s offices,
but more recently traditional CDCs have played this role in order to raise capital. The Fifth
Avenue Committee (FAC, a south Brooklyn CDC) is among those who have regularly conducted
such financial arrangements with for-profit developers; in fact, the CDC shares a board member
with a common corporate beneficiary of these arrangements, BFC Partners. Many CDC staffers
and leaders might find this kind of deal distasteful, but see few better options to fund their
operations, including their organizing projects.
Whereas structured deals between non-profits, corporate developers and the state are
common for specific redevelopment projects, a more generalized incentivization structure is
practiced in the case of city-initiated rezonings of working-class neighborhoods. During both the
Bloomberg and de Blasio administrations, working-class neighborhoods with large African
American, Asian, and Latino populations were targeted for rezonings that increased those
neighborhoods’ development capacity, raised land values, opened rent gaps, and facilitated the
entry of high-end developers to parts of the city they might otherwise disregard (Angotti and
Morse 2016). In order to encourage non-profits to support such rezonings, both administrations
have added what some organizers call “sweeteners” that make such rezonings easier to support
and harder to oppose, particularly for non-profits that have been calling for public investments in
their areas for years. During an interview with Stephenson – then an organizer at New York
Communities for Change (NYCC), the successor to ACORN in New York City – I asked
whether these kinds of sweeteners incorporated non-profits into city strategies around planning,
development, and gentrification. Echoing the kind of language my informants used to describe
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the relationship between 32BJ and the real estate industry,104 Stephenson responded, “Yes, it’s a
death grip.”
These sweeteners take many forms, including funding for legal services and tenant
counseling in the affected area, and affordable housing contracts for established local non-profits
(Stabrowski 2014 and 2015). When de Blasio pushed his MIH legislation, he both targeted
particular initiatives (such as anti-harassment legal support, published lists of predatory
landlords, and a “certificate of no harassment” process for certain forms of new development) to
rezoned areas, and created a $700 million Neighborhood Development Fund for projects and
programming in upzoned neighborhoods – all of which, it must be reiterated, have been in areas
vulnerable to gentrification. The rezoning of Inwood, for example, was coupled with $200
million worth of incentives, including waterfront parks, improvements to a local school, and a
new library (Mays 2018).105 Several non-profits in Brownsville have supported a potential
rezoning because their leaders have been promised crucial public services that those
organizations have long demanded: improved public transit, green markets, public art, schools,
sanitation, and more.
Mayor Bloomberg was often directly responsible for allocating these kinds of funds.
Using his own billions, the mayor created a philanthropic organization, run by First Deputy
Mayor Patricia Harris, which distributed funds to non-profits. Those groups would then support
– or at least opt not to vocally protest – key elements of his political agenda (Viteritti 2017, 134).
During his first term, Bloomberg donated $600 million to non-profits like Harlem’s Abyssinian
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I refer here to Mendoza’s characterization of 32BJ and REBNY’s “tight embrace” and Florentino’s description of
their “deadly embrace” in their interviews.
105
As Inwood planning activist Michael Raegan (a pseudonym) explained in his interview, this library proposal has
also been protested as a net loss in public space.
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Development Corporation, Washington Heights’ Alianza Dominicana, and the BedfordStuyvesant Restoration Corporation (Moody 2007, 163). This strategy echoed the Koch
administration’s support for non-profits (in the form of city contracts and in rem buildings), but
expanded and formalized it manifold. Current mayor Bill de Blasio has nowhere near the riches
Bloomberg had amassed, but he sought to repeat the former mayor’s political philanthropy. De
Blasio created a non-profit, the Campaign for One New York, which accepted over $4 million in
donations from developers, unions, and city contractors, then provided the seed money for
projects like United for Affordable New York, which brought together unions and non-profits in
support of de Blasio’s rezoning agenda (Viteritti 2017, 191).
The presence of “local preference” rules in development projects, which give
neighborhood residents more favorable chances of being selected for income-targeted units in
otherwise market rate developments, has also encouraged non-profits to support such projects.
Even if the majority of the units added to the neighborhood will be priced well above their
members’, clients’, and constituents’ means, these rules mean that non-profit leaders know that
at least some of the new development will reach those they aim to serve (even if, in the process,
the mode of development negatively affects those not selected for tenancy). Non-profit support
for such developments gives the lottery system by which tenants are selected – a classic
demonstration of neoliberal ideology, in which only those lucky enough to literally win the
lottery get to benefit from corporate largesse – a progressive patina (Cindi Katz 2018, 732).
Like the lottery system, only some of the promised benefits that are supposed to come
with a rezoning are certain to manifest. The Neighborhood Development Fund was allotted $1
billion, the majority of which ($700 million) would be allocated by EDC. In the course of three
years, EDC spent over half of its budget ($362 million) on the city’s first four rezonings – East
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New York, East Harlem, Jerome Avenue, and downtown Far Rockaway (The Real Deal 2018).
The mayor’s plan, however, called for 15 neighborhood rezonings, raising doubts about the
city’s willingness to pay for similar sweeteners in the future (Anuta 2018b). According to Oscar
Alonza (a pseudonym), a staff member at the Bronx CDC Banana Kelley (discussed in greater
detail later in this chapter), many of the sweeteners are weak assurances which may never
manifest. The only real and immediate and verifiable exchange the Department of City Planning
can facilitate, he argued in an interview, is to give non-profits land as a part of a rezoning, “either
from the city, or through eminent domain, or having a community land trust, or some other kind
of development process.” At that point, non-profits can ask themselves and those they represent:
“Is that a tradeoff people are willing to make?”

CBAs: Labor Peace in the Neighborhoods
One way the terms of an agreement between non-profits, unions, developers, and the
local state are formalized is through a Community Benefits Agreement (CBA). For unions, a
CBA can include PLAs or establish neutrality agreements at future developments; for nonprofits, they often include a set number of housing units to be set aside for low- or moderateincome households, and may also include demands around open space, education, transportation,
and public infrastructure. Murtaza Baxamusa (2008, 263), a scholar-practitioner who has
negotiated CBAs through a non-profit connected to the San Diego building trades, characterizes
the potential achievements of a CBA as “economic (employment, financial), social (mandated
hiring of certain groups, affordable housing) or environmental (air quality, open space,
conservation).” While in many other cities, unions have been the predominant voice bargaining
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with developers and the state on behalf of working-class people and their interests, in New York
non-profits have taken a more central role in these negotiations.
In both content and form, CBAs vary widely according to the circumstances of a
development. Wolf-Powers (2012, 218) defines CBAs as “a set of programmatic and material
commitments that a private developer has made to win public support from the residents of a
development area and others claiming a stake in its future.” This is a useful definition because it
describes not only the finished product – the CBA itself – but a key factor that necessitates its
negotiation: developers’ desire for public legitimation. In an interview, Baxamusa presented a
more optimistic view of the CBA as a useful corrective to the narrowness of US land use and
planning systems, which are designed primarily in relation to property owners. CBAs, he argued,
help “turn around the assumptions so that community benefits are the whole purpose of planning,
and everything else – height, color, design etc. – should be secondary…. [CBAs] turn around the
traditional idea of planning, because they assume that traditional planning is not providing
benefits to the community.” Striking a balance between these competing views, Simon Frankel, a
union strategist, told me in an interview that he views the CBA process as “a way to have a fight
about capitalism and development with all the parties at the table, and to extract as much as you
possibly can based on the power you have.” This approach to community development poses the
CBA as a site of struggle, rather than a means to find a mutually beneficial tripartite solution.
The model CBA for many in the United States is the agreement that preceded the 2001
LA Live development. The $2.5 billion downtown development, completed in 2010, included the
Staples Center arena, hotels, luxury condominiums, office towers, a performance venue, a movie
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theater, restaurants, and nightclubs over 27 acres. The agreement, negotiated by five unions106
and 21 resident and religious organizations, brought together over 300 individual residents to
participate (Saito and Truong 2015, 272). The CBA stipulated that 20 percent of the housing
units would be income-targeted, local residents would be hired, and – in a later addition – a land
trust would be created for a portion of the area. Ultimately, in large part due to continuous
monitoring and advocacy from the non-profits and unions, the jobs were created, and the housing
was built; much of the affordable housing, however, was not built on-site because residents no
longer wanted to live in this part of the city given that “the construction of the Staples Center and
L.A. Live erased much of the physical and social structure of their community” (ibid, 273). The
LA Live CBA quickly became a model for New York City politicians and organizers in such
projects as Atlantic Yards (a major mixed use development beside and on top of a Brooklyn rail
yard), Yankee Stadium (a new arena, directly next to the original, built on public park land),
Gateway Center (a mall built at the former Bronx Terminal Market and Bronx House of
Detention sites) and Columbia University (which sought to expand its campus deep into west
Harlem). Bertha Lewis, then director of the New York City chapter of ACORN, called LA’s
agreement “the gold standard” for CBAs, and then-controller John Liu cited it as a model for his
2010 New York City Task Force on Community Benefits Agreements (ibid, 2015, 281).
In the LA Live model, the CBA is a means of “land value capture:” a conceptual
framework for planning mechanisms that – in recognition of the economic value the state creates
for a private owner via increased development capacity, infrastructure, tax incentives, and public
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Saito and Truong (2015, 264) note that none of the five were building trades unions, and situate the CBA in the
context of “a shift in power in the city caused by the ‘geographic fragmentation,’ declining ‘consensus of growth
interests, and the growing political influence of service worker unions, Latinos, and community organizations.” This
shift is documented in Milkman 2006.
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services – extracts some social or public benefit from the developer. This public benefit is then
meant to offset or mitigate some of the development’s negative effects. As Wolf-Powers (2012,
218) describes, “if intensified land development will… cause property values to rise with
negative consequences for renters, a CBA is a mechanism by which affected stakeholders direct
a portion of the publicly created value increment toward mitigation of these effects.” CBAs,
however, are “perhaps the most controversial” value capture mechanism commonly practiced in
US cities today because of the common mismatch between the value ceded to developers versus
the benefits created for communities, as well as the questionable enforceability of CBA
commitments (ibid, 217).
Wolf-Powers’ (2012, 218) definition emphasizes that developers engage in CBA
processes in order to gain the support of crucial segments of the public before initiating what
could otherwise be a contentious public review process. While the promised benefits will
ultimately cost the developer a share of their future profits, “a faster approval process with
community groups as allies rather than opponents [makes] developers see CBAs as an acceptable
trade-off and a cost of doing business” (Saito and Truong 2015, 280). In an interview, Baxamusa
likened this to the “no-strike clauses” that have become standard in US union contracts, and
assure employers that workers will not strike during the course of a contract.
It is a give – the community has to sacrifice its ability to protest. It’s
similar to what we consider to be a no-strike clause, because you do
not want disruption to occur because the contractor has agreed to
sign a contract with you, and if there is a dispute there are other
alternative means to address that dispute rather than what would
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normally occur. It creates a sense of balance and harmony, and the
developer has an incentive to negotiate with you.
A CBA, then, is a means not only to extract goods from the developer but to pacify the
neighborhood: to contractually tie signatories (including non-profits and unions) to a
development project, and to remove the threat of disruptive action – the means by which poor
people have historically wielded their social power to the greatest effect (Piven and Cloward
1977). In so doing, the CBA “does not simply limit the probability that a project will be scuttled,
but it also cements the support of crucial elected officials, burnishes the reputation and ‘brand’ of
the developer, and makes it more likely that local residents will patronize the development…. All
these things can be extremely valuable to developers” (Wolf-Powers 2012, 220).
The value for the “community” comes in multiple forms. The clearest among them are
the agreed-upon “benefits” in a CBA, including most commonly some number of jobs and
income-targeted housing units. Many non-profits and unions, particularly in New York City, will
come to these negotiations assuming that the development will most likely go forward with or
without their support, and therefore see signing a CBA as a way to get something out of a
development that will otherwise yield nothing, and may be understood to be harmful to
members, clients, or constituents. Other non-profits and unions may support growth generally in
the form of real estate development as a means to create jobs, tax revenue, and local investment,
and thus see the CBA as a means to get more out of a development they would already support.
Additionally, the CBA process requires that “the community” be defined as a group of
signatories, who are sometimes brought together as a brand new Local Development Corporation
(or another non-profit form). This can elevate certain groups and individuals into spokespeople
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for a given geography (and in some cases a racially and/or religiously defined population) and
thus – in Baxamusa’s (2008, 271) terms – move them “from pawns to power brokers.”
There are numerous critiques of the CBA framework from across the political spectrum.
A CBA can serve the narrow interests of the signatories, rather than producing genuine
community-wide benefits (Been 2010). It can also turn projects that should be protested into
projects that are celebrated. In such cases, “even if value is captured in a CBA, it may be value
produced at an unacceptably high cost to the public” (Wolf-Powers 2012, 219). While Baxamusa
argued in an interview that union and non-profit partnerships can build the power necessary to
kill projects they do not wholeheartedly endorse, this power – or at least this will to use that
power in an oppositional manner – has not commonly been manifested in New York City CBA
negotiations.
Given that this more confrontational mode of CBA negotiations has not been commonly
used in New York, the effect has been to draw non-profits and unions into a growth regime
premised on intensifying real estate development. As Saito and Truong (2015, 266) demonstrate,
non-profits and unions “have joined both sides of the development struggle, supporting major
projects and exchange values while advocating for redistributional policies and use values.”
Much in the same way unions have taken on the mantle of “job creators” in land use politics
(MacDonald 2017a, 12), non-profits here have taken on the position of profit creators in order to
channel some of the private surplus toward securing their members’ social reproduction (WolfPowers 2012, 220). An adversarial relationship becomes a partnership, and the community’s
power is channeled into aiding real estate capital as a means toward aiding itself (Saito and
Truong 2015, 283).

315

Perhaps the highest profile CBA in New York City thus far has been the one developed
for Atlantic Yards (now Pacific Park), a sprawling Bloomberg-era megadevelopment in an area
that connects Fort Greene, Prospect Heights, and Park Slope. Centered around an arena sited
over a train yard, the 22-acre project includes several residential and commercial high rises,
which, according to initial projections (since revised multiple times), would include 600,000
square feet of office space, 230,000 square feet of retail, and 4,500 units of housing (Larson
2013, 38-39). It would involve state condemnation of 70 buildings on six blocks, displacing
around 1,000 people (Atlas 2009, 154). The fight over Atlantic Yards was one of the most
contentious and convoluted development debates of the day in New York City, but the developer
– Forest City Ratner – had on their side not only several union supporters, but one of the city’s
most powerful non-profit organizing groups: ACORN.
According to an oft-cited account by Atlas (2009, 155), New York City’s ACORN
chapter leader Bertha Lewis was at first skeptical of the development, viewing it as yet another
gentrification scheme. As the Atlantic Yards/Pacific Park muckraker Norman Oder (2010) has
pointed out, however, Lewis stood alongside Ratner from the project’s very first press
conference in December 2003. ACORN had previously protested Ratner’s wage and hiring
policies at the neighboring Atlantic Center Mall and had won a set of concessions. According to
Atlas (2009, 160), Lewis “knew [Ratner] was tough but reasonable and that he might be willing
to negotiate. Ratner knew ACORN could be a serious barrier if it opposed Atlantic Yards, and
Lewis knew that partnering with ACORN was not a stretch for Ratner; he would understand the
benefits.” Ratner did not need help securing initial government permits – to much local
consternation, the developer managed to bypass the city’s planning process by working through
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the state’s Empire State Development Corporation – but rather in securing funding from the state
legislature and building up popular support for the project.
ACORN viewed Atlantic Yards as both a threat and an opportunity: it could hurt their
Brooklyn members, but it could also be a major opportunity for large-scale and high-profile
development (Atlas 2009, 157). In exchange for their support, ACORN demanded that half of
the new housing be income-targeted along a sliding scale. Ratner acceded to the demand, though
the income targets for the development skewed quite high: while about 20 percent of the
apartments would be set-aside for low-income households (in line with the city’s thenpredominant 80/20 framework), the rest would be reserved for higher income households,
including two bedroom apartments set to rent for $3,000 to households making over $138,000
(Oder 2014).
The arrangement was finalized through a CBA that brought together eight community
organizations (Saito and Truong 2015, 281). Critics of the deal argued that those organizations
“stood to gain handsomely from the developer’s largesse, while excluding groups pushing for
modifications to the project plan, including revisions to a subsidy package that independent
analysts viewed as revenue negative for the public sector” (Wolf-Powers 2012, 219). Making
matters worse, several of the groups seemed to be created for the express purpose of joining the
CBA. Only two of the eight organizations – ACORN and New York State Association of
Minority Contractors – were incorporated prior to the CBA (Atlas 2009, 169). One organization,
Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD) was created to run job training
programs, though none of the organizations’ officers had any such experience (Moody 2007,
236). According to Atlas, “BUILD had no membership income for 2004 and only $10,000 in
revenues. For 2005, however, the group suddenly reported a whopping increase in its budget to
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$2.5 million, and another $2.5 million for 2006,” most of which came directly from the
developer (ibid, 168). Moody (2007, 236) notes that as a result of negative press coverage the $5
million never materialized, but the group still received $10,000, free space and equipment from
Ratner.
In an interview, Speliotis – whose organization, MHANY, was linked to ACORN –
defended ACORN’s participation in the CBA and support for the project, arguing along
traditional planning grounds that transit-rich corridors should be upzoned for more intensive
development. As she told me, “you want more townhouses on Atlantic Avenue and Flatbush? I
mean, that's just stupid. And so what happens is your opposition is so short-sighted or whatever,
or parochial, let's say, that it ends up making the developer look better.” While insisting ACORN
did not get any money from Ratner (though the group is reported to have received $1.5 million in
loans from the developer during the organization’s 2008 crisis [Rutenberg 2009]), Speliotis
acknowledged that others received the developer’s support while challenging the notion that they
were necessarily compromised by doing so. “You can take money and still be principled. [But]
it’s harder – especially if you didn’t exist and now you exist.”
When the deal was signed, Lewis famously kissed Mayor Bloomberg in excitement,
creating an indelible image that would serve to both bolster the mayor’s image as a populist
rather than a plutocrat, and to sully ACORN’s reputation as an independent power and popular
representative. Along with the building trades, ACORN then “financed busloads of supporters to
disrupt” the community input portions of the project’s Environmental Impact Statement hearings,
and helped shepherd the project toward its final approval (Angotti 2008, 219). Once the CBA
was complete and the project had been approved, however, the developer scaled back
substantially on its key promises. After the 2008 financial crisis, Ratner switched part of the
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project from on-site construction to off-site pre-fabrication, reducing costs by 20 percent through
both a reduction in the number of jobs and in the amount paid to each worker (Sorkin 2018, 98).
They also scaled back significantly on their housing promises. According to Angotti (2008, 219),
shortly after the CBA was signed Ratner added market-rate condominiums to the project and
“reduced the proportion of affordable housing to around 31 percent, with less than half of that
going to low-income tenants (the program was structured in such a way that only 14 percent of
all units would be affordable to those making less than the median income for Brooklyn.)” In
recent years, as the affordable units have become available for rent, the lower-income units have
seen a surge in demand, while those targeted for higher-income residents have been difficult to
fill since people in those income brackets can often find market-rate apartments that cost less
than 30 percent of their income per month (Smith 2017). As has often been the case in New York
City, the Atlantic Yards CBA was strong enough to gain and retain the support of one of the
city’s most powerful non-profits, but not strong enough to ensure that the developer would
deliver on their promises.

Participation and Legitimation
In addition to the material gains that incentivize non-profits to side with developers on
land use issues – neighborhood reinvestment, RFP-structured developer deals, spaces in which to
operate, jobs and job training programs, CBA-backed housing and wage commitments, and more
– there is a subtler set of political pressures that influence non-profits’ planning politics. These
political considerations are not divorced from material considerations, but rather are the
pathways by which non-profits secure the material gains of real estate growth. In order to remain
in the good graces of those state actors, funders, and developers who can select organizations to
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be the beneficiaries of new developments, non-profits participate in consensus-driven and
negotiated (rather than contentious and oppositional) land use politics. While these participatory
processes originated as a response to urban social movements’ organizing and protest against
urban renewal and other forms of authoritarian spatial politics, participation in these processes
today can be extremely valuable to the politicians and developers who initiate them, in that they
signify community engagement in the process and thus help legitimate the validity of the
outcome. None of this is necessarily functionalist in operation or intentional in design – no one
forces non-profit leaders to enact these politics, and their participation in no way guarantees that
they will reap material benefits from future intensified development – but the dynamics often
play out such that even non-profits’ measured criticism of pro-real estate land use changes
reinforce both the real estate state itself and the actors responsible for its reproduction.
Though situated in Cleveland, McQuarrie’s research provides some of the clearest
theoretical explanations for this phenomenon as it plays out in New York City. Discussing that
city’s community-based organizations’ failure to deliver on promises to bring affordable housing
and good jobs to the city’s neighborhoods, McQuarrie (2013, 145) asks, “What is the legitimacy
of CBOs based on if not programmatic effectiveness? The answer, in brief, is that they underpin
the authority of urban elites when promises of growth are understood to be empty.” In New York
City today it is not the promise of growth itself that is “understood to be empty,” but rather it is
the promise that such growth is widely beneficial that could be called into question. McQuarry
continues, “In this context, CBOs facilitate elite authority, based not on their programmatic
effectiveness but on their claim to effectively represent the city’s neighborhoods. From this
perspective, what matters is that the organizations are participatory and that they are organized
at the scale of the community or neighborhood” (emphasis in the original). Much of this push to
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participate, McQuarry argues, came less from the residents themselves than from funders who
had become frustrated with CDCs’ technocratic turn: a highly managerial CDC, they found,
could no longer persuasively represent community interests in political processes, and thus
served little use to political elites seeking local validation for their growth agendas; a highly
confrontational community-based organization would pose an equal and opposite problem, in
that it would create a counterforce against their planning program. The solution to this dilemma
for funders was to promote “consensus organizing,” which shies away from “formal mechanisms
of representation that can hold decision makers accountable” (presumably electoral politics) and
“requires accepting normative standards of civility that trump the use of power or contention to
secure goals” (ibid, 163). This makes consensus-driven non-profits highly valuable to funders,
developers, and politicians, demonstrating that “Participation is no longer a threat to elites; it is a
resource” (McQuarrie 2013, 169).
Marwell takes a similar approach to her case studies of non-profits in northwest
Brooklyn, where many of the organizations she profiles engage in some form of performative
participation in planning politics. For these groups, participation
serves as a means to an organizational end: mustering the
bureaucratic clout necessary to shift the arrangements of the
economic and political fields in which these organizations operate.
The individually held products of interpersonal interactions within
the community, then, are not these CBOs’ main concern: rather, they
are interested in how resident participation creates a resource that
the organization can deploy within relevant fields of action
(Marwell 2007, 188).
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Demonstrating their ability to summon large numbers of residents into a political process allows
non-profits to distinguish themselves within their field. This has become a competitive advantage
for some non-profits, like the immigrants’ rights group Make the Road New York (Make the
Road), which can be counted upon to bring more members to actions and hearings than nearly
any other New York City non-profit. Their model, in fact, is premised on participation: in order
to access such services as legal aid and English-language courses, members must first meet with
an organizer who encourages them to attend the organization’s meetings and events (McAlevey
2014, 184).
Once non-profits take on this role, however, their participation can be mobilized toward
ends the organizations might otherwise oppose. In the case of the 2017 East Harlem rezoning, for
example, City Councilmember and Council Speaker Melissa Mark Viverito – a former 1199
organizer – sought to summon the participation of all neighborhood “stakeholders” in the
creation of a community plan, upon which the Department of City Planning (DCP) could act.
Among the active participants was Community Voices Heard (CVH), a neighborhood-based but
regionally focused non-profit that focuses on welfare rights, public housing organizing,
environmental justice, and participatory budgeting. CVH had received a great deal of funding
from Viverito in the past, and was asked to serve as co-facilitator of the steering committee of
the planning group. The group put together a consensus-oriented plan for increasing density via a
moderate inclusionary upzoning; DCP then returned with a rezoning proposal that looked little
like the plan CVH had endorsed. CVH then reversed course and opposed the rezoning, standing
with grassroots groups like Movimiento por Justicia en el Barrio and against other members of
the original planning group – including most prominently 32BJ (Savitch-Lew 2017). In many
ways, however, it was too late: once the ULURP process began with the Councilmembers’
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blessing, there was little chance the city’s rezoning would not pass. CVH had thus helped
legitimize Viverito’s rezoning process, even if they ultimately opposed its outcome. According
to Marina Ortiz, a long-time radical activist and former East Harlem Community Board Member,
participating in these processes in the past was “a huge waste of time, blood, sweat, and tears”
that forced organizers to run around “like rats in a maze.” “They treat us like children, or lab rats,
and it’s fucking racist.”

Retooling the Machine
Participation alone is not the key to non-profits’ influence; as with unions, non-profits’
participation is most meaningful to state actors when they can demonstrate their ability to
translate participation into votes. The way they do so, however, is much more complex than
unions, which commonly form Political Action Committees for that expressed purpose. Some
non-profits, like Make the Road and Tenants & Neighbors, have explicitly political offshoots,
incorporated under the tax code as 501c4 rather than 501c3 organizations, and can conduct
lobbying or endorsements through that partner organization. Non-profits organized solely as
501c3s, however, must manage to conduct similar operations through more circumspect means.
According to Marwell (2007, 111), “CBOs can engage in a more complicated, and
technically illegal, exchange of resources for votes – a three-way, indirect transaction involving
not just the CBO and the client/voter, but also the elected official.” One of Marwell’s primary
case studies is the Ridgewood-Bushwick Senior Citizen Council (often abbreviated to
Ridgewood-Bushwick, and now renamed RiseBoro). Though perhaps an extreme case, in that it
was founded by and remained extremely close to Brooklyn Democratic party boss, state
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Assembly member, and longtime Assembly Housing Committee chair Vito Lopez, RidgewoodBushwick demonstrates how non-profits can become political operations, and thus secure public
funding by proving their value to the state actors controlling parts of the budgetary apparatus.
Marwell (2007, 97) calls this “a private politics of distribution” (emphasis in the
original): the non-profit seeks government funds and contracts by demonstrating to state actors
that they can turn their clients into reliable voters or campaign volunteers, and thus secures for
their clients a higher level of services than other groups might be able to access. In order to
secure this kind of participation, the non-profit has to inculcate in its clients (or, in other cases,
members) that they are expected to participate in specific actions in exchange for the services
they consume. The organization must ensure that both staff and clients understand that positive
political relationships are the key to continued operations, and that elected officials, their staff,
and their appointees are convinced that the non-profit can deliver its clients’ votes (ibid, 118). In
order to maintain those assurances, the non-profit engages in three activities: 1) educating its
members as to the details of contract allocation; 2) bringing their members to attend and
participate in decision-makers’ hearings and events; and 3) mobilizing clients as voters in local
elections on behalf of incumbents (ibid, 119). Ridgewood-Bushwick perfected this complex
practice, but many other non-profits have adopted and adapted it to their own needs.
This complex program reproduces much of the work that was commonly performed by
New York City’s Democratic political machine during its 19th and early 20th century zenith
(Stabrowski 2015, 1124). Such machines never disappeared – in fact, Vito Lopez was an
exemplary machine operative and leader – but they have waned in power after successive rounds
of reform and insurgent elections have limited (if never eliminated) their ability to control
political offices, offer patronage jobs, and grant loyalists special privileges. As machine control
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has diminished, however, non-profit contracting has increased, and with it non-profits’ power to
offer material benefits (including food and shelter), social services (like legal aid and
immigration counseling), and – for the bigger non-profits – jobs (in the form of staff positions).
In low-income neighborhoods, non-profits “are structurally positioned to reprise the role of the
political machine” (Marwell 2007, 112).
As Piven and Cloward made clear, one of the Great Society’s missions was to establish
non-profits as ways to engage the participation and provide services to those urban actors the
machine refused to incorporate: working-class African Americans, Latinos, and Asians. Through
non-profits, the national Democratic party sought to retain power in urban areas that were
experiencing political crises of legitimation. “Through both neighborhood and citywide
structures, in other words, the national administration revived the traditional process of urban
politics: offering jobs and services to build party loyalty” (Piven and Cloward 1971, 260-261).
Years later, this process has evolved, but endures. Its endurance, however, continues to limit the
spectrum of political practices and possibilities. Writing about unions in relation to classic
machine politics, Katznelson (1981, 114) offers that “the machines, for workers, were ‘us,’ yet
the machine also limited the content of ‘us’” through its rewarding of exclusivity. Marwell points
to a corollary process for contemporary non-profits, in which “clients may develop a narrow
interest in the fortunes of the organization itself, rather than those of the wider neighborhood or
the city as a whole, or even a notion of the public good” (Marwell 2007, 118). When non-profits
offer patronage in exchange for participation, they inculcate a loyalty to one particular
organization, rather than a more expansive solidarity or political consciousness.

CDCs and Land Use Politics
325

CDCs remain the predominant form of non-profit organization engaged in US urban
housing politics. In New York City, not only are CDCs plentiful in and of themselves, but many
of the most active organizing and advocacy non-profits that engage in land use, planning,
development, and housing politics are themselves offshoots of CDCs: in the Bronx, Community
Action for Safe Apartments (CASA) is connected to New Settlement Apartments; in Brooklyn,
the Flatbush Tenants Council grew out of the Flatbush Development Corporation. As discussed
earlier, CDCs are a contradictory form: as both developers, owners, and managers of housing
and as sponsors of community organizing projects, they often must prioritize the former mission
above the latter; as institutions financed by wealthy foundations and the state, the parameters of
their political engagement can be imposed by their patrons. As Stoecker (1997, 4) insists in his
famous critique of CDC political culture, the primary problem is not bad choices or corruption
among CDC leaders, but rather the system they are tasked with upholding: “It is not the CDCs,
but the model we hold up for CDCs to meet and the US political economy that are the
problems.”
According to DeFilippis (2004, 43-46), CDCs’ original ideology centered around a
combination of three tendencies: Black power/Black capitalism; direct democracy/neighborhood
government; and coops/communes/collectives. Over the years, that ideology was revised to
converge around a “neoliberal communitarianism” comprised of three other tendencies: a market
orientation; an aversion to confrontation; and an assumption of shared interests within a defined
community (ibid, 55). These contemporary tendencies are not total departures from the original
principles, but instead represent a swing toward the original’s conservative pole, and arguably
the completion of a long project of urban pacification. In one of his most critical passages,
DeFilippis’ (ibid, 55) argues that
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The political logic of CDCs in American politics has therefore come
full circle. The federal government, which initiated the movement
for community development by sponsoring often radical political
organizations

working

toward

community

control

and

empowerment, now supports CDCs exactly because they are no
longer connected to any radical political movement. And the goals
of CDCs have also come full circle. Initially conceived as vehicles
that would use the market as a means to the end of community
empowerment and control, they have now become vehicles for the
market, in which the goal of community control is not even an issue.
CDCs are in the position of reproducing some of the very conditions they were initially imagined
to confront: in their original construction, CDCs were formed in neighborhoods that were
systematically excluded by urban political machines, which had resulted in housing crises and
urban renewal displacement; in their contemporary form, CDCs’ political incorporation can
hinder them from fully confronting contemporary housing crises, leaving the same populations
subject to displacement via gentrification and other processes of dispossession.
The Bronx’s Banana Kelly presents a telling case study of CDCs’ limitations in
challenging the real estate state. Banana Kelly is a south Bronx CDC that takes its name from the
curvy street on which the group did some of their first work reclaiming landlord-abandoned
buildings and converting them into permanently affordable housing. They were a major force in
pushing back against capital’s active disinvestment and the state’s “planned shrinkage” of
services from the Bronx, and the over time the organization grew in size and stature to become a
broader political voice and social service provider. In recent years, the CDC expanded its
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emphasis on organizing, hiring new staff, establishing a new office, setting up tenant
associations, taking landlords to court, pushing for pro-tenant legislation, and joining in coalition
with both more conservative groups (like Women’s Housing and Economic Development
Corporation) and more radical groups (like the grassroots Take Back the Bronx) around
impending rezoning actions. In an interview, Banana Kelly’s former director of organizing, Anna
Burnham, stated that between 2015 and 2017, the organizing staff grew by close to 500 percent,
and their annual budget increased from $60,000 to $250,0000. With that growth, Banana Kelly’s
organizing arm became more independent of its property management arm. In Burnham’s telling,
the organizing department “had gotten to the point where we were physically separated from the
main Banana Kelly landlord development office, and growing and doing our own thing.”
At the same time as Banana Kelly’s organizing branch was expanding, real estate in the
south Bronx was heating up, and other non-profits were taking a less confrontational stance
toward new luxury development. Keith Rubenstein of Somerset Partners had recently thrown a
“Bronx Is Burning” themed party on the site of a future south Bronx luxury development. The
infamous gathering attracted not only investors, landlords, and celebrities to toast the
neighborhood’s future gentrification by mocking its painful past, but also the staff of some local
non-profits, like the South Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation (Solomont 2015).
Meanwhile, as de Blasio’s MIH initiative was moving toward a vote, Councilmember Carmen
Arroyo retired and the Bronx Democratic machine selected Raphael Salamanca to replace her.
Banana Kelly opposed MIH to the end – even as the vast majority of non-profits came to support
it – and Burnham urged Salamanca to either vote against the bill or abstain from voting.
Salamanca was incredulous, and called Banana Kelly’s longtime director, Harry DeRienzo, to
complain. Soon thereafter, the Department of City Planning began a study of Southern
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Boulevard, the first step in an eventual city-initiated upzoning. Banana Kelly’s organizers
responded with what Burnham characterized in her interview as “aggressive education and
outreach campaigns, and being an adversarial body in spaces with DCP.”
During non-work hours, Burnham and other Banana Kelly organizers briefly attended a
protest against the Southern Boulevard rezoning study, which was organized by several other
Bronx organizations without Banana Kelly’s participation. Salamanca sent a staffer to
photograph the protest and captured a moment in which Burnham was standing a few feet in
front of a sign calling Salamanca the “New Pimp on the Block” (Olumhense 2019). Salamanca
then sent that photo to DeRienzo, and threatened to pull his financial support for the organization
if they did not remove the organizers and cease protests against him and the potential rezoning.
DeRienzo responded by sending an email to the Banana Kelly board of directors, reporting that
“Councilmember Salamanca is actively threatening not only to stop support and oppose any
future projects/funding but told Hope Burgess [then a supervisor, now CEO] today that he
actively [sic] seeking to rescind his approval of the $90,000 he approved for Banana Kelly as
part of the Stabilizing NYC Program,” a pot of public funds administered by HPD but requiring
Council approval. Burnham explained to me that Banana Kelly also depends on support from
their City Council representatives in other ways, including opportunities to take over the
ownership and management of substandard buildings. As DeRienzo made clear in the email,
“Losing funding from one source can have a cascading impact on other current and potential
sources. This is especially true if the Councilmember is actively intervening with HPD and the
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Mayor’s Office of Contracts to take something away or stop something [c]oming to us”
(Olumhense 2019).107
After some back and forth, in which tensions between the organizers and the leaders and
board intensified, the board of directors voted to fire Burnham and another organizer, and place
on probation a third who would subsequently quit in protest (Olumhense 2019). Banana Kelly’s
stated reason for firing the organizers was that “The board demanded changes in our organizing
department based upon their determination that our organizing staff took advocacy positions and
led campaigns that did not include [Banana Kelly] resident Council leaders” (ibid.). In an
interview with a current Banana Kelly staffer, a similar line was repeated: the board is controlled
by the community, and the community decided they could not countenance an organizing staff
who took aggressive positions around planning and development issues of interest to a key
Councilmember. Banana Kelly thus frames the organizers’ firing an expression of community
control, rather than its opposite: an inability to part with the development agenda of key Council
members and their allies in real estate.
In her interview, Burnham posited a different interpretation of the board’s partial
composition as members of Banana Kelly and residents of housing they manage. Noting that the
CDC has a separate board from the organizing board, Burnham explained:
So there was gonna come a time when protecting the interests of
Banana Kelly were in direct conflict of the organizing department,
because we were fighting a rezoning campaign, and if you peeped
right around when this was happening, de Blasio was announcing
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Councilmember Salamanca denies making this threat, but Banana Kelly has confirmed that DeRienzo sent the
email to the board conveying this allegation (Olumhense 2019).
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all this new money for nonprofit developers through rezonings. So,
if people are gonna operate in their interests of protecting the
nonprofit CDC, and protecting their own personal social location in
that they were Banana Kelly tenants, largely protected,
comparatively, by any rezoning or by any forces of gentrification,
then those interests don't exactly align with the interests of the
campaign that we were running.

Ultimately, Burnham argued that the CDC board felt it was losing control over the group’s
organizing project, which was entering into coalitions with other organizations and presenting an
oppositional stance toward the potential rezoning.

So, I don't think that you can nuke your organizing department
unless there was a serious conflict of interest between where the
CDC was and where the organizing department was. They were not
meshing. And where I made a mistake is that I just let that happen.
I was like, "I'm not gonna try and build processes or create
protections, or try to renovate bylaws." I didn't spend any time doing
that, because I was like, naively, "We are succeeding. We are
growing. And no one can touch us." I never, ever thought that they
would do this. Literally, I'm still shocked by it. This is literally the
craziest thing I've ever seen in my life. So, that foundation was there.
The instability was there. And then, the spotlight on the Southern
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Boulevard rezoning, and [the coalition] growing, and including so
many other people, that people that were used to having so much
control over what Banana Kelly did and what the organizing did,
realized pretty quickly that we are getting dragged into fights – in
their mind. I don't think we were dragged into fights, but we were
getting pulled in directions that we actually can't control, because
we have other people in this coalition we're working with, that sit to
the left of us, or sit to the right of us, or wherever they sit, and we
can't tell them what to do. And that idea is really scary for people,
and it takes some trust in the process to let that happen.
Though the Banana Kelly board and leadership fired its organizers to secure funding and
political relationships, their actions – which shocked many in the housing world but were
defended by the organization’s closest non-profit partners – may have jeopardized both. At least
one foundation that was ready to back their organizing work around the Southern Boulevard
Rezoning opted not to fund the group. The group’s tenant organizing work has plateaued, and
Banana Kelly was absent from the expansive Housing Justice For All coalition that formed to
fight for universal rent control in 2019. Perhaps most ironic of all, the group must now be careful
to avoid the appearance of closeness to Councilmember Salamanca, particularly after a second
controversy erupted when Banana Kelly evicted a radical space (the Bronx Social Center) they
had long allowed to operate in the basement of one of their buildings after Salamanca allegedly
complained (Olumhense 2019). Ultimately, years later, Salamanca blocked the proposed
Southern Boulevard rezoning, largely in response to ongoing local protests (Salamanca 2020).
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Banana Kelly is generally one of the more activist-oriented CDCs in operation in New
York City today, and yet the pressure from a councilmember and the threatened loss of funding
and development opportunities – coupled with a successful framing of the organizing department
as outside the mission and scope of the CDCs core work – put the organization in the position of
enforcing the state’s pro-real estate agenda on its own staff. These kinds of pressures from
councilmembers, as well as from the mayor and from city agencies, make an oppositional
planning politics challenging for CDCs to embrace. As Michael Higgins Jr., an organizer for
Families United for Racial and Economic Equality (FUREE) explained to me, the CDC that
backs his project must retain close ties with the city’s Department of Housing Preservation and
Development in order to remain operational. “If you are an organization in that type of space you
really can't be that radical because you might risk undermining your fundamental mission.”
For many CDCs, the turn toward pro-real estate land use politics is an outgrowth of
CDCs’ strange status in the interstices of the public and private land and housing markets. As
Bratt (2009, 68) theorizes, CDCs simultaneously operate both inside and outside the logic of the
private land and housing market. They acquire land at low or no cost, but often must do so
through partnerships with for-profit entities whose profits derive in part from rising urban land
values. They obtain equity through the public LIHTC system, but those funds are generated from
payments from corporate actors (including most prominently investment banks and real estate
firms). They build for those who cannot afford market-rate housing, but can sell their properties
after the time-bound affordability restrictions lapse.
In overheated markets like New York City’s, CDCs face particular challenges, which can
often be resolved through partnering with elements of capital and the state in projects the CDCs
might otherwise reject. The biggest challenge is acquiring land and buildings when costs have
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been inflated. In such cases, any new source of land is scoured as a source of development. In an
interview, CDFI staffer Santos told me that his organization is encouraging church- and
healthcare-based organizations to pursue new development on whatever parcels they own.
Community gardens are similarly viewed as underutilized land that could be improved through
development (Martinez 2010). For-profit developers who might otherwise be treated as
adversaries are seen as partners in securing land for new developments, including public land in
the process of alienation (Bratt 2009, 72). CDCs are increasingly selling off sites they were
entrusted to protect in order to secure funding. For example, the Abyssinian Development
Corporation, a church-based CDC in Harlem, recently sold a 125th Street lot to the luxury
developer Extell. That site contained a large Pathmark supermarket, which the CDC had
previously spent years campaigning to bring to the neighborhood in order to end its status as a
“food desert” (Wolf-Powers 2017). Similarly, Abyssinian recently sold the “Renaissance Theater
and Casino,” a historically significant space that the CDC was entrusted to preserve (McGruder
and Johnson 2015).
Speliotis reflected on this kind of “survival mechanism” during her interview:
So the nonprofits are no different: they have a business and they
want to stay alive. And so they make some bad decisions or some
short-term decisions, and enter into deals that neither on their face
nor behind are good ideas, but they do them for – you know, and
again, I'm not I'm not criticizing, I mean, I might criticize them, but
I mean, I'm just saying: people do what they need to do. And it's
hard in this marketplace to stay principled.
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Over the course of our 42-minute conversation, Speliotis referred to non-profit property
management as a business seven times. This is by no means a criticism; she is entirely correct
that non-profits in a capitalist market have to behave at least somewhat like capitalist firms in
order to remain operational. But when CDCs hold such a large share of a city’s housing
organizing culture, they force political movements to operate under the constraints of capitalist
microeconomics.
These tensions are made worse by public policy that hastens the marketization of nonprofit housing. Much of the housing that CDCs develop – including anything built with LIHTC –
has an affordability expiration date, after which the housing will revert to market rents unless
another source of subsidy is secured. When subsidies and regulatory agreements expire, nonprofits in hot markets face a choice: they can organize to secure new subsidies, or they can sell
their properties for a windfall. Some follow the latter as a path of last resort, while others leap at
the opportunity. According to Fitzsimmons in an interview, many of the city’s low-income
senior developments receiving HUD 202 subsidies are coming up against 15- and 20-year
subsidy agreements, and there is little being done to preserve them. Neugebauer explained to me
in an interview that groups will sometimes retain one or two buildings with good cash flow, but
sell the rest and switch to other kinds of work, such as job training or social service provision.
This trend, Neugebauer continued, is the direct result of a long-term disinvestment from CDCs
under Mayor Bloomberg, as well as an increasing difficulty in attracting trained professionals
and planning graduates to work for relatively low pay in CDCs. Neugebauer related that she
regularly gets calls from real estate companies offering millions of dollars to purchase the
portions of her CDC’s portfolio in the recently rezoned portion of East New York. While her
organization, Cypress Hills LDC, has neither the desire nor legal ability to marketize their
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properties, other CDCs have moved swiftly in this direction. In recent years, according to an
interview with Santos, both Abyssinian Development Corporation and Bedford Stuyvesent
Restoration Corporation have sold off several properties whose 15-year LIHTCs had expired.
One CDC in particular, Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE), demonstrates how deeply
an organization can slide: in this case from cadre organization to capitalist operator. As such,
AAFE represents one of the most extreme transformations of any New York City non-profit.108
The group’s roots are in a small campus-based political organization, which then became a “back
to the community” service-oriented group based in Chinatown. They took on a revolutionary
Marxist-Leninist ideology and operated first as the Asian Study Group, then Workers’ Viewpoint
Organization, and finally allied with the Communist Workers Party. In 1974 they created Asian
Americans for Equal Employment as a popular “serve the people” front, whose first major public
project was to protest the exclusion of Asian workers from a Chinatown Mitchell Lama
development known as Confucius Plaza. After some intense confrontations they persevered, and
the developer agreed to hire a minimum number of Asian construction workers. This victory
gave the group some popular legitimacy, which they then put toward protesting anti-Asian police
violence (Kwong and Miščevič, 2005, 294-295). In 1976 the group changed its name to Asian
Americans For Equality in order to broaden its mission and appeal, but its leadership retained
tight “party control” and expelled more than two dozen members accused of holding less-thanrevolutionary politics (ibid, 296).
In 1979, the Communist Workers Party – under the leadership of AAFE founder Jerry
Tung – sponsored a protest against White supremacy at a public housing complex in Greensboro,
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This section on AAFE is adapted from unpublished writings prepared by the author for a never-completed
collaboration with the late Peter Kwong. I am responsible for the contents, but Kwong remains a deep influence on
the analysis.
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North Carolina. At the rally, Ku Klux Klan members shot and killed five party members in broad
daylight (Bermanzohn 2003). In the shadow of this terror and loss, the party reevaluated its
political orientations and strategies. The party encouraged its leaders to study the texts of
“futurist” pop-philosophers like Alvin Toffler and John Naisbitt rather than Marxist-Leninist
staples (Elbaum 2002, 282). Tung came to advocate an odd plan – mocked by other Asian
American activists as his “takeover from above” strategy – of encouraging members to first gain
influence in the Democratic party and unions, then use those organizations’ funds to buy
American Express, and then use their controlling share of that financial institution to buy out its
competitors (Wei 1993, 225).
While the second phase of Tung’s plan remained a fantasy, in Chinatown, the first phase
was successful. AAFE participated in anti-gentrification demonstrations and lawsuits
surrounding a 1981 plan to build luxury towers in Chinatown and used the experience to gain
“important knowledge about housing development, land use, and New York City politics” (Tani
2011, 424). In the mid-1980s, when the Communist Workers Party dissolved, AAFE built their
reputation within the city’s Democratic Party circles by participating in the 1984 presidential
campaign of Reverend Jesse Jackson and the New York Gubernatorial campaign of Mario
Cuomo. The latter resulted in AAFE’s first significant stream of state patronage (Kwong and
Miščevič 2005, 297). In 1986, AAFE won a $1 million grant to build a homeless shelter, and was
designated the first state-funded Neighborhood Preservation Company in Chinatown (ibid, 299).
They began taking over in rem properties, developing the first LIHTC-financed projects in New
York City, and transforming themselves into a mainstream housing developer and power broker.
In 1991, when the City Council boundaries were being redrawn, most of the Chinatown left
pushed for the neighborhood to be included with its working-class and largely immigrant
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neighbors in the Lower East Side. AAFE, however, fought for Chinatown to be aligned with the
wealthier and Whiter neighborhoods to its west, arguing that such conditions would be fruitful
for their leadership to enter electoral politics (Hsiao 2001). AAFE’s way prevailed, and
eventually their strategy succeeded. After several unsuccessful attempts, AAFE leader Margaret
Chin won a seat on the City Council and remained in power for three terms with deep support
from the real estate industry (Samtani 2013). Tani (2011, 424-425) describes AAFE’s turn
toward housing development as both “a natural outgrowth of the struggle against gentrification”
as well as a means to bestow “stability and legitimacy to members who seemed to be growing
out of their radicalism or were never radical at all.”
After September 11th, 2001, when money started flowing into Chinatown from the Lower
Manhattan Development Corporation, AAFE was instrumental in determining where it would
go. As a result, some of it went to their own projects, including $7 million for the Chinatown
Partnership, a precursor to the Chinatown Business Improvement District that was charged with
duplicating public services, such as street cleaning and sanitation, and making the neighborhood
more friendly to tourists (Chan 2007, 71). In 2004, AAFE released a post-9/11 planning
document called America’s Chinatown: A Community Plan (Rebuild Chinatown Initiative 2004).
The document is a sprawling list of policy proposals, development pitches, and design guidelines
that touch on a wide range of subjects, but its main goals are to reshape Chinatown’s business
culture toward tourism and high-end services, and create more opportunities for residential and
commercial development. While the plan certainly calls for more low-income housing and better
paying jobs, goals shared by most of the Chinatown left, it also includes several proposals that
are closely aligned with real estate capital, chain retailers, and the tourism industry: creating a
Business Improvement District for the neighborhood in order to help create “a clean Chinatown”
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(ibid, 43); attracting Chinese chain stores (ibid, 45); demarcating a “heritage trail” for tourists
(ibid, 21); establishing an Asian-style “full-service spa” and hotel on the East River waterfront
(an area characterized by public and subsidized housing) (ibid, 21); pursuing inclusionary
upzonings, with affordability targets in line with the Bloomberg administration’s modest
proposals; upzoning Canal, Bowery and Broadway to cultivate a “Pacific Rim office district”
(ibid, 17); luring an “Asia Commerce Building” to serve as a “beacon for commerce” (ibid, 19);
and building big box retail stores along Delancey Street (ibid, 44).109
In the years following the plan’s release, the Bloomberg administration embraced many
of its more conservative proposals. When parts of lower Manhattan were being rezoned in 2008,
AAFE forcefully supported Mayor Bloomberg’s proposal, which largely left Chinatown
unprotected while granting its already-gentrified neighbors to the north a respite from
overdevelopment. During the rezoning hearings, AAFE’s executive director tried to discredit the
workers center Chinese Staff and Workers Association (CSWA) and other organizations who
opposed this rezoning, and publicly accused its critics of “schoolyard tactics,” divisiveness, and
hypocrisy (Kui 2008). The rezoning was passed and helped encourage Chinatown’s
gentrification (Stein 2016). In 2011, when a deal was being negotiated over what to build on the
Seward Park Urban Renewal Site, a six-block swath of nearly empty land that was cleared in the
1960s for promised but undelivered public housing, it was AAFE’s call for a mix of luxury and
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The Rebuild Chinatown Initiative plan is now quite difficult to find. Both AAFE and the consultants involved with
the project have removed it from their websites, and instead link only to the Initiative’s “The Community Speaks”
document, which compiles survey responses from Chinatown residents and workers. The plan, however, remains
archived on the Museum of Chinese in America website at http://911chinatown.mocanyc.org/reports.html.
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low-cost housing that finally won the day over more radical groups’ demand for 100 percent
affordable housing.110
Outside of Chinatown, AAFE’s real estate deals have been more aggressive. In Flushing,
home to the largest Asian community in Queens, AAFE has sponsored a number of commercial
and residential projects. One of their tax-exempt spin off organizations (Community Homes
Housing Development Fund Company) has bought, emptied, deregulated, and flipped rent
stabilized buildings, in one case capitalizing on a 180 percent increase in exchange value while
describing their building’s rent gap to potential buyers as “offering tremendous upside potential”
(Hum and Stein 2016). The building’s buyer was Rong Dong, a Flushing-based online real estate
investment firm that almost immediately put the building back on the market for an additional 38
percent above their buying price. Throughout the process, tenants suffered through unsafe
conditions and serial harassment. One of AAFE’s most recent ventures – a supermarket
development in Far Rockaway – will be financed in part through the controversial EB-5
program, which allows wealthy individuals to buy US residency permits by investing over
$500,000 in a real estate project located in a low-income area. AAFE is the first, and, for now,
only non-profit to sponsor such a venture. Far beyond their ordinary geographical boundaries,
AAFE has built a commercial complex in Kansas City, Missouri, which they purchased from the
Federal Government for half a million dollars. The final project is expected to host a number of
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The Seward Park Urban Renewal Area was initially cleared in order to build a set of union cooperatives just
north of the Amalgamated Dwellings and others in the area sometimes referred to as Cooperative Village. Those
plans fell through, however, and local opposition to public housing and integration – including from union
cooperators – kept the lots vacant for over 40 years despite the advocacy of other local pro-public housing groups
under the banner of the Joint Planning Council of the Lower East Side (Bendiner-Viani 2019; Stein 2014).
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artisanal food businesses; it is not at all clear how this relates to their mission as an affordable
housing developer and civil rights organization.
AAFE’s transformation from New Communist organization to low-income developer and
finally to high-powered non-profit is obviously an extreme example. Most CDCs’ transitions
have been far more modest, displaying both more conservative origins than the Asian Study
Group and less conservative present-day outcomes than AAFE. In the extremity of its transition,
however, AAFE demonstrates just how far CDCs can go toward pursuing spatial politics that
intensify real estate profits. Some of this is structural: without state and corporate backing, CDCs
like AAFE cannot operate their below-market housing. By embracing those backers, however,
and at times mimicking their business models and political agendas, CDCs can help ensure that
land values overall continue to rise, and the city continues to gentrify. Some CDCs have bristled
at these entanglements; others have welcomed them.

Advocacy and “Organizing Organizations”
If CDCs remain the predominant type of non-profit organization involved in urban
housing and development politics in working-class neighborhoods, the second major form is
membership-based organizing and advocacy groups. As mentioned earlier, these groups can be
tied to CDCs, as when a group like Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition emerges
out of the Fordham-Bedford Housing Corporation, or FUREE is tied to the Fifth Avenue
Committee (a south Brooklyn CDC). Some advocacy organizations have the inverse relationship,
in which an organizing group spins off a side project to manage housing, as in the case of New
York City’s ACORN branch (now called New York Communities for Change [NYCC]), which
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created MHANY for that purpose. These kind of organizations can also exist entirely
independent of CDCs and their property ownership and development interests, as in the case of
multi-issue organizations like Make the Road and CVH as well as single-issue housing groups
like Tenants & Neighbors (where I worked as an organizer and served as a board member) and
the Metropolitan Council on Housing (which emerged, in part, out of the Chelsea-based groups
that fought the displacement of tenants to build Penn South). Though they represent groups of
various sizes, missions, geographical scopes, and orientation toward property and development,
all of these groups represent a base of members who are generally working class and vulnerable
to gentrification, and seek to affect policy around housing preservation and development.
The language used to characterize these organizations, however, points to an important
theoretical debate around the nature of their power, and ultimately the way they engage in spatial
politics. McAlevey, who comes out of a background in union organizing and leadership, calls
these non-profits “organizing organizations.” Writing specifically about Make the Road,
McAlevey (2014, 176) provides the following criteria for such groups:
organizing organizations’ members are central players in campaigns
and have decision-making power in such key areas as hiring and
firing staff, approving budgets, and deciding on the direction and
priorities of the organization. Not only are members the central
actors but they also understand that mass collective action is their
primary source of leverage. And, crucially, the goal of an organizing
organization is not simply to win specific legislation or material
benefits, but to make long-term, structural changes in the power
structure of the wider society, shifting the balance of power toward
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the organization’s base constituency and away from the forces that
oppress them.
This stands in contrast to traditional advocacy groups (McAlevey names the Center for
Constitutional Rights, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Greenpeace) which “campaign
on behalf of some broad societal goal or on behalf of a constituency or constituencies, or both”
(ibid, 176, emphasis in the original). For McAlevey, the difference between an advocacy group
and an organizing organization is that the latter, like a democratically run union, is an
organization of members who craft their own campaigns and make their own decisions about
strategies and tactics. Their goals are expansive, even if their campaigns are more targeted.
Whether they win or lose is determined by whether the members can summon the collective
power necessary to take on an adversary or a system with substantial economic or political
power. This analysis closely matches the self-presentation of groups like Make the Road, which
often emphasize their member-leadership and transformative goals.
McAlevey’s definition is written in direct contrast – and partly in response to – that of
Steve Jenkins, who, during his time as a Make the Road staffer, wrote an influential article
reframing New York’s member-based activist organizations as closer in reality to traditional
advocacy organizations than to unions or radical political parties (Jenkins 2002). Jenkins
specifically names Make the Road By Walking (now Make the Road New York), as well as
CVH, Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (now CAAAV: Organizing Asian Communities),
Youth Force, the Workplace Project, and CSWA. (CSWA is an odd choice in that this
organization functions as a workers center and an independent union). “All,” he writes,
emphasize building a base of power for people directly affected by
a given oppression, and using the collective action of their
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membership to pressure decision-makers to make the changes they
are seeking. All stress that oppressed people themselves must
exercise democratic control over the organizations and take
leadership roles in all aspects of their organizing campaigns. The
organizations accomplish this goal by prioritizing popular education
and leadership development and by having the people they are
organizing do some or all of the following: serve on the
organization’s board of directors, strategize and make decisions
about organizing campaigns, plan demonstrations, speak to the
press, facilitate meetings, and raise funds. (ibid, 57).
While there is some difference in tone and emphasis between Jenkins’ and McAlevey’s
description of these types of organizations – particularly McAlevey’s insistence that they seek to
use their power to make structural changes, rather than to influence elites – they are still more or
less describing the same approaches. Both acknowledge, for example, that these organizations
raise the consciousness of their members around the political economy in which they are
situated, and the importance of fighting back to change it. Where Jenkins departs from
McAlevey, however, is in diagnosing what he sees as the problem with such organizations, and
the difference between their rhetoric and reality:
However, many organizing efforts are being compromised by a
failure to confront the way social struggles are shaped by the social
conditions in which they are situated. Organizing campaigns are
frequently initiated without regard to whether a given group of
people, if organized, would have the power to force changes from
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the institutions they are confronting. The failure to face this critical
power dynamic leads us to overemphasize the importance of both
the consciousness-raising aspect of our work and the power
dynamics between professional staff and the people being
organized. The result is that in many cases we are transforming the
appearance but not the substance of what are, in effect, traditional
advocacy campaigns. Our failure to consider objective conditions
when initiating the campaigns comes back to haunt us, as ‘member
power’ is increasingly relegated to the ideal realm of symbolism and
rhetoric. Unable to radically change the real power dynamics at play,
we continue what are in effect traditional advocacy practices, but
radically change the way we describe them (Jenkins 2002, 57-58).
In Jenkins’ analysis, these organizations’ tendency to “ignore all these objective factors” leads
them to diagnose the problem with advocacy as “the advocate-client relationship,” rather than the
relationship between the member and the social forces that oppress them – an employer, a
financial institution, or a government agency (ibid, 61). This then leads them to reproduce the
advocacy model under a valance of organizing culture, and wind up in a type of non-profit that
Rodríguez (2007, 34) terms “radical in form, but liberal in content” (emphasis in the
original).111
The traditional advocacy organization uses professionals (including lawyers, social
workers, and planners) working on behalf of clients or constituents to influence elites (employers

111

Rodríguez is borrowing and altering the phrase from Ruth Wilson Gilmore, who notes of the promising
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content.”
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or state actors) to alter their behaviors or policies. The advocates cannot make the change they
seek themselves, however, and therefore their effectiveness lies in convincing elites to make a
change based on the latter’s self-interest, reputation, or sense of “social justice.” The parameters
of their politics are limited by what elites are willing to do or capable of doing. Generally
effective advocates can communicate in a manner that that is both familiar to and respectful of
the elites they seek to influence (Jenkins 2002, 61-62).112 Jenkins (2002, 63) argues that many of
the newer organizing-based groups “ignore the difference between the ‘collective power’ of
people to force changes from the institutions they are confronting and the ‘collective power’ of a
group of people as symbols, who attempt to convince elite sources of power to correct a given
injustice.” As such, they can fall into the situation Ortiz described in an interview, in which the
members of one such organization involved in the East Harem rezoning were “used as props” by
the group’s staff and leadership, which was ultimately responsible for the organization’s
decisions around the rezoning.
In contrast to “advocacy power,” which relies on the symbolic power of members to
convince elites of their cause’s merit, Jenkins (2002, 62) poses “social power” as “based in some
capacity by the group itself to coerce the decision-maker to make the changes they seek.” This
coercive power generally comes from the members’ ability to threaten production (as in the case
of workers who can go on strike, particularly if their employer is relatively immobile) and/or
vote out an elected official. While any organizing campaign is likely to rely on some
combination of advocacy and social power, the non-profits Jenkins profiles are overly dependent
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“reasonable” (Carr 2012, 427).
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upon the former specifically because they lack enough of the latter, no matter how the
organization is structured. The members’ dispersal at multiple job sites, as well as their
employers’ abilities to fire and rehire workers or move to another location, makes striking a more
difficult (though certainly not impossible) activity for such organizations to embrace, and thus
leads workplace organizations to emphasize legal actions for backpay over demands for
unionization. Elected officials’ entrenched status and non-citizen members’ lack of voting rights
makes electoral challenges – or other actions premised on the threat to a politician’s incumbency
– more difficult (but again not impossible) and leads organizations to work with elected officials
to moderate their positions rather than seek to replace them.
In contrast to these forms of non-profits, Jenkins poses unions as organizations that are
truly member run (in that their leadership is directly elected and all of their funding comes from
dues) and whose power is explicitly based in their members’ “shop floor” social power. Jenkins
would, in fact, go on to leave Make the Road to become a staff researcher at SEIU 32BJ.113
When McAlevey reappraised Jenkins’ article for her 2014 chapter on Make the Road as an
“organizing organization,” she noted the irony that many unions – not the least SEIU, her former
union and the subject of some of her most scathing critique – adopt political positions
comparable to those espoused by the organizations Jenkins critiques. Jenkins, McAlevey (2014,
177-178) writes, “all but ignores that unions’ strategic and tactical repertoires are also highly
constrained by such mechanisms as the no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements, to
which dues ‘checkoff’ – the source of almost all union revenue – is tightly linked. In addition,
unions have deep institutional ties to political and economic power-holders that limit their
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effectiveness,” and thus engage in “cooperation with key employers” and elected officials.114
Unions, then, do not necessarily fare any better in espousing oppositional politics than
organizing-based non-profits.
McAlevey is certainly correct that many “organizing organizations” are truly guided by
their members, and some have a more active and democratic organizing culture than many
unions. The groups with 501c4 arms can be just as politically active as any union. This includes
groups like Make the Road, even though many of their most active members cannot vote. In
recent years, after feeling the sting of supporting Queens Democratic machine leader Joseph
Crowley for Congressional reelection against the Democratic Socialists of America-backed
insurgent candidate Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, Make the Road staked out a less cautious
approach to political organizing, and backed Cynthia Nixon in her primary challenge to
Governor Andrew Cuomo. This jeopardized their ability to secure funds from both the state
government and Cuomo-aligned unions but helped rebuild the organization’s social legitimacy
(Gay 2018).
These changes do not, however, mean that Jenkins’s analysis of how these groups seek to
create change is wrong or outdated. They can be member led while remaining reliant on moral or
logical appeals to elites; as Banana Kelly staffer Alonza pointed out in an interview, their
campaigns can be dictated by member demands for 99 percent of their campaigns’ duration, then
revert to tight staff and leadership control over the final high-level negotiations that might ensue
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effective way to make the point I was making.”
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in the final days of a campaign. In those cases, the tenor of the policy campaigns around
development, zoning, land use, and housing campaigns tends to be confrontational and highlight
the organizations’ people power, but their resolution tends to be much more restrained.
In an anonymous interview, Jack Ramsey – a pseudonym for an executive director at a
tenants rights non-profit115 – described how this dynamic unfolded when a coalition of
organizing-based non-profits and building trade unions (RAFA, discussed in greater detail
below) fought for changes to the zoning text that would incentivize the use of union construction
labor. “When I talk to council members about it, they’ve been like, you know, ‘you’ve got good
lawyers, we have good lawyers.’ And we’re just in lawyer land.” No matter how people-powered
and contentious the campaign had previously been, the Council members calmly deferred to their
own lawyers and the coalition members’ lawyers to resolve the dispute. “Lawyer land” is
certainly a contested space, but it is a space of negotiation between elites, which leads to a
greater likelihood of remaining within the realm of the possible – as understood and defined by
those same elites. This can lead to pessimism in terms of the long-term political horizon, and
optimism in the light of past defeats. Moody (2007, 179) characterizes the latter as the “‘at least
he’s not Giuliani’ syndrome so common among liberals” during the Bloomberg years; the same
language could be used today (replacing Giuliani with Bloomberg) to describe the approach of
many elites negotiating on behalf of member-led organizations, and translating the terrain of the
negotiations back to the members in order to describe and justify their outcomes.
In order to even enter “lawyer land,” organizing-based non-profits must first establish
their desire for and deservingness of a role in final negotiations. The metaphor commonly used to

115

Ramsey asked not only for his name to be changed, but for his organization to go unnamed in this work.

349

describe such a role is “a seat at the table,” a phrase that conjures an image of exclusive access,
measured debate, and collaboration between actors. Eric Tang, a former executive director of the
organizing non-profit CAAAV, describes this desire as a quest for legitimacy on the part of left
organizations (Tang 2007, 218-220). Once that legitimacy is achieved, however, maintaining it
can become a programmatic prerogative, leading groups to take positions on development issues
they might otherwise shun. Make the Road, for example, chose to support the expansion of a
Business Improvement District in Jackson Heights, Elmhurst, and Corona, despite their own
members’ discomfort with this neoliberal placemaking tactic, in order to secure a seat on BID’s
board (Stein and Hum forthcoming). In an interview, FUREE organizer Higgins –described the
dilemma as one in which the very success and growth of an organizing-based non-profit can lead
to its political retrenchment: “once you, as an organization, become of a certain size, there's a lot
of relationship – not necessarily building, but maintenance, and you're willing to do a lot to keep
yourself at the table, even if it's not a good table to be at.”
While often metaphorical, the table is sometimes material. Local elected officials can
convene invitation-only gatherings of “stakeholders” in order to negotiate a dispute and, often, to
make clear the outcome they desire. Local political bosses tend to be quite unsubtle about their
preferences. Marwell (2007, 82) describes the way Brooklyn party boss and non-profit founder
Vito Lopez would hold an annual gathering for the leaders of local non-profits, which included
an “informal, late-night chat session with top-level staff from a number of the district’s
organizations.” During these sessions, Lopez would remind those non-profit leaders – and
particularly David Pagan of Los Sures, whose organization was more politically active around
development issues than many others in the neighborhood – that loyalty is the most important
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thing in politics, and that no one who criticized Lopez could expect support or funding in the
future (ibid, 82-83).116
Outside of “lawyer land” and “seats at the table,” organizing-based non-profits are often
reliant on government funding for their operations, especially since most private foundations
(another conservatizing force) are less likely to fund organizing than physical development
projects, social service provisions, or jobs training programs. This state dependency can limit
these organizations’ willingness to fully oppose city plans or fight for alternatives that are
fundamentally at odds with the city’s core approach to real estate-driven growth. With the
notable exception of NYCC, most of the biggest organizing non-profits raise a large percentage
of their operating budgets from city grants, either in the form of city initiatives (like the funding
for tenant organizing that de Blasio approved for working-class neighborhoods that went through
an upzoning) or, more commonly, “member items” (the annual discretionary grants earmarked
by each City Councilmember for preferred causes and groups).
This is not to say that organizing-based non-profits simply give up and support whatever
their political patrons desire. Confrontations continue, but they are often muted; positions differ,
but they are always moderated. As Alonza, a current staffer at Banana Kelley explained to me,
“depending on your City Council person and the thickness of their skin, it’s a strategic question
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and I will ignore you. Ultimately Lopez did not deliver on his promises to our organizations, and instead passed a
piece of legislation we opposed. He did, however, add a set of benefits for a small group of loft tenants in his
district, who stood by his side in the legislative chamber during the bill’s passage.
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of ‘how can we get them on our side’ and still have our side be a good side to be on.” Once the
funding is secured, non-profits are required to produce certain “deliverables” based on the RFP
they responded to or the terms of their member item funding. In her interview, Ortiz recounted
how her organization had, at first, sought government funding, but found the terms too
restrictive: “the city comes up with things” that they require non-profit grantees to do, “and nonprofits have to scramble to figure out how they’re going to do these things.” Worse yet, “you
don’t just get money, you get phone calls” from politicians asking them to attend press events, or
– in her case – vote a particular way as a member of the community board.
These dynamics – the pull of funding, the desire for a “seat at the table,” the tensions
between social and advocacy power – are not static, and manifest differently in every case. One
coalition that brought together many of the city’s most active organizing-based housing nonprofits and illustrated the interplay of these dynamics was the Real Affordability for All (RAFA)
campaign of 2014 to 2016. As mentioned previously, the coalition brought together organizing
non-profits like Make the Road, NYCC, VOCAL NY, and CVH, as well as CDCs like Banana
Kelly and the Pratt Area Community Council (PACCC, now renamed IMPACCT Brooklyn), and
building trades locals such as Laborers Local 79, Plumbers Local 1, the District Council of
Carpenters, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 3. For most of its
existence it was coordinated by the Alliance for a Greater New York (ALIGN), an advocacy
group that pulls together union and non-profit organizations on issue-based campaigns. As its
name implied, Real Affordability for All sought to challenge the mode of development promoted
by Mayor de Blasio, whose initial housing plan promised to create or preserve 200,000 units of
affordable housing. In his interview, Ramsey told me that after this number was announced, big
organizing groups like NYCC and Make the Road “wanted to have some sort of seat at the table
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around that.” Their staff had preexisting relationships with high-level members of the de Blasio
administration and felt they could influence the zoning component of the mayor’s plan. Ramsey
relayed that his organization, like many others, joined the coalition “because there was this
feeling that RAFA was going to be the umbrella group for the tenant movement talking about
housing issues. And so if that was happening we felt as though we had to be at the table.”
In contrast to the mayor’s MIH proposal, RAFA recommended that the city retain a
voluntary “density bonus” model of inclusionary housing, which would have allowed developers
to build larger buildings if they made half the units affordable to people earning that
neighborhood’s median income, and built the project using union contractors who prioritized
local hiring (though workers would receive lower wages than they would in a fully market-rate
project).117 The coalition argued that MIH’s high-skewing AMI targets represented a
continuation of Bloomberg’s pro-gentrification zoning policies, and their scheme – though
voluntary instead of mandatory, and in this sense closer to Bloomberg’s approach than de
Blasio’s – would result in both more affordable housing and better jobs for residents in rezoned
neighborhoods (Real Affordability For All 2015, Real Affordability for All 2016a). The plan did
not challenge the idea that new affordable housing should be built by private developers with
minimal public subsidies and should therefore be cross subsidized through luxury construction in
working-class neighborhoods. In that sense, even the alternative proposed by RAFA conformed
to the neoliberal logic of urban housing development. Still, the RAFA “floor area bonus” – if
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According to Ramsey, this voluntary structure was important to coalition members who believed that making it
mandatory would violate the Urstadt law, a fiscal crisis-era state law that limits cities’ actions around housing
issues. These groups also believed MIH violated Urstadt and would be subject to legal challenges, but those
challenges have not manifested.
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developers volunteered to use it – would have imposed more stringent demands on developers
and resulted in a greater concentration of actually-affordable units in upzoned neighborhoods.
As the campaign heated up, frictions within the coalition started to surface. When RAFA
released a report arguing that de Blasio’s MIH plan was a continuation of the inequalitymaximizing approach to land use favored by Bloomberg (Real Affordability For All 2016a),
several CDCs and non-profit developers broke from the coalition, including PACC, the
Supportive Housing Network of New York, and the umbrella organization ANHD (which
represents most of the city’s CDCs, as well as several prominent organizing organizations). Just
thirteen of the 61 members opted to put their organizations’ names on the report (Goldenberg
2016b). They feared that being associated with such a direct attack on the mayor’s development
agenda – which was supported by almost all of the City Council as well as REBNY and
NYSAFAH – would harm their reputations among elites and compromise their funding and
access to power.
In the final days before the City Council vote on MIH, RAFA planned a set of civil
disobedience actions at City Hall to protest the plan. It was, however, becoming increasingly
clear to RAFA coalition members that the Council would almost unanimously vote in favor of
the mayor’s program. Meanwhile, the mayor offered to slightly tweak the calculations in his plan
to allow for scenarios in which a larger percentage of the new housing would be set aside for
households making as low as 40 percent AMI, and offered to initiate a study of whether RAFA’s
density bonus could be adopted in addition to MIH. The remaining RAFA groups postponed
their actions and came together in order to decide how to proceed (Mays 2016). Interview
subjects who participated in the ensuing meetings provided somewhat different accounts of what
happened next, but all agreed that the largest of the organizing-based non-profits, including
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NYCC and Make the Road, pushed for RAFA to endorse the compromise and support de
Blasio’s plan.
Ultimately that faction won out. The day before a proposed action, RAFA announced that
it was cancelling the civil disobedience and would endorse the mayor’s slightly amended plan.
They posted memes on their social media accounts proclaiming, “VICTORY!! LOW INCOME
NEW YORKERS WIN A STRONGER AFFORDABLE HOUSING PLAN” and “NEW
STUDY WILL CREATE PATH TO REAL AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR LOW-INCOME
FAMILIES!” over images of Black and Latino new Yorkers protesting the Mayor’s plan (Real
Affordability For All 2016b, Real Affordability For All 2016c). In a stark rhetorical shift,
RAFA’s ALIGN-based coordinator explained to a reporter, “We know Mayor de Blasio shares
our core progressive values, and he has listened to our concerns. That’s why we support this
stronger, more robust affordable housing plan” (Whitford 2016). Some RAFA members felt
betrayed and took their fight to the City Council chambers on the day of the vote; other groups
were relieved that the long campaign was over.
The RAFA case demonstrates some of the limitations facing many non-profits – perhaps
the organizing-based non-profit advocates in particular – when they aim to confront state-driven
land use changes that accelerate gentrification. While the coalition was impressive in its size, and
particularly noteworthy for drawing together both building trades unions and non-profits, even
their initial proposal sought to ensure affordable housing construction would be profitable for
developers, and could still be paired with large-scale luxury development in working-class
neighborhoods. Perhaps more importantly than the specific content of their alternative is the
coalition’s unwillingness to stand behind its own plan in the face of apparent legislative defeat.
The groups determined that they would not protest what they could not stop, and ended up
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providing crucial cover to the Mayor and the City Council when they passed the REBNYbacked zoning plan. While there is certainly a persuasive strategic logic to choosing one’s
battles, the RAFA coalition formed with the express purpose of challenging de Blasio’s zoning
plan. Instead, in order to retain their status as “winners” and maintain ties with the elements of
capital and the state on which they depend, non-profits either backed out of the coalition or
endorsed the very plan they joined together to oppose.

Contours of Dissent
As Bloomberg and de Blasio unveiled rezonings in working-class neighborhoods
intended to intensify market-rate construction (even with the stated purpose of creating
affordable housing), most non-profits initially responded by negotiating the terms of these
proposed rezonings in order to extract something from them. If those negotiations fell flat, as in
the case of CVH in the East Harlem rezoning or CASA in the Jerome Avenue rezoning, some of
these non-profits then took an oppositional posture, but did so at a point when they could no
longer successfully block the rezoning. With the exception of workers centers and movementbased organizations that happened to be incorporated as 501c3s (like CSWA or Movimiento por
Justicia en el Barrio), it was rare for non-profits to start with an expressly oppositional
orientation and fight a rezoning to the end.
During the course of my interviews, I asked many non-profit informants why this was. I
received many different answers to that question, and their varying answers have informed the
arguments in this chapter. One answer provided by a staffer at a highly influential advocacy and
technical assistance non-profit offered perhaps the most comprehensive response. According to
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Peterson, there are three overlapping explanations for this strategic orientation toward
negotiation and compromise over direct opposition. Some non-profits wanted a better version of
what was being offered; though they did not necessarily want the luxury housing, they deeply
desired public investments and the opportunity for community planning, and they saw a rezoning
as the only way to grasp such gains in the current political moment. Other non-profits never
believed they could win a campaign to stop a rezoning, and so saw participating in shaping its
parameters as a way to gain something out of the process, build and assert their power, and
mitigate against the plans’ worst aspects. Finally, some non-profits whose neighborhoods were
selected for rezonings early in each mayor’s programs might have acted differently if they had
seen how the process had played out elsewhere, but did not have that opportunity.
Peterson then provided her organization’s analysis of the rezonings, which is shared with
and informed by many of the non-profits with whom they work. The stated premise of
inclusionary upzonings, Peterson explained, has been that the city is taking advantage of a hot
real estate market in order to provide a social good (affordable housing); in reality, the
inclusionary upzonings are stimulating an overheated market even further, and making weaker
land and housing markets in pockets of the city more valuable. This may have happened anyway,
but the rezonings hasten the process by expanding development opportunities, bringing hype,
and ultimately accelerating gentrification. As those local markets become unaffordable,
developers will stop seeking subsidies to offer below market rents, and non-profits will be priced
out of their markets. Like most other housing non-profits, Peterson’s organization long endorsed
and pushed for mandatory inclusionary zoning, but they imagined it as a tool that would be most
useful in middle-to-high market neighborhoods, where it would function as a stronger form of
value capture. They also imagined it as a citywide program to be combined with a revised 421a
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tax structure, whereby 421a could create more deeply affordable housing (because the value of
the tax abatement is so enormous) while MIH could create middle-income housing. This,
however, was not what happened: 421a continues to create very little low-income housing, and
MIH has so far only been adopted in working-class neighborhoods at risk of gentrification. In
Peterson’s analysis, “now we're stuck with 421a, which is awful – even more awful than it used
to be, and of no use whatsoever from an affordability perspective. You've got MIH that is in and
of itself better than nothing, but not creating the depth of housing that's most needed, and then
being applied mostly in the wrong places for that kind of tool. So that sucks.” Despite all this
they still see MIH as a win, but their message is that it was a missed opportunity. They never told
the City Council to vote against it, but they also never developed an alternative they were
comfortable with. Their focus was always on pushing the AMI levels lower, and in that they
succeeded modestly.
Most of the non-profits Peterson’s organization advises – a mix of CDCs and organizing
groups – took what she called in her interview a “no unless” approach to the rezonings. “Some of
them have been stronger on the no, and some of them have been stronger on the unless. The tone
changes and the content shifts a little. Nobody has wholeheartedly been like – ‘yay, come on in!’
But I think most people don't see just saying no as a viable strategy, so that's not what they've
been trained to do.”118 The overall goal of this “no unless” approach was to dilute the most
disastrous elements of the rezonings while securing some modest benefits for their organization
and those they serve. If this did not happen, some organizations then switch to an oppositional
stance, knowing that a victory was unlikely but understanding that supporting such a plan could

Peterson’s use of the passive voice – “they’ve been trained” – elides the fact that it is her organization that does
the training in these situations.
118
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cost the non-profit its social legitimacy with its members and base. Others, however, might
continue to tenuously support the process in order to maintain legitimacy with funders and state
actors.
Higgins told me in an interview that he calls this the city’s “passive aggressive hijacking”
of non-profits, in which planning officials convey to the organizations, “You go with the process,
or you get nothing.” Non-profits then feel compelled to participate in processes they find
illegitimate, then “do their own media spin” to explain why they participated in a planning
process they would later oppose. Piven and Cloward described a similar phenomenon repeating
through 20th century US history, in which mobilizations of poor people are channeled into
ineffectual state-moderated processes that dull the impulse to exert power through disruptive
action. They write, “It is our belief that many past organizing efforts foundered because they
failed to take account of the profound ways in which the social structure restricts the forms of
political action in which the lower classes can engage, and having failed to recognize these
limitations, organizers and leaders also failed to exploit the opportunities afforded by lower-class
mobilizations when they did occur” (Piven and Cloward 1977, xxiii).
Higgins, in describing what he called the “ecosystem” of non-profits, argued in his
interview that the “social structure” Piven and Cloward referred to includes not only the obvious
elements of capital and the state, but also big organizing-based non-profits that exert major
influence over smaller non-profits.
There's this very much an ecosystem and you generally know very,
very well if you're in a big organization or small organization, and
that kind of controls your stances and sometimes how you organize.
You know, sometimes if you are smaller then you get to be a little
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bit more independent in terms of the campaigns you stick up for and
how you choose to engage community, and sometimes if you work
for a larger nonprofit you’re sometimes – often – a turnout machine
for certain processes, for better or for worse.
Make the Road, for example, is able to bring more members to actions than nearly any other
non-profit in the city, in part because of the group’s successful organizing culture and in part
because participation in such actions entitles members to the social services the organization
provides. Higgins is not engaging in a scalar fetish in which small is beautiful and big is
dangerous; instead, he is explaining the ways in which some of the most successful groups can
act as moderating forces with movements. These organizations, Higgins continued, can then act
as “gatekeepers” when they should be “door-openers,” and can come to “think of themselves as
the voice for a community.” This, in turn, marginalizes the voices that do not conform, and
enables powerful actors to cast those dissenting groups as unreasonable and unruly by
comparison. Ultimately this dynamic incentivizes participation in processes groups might
otherwise oppose, not least in order to garner the funds necessary to keep doing important work.
As Fitch (1993, 215) wrote years ago, “In the battle for funds, the winners, in the long run, seem
to be the community groups whose agenda overlaps the most widely with the funding
community.”
None of this means that all non-profits – and especially movement-oriented non-profits –
are to blame for their own shortcomings. They exist in a hostile environment that is far from their
own making: almost all are directly dependent on a mix of private foundations (tax shelters for
the wealthiest), FIRE-sector giants (who are both the main driver of gentrification and the
primary purchaser of LIHTCs), and capitalist politicians (from local growth boosters to Trump
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Administration appointees) in order to do the best of their work: community organizing, and
housing provision for those excluded from the market and ignored by the state. While leaders
may make questionable decisions, and some non-profits have willingly walked away from their
prior convictions, the reasons for their uneasiness around oppositional politics are more
structural than they are personal. Katz offers admirable honesty and sensitivity about the
discomfort she sometimes feels when criticizing advocacy organizations, offering a justification
for her focus on liberal environmental groups that is applicable to New York City housing nonprofits as well. Returning to a quote discussed in the introduction, Katz (2005a, 61) writes:
I must confess… that I feel squeamish sometimes about taking on
either of these conservancies. They are on one level “good guys” in
a sea of far worse political operators, so why (I hear my father asking
me) do I need to go after them? Precisely because they trade on
being “good guys,” to evade scrutiny. Not only do they operate
politically with very little external accountability, but their funding
strategies explicitly remove not only tax dollars but public
environmental responsibility from the state. Privatizing nature and
space, as these conservancies do, reduces the tax base for less noble
environments, siphons off the pressure for safe, engaging, healthy
public environments elsewhere, and eclipses the environmental
interests of nondominant populations.
Much of the same could be said about New York City housing non-profits: most of them are
“good guys,” and yet the dominance of non-profit groups limits the tactics, strategies, demands,
and horizons available to activists working on housing and planning issues. It is impossible to
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know whether the housing movement would be more dynamic in the counterfactual of a
diminished non-profit sector, but it is clear that the non-profits’ structural limitations tend to
become the limitations on the movement as a whole.
This dynamic, however, is beginning to change, with unincorporated neighborhood
groups – like Take Back the Bronx, the Crown Heights Tenants Union, Queens Neighborhoods
United, and the Coalition to Protect Chinatown and the Lower East Side – growing in number
and size, and non-party political formations (like the No IDC119 coalition and the Democratic
Socialists of America) challenging incumbent Democrats on their pro-real estate politics.
Considering these developments, a few non-profits seem to be adjusting to maintain their
relevance by becoming more active in insurgent electoral campaigns, being somewhat more
combative in rezoning fights, and embracing wider-reaching housing programs like the campaign
for “universal rent control.” This does not mean, however, that non-profits are ready to lead the
movement in an entirely new direction. The structural limitations on non-profits deny them the
possibility to far outpace their patrons and promote a planning vision that would be truly
objectionable to capital or the state.

119

The No IDC coalition pushed to oust a group of elected Democrats in the New York State senate known as the
“Independent Democratic Conference” who caucused separately and thus enabled Republican control over the
State Senate.

362

Chapter 6: Money, Power, Survival

At different times and in different places, some unions and non-profits have pursued
spatial politics that are antagonistic to the demands of capital and the state; at least as often, those
same organizations have sought to join into a bloc with elements of capital and the state. Like
people and history, or workers and landscapes, organizations make their own spatial strategies,
but they do not make them as they please (Marx 1852 [2019], 480; Mitchell 2012, 168). Their
paths are neither entirely determined by outside forces nor wholly contingent on members’ or
leaders’ demands. If one assumes an entirely agentic framework, then changing institutional
behaviors would be as simple as changing the minds of key decisionmakers or simply replacing
them. If one assumes a rigidly structural framework, that change would be altogether impossible,
as their decisions would be understood as predetermined by forces beyond their control. Neither
over-simplified extreme is satisfactory, nor even particularly useful.
Individuals and organizations surely have agency in pursuing spatial strategies, but their
options are shaped by structural factors; those structures are not immutable historical and
geographical forces but are instead shaped by the agentic actions of previous generations of
individuals and organizations. As Gilmore (2008, 40) argues, structure and agency are coconstitutive rather than opposing social relations: “Structures are both the residue of agency and
animated by agential capacities, while the modes in which ordinary people organize to relieve
the pressures that kill them and their kin are, or become, structural – especially insofar as they
draw from, and operate through, relationships that can only be called structural as well (familial,
religious, cultural, etc.).” Unions and non-profits are themselves structures – they are organized
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into highly regulated forms by the state and in relation to capital, and they channel members’ and
leaders’ agency in ways that are specific to those institutional arrangements.
The actions New York City unions’ and non-profits’ have taken around issues of
planning and development can only be understood through explanatory frameworks that place
agency in the context of structure, and vice versa. The organizations, as well as the land use
changes in question, are too heterogenous to be guided by the same single theoretical or
empirical explanation. There is simply no individual factor that explains all of their behavior.120
There are, however, a number of explanatory frameworks that bind together multiple cases and
contingencies; these frameworks can then be grouped into three broad categories: money, power,
and survival.
First, like any worthy investigator, we can follow the money. Without falling into a
narrow economism, it is nonetheless a truism that money drives a great deal of political behavior.
This is not to suggest that narrow corruption on the part of unions and non-profits is the root of
the problem – though clearly that has also existed for centuries – but rather to acknowledge that
both unions and non-profits are swayed by their funding sources, both direct (as in non-profits
whose budgets depend on wealthy donors and state patronage) and indirect (as in unions whose
continued existence depends on their employers’ solvency and whose pension funds seek
maximum returns on investment).
Second, we can seek out the ways working-class organizations respond to the state’s
coercive power. Under conditions of direct and indirect repression, as well as cooptation and
discoordination, unions and non-profits may see their political horizons receding and seek
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The exceptions to this statement – explanations such as “it’s capitalism” or “it’s neoliberalism” – are as
undeniably true as they are bafflingly broad.
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alliances with actors within the elements of the state on which they rely. The working-class
institutions we know now are, in part, those that either survived prior rounds of state repression
(via COINTELPRO, HUAC, or other modes of attack on left institutions and leaders121), or grew
to prominence in the absence of silenced radicals.
Third, and building off the prior two frameworks, we can see organizations’ spatial
strategies as means of securing their own survival in a hostile climate. With union density
declining (even in New York, though at a slower rate than the rest of the country [Milkman and
Luce 2019]) and competition stark for non-profit support, working-class organizations face
pressures to grow and eclipse their cohorts, as well as to secure scarce resources. This can lead to
opportunistic or fatalistic modes of politics, as well as more active attempts to reshape the local
political and economic landscape of toward more favorable outcomes for particular institutions.
Money, power, and survival are far from the only factors driving union and non-profit
behavior. Most importantly, these institutions are guided by missions, and must be responsive to
their members’ voices and demands. Those three forces, however, create strong incentives for
working-class institutions to pursue spatial strategies aligned with – or at least not directly
antagonistic toward – property capital and the real estate state. Any organization that seeks to
alter this pattern must first contend with the structures that reinforce current conditions.

Money
Follow the Money, Part 1: Foundation Funders’ Influence Over Non-Profits
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COINTELPRO was the Federal Bureau of Investigations Counter-Intelligence Program; HUAC was Congress’
House Unamerican Activities Committee.
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Most non-profits engaged in planning politics – and especially those that do not build or
manage property – secure a large proportion of their funding through grants from private
foundations. These foundations emerged during the Gilded Age, when federal policy enabled
ultra-exploitive capitalists like Carnegie (in 1905), Russel Sage (in 1907), and Rockefeller (in
1913) to shelter their profits from taxes through establishing ostensibly charitable ventures
(Kohl-Arenas 2016, 10; Gilmore 2007b, 45). As discussed in Chapter Three, foundations like
Ford have been particularly active in urban development politics, not only funding mission- and
member-driven organizations but setting political agendas of their own through funding
preferences, self-produced policy papers, and gatherings for non-profit leaders (Taylor 2016,
179). While most non-profit organizers and leaders resent the influence of unaccountable
foundations over their work, they nonetheless understand them to be integral to their
organization’s continued existence. In an interview, Alonza of Banana Kelly – which, as
discussed in the previous chapter, recently experienced its own funding-related political crisis –
said of community organizing, “there’s not much money for it, and it doesn’t make much money,
so how are you going to fund it?” Non-profits like his are “organizing in low wealth
communities, so dues can’t be very high.” As Stoecker (1997, 8) describes, “The problem of
maintaining community control is rooted in the fact that poor communities do not have enough
community controlled capital and must woo outside capital whose tendency is to transform use
values into exchange values.”
This dependent relationship enables a form of “movement capture” (Francis 2019), in
which organizations reshape their political programs toward funders’ more moderate and
reformist agendas. As Arena (2012, xxvii) argues in his study of how and why New Orleans nonprofits supported post-Katrina public housing demolitions, “The hard reality faced by nonprofits,
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radical or otherwise, is that to obtain funding they have to fit their agenda into the issues and
guidelines laid out by the funders,” including “reasonable goals that do not represent a radical
challenge to the status quo.” Funders’ politics often seep into non-profits’ strategizing, even if
they are not yet grantees but hope to become ones in the future: “Even if funding is not obtained,
nonprofit ‘grassroots’ organizations will often structure their initiatives and organizing to fit
within a model acceptable to the foundation’s funders. If a grant application is denied in one
funding cycle, there is always hope for next year” (ibid.).
Wolch (1990) labels the nexus of foundations and non-profits “the shadow state,” an
unelected social bloc responsible for funding certain social programs (and not others), fulfilling
certain political agendas (and not others), and reproducing class society, all in the context of state
retrenchment from social reproduction. “The shadow state’s” size and influence can impose the
strictures of funding and the norms of non-profit culture over many genuinely grassroots groups
that are legally incorporated as non-profits, who thus exist “in the shadow of the shadow state”
(Gilmore 2007b, 47). The expressed or implied preferences of private funders then create a
“second bottom line” for non-profits to meet (Bockmeyer 2003, 177): organizations are
encouraged – sometimes even required – to demonstrate the successfulness of their programs
through such metrics as “return on investment” or “value added” (Marwell and McQuarrie 2013,
135-136). In some cases, foundations understand rising “real estate values as the primary
measurement of community well-being” and non-profit success (McQuarrie 2013, 158).
Funders may also reward activist groups that offer what Jenkins (2002, 71) calls an
“idealistic conception of ‘member power,’… because the idea of giving ‘voice’ to marginalized
communities fits comfortably within a liberal, pluralistic view of our society,” or the “belief is
that problems in our society occur because the ideas and experiences of oppressed people are
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excluded from democratic debate and not because of a struggle between groups of people with
competing interests.” Compounding this tendency, many foundations insist non-profits engage in
“self-help” programs, which locate the heart of social problems within the oppressed rather than
within their oppression (Kohl-Arenas 2016). Ultimately, the biggest foundations can reinforce a
hegemonic “common sense” notion of how the world works and how it can change (Thibault
2007, 882; Arena 2012, xxvi). While individual foundation officials may not maintain this view,
and while many grassroots groups actively contest these strictures, “the power of philanthropy is
a piecemeal process of adapting, negotiating, and eventually incorporating and neutralizing the
leadership and strategies of radical social movements” (Kohl-Arenas 2016, 12).
In addition to private foundations, some non-profits seek sources of funding directly from
capitalist firms: partnerships with for-profit developers (as discussed in the previous chapter);
grants from banks seeking improved Community Reinvestment Act scores; and LIHTC
investments from FIRE-sector corporations (as discussed in Chapter Three). While these
partnering firms similarly seek to bend non-profit politics away from direct attacks on capital or
capitalism, they do not exert quite as much control as foundations, whose officers directly read,
weigh, and approve or disapprove of particular plans of actions. While non-profits have the
power to ignore funders’ desires, they may find difficulty in maintaining their operations if their
programs are viewed as too radical.

Follow the Money, Part 2: Government Funders’ Influence Over Non-Profits
In addition to foundation funding, most New York non-profits engaged in housing and
land use politics seek some sort of state support, often in the form of grants from the federal
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government (usually HUD), the state government (usually the Division of Homes and
Community Renewal), or from the city (usually HPD, the Human Resource Administration, or
from individual City Councilmembers in the form of annual “member items”). During the
Bloomberg era, this funding also came through the mayor’s own non-profits, which “administers
private charity the way politicians dole out government pork, which ‘chills dissent’ and keeps the
nonprofit sector in line” (Viteritti 2017, 135).
Once funded by state agents or agencies, non-profits may become politically tamer – not
only out of thanks for previous rounds of funding, but also out of fear that such funds will
quickly be cut if the organization comes to be viewed as unthankful or out of step with the
funders’ goals and ambitions (Marwell 2007, 93). As the Banana Kelly case discussed in the
preceding chapter demonstrates, the threat of withdrawal of public funds can be a dramatically
disciplining force. In that case, the CDC fired its own staff to protect its funding stream; in other
cases, organizations refuse to moderate their position and suffer the sting of public
disinvestment. Angotti (2008, 103) describes a case in which one non-profit – Housing Works,
an affordable housing developer for people living with HIV/AIDS – saw its city housing
subsidies cut after refusing to back down from critiques of Mayor Giuliani. In order to avoid
these kinds of entanglements, some non-profits refuse to take public financing altogether; most,
however, simply seek to navigate the politically treacherous terrain as best they can.
In so doing, many non-profit leaders and staff cultivate close relations with both elected
officials and agency staff, even as their agendas differ on fundamental issues. In an interview,
CDC staffer Fitzsimmons characterized non-profit housing as “an industry built entirely on
cronyism. You can’t even call it a critique, it’s just a statement of fact”. When I asked what they
meant by “cronyism,” they replied, “what I would call cronyism someone else would call
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‘embedded relationship-building.” Peterson, whose organization advises non-profits engaged in
land use politics, told me that maintaining working relationships with their local councilmembers
– who are not only key to their own funding strategies, but also the central actor in most ULURP
processes – is one of the leading reasons why more non-profits do not oppose rezonings they
consider worse than the status quo.
The public money that goes to organizing groups and CDCs is not a tremendous
expenditure; in fact, it is, in Stoecker’s (1997, 7) phrase, just “Enough… to stave off social
unrest, but not enough to threaten the unequal balance of power.” When new funding streams are
announced, many non-profits will alter their programs to match the newly available funds. This
can sometimes lead non-profits to creep into a kind of behavior they would otherwise chastise. In
a rather extreme example, in 2010 the Brooklyn chapter of Habitat for Humanity created a brand
new program – the largest in its 32-year history – in order to qualify for a $21 million HUD grant
to increase homeownership in areas with high foreclosure rates. For its target area, the non-profit
chose the Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood. While Bedford Stuyvesant had in fact experienced
a wave of foreclosures, its buildings had sold quickly, and the neighborhood exhibited an
extremely low rate of vacancy. In order to fulfill their grant obligations (as well as an additional
$22 million in private funds the organization had leveraged after winning the HUD grant),
Brooklyn Habitat for Humanity struck deals with notoriously abusive neighborhood landlords to
evict their rent stabilized or subsidized tenants, and then sell their buildings to the non-profit,
which in turn would sell the buildings to a new homeowner. At least four of the buildings that
Habitat purchased for this program were fully occupied shortly before their purchase; in two
cases, Habitat purchased the buildings just days after they were cleared, then falsely advertised
them to potential buyers as “long-vacant.” At least three families went homeless as a result of
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their eviction (Rochabrun 2016). While this may be an extreme example, it nonetheless
demonstrates just how far a non-profit can turn away from its mission in order to qualify for
public funds and satisfy grant terms: in this case, an organization whose mission is to provide
housing for the homeless opted instead to make households homeless in order to help fulfill the
state’s homeownership mission.

Follow the Money, Part 3: Unions and Sectoral Growth
Unions’ relationship to funding is entirely different than non-profits: whereas nearly all
non-profits depend on external funding from foundations and the state, nearly all unions are
funded entirely through membership dues. They are therefore not, in this sense, directly
dependent on either politicians (or their appointees) or on philanthropic elites to run their daily
operations and political endeavors. Still, there is a strong dependency between unions and
capital: for money to keep flowing to unions, it has to keep flowing to members; for members to
get paid, the businesses must remain profitable and growing. As former 32BJ staffer Florentino
pointed out when comparing union and non-profit funding models during his interview, unions
are deeply invested in the financial wellbeing of the employers with whom they negotiate, as
well as the overall stability of the sector (or sectors) in which those employers are situated.
In the United States, the labor regime that emerged out of the New Deal tied “benefits”
(i.e. the collective means of social reproduction – particularly pensions and health insurance) to
employment and family, rather than making such programs universal. For those included in this
bargain, not only workers’ paychecks but their health and futures were intimately tied with their
employer’s economic wellbeing. There is therefore a strong incentive built into the system to
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support political agendas – from cold war empire-building to local land use and development
issues – that benefit the employer, even if it contributes to the growth of imperialism or the
gentrification of the city (Rana 2019). This relationship can also cause unions to fight back
against more militant political organizing in their midst. According to Jonas (1998, 326), “unions
have been known to co-opt local opposition movements” against their employers’ political
agendas out of “fear that future inward investment opportunities might be jeopardized by
organized political action.”
MacDonald (2011, 216) goes so far as to assert that “North American labor history
knows of no case of unions challenging the nature of what is produced. And yet this is what is
called for in a left strategy adequate to the challenges posed by neoliberal urbanism,” since what
is being overwhelmingly produced – luxury space – threatens to displace those whose labor
enables its production (or others in the same or lower class position). Milkman (2015, 175)
argues that through legislative lobbying around minimum wages, safety regulations, and
insurance expansions, unions genuinely do represent the broader working class, and not just their
own sectional interest. This is distinct, however, from threatening the fundamentals of one’s
sector with anything beyond a temporary strike – the resolution of which is meant to affect the
distribution of the surplus, rather than reduce the employer’s production capacity or total output.
One possible exception to MacDonald’s rule is the International Longshore Workers’ Union’s
opposition to neoliberal free trade agreements (Ahlquist and Levi 2013, 186). That union’s leftist
political culture – which goes back to its founding and the leadership of longtime president Harry
Bridges – has allowed the union to take political stands on many issues other unions have refused
to touch. Striking against trade agreements that would almost certainly increase West Coast port
activity, however, represents an almost unprecedented example of a NLRB-recognized and
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contract-bound union (in contrast to an organization like the Industrial Workers of the World, in
its past or present iterations) taking direct action against their employers’ basic business
operations without intent to compromise on an eventual growth agenda.
ILWU is the exception that proves the rule. While such activity is more common in
countries with sectoral or (inter)national bargaining arrangements, it is exceedingly rare under
the North American norm of unions based in crafts, industries, and turf. In Ahlquist and Levi’s
In the Interest of Others, the authors study four unions in order to understand the contingencies
of solidarity: when unions act along their own narrowest interests, and when they act on behalf
of a much larger group. As discussed in Chapter One, Ahlquist and Levi (2013, 2) describe this
as “communities of fate:” “those with whom individuals come to perceive their own interest as
bound and with whom they are willing to act in solidarity…. The community of fate may
encompass only members of the organization, in which case the actions will be narrow and
exclusively self-serving. But the community of fate could also encompass unknown others for
whom the members feel responsibility.” Later, they clarify that “the process of constructing
communities of fate involves drawing boundaries between groups: who is ‘like us’ and who is
not?” (ibid, 277).
Most of Ahlquist and Levi’s examples take on the question of when unions do and do not
expand their communities of fate to include other members of the working class beyond their
own membership; they do, however, note that “there are many instances in which we see
managers attempting to engender a ‘community of fate’ within the firm, typically trying to
convince workers that the interests of the firm and the interests of the workers are aligned”
(Ahlquist and Levi 2013, 268). The case study of New York City union land use politics suggest
that it is not just managers who attempt to construct a community of fate that pulls in labor, but
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also labor organizations that attempt to strengthen their own position by extending their
community of fate to employers. When that employer’s industry is situated in the real estate
sector, that has meant embracing the politics of gentrification as part and parcel of the politics of
labor, and thus bolstering the spatial expropriation of the value labor has produced (Chatterjee
2014).

Follow the Money, Part 4: Unions and Pension Fund Investments
In addition to being labor organizations, US unions are also managers of capital. One of
their most important duties is to set aside both employer and worker contributions into funds set
to grow and be repaid to workers upon retirement in the form of a private pension. Though
individual union members are rarely rich, their collective funds amount to trillions of dollars in
savings and investments. This is a relatively recent phenomenon: during World War II, US
pension funds were fairly small and localized; by the mid-1970s however, pension funds
“became the largest pool of equity investment anywhere in the world (McCarthy 2017, 89). In
2010, the value of union pension funds reached $10 trillion (ibid, 77). These funds are important
to understanding unions’ political programs – particularly in the realm of land use – and the
multiple purposes they serve.
Ghilarducci (1992) calls pension funds “labor’s capital,” and posits three modes of
analysis for understanding how the function. Neoclassical analysts view “pensions as efficient
contracts” (ibid, 3). The point of the pensions is for employers to retain workers without having
to immediately raise their wages. This disincentivizes what they call “shirking” on the job
because workers will be afraid that being fired will mean not only losing income immediately
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(which is easier to replace) but also in the long-term (which is harder to come by). By contrast,
the Marxist analysis views “pensions as worker control devices” (ibid, 4), whereby the pension
bonds workers to their employer in a paternalistic manner, divides workers by age (with older
workers sometimes selling out younger workers through contracts that shore up pensions while
cutting starting wages), and dulls the call for comprehensive social security. Finally, Ghilarducci
posits the institutionalist framework (to which she subscribes), which views “pensions as social
institutions” that evolve over time to take on different meanings and can be used flexibly toward
different ends (ibid, 6). In this view, the pension pushes capitalist employers toward an
“industrial feudalism” in which they are responsible for workers’ wellbeing far longer than they
would otherwise entertain, and unions can use pension investments as tool to extract more
favorable terms from employers (ibid, 6). All three of these explanations occur in the world
simultaneously: most employers who offer pensions take the neoclassical view; most radical
labor activists take the Marxist view; most union staffers and leaders take the institutional view.
In fact, all three interpretations have been promoted for the entire history of union pensions.
In 1927, radical labor organizer William Z. Foster published a pamphlet titled Wrecking
the Labor Banks, which decried early pension schemes as “trade unionism capitalism,” or “the
assembling by the trade union leaders of such meager savings as the workers are able to make
out of their slim wages and then to invest them in industry” (Foster 1927, 7). He then suggested a
slogan for the unions pioneering this program: “Labor is becoming Capital” (ibid, 7). According
to Foster’s narrative, the first union to attempt a pension scheme was the Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers (BLE), whose initial investments included buying the Equitable Life
Building – then the world’s tallest building, and the source of enough outrage to jump-start the
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movement for zoning in New York City.122 A BLE leader argued that union pension investments
in capitalist firms had “demonstrated American labor’s complete answer to the theories of Marx
and Lenin” (i.e. refuting them by showing the concurrence – rather than conflict – of labor and
capital); another claimed triumphantly, “Instead of standing on a corner soapbox screaming with
rage because the capitalists own real estate, bank accounts, and automobiles, the engineer has
turned in and become a capitalist himself” (ibid, 12). When markets went through a cyclical
downturn, however, the BLE’s investments lost their value; at that point, an enormous amount of
corruption was uncovered at every level of the union’s investment program (ibid, 13-14).
Corruption, however, was not at the heart of Foster’s critique; instead, he argued that
trade union capitalism militates directly against the growth and
development of the labor movement in various ways, but chiefly by
killing in the unions the idea of a struggle against the employers and
setting up instead theories and practices based upon the false
conception that in order for the workers to make progress they must
collaborate with or more properly, subordinate themselves to, the
employers. The class collaboration policy of which it is part denies
the fundamental conflict of interest between the working class and
the capitalist class (Foster 1927, 55).
One of the greatest challenges to Foster’s analysis of pension funds as inevitably
fostering class collaboration would come from the United Housing Foundation, which, as
discussed in Chapter Two, invested union pension funds directly into the production of
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Ironically, the building now houses the New York City Department of City Planning.
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affordable housing and other cooperative social goods for union members and other workingclass residents. Even this program, however, involved a fair amount of collaboration with the
growth machine in the form of banks and state agencies interested not only in development for
development’s sake, but specifically in driving out even lower-income workers from targeted
parts of the city. Soon, however, state policy would make even those politically compromised
programs more difficult to pursue.
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act (which Business Week called “A New Deal for American
Employers” [McCarthy 2017, 97]) demanded that pension funds be controlled by a joint laborbusiness group containing at least 50 percent employer representatives. By the mid-1950s,
pension funds were already investing an increasing share of their funds in corporate stocks: in
1949, pension funds had invested $586 million in stocks; by 1954, it was $3.1 billion; by 1960,
$16 billion; and by 1970; $76 billion (ibid, 86). Georgakas and Surkin (1998, 37) quote an
unnamed Detroit auto worker active in the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement analyzing this
trend in the newspaper Inner City Voice in 1970: “The huge treasuries, originally conceived to
stockpile ammunition for class warfare, have put the unions in the banking, real estate, and
insurance businesses.”
In 1974 came an even more impactful set of limitations on pension fund management in
the form of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which McCarthy argues
“completed the process of financializing pensions” (ibid, 105). ERISA legislated increased
disclosure requirements, stricter vesting and funding guidelines, guarantees of payment for
workers whose funds fail, and, most consequentially for this story, narrower fiduciary standards.
Section 404(a)(1) of the act required that pension fund managers invest “with the care, skill,
prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in like
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capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like
character with like aims.” In other words, union pension funds should be invested like any other
capitalist enterprise, and value higher yields over any other social or political commitment.
Affordable housing can be pursued as an investment strategy, but only if it is either highly
profitable (which then calls into question the housing’s affordability) or if it comprises only a
small portion of the overall portfolio. McCarthy quotes a Department of Labor administrator
explaining, “what the pension plan fiduciary needs to determine about an investment is not, first,
whether it is socially good or bad but how the proposed investment will serve the plan’s
participants and beneficiaries” (ibid, 111).123
Nonetheless, commentators on the right claimed that pensions’ turn toward corporate
stock ownership represented a red menace. In 1976, Peter Drucker published an influential book
titled The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America, arguing that the
US economy was in peril because union funds owned increasing shares of the largest industries.
Investing for the highest rate of return, however, virtually assured that unions would remain in
line with corporate profit imperatives: pensions would buy stock in firms that payed low wages,
closed plants, and violated labor laws, and even invest in some of the very companies those
unions were actively targeting in organizing campaigns (Ghilarducci 1992, 112). In an interview,
long-time union strategist Goldberg summarized the situation for union leaders: “I used to do a
lot of benefit fund work so I'm familiar with pension funds, trustees, administrators, and that sort
of thing. The cards are marked, the deck is stacked, and those people who are in leadership
positions are unwilling or unable or just don't know how to change the power relationship.” Most
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A year after ERISA was passed, New York City public sector union pension funds would bail out New York City
during its fiscal crisis, and thus perversely benefit from the ensuing austerity regime (as discussed in Chapter 3).
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pension funds invested their capital identically to insurance companies or mutual funds, rather
than as a distinct creature of and for labor (Baker and Fung 2001, 13).
By 1985, union pension funds had invested $500 million in real estate (Ghilarducci 1992,
125). Some of this money, as in the AFL-CIO HIT discussed in Chapter Three, went to
affordable housing production (which even commercial investment funds recognize as an
important part of an investment portfolio, as such developments retain their revenues in down
markets), but the vast majority went into high-end commercial development. The building trades
were especially interested in real estate and used a “Keynesian multiplier argument” to describe
such investments as market and employment stimulators (ibid, 125). A great deal of pension
investment in real estate would go toward explicitly speculative ventures, including toward
financial derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations based on subprime mortgages
(McCarthy 2017, 89 and 94). Ultimately, many pension funds invested in hedge funds and
private equity firms, which took specific aim at gentrifying cities around the world – including
the homes in which many union pensioners hoped to remain during their retirement (Lerner and
Livingston 2019). By 2015, over thirty union locals had invested a combined $3.2 billion in
Blackstone – a private equity fund that is now the world’s largest landlord – in order to support
that company’s plan to buy up foreclosed single-family homes and convert them into investment
properties (Brady 2019). While particularly egregious pension actions have caused uproars,
pensioners have generally supported investments that produce a healthy return. As Aronowitz
(2003, 8) points out, “stakeholders normally defend the system that has given them ownership.”
In New York, public sector pensions have invested over $1 billion in Blackstone since
2003 (Henwood and Featherstone 2018). Pension funds own various bits and pieces of the city’s
high-end real estate market. The Retirement System of Alabama owns outright one of the
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country’s biggest private office buildings, 55 Water Street. The Ohio teachers’ pension system
owns a large part of 15 Union Square West, a commercial office space converted into luxury
apartments. TIAA, the preferred pension fund for university and non-profit employees, owns
similar buildings in TriBeCa and the Meatpacking District. The California pension system
CalPERS bought the postmodern commercial office building 787 Seventh Avenue for $1.9
billion in 2016. In 2013, the New York State teachers fund bought 49 percent of high-end
commercial office building 245 Park Avenue for $438 million; in 2017, after the neighborhood
was rezoned, the building was sold for $2.2. billion (Dwyer 2018). As discussed in Chapter Four,
the Ontario municipal workers union became the lead investor and co-developer of Hudson
Yards, which they call the largest private real estate development in US history.124 These
examples only account for direct investments in real estate; far more pension fund money is
invested in hedge funds and private (or “predatory”) equity funds, which in turn put money into
real estate, including schemes to deregulate affordable housing (Fields 2015).
From the 1990s to the present, more unions – including the AFL-CIO itself – have
embraced their role as activist investors and used their shareholder power to act as a “corporate
watchdog” (Fitch 2006, 25-26). These unions – particularly those like SEIU with large research
staffs – used their power as shareholders to make demands on corporations, and wielded the
threat of divestment as a potential penalty for non-cooperation. This tactic has had some notable
success in forcing employers into labor neutrality agreements or cutting executive salaries
(Webber 2018), but is altogether different than investing in labor’s social development. For the
strategy to work, unions must be invested broadly in all sorts of non-union corporations, only a
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“Private” belies the fact that Hudson Yards literally rests upon public infrastructure, and has thus benefitted
from an estimated $5.6 billion in public subsidies and infrastructure investment (Fisher and Leite 2019).
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small fraction of which will ever receive the union’s shareholder attention. The constricting
regulations placed on union pension funds by federal legislation, as well as the union fund
managers’ own pursuit of returns, make clear the stakes of what Skerrett et al. (2018) term “the
contradictions of pension fund capitalism.” While investing labor’s capital gives unions
shareholder power in corporate behavior, it also ties unions closer into a “community of fate”
(Ahlquist and Levi, 2013) with those who profit off their exploitation. In the specific case of real
estate investment, union pension funds grow as rent gaps close; pensions are provided as
pensioners are evicted.

Power
A History of Repression
Contemporary US union and non-profit behavior around questions of land use and
development is formed in the context of a long history of state repression against labor. This
history stretches back to the beginnings of the country in “original accumulation” (commonly
translated as “primitive accumulation”) (Marx 1867 [1976], 873): the entire landscape of the
United States exists on land originally inhabited by indigenous people, and a very large portion
of it was – and continues to be – cultivated through various forms of “unfree labor” (Strauss
2012), including slavery, indentured servitude, sharecropping, debt peonage, and much more
(Estes 2019; Woods 1998). Violent repression of labor’s autonomy – especially in its collective
expressions – has always been a part of the way space is produced in the United States, from
colonial routes through plantation development and onward into industrialization. Working and
living conditions in contemporary New York City are quite different from these previous forms
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of unfreedom, but the organizations that exist to represent labor today are nonetheless shaped by
prior precedents.
This history of repression has had a deeper and longer-lasting impact on unions in the US
compared with other countries whose industrial economies developed in parallel (Katznelson
1986). New York City unions, though broadly institutionalized into the city’s political culture
and machines, continue to operate in a context of corporate assault (as demonstrated by the
recent open shop movement at Hudson Yards, discussed in Chapter Four) as well as state
retrenchment of labor rights (as demonstrated by recent NLRB rulings limiting organizing
rights). New York City non-profits, meanwhile, developed in the context of state attacks on
radical organization in the 1960s and 1970s through the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Counterintelligence Program and other modes of political repression. While most non-profits in
the city today receive various forms of state aid, they are constantly reminded that such funding
is precarious, and depends on their remaining politically useful – or at least non-antagonistic – to
their patrons. In this context, union and non-profit reticence toward direct conflict with capital
and the state over issues of land use and development can be understood as a ramification of
prior rounds of struggle and repression.
This is not just the conclusion of outside analysts; many union and non-profit leaders
recognize this as a leading dynamic in their work. In an interview, longtime union strategist
Goldberg summarized this condition, as it faces both unions and non-profits:
The times in which we’re living – we’re all doing defensive work,
trying to defend gains of the past. It’s not a critique of leaders, it’s
the reality that working-class interests have been crushed over the
past 50 years. In that environment they’re making decisions to
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protect what they have and make a gain here and there, and as a
result they have to support real estate. [They’re] trying to maintain
what we have for working people, and living to fight another day.
Goldberg points to a 50-year timeline; others see this dynamic playing out throughout the
country’s history, with centuries of legal and physical repression pushing working-class
institutions toward increasingly cautious, conservative, and self-policing programs (Fantasia
1988, 25-72). Voss (1994, 231) points to the origins of the relative timidity of US unionism in
the repression of an early radical labor movement – the Knights of Labor – that culminated in
1866 and 1867: “American labor exceptionalism – that unexpected combination of weak
working-class institutions and unions’ political conservatism – was not foreordained, it was
made. The American labor movement was not born ‘different,’ or ‘more limited,’ or more ‘job
conscious’ than other labor movements; it became that way in the wake of the collapse of the
Knights of Labor. The demise of the Knights foreclosed important options for the American
worker, and labor in the twentieth century was very much shaped by this absence.” In her telling,
US labor’s problem has not been a lack of organizing, strategy, or struggle; instead, the problem
is that long ago “employers won the class struggle,” and ever since labor has been operating on
capital’s terrain (ibid, 232). While the International Workers of the World and the Communist
Party would later reinvigorate the traditions of labor militancy, the US state proved particularly
brutal in criminalizing their organizing. In their study of 20th century “poor people’s
movements,” Piven and Cloward (1977, 98) come to the conclusion that “in instance after
instance, worker struggles did not collapse from lack of internal unity; they were smashed by the
coercive power of the state.”

383

In the neoliberal era, legal, procedural, spatial, and public relations campaigns have
ramped up to either break unions or prevent unionization. Capital strikes – like that which
precipitated New York City’s 1975 fiscal crisis – disciplined localities into restrictive labor
regimes and austerity staffing; so-called “right to work” and “open shop” laws have proliferated
at the state levels; firms restructured both the spatial elements of production (where goods are
produced, and the layouts of their plants) to avoid unionization; union-busting consultancies and
law firms used both NLRB inefficiencies and the tools of public relations to squelch union
drives; and the country as a whole moved from what Gilmore (1999) calls “military
Keynesianism to post-Keynesian militarism.”
Milkman (2015, 175) suggests that the US union movement adapted to neoliberalism and
its own concomitant decline in union density and power by switching from “inside game”
strategies (those premised on their capacity to influence both corporate and state decisionmaking through partnership) to an “outside game” premised on “mobilizing rank-and-file
workers and their supporters in the wider community into various types of public protest” (ibid,
181). The goal of such protest campaigns, however, is to reach a settlement with the employer
that includes the union in its future growth strategy. In contemporary New York City, the
predominant growth strategy includes ever-rising real estate values as an essential and often
driving component. SEIU’s famous Justice for Janitors campaign, for example, brought back
confrontational street protests and recognition strikes to the repertoire of US urban union drives.
Once those campaigns were won, however, many SEIU locals formed political partnerships with
the real estate industry to hold onto the gains they previously secured and enjoy the benefits of
their sector’s expansion. The “game” that is being played is what Bourdieu (1984, 79) called
“illusio”: “an involvement in the game which produces the game.” The goal of the “outside
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game” is to reestablish the “inside game,” which in turn only exist by threat of a switch to the
outside.
Whereas the repression unions are reacting to has historically been directed straight at
them, the repression non-profits are reacting to has historically been directed at the more militant
movements that either preceded them or existed alongside them. According to Rodríguez (2007,
26), contemporary non-profit politics can be understood as an outgrowth of 1960s and 1970s
attacks on radical US social movements, “a coalescence of official and illicit/illegal forms of
state and state-sanctioned violence: police-led racist violence (including false imprisonment,
home invasions, assassinations, and political harassment), white civilian reaction (lynchings,
vigilante movements, new electoral blocs, and a contemporary surge of white nationalist
organizations), and the proliferation of racially formed (and racially executed) juridical measures
to criminalize and imprison entire populations of poor and working-class Black, Brown, and
Indigenous people” (ibid, 23-24). At the same time, as discussed in Chapter Three, federal
funding of non-profits was a strategy of incorporation aimed at channeling dissent into
established processes: as non-profits grew, so did attacks on radical organizations that refused
this mainstreaming. In this context, the entire infrastructure of neoliberalism – including (but far
from limited to) the proliferation of state- and foundation-funded non-profits to replace welfare
functions and coordinate place-based working-class political advocacy – can be understood as a
violent reaction to the liberation movements that coalesced in the 1960s and early 1970s in the
US and worldwide (Woods 2011). The result for those organizations that either survived this
onslaught or emerged in its wake is an “inside/outside” dynamic that works by “funneling
activists into the hierarchical rituals and restrictive professionalism of discrete campaigns, think
tanks, and organizations, outside of which it is usually profoundly difficult to organize a critical
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mass of political movement” (Rodríguez 2007, 26). As Rodríguez argues, “the non-profit
industrial complex has facilitated a bureaucratized management of fear that mitigates against the
radical break with owning-class capital (read: foundation support) and hegemonic common sense
(read: law and order) that might otherwise be posited as the necessary precondition for
generating counter-hegemonic struggles” (ibid, 31).
If one impact of long-term repression has been to delegitimize, tamp down, or drive out
radical autonomous organizing, another has been to steer the surviving institutions toward
defensive partnerships with state actors. According to Hauptmeier and Turner (2007, 133), this is
especially the case in New York City, where unions have turned toward “political coalitions” (in
contrast to LA unions’ turn to “social coalitions”). Citing the 2001 mayoral election and 2002
gubernatorial election as their primary case studies, Hauptmeier and Turner demonstrate that
New York City unions tend to express their power through “their actual or expected leverage in
elections,” but do so based on their particular interests. The result is a “fragmentation of political
influence” that manifests in a chaotic field of conflicting endorsements, with each union
protecting the candidate whom their leaders feel can best protect their interests (ibid, 133).
McQuarrie (2013, 160-162) identifies a similar pattern among the “clientelist” type of CDCs,
which attach themselves to a particular politician or machine as a lifeline, then reshape their
programs to benefit their patrons. “Community development, in the case of these CDCs, is
subordinated to the logic of electoral politics” (ibid, 160). In both cases, the defensive attachment
of unions and non-profits to external sources of power encourages them to pursue spatial
strategies that are in line with those their political patrons favor.

“Schumpeterian Unionism” and Its Non-Profit Corollaries
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In the face of state and corporate repression, working-class institutions do not simply give
up on their agendas; nor do many working-class institutions fight back directly against such
repression with militant focus. Instead, most adapt to changing conditions while trying to guide
that change in favorable directions. Focusing on Canadian unions facing shifting economic
landscapes, Tufts (2009) offers the explanatory framework of “Schumpeterian unionism” to
describe the way unions – like capitalist firms – are subject to evolving challenges that force
them into a state of constant reinvention. Building on Schumpeter (2013 [1943]) and Jessop
(2002), Tufts defines this concept as “a model of labour organizing that preserves working-class
agency by adapting to successive rounds of economic ‘creative destruction’” which, while
“neither transformative nor revolutionary,” “may sustain labour as a viable economic agent
within harsher variants of neoliberalism” (ibid, 981). In so doing, however, “the choices unions
make can contribute to neoliberal agendas while simultaneously reproducing labor as viable
institutions” (ibid, emphasis in the original).
Schumpeterian unionism is distinct from both business unionism (which exists to aid
capital) and social unionism (which exists to confront capital), and fits more closely the model of
union land use campaigns discussed in Chapter Four. In its approach to representation,
Schumpeterian unionism encourages unions to develop campaigns which draw in a large number
of workers at once through indirect and multi-scalar efforts (Tufts 2009, 982), such as a push to
rezone a neighborhood once labor neutrality agreements are secured. In its approach to new
organizing, Schumpeterian unionism embraces “ephemeral coalitions rather than sustainable
community unionism” through “campaign specific” alliances in which unions’ “superior
financial and political power is not easily surrendered to create equal coalitions” (ibid, 983). In
relation to management, Schumpeterian unionism stresses “limited trust” relationships “where
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cooperation is often ephemeral and lent for competitive support under specific conditions,” often
linked to the promise of increased productivity and competitiveness (ibid, 983). Perhaps most
importantly, in relation to the state, Schumpterian unionism “is more than willing to enter uneven
tri-partite relationships with the state and capital,” particularly at the local scale (ibid, 984). This
entails a high degree of cooperation “with municipal politicians (Left and Right) to influence
processes such as urban development” (ibid, 984). This bipartisan approach to development
politics manifested in many unions – especially in the private sector – supporting the real estateoriented planning initiatives of both Bloomberg and de Blasio.
One of the key goals of Schumpeterian unionism is to regulate the labor market at the
local level in order to secure their place in sectoral growth. This builds on Peck’s (1996, 11)
insight that labor markets “are socially regulated” through varying forms “ranging from formal
labor law to socially embedded work norms, from employer discrimination to union action.”
Through the kinds of apprenticeship, training, licensing, and accreditation programs Tufts
describes, “Trade unions and professional associations derive much of their power in the labor
process from the restrictions they are able to place on the supply of labor to their particular niche
of the labor market” (ibid, 65). This mode, however, demands a degree of exclusion, often sorted
through the social categories of race, gender, and age (ibid.). Schumpeterian unionism does not
challenge these dynamics as a whole, but rather acts to ensure that their particular workforce is
not counted among the excluded.
Though developed to explain contemporary union behavior in the context of neoliberal
restrictions and following a history of labor repression, the Schumpeterian framework can also
be extended to many non-profits, which have developed campaigns in relation to capital and the
state that engender neither straightforward support for gentrification (though this certainly also
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happens) nor full-on confrontation against the real estate state (though this too occurs). More
commonly, non-profits form the kind of tentative win-win-win partnerships to support a “high
road” development agenda which includes some degree of low-income housing and
neighborhood preservation as part of a broader neoliberal development agenda. They construct a
similar form of “limited trust” (Tufts 2009, 983) with for-profit developers in order to secure
space or contracts, and maintain a similarly intensive dependence on local state actors for
funding and development options. In perhaps the closest link, many Schumpeterian non-profits
place an identical emphasis on “human capital investment through vocational training” as “a
means for increasing local competitiveness and preparing workers for future rounds of creative
destruction” (ibid, 984). This is sometimes done in direct competition with union apprenticeship
programs, however, and thus forms a strategy to ensure their own survival at the expense of other
working-class institutions.
Schumpeterian non-profit strategy is essentially the model presented in Pacewicz’s
Partisans and Partners, in which “grassroots community leaders” react to and reproduce the
limitations placed on local development politics under neoliberalism. According to Pacewicz
(2016, 25-26),
Keynesian-era policies structured business and labor leaders’ public
game in similar ways. Leaders from both sides traded on an ability
to mobilize their supporters during conflicts over locally rooted
resources and were united by a common understanding of public
engagement as the skillful representation of these supporters….
[N]eoliberal reforms changed the arena in which community leaders
play their public game. These reforms facilitated outside acquisition
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of locally owned firms, eliminated traditional leaders’ access to
discretionary federal funding, and created opportunities for those
willing to form broad-based partnerships.
Today, resources are allocated “through competitive, market-like mechanisms” (ibid, 300) to
groups that frame themselves as “partners” and eschew contentious politics in favor of
collaboration (ibid, 281). These non-profits have adapted their orientations to the latest round of
creative destruction and reframed their mission as partners in urban growth. In neither the nonprofit nor labor manifestations are working-class institutions at the leading edge of this change,
nor are they designing compromised programs based on their own visions; they are responding to
the chaotic, harsh, and ever-changing conditions of capitalist development.

Planned Informality
It is not only through coordinated programs of repression that the state and capital
discipline labor, but also through the apparent absence of coordination or agenda. “Informality”
is a term often used to describe forms of labor that fall outside established and sanctioned
channels. As Roy (2009, 84) shows in her analysis of Indian urban planning, however, “the state
is an informalized entity” too, and informality itself can be “a feature of structures of power.” In
New York City, one way in which this planned informality is manifested is the city’s refusal to
develop a comprehensive plan, and instead to rely on neighborhood (or even parcel) level
rezonings as the primary form of land use control. This use of “zoning instead of planning”
(Angotti 2005) makes all land use decisions ad hoc, up for negotiation, and settled through deals
between land owners, developers, councilmembers, the mayor, unions, and non-profits. As
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Sorkin (2018, 119) reasons, however, “these deals are only viable when developers feel they
have more to gain than they must give back, and so each of these exchanges is, by definition, a
bad deal for the public.”
Unlike Roy’s case study of Indian cities’ planning capacity as intentionally
decommissioned, Angotti presents New York City as resistant to formal planning from its
founding. When the five boroughs were incorporated in 1898, “the new central government
rejected comprehensive planning for the entire city,” and relied instead on a decentralized and
fragmented “Board of Estimate” system that offered a great deal of openings for real estate
influence (Angotti 2008, 59). Angotti (ibid.) describes the ensuing result as “an overdeveloped
central core, sprawl in the outer boroughs, subway lines that did not connect with one another,
poorly served portions of the outer boroughs, a dearth of open space, and lack of public places.”
A 1963 City Charter revision forced the city to create a master plan, which was delivered in
1969. Though “more descriptive than prescriptive” (ibid, 74), the plan contained some modest
curbs on real estate that the industry opposed. As a result, the City Planning Commission never
passed the plan, and it faded into memory. More recently, the City Council’s 2019 Charter
Revision Commission studied the possibility of mandating a comprehensive planning process,
but recommended instead only minor revisions to the existing Uniform Land Use Review
Procedure (Murphy 2019).
In the absence of a comprehensive plan, there is little to evaluate an individual land use
change against except its acceptability to various power brokers: developers, on the side of
capital; mayoral appointees and local councilmembers, on the side of the state; and organized
workers and residents on the side of labor. If a deal must be struck in every land use change, then
the state or capital (depending on which party initiates a rezoning) can seek to pull in supportive
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elements of labor, even if others object based on their own institutional objections or a broader
concerns over the impacts of the change on the wider class.
Reinforcing this tendency toward compromise and deal-making is the political
foreclosure of stronger planning policies, particularly around housing. The most enduring
programs to secure space for labor in capitalist cities have been public housing and rent control;
federal law (including historically low HUD budgets and the 1999 Faircloth Amendment, which
bars the federal government from funding any net increase in a local public housing authority’s
stock) makes expanding public housing challenging; state law (specifically the 1971 Urstadt law,
which prohibits cities in New York from creating local rent control ordinances that go beyond
the state’s limited program) makes expanding rent control at the local level illegal. What cities
retain, then, is land use policy, and particularly zoning – an important tool in the regulation of
built forms, but never a particularly effective tool for stabilizing housing prices or quickly
producing large quantities of housing for those unserved by the private, unsubsidized housing
stock. Zoning, too, is a suspect mechanism for ensuring union growth. Though unions of all
kinds have engaged in land use policy in order to grow their numbers or maintain their power,
they have had difficulty legally inserting union guarantees into the zoning text. Instead, they
have focused on tying the subsidies or public land alienation that are often paired with rezonings
to unionization, or have secured deals with the parcel owners in the area being rezoned.
According to an interview with Ramsey, then the executive director of a long-standing
housing organizing and advocacy non-profit, “[W]e lost the affordable housing debates a really,
really long time ago, in which the idea of having fully affordable housing was still on the table.”
While he insists of course he “would love for there to be fully affordable actual low-income
housing that’s being built, but that’s just not something that’s happened in the city for the past
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10, 20 years.” Instead, the organization is incentivized to promote inclusionary zoning schemes
which only produce affordable housing in the context of intensified market-rate development.
This is by no means the organization’s political vision, but “at least there will be new lowincome people who will be able to afford to live there.”
In addition to deal making, this informalized system of piecemeal rezoning over
comprehensive planning or forthright commitments to either low-rent housing or unionization
pushes non-profits and unions into bank-shot activism, or supporting one policy in order to make
another policy outcome more likely. As discussed in Chapter Four, several unions – such as
1199, UFT, and HTC – signed a letter supporting the Amazon subsidy package in order to secure
an entirely unrelated set of policies from the Cuomo and de Blasio administrations, in part
because this form of deal-making is perceived to be the most salient route toward securing their
needs from the state. Marwell (2007, 80) presents the example of Williamsburg’s United Jewish
Organization supporting a controversial 1997 residential rezoning of a nearby industrial area
(opposed by the local CDC Los Sures) for the sole purpose of making more likely an entirely
separate rezoning action they favored in the nearby Hasidic area. In these cases, it is not the iron
hand of the state forcing unions and non-profits into class compromise, but rather its quiet
foreclosure of viable pathways for what unions and non-profits to secure what they actually want
from government.

Survival
Grow or Die: Labor’s growth imperative
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One of capitalism’s laws is that firms must continuously grow or else risk being eclipsed
by competition or falling deep into debt (Marx 1867 [1976], 742). This puts pressure on
capitalists to find ways to increase productivity while diminishing costs, most commonly through
labor-saving technology and labor cost cutting. While unionization changes a firm’s capacity to
unilaterally make such decisions around staffing and wages, unions seek to ensure that the firms
in which they operate remain functional, and thus can embrace strategies that aid in their market
expansion.
In addition to ensuring that the union firms and employment sectors keep swelling,
however, unions must themselves keep growing. This is not quite as ironclad a law as firms’
growth imperative, but it is a real pressure nonetheless: if firms keep expanding while unions
remain stagnant, unions will lose market density and decline in power and relevancy. Eventually
either the industry will go non-union, or a different union will rise up and challenge the
established union. Growth also helps ensure that unions maintain their vibrancy, bringing in
more exploited workers rather than simply caring for their own protected few (Savage 1998,
244). Growth is also a temporal imperative. According to Clark (1989, 21), “only through
attracting new members can unions be sure that their power is reproduced from one time period
to the next.” By demonstrating both individual unions’ and the union movement’s staying power,
growth becomes “the means of legitimating union power” (ibid.). Unions also grow for less
noble purposes: mergers and geographical expansions can build up workers’ power to challenge
capital’s mobility, but territorial growth can also frustrate members’ attempts at building rank
and file challenges to union leadership (Early 2011, 313). The growth imperative can also be
used as a justification for cutting deals with corporations under unfavorable terms – what
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dissident SEIU United Healthcare Workers-West Vice President John Borsos (2008, np)
characterizes as “sacrificing rights and standards now to build power for later.”
In the kind of deals discussed in Chapter Four, however, it is less rights and standards
that are sacrificed than the class character and affordability of the city. The problem for workers
is not necessarily that the contracts which result from pro-real estate land use politics are sub-par,
but rather that their and their neighbors’ wages are increasingly subsumed by perilously rising
housing costs, which result in part from the city’s usually union-approved approach to land use
and planning. Unions that engage in intensive land use politics – particularly 32BJ and HTC, but
also the most growth-oriented elements of the building trades – aim to secure their own growth
by aiding developers in closing rent gaps. They reject the model of “hot shop” organizing – or
selecting organizing targets based on where workers are demanding union representation on a
shop-by-shop basis – in favor of a top-down model in which union research and political staff
identify either corporate targets or city initiatives that can be leveraged for future large-scale
growth: a territory-wide agreement with an employer, legislative language requiring neutrality
agreements or prevailing wage standards, or some combination of the two. This model has no
doubt been effective in expanding these unions’ membership numbers, but it has done so at the
expense of supporting (or only temporarily and strategically opposing) a land use and
development agenda that makes living in the city more expensive (or ultimately untenable) for a
growing number of working-class households. There are, of course, many alternatives to both hot
shop and top-down growth strategies – including the kind of “whole worker organizing” model
McAlevey (2012, 14) and others endorse when combined with strategic targeting of key
industries and employers. Converting to that model, however, would entail a wholesale
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transformation of the strategies, cultures, and internal organization of both the most stagnant and
fastest growing unions in the city.
Alongside unions and corporations, non-profits confront a similar growth imperative.
Non-profits that do not grow in terms of their client bases, memberships, staffs, budgets, or turf
can be overtaken by growing non-profits, which can monopolize both foundation and state
funding as well as media coverage and political access. Wagner (2000, 123) compares the nonprofit field to a capitalist marketplace on microeconomic terms and finds “a similar pattern to
that of the life cycle of small businesses…. Like small businesses that find themselves
unprofitable due to competition, lack of viable product, or pressure to merge or be acquired, a
large number of nonprofits fade from existence in a fairly short time.” Like for-profit real estate
firms, non-profits that manage housing have the option of expanding their property base as a
means of growth and survival. According to Stoecker (1997, 9), such non-profits “are landlords
and as landlords have an interest in maintaining the financial solvency of the organization,
[though] they are nicer about it than for-profit landlords.” In order to remain viable, either their
rents must rise to meet rising organizational operating costs, or the number of properties
managed must increase to bring in new developer fees and rent roles.
For the best CDCs, expanding market share means expanding the stock of affordable
housing. It could also, however, mean growing by acquisition and pushing out smaller CDCs that
might prioritize organizing as an equally important institutional imperative. In an interview,
Ramona Russo, a staffer at one of the country’s largest CDCs, told me that her organization has
expanded in a deliberate model based on the corporate raiders of the 1980s: they regularly
acquire smaller non-profits, retain their working revenue streams, and lay off as many workers as
possible. The group started as a health service organization, then became a CDC, and now has
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executive staff each earning annual salaries of several hundred thousand dollars. This does not
always make economic sense for the CDC, as not all of the groups they acquire add economic
value to the operation. Acquiring them, however, brings potential competitors into their fold and
increases their market share, which in turn builds their “political clout” and “branding” capacity.
While such non-profits continue to provide essential services that neither capital nor the state
will currently ensure, Ortiz emphasized in her interview that “the stress to be competitive is
eroding the foundation of what it means to be a service organization or non-profit.”
When Burnham said during her interview that in the years before her firing Banana
Kelly’s organizing department had expanded tremendously, I asked what drove this growth
spurt. She explained that Banana Kelly grew to fill a need in their particular geography, but that
“there's always a new group that comes up and then cycles out. That is, the organizations peak
and then they fizzle out, and then they peak and then they fizzle out. And it's rested on funding
cycles, but also I think that it's part of this desire to seem new, when it's not new.” I asked what
was supposed to seem new, and Burnham replied “the work. The branding of the work. Like how
do foundations seem like they’re doing something new without actually doing something new?”
In Burnham’s analysis, non-profits are part of a recurring cycle of investment and divestment,
driven by their funders’ own competitive desire to appear cutting edge. While such funding can
enable important organizing or programming, it is inherently unstable, and can lead non-profits
into dubious ventures in pursuit of the glow of the new.
The non-profit growth imperative can not only affect organizations’ own programming –
for better and for worse – but also the way non-profits interact with the growth machine. Support
(even tentative) for real estate-friendly rezonings and redevelopment schemes can not only help
secure funding, but can reframe non-profits as reliable and reasonable partners in growth in the
397

eyes of state actors and developers. This, in turn, can marginalize dissenting non-profits, which
get characterized as ornery in their tactics and unreasonable in their expectations. Such
organizations may then find difficulty securing funds and ultimately close, creating even more
space for conciliatory non-profits to grow. These are not hard and fast rules – CSWA, for
example, has managed to stay open for four decades without sacrificing an ounce of militancy.
The political economy of non-profits, however, in which continued existence depends largely on
support from capital (foundation grants) and the state (budgetary allocations), tends to favor
those organizations that can grow, and that growth is made much easier if they can retain their
patrons’ favor.

Opportunity and Opportunism
As described in Chapter One, labor, capital, and the state all contribute to the production
of urban space, but they do so on deeply uneven terms. As a result, labor organizations seek not
only to produce space on their own terms, but also – and more often – through channels created
by or in response to powerful forces – what sociologists call “political opportunity structures”
(Tarrow 1998).
Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) argue that organizations of labor (specifically unions) and
organizations of capital (specifically corporations) necessarily function under different logics.
They note that “unions are associations of members who, before they can become members of
unions, are already members of other organizations, namely employees of capitalist enterprises”
(ibid, 72). Unions are thus “secondary organizers, and capital itself functions as a primary
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organizer” (ibid.). This fundamentally uphill position directs unions into various forms of
“opportunism,” which they – channeling Luxemburg (1906) – characterize as
the tendency toward an exclusive orientation of the working class
movement toward established and recognized channels of political
action, a tendency toward an exclusive reliance upon parliamentary
and electoral forms of struggle within the working class movement,
the acceptance of the ‘division of labor’ between economic and
political struggles… a strategic self-limitation of the means and
forms of struggle and thus, to put it most abstractly, an interruption
of the dialectic of means and ends and the resulting reification of
means, which are henceforth considered to be ends in themselves
(Offe and Wiesenthal 1980, 104-105).
While in some ways contemporary unions’ land use activism represents a disruption of this
dynamic, with unions expanding the traditional repertoire of struggle and collapsing the
economic-political division, their activity remains in reaction to the dominant planning
paradigms and movements of capital into urban real estate, and reifies the “means” of real estate
cooperation over the “ends” of securing a place for labor.
Opportunism, however, does not manifest solely by failures of labor leaders, and nor does
it disappear solely with their replacement. It is a function of labor organizations’ social location
in a capitalist republic. As Piven and Cloward (1977, 23) noted bluntly, “opportunities for
defiance are structured by features of institutional life. Simply put, people cannot defy
institutions to which they have no access, and to which they make no contribution.” Given these
realities, and also the grave stakes involved in organizing, Offe and Wiesenthal (1980, 105)
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reject both “moralistic” objections to opportunism and “pragmatic” acceptance of it, and suggest
instead that opportunism is a “rational and unstable solution to the dilemma of working class
organizations” (ibid, 106). Rather than a fight or flight instinct, opportunism represents an
instinct to make the best out of a bad situation: it is a compromising mode of institutional
survival in a structurally hostile environment.
They construct a three-part “sociological” explanation of the phenomenon of union
opportunism, which includes: 1) a “substantive” dimension, pointing to an overemphasis on
“institutionalized or otherwise immediately available means” that preempts attempts at larger
scale structural changes; 2) a “temporal” dimension, pointing to an overemphasis on “immediate
and short term accomplishments” over their long-term implications; and 3) a “social” dimension,
pointing to a “maximization” of their membership (turning out as many as possible for actions or
elections) simultaneous to a “tactical exclusion” of those beyond their reach (putting their own
members’ interests at work above those of all other workers) (Offe and Wiesenthal 1980, 105).
Geographers must add a crucial fourth element: a spatial dimension, pointing to unions’
territorial boundedness as a factor that drives them into collaborative arrangements with locally
dominant elements of capital and the state (Cox and Mair 1988; Herod 2001).125
Discussing some of these dynamics as they play out in New York City land use politics,
former RWDSU organizer Jeffrey Eichler summed up the lessons he imparted by saying, “My
point was that the narrower interests of the union make the effort to work with community
groups who have broader goals quite difficult.” When asked if his effort to solidify these
partnerships was ultimately winnable, Eichler replied, “I mean, no – I don’t think it’s winnable

125

Though the analysis is written with unions in mind, many of these explanations clearly fit non-profit
opportunism as well.
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unless the unions would completely change, and I don’t see that happening. I think they lost their
opportunity to do that.” He then discussed the 2011 labor uprising in Madison, Wisconsin as the
last big moment when unions could have seized the initiative, but ultimately settled into a
familiar but losing electoral repertoire.
The unions, because of their nature, because of who they answer to
–they find it very difficult to break out of the narrow parochial
concerns. They want to increase their membership, they are afraid,
terrified of losing because they are afraid that if they lose, they'll
lose everything – except for by being so narrow [that] they lose it all
anyway. The only way unions can grow in this country is if they are
part of a larger movement at this particular time. At times they
recognize it but they're afraid to make the full commitment of what
that entails and what the risks are. And there are big risks, I'm not
denying that.
As “sectional” working-class organizations (Gindin 2013, 65), unions survive by embracing
partnerships with elements of capital and the state over attempts to build class-wide unity against
those forces. A class-based strategy, as Eichler makes clear, would entail significant risk, which
unions – like non-profits – are unlikely to accept until conditions force them to reconsider.

Losing Toward Victory
The leadership of many non-profits and unions are resigned to a kind of fatalism around
land use and development in New York City: they assume that almost all rezonings initiated by
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the city will be approved by the city, and they assume that developers will continue to succeed in
achieving favorable policies around zoning, taxation, and public land alienation. In this, they are
certainly not wrong. The city’s contemporary political economy primarily puts planning in the
service of real estate, in both its concentrated form (large-scale real estate development) as well
as its diffuse form (exclusionary single-family home districts). Opposing this agenda may be of
vital importance for the long-term survival of working-class life in the city, but it is far from
certain to produce immediate results for existing members and institutions. Non-profits and
unions may then support – or only temporarily oppose – plans and projects they might otherwise
reject in order to get something important out of the process: housing units and jobs most
tangibly, but also access to power and future revenues. According to former 32BJ staffer Sally
Rohmer, the leadership of that union assumes gentrification to be inevitable in the absence of
massive state support for social housing (which they are not calling for, and do not see as
imminent); under this assumption, they – like many other unions and non-profits, only more
intentionally and successfully – attempt to extract benefits from the continued growth of private,
for-profit real estate.126 In this sense these organizations win something by losing: they concede
the mode of planning and development to the real estate state, but they live to fight another day,
and may have gained some valuable concessions along the way.
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this tendency in recent years was the RAFA
campaign and their fight over mayor de Blasio’s housing and zoning plan (discussed in Chapter
Five). The coalition presented an alternative that, while also reliant on the tool of inclusionary
zoning, differed in important ways from the mayor’s plan. As the campaign became increasingly
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Rohmer also noted that 32BJ’s political department would occasionally send out emails to union staff linking to
articles that claimed that increasing the city’s rate of market-rate development was the key to solving New York
City’s affordable housing crisis.
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confrontational, more cautious coalition members dropped out; as the prospects for victory
turned grim, the coalition reversed course and endorsed a slightly modified version of the
mayor’s original plan (along with a promise to study the coalition’s preferred model, which
subsequently proved fruitless). While joining the winning side is an understandable response to
the evident reality – there is no inherent value to righteous failure – RAFA’s reversal produced
troubling dynamics: it allowed the mayor to claim he had the backing of the city’s most powerful
working-class institutions; it complicated future efforts to fight back against individual
neighborhood rezonings (all of which encouraged intensified real estate investment in workingclass neighborhoods whose residents are majority Black and Latino); and it drove divisions
between those institutions whose source of legitimacy arises from their access to the mayor and
councilmembers, and those whose source of legitimacy arises from their willingness to confront
them.
A few years before the RAFA campaign, ACORN made similar calculation around their
engagement with Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards megadevelopment. In his sympathetic assessment,
Atlas (2009, 159-160) characterizes the fundamental questions ACORN leaders and members
asked themselves when assessing what their role in the project should be: “‘If we support it, how
much will it cost the organization? If we are against it, can we defeat it? The most important
questions were: ‘Is this the type of issue that ACORN ought to work on? How will it help
ACORN members and the poor? What can we win for our members? How long will it take to
win? Will it build ACORN membership? Will it make us stronger?’” Shortly thereafter,
however, Atlas suggests it was not their own deliberative process around these questions that
drove their decision-making, but rather ACORN leaders John Kest and Bertha Lewis’
assessment that the developer “had the clout to get his project approved and he had the money to
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influence the politicians” (ibid, 161). Lewis argued that “It’s better to win something than go into
opposition and just yell and scream and ultimately lose” (ibid, 174), and an ACORN chapter coleader is quoted as surmising that “Downtown Brooklyn is growing, and if it’s growing, let’s get
a piece of the action” (ibid, 176).
The organization’s analysis, as Atlas presents it, was that while they understood
supporting the development would incur significant risk in terms of the group’s reputation, they
did not believe they had the power to stop it, and did not want to be seen waging a losing fight.
Instead, they supported it, and extracted from the developer a set of concessions, primarily
around income-targeted housing units. By the end of the article, however, Atlas contradicts his
own sources’ analysis of their power compared to Ratner’s and claims that “If ACORN had
joined the opposition, it was doubtful the Atlantic Yards deal would prevail. Instead, ACORN
(the activist, poor people’s organization) and Ratner (the rich developer) found a way to work
together for the common good” (ibid, 177). This counterfactual is impossible to prove, but
Atlas’s framing allows the organization’s strategic decision to be understood as a pragmatic
achievement, and their untaken path as unnecessarily destructive. Atlas is far from unique in this
sophistry or slippage; it is quite common for such pyrrhic victories to be reframed post-hoc as the
result of bold decisions rather than the austere analyses of what is necessary for an organization
to survive.
This mode of resignation is increasingly common in cities that have branded themselves
“world-class” and are relentlessly pursuing a planning vision based on that image. Writing in the
context of Delhi, Ghertner (2015, 42) argues that “the world-class city is offered as an already
known conclusion; it is cast in a prophetic temporality. The picture of the future is, more or less,
fully supplied. What matters is not debating how present action will shape the emergent future,
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but rather how present action can be aligned to prepare for what is to come.” In cities like New
York, as in Delhi, real estate boosters aim to convince erstwhile opponents that the end is already
written; or, in Ghertner’s aesthetically-driven framework, it is pictured: for the city to either
become or remain “world-class,” it must look a certain way; for it to look a certain way, it must
cost a certain amount. All benefits to the people, then, are to be extracted from the realization of
this vision, rather than the promotion of an unfamiliar alternative. This mode of planning
presents working-class organizations with a false dichotomy: resign themselves to participation
in the production of luxury space, or resign themselves to marginality on its peripheries.

Limits to Labor
The production of space under capitalism is structured to incentivize the formation of
uneven assemblages – or regional blocs (Woods 1998) – of labor, capital, and the state toward
ultimately different but provisionally aligned goals. The three are not equal participants in
shaping the contours of spatial production, and nor are they unified social groupings within
themselves. The process is full of conflict as well as concert, fragmentation as well as alignment.
In different times and places, labor has broken from capital and the state to fight for – and
ultimate to create – landscapes of labor premised on the collective social reproduction of those
whose work produces the city. These breaks with the dominant geographical order are not
spontaneous or accidental (though they contain elements of both) but are instead planned and
deliberate. For labor to form a class for itself takes not only organizing and vision, but also
persistent political will.
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Revolutionaries have long lamented the limitations of the political forms in which labor
tends to organize. The predominant historical form has been unions, which are both central to
confronting capital and, in most instances, incapable of transcending the limitations of capitalist
development. In the context of early 20th century Germany, Luxemburg (1908, 37) argued that
“unions cannot give the workers a determining influence over production. Trade unions can
neither determine the dimensions of production nor the technical progress of production….
Trade unions are nothing more than the organized defense of labor power against the attacks of
profit.” She describes their attempts to shape the labor market and fight for higher wages as both
“indispensable” and “a sort of labor Sisyphus” (ibid, 37; see also MacDonald 2014). Luxemburg
was by no means attacking unions or unionization, but instead clarifying that these institutions
should not be expected to unmake capitalism. They can influence its trajectory, but never be a
“determining influence.” For this reason, Lenin urged organizers not to overemphasize the
revolutionary capacity of unions, or to focus exclusively on economic factors at the point of
production. The goal instead should be to “elevate working-class trade-union politics… to
Social-Democratic politics,” not to “degrade Social-Democratic politics to trade union politics”
(Lenin 1902, 82).
In the US context, Piven and Cloward (1977, 155) identify the conservatizing force
within the union movement as unions’ institutional responsibility “to maintain internal discipline
in the factories in exchange for recognition,” in addition to “the severing of union leadership
from dependence on the rank and file, first through their reliance on the federal government for
membership gains, and then through the dues check-off” (ibid, 159-160). Aronowitz traces the
root of the problem in the US to union movement’s desire to “share in the expansion of
American capitalism, not its downfall” (Aronowitz 1973, 257) and to represent itself “as an
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interest group, part of the parallelogram of forces that is said to constitute national and local
power” (Aronowitz 1992, xxi). Fitch (2006, 115), looking back to the Progressive Era, points to
US unions’ historical orientation toward protecting their relation to employers over expanding
their ranks. All three point to a tendency toward union conservatism, often derided as “business
unionism.” Ahlquist and Levi (2013, 53) go so far as to assert that “Most labor unions in [the
US, U.K., and Australia] are business unions, that is, the unions operate as businesses that offer
bargaining, lobbying, and other services in return for dues. Their stated aim is to improve the
economic and work situation of the membership, and many of them do just that.” Some business
union leaders are explicit about their orientation; Ahlquist and Levi (ibid, 55) quote the
Teamsters’ Dave Beck as saying, “I run this office just like – just like an oil company or a
railroad. Our business is selling labor. We use businesslike methods. Business people have
confidence in us.” Along the same lines, Jimmy Hoffa is quoted as saying, “Running a union is
just like running a business. We’re in the business of selling labor. We’re going to get the best
price we can” (ibid.). This, Aronowitz (1973, 258) argues, is exactly the appeal of the business
union to workers: “To many, James Hoffa was a hero not because he represented a challenge to
the robber baron but because he was the labor equivalent of him.”
The social function of business unionism under capitalism, Federici (1974, 5, italics in
the original) argues, is to inculcate a working-class politics that treats workers “only as a
capitalist commodity, simply labor power, whose price (the wage) has to be regulated and fixed
to allow for capitalist planning and prevent social conflict.” The planning to which Federici
refers is most likely occurring at the firm or industry level but can also be transferred into the
question of space and urban development: business unionism helps ensure labor participation in
urban growth machine politics. The kind of Schumpeterian unionism (Tufts 2009) now prevalent
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in New York City adds a greater degree of activism to this relationship, but does not challenge
the confluence of labor and capital toward a spatial politics that secures labor’s ability to extract
capital not only from workplace labor but also from the social labor of spatial production. It is
distinct from business unionism in philosophy, organization, and political orientation, but does
not produce a different outcome in terms of the city’s planning trajectory. A critic of longtime
SEIU president Andy Stern, who promoted union-corporate-state partnerships as essential to
union growth and survival (Stern 2006, 70-71), characterized this type of politics as “replacing
class struggle with class snuggle” (Nall 2005, quoted in Early 2011, 51). “Class snuggle” may
have helped the union grow – which is no small matter – but, as Fantasia (1988, 242) argues, “as
long as labor remains unthreatening there is little incentive for capital to cease its assault on
gains labor has made since the 1930s, and indeed on the existence of unionism itself.”
With many notable exceptions (including INCITE! 2006, Kohl-Arenas 2016, Sangtin
Writers and Nagar 2006, Arena 2012, Wagner 2000, and Wolch 1990), there is far less literature
on the structural limitations of non-profits than on the path dependency toward union
conservatism. This is in large part because the contemporary political non-profit is a relatively
recent development (unfamiliar, for example, to Rosa Luxemburg or Vladimir Lenin127), but it is
also because few theorists or movement leaders expect non-profits to be revolutionary agents,
whereas unions – as proletarian organizations – provide the clearest manifestation of workers’
power as workers under actually existing capitalism. While non-profits are arguably better
positioned to take up more radical positions on questions of land use and urban spatial
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production than unions, given that they aim to directly represent low-income urban residents’
interests and areas, they tend to have less social power (Jenkins 2002) than unions to realize
those political visions.
Ultimately, unions and non-profits both tend to be risk-averse institutions. While
historically many have argued that workers under capitalism “have nothing to lose but their
chains” (Marx and Engels 1848 [1992], 58), many union leaders feel they have much at stake:
their institutions are responsible for maintaining wage standards, growing pension funds, and
representing workers in local and national politics. Unions, according to Lerner (2011, 9), are
“just big enough – and just connected enough to the political and economic power structure – to
be constrained from leading the kinds of activities that are needed.” Likewise, non-profit leaders
may fear that losing the support of key funders would not only imperil their organizations
themselves but would also prevent them from providing essential services – most of which fill
dire gaps left by the state and capital in the promotion of social reproduction. There are also
significant legal barriers to non-profit radicalism. As Tang (2007, 217) describes, non-profit
organizers regularly take a “self-inventory” of their available options: “‘Why do we apply for a
police permit to protest the police?’ Because if we break the law, our board is liable. ‘Why can’t
we lobby?’ Because that would violate our [501]c3 status and the conditions of our grant. ‘Why
not just take the streets?’ Because insurance doesn’t cover it.”
At the end of my interview with Jan Peterson, a staffer at a non-profit that provides
technical assistance to other non-profits engaged in land use campaigns, I asked if there was
anything important she felt we had not discussed. She took the opportunity to present a case for
contextualizing non-profit risk aversion, and framed it against the voices of left critics like me
who have critiqued their approaches:
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I think there's a lot of political navigation that happens. Nonprofits'
relationships with their council members are really important. And
where you draw the lines and when you risk really alienating a
council member is a serious consideration. I believe some nonprofits
err way too far on the side of being moderate all the time. But I also
think there's some activist voices that are completely dismissive of
the importance of having a viable institution, and of having
accountability to a large base of members, or to a long-term
commitment to a neighborhood, as opposed to being able to sort of
like act as an individual, or as a small group of individuals, and how
that factors into institutions' decisions. I often am frustrated by the
moderation that nonprofits will take, but I'm equally frustrated by
activists – as opposed to organizing voices – that will call everybody
a sell-out but are not themselves necessarily accountable to
anybody. It matters having an organization continue to exist, and
when you should put that at risk is a question, right? I think it's right
not to put that at risk for every little thing.…
I think the best nonprofits know their constraints, understand their
constraints, push at the boundaries of their constraints, expand them
over time, and make hard decisions about how big a risk to take for
what, when, and make those decisions in ways that are accountable
to a membership or constituency in one way or another. And I think
it's very easy for people who are not tied to any organization or
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institution and who are not particularly accountable and who don't
have those concerns to always see that as selling out or always see
that as being too moderate. At the same time that I think that it's easy
for non-profits to get too conservative and to be too risk-averse. I
think we on the left talk a lot about being too risk averse and being
too moderate and whatever, and I don't think they’re the same. I
believe having organizations matters: not having to reinvent the
wheel every time, having something that can grow over time, that
can accumulate experience, accumulate relationships, accumulate
buildings in the neighborhood that are going to be permanently
affordable. I think those things are valuable, and so part of what I
believe should go into a calculation of what you do and what you
don't do, what you prioritize, what you risk, is thinking about the
value of being a sustainable, growing, thriving organization and
being able to do the many things that you believe are worth doing.
Does that mean you never take risks? Of course not. But does that
mean you always take a radical, principled stance no matter what?
No. What good does it do you sometimes, or what are you losing out
on, and is it worth it?
Peterson’s defense of non-profit risk aversion is entirely sensible: it is important to
criticize non-profits (or unions, for that matter) for their tendency toward political moderation,
but it is unwarranted to expect them to act otherwise given not only the incentives in place
(including, as Peterson points out near the beginning of her answer, the need to retain
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favorability with political elites) but also the crucial daily work that these institutions are tasked
with. The long-term implications of this balancing act, however, do not bode well for the
organizations’ political capacity. As Piven and Cloward (1977, xxi) argue, “it is not possible to
compel concessions from elites that can be used as resources to sustain oppositional
organizations over time…. As for the few organizations which survive, it is because they became
more useful to those who control the resources on which they depend than to the lower-class
groups which the organizations claim to represent. Organizations endure, in short, by abandoning
their oppositional politics.” As understandable as risk-aversion may be toward the goal of longterm institutional survival, such survival entails risks of its own if it is premised on a declining
capacity to threaten elites. Non-profits and unions survive through access to money and power,
but such institutional survival can also ensure the suffering of those who remain outside their
“communities of fate” (Ahlquist and Levi 2013).
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Conclusion: Ours and Ours Alone

All the world that's owned by idle drones is ours and ours alone
We have laid the wide foundations, built it skyward stone by stone
It is ours not to slave in but to master and to own
While the union makes us strong
– “Solidarity Forever,” Ralph Chaplin

This cannot go on forever. First and foremost, no city can perpetually gentrify: at some
point, all asset bubbles burst, and – as demonstrated throughout histories both distant and recent
– real estate is no exception. In fact, this very economic tendency is a central part of the larger
dynamic in which gentrification is situated: the geographically uneven development of capitalist
urbanity (Weber 2015). New York City planners have been highly effective at maintaining the
upward trajectory of real estate values thus far in the twenty-first century, with any slippage at
the very top of the market always accompanied by rising rents at the bottom. At some point,
however, a crisis will come: skyscrapers, debts, and sea levels cannot all rise simultaneously
without end.
Even before such an overall economic crisis strikes, however, the city’s working class
may face a deepening crisis of social reproduction and spatial location: more and more
households can no longer afford to live in the city in which they work. While the kinds of spatial
politics unions and non-profits typically engage in can secure higher wages for unionized
workers and affordable housing or other social amenities for a segment of the city’s working
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class, they rely on land use tools that ultimately raise the overall value of land and ripple out
through the generalized condition of rising rents throughout the city, and in those working-class
neighborhoods with the greatest rent gaps in particular. As a result, many workers – including
members of unions and non-profit organizing groups – are leaving the city, driven away by the
worsening mismatch between wages and housing costs (Smith 2002, 435-436).
Today there are over 600,000 “super-commuters” in the New York metropolitan, the
planning terminology for those whose daily journey from home to work takes over one and a half
hours each way (Furfaro and Lapin 2018). They live what Zhan and Scully (2018) call “spatially
extended livelihoods,”128 with home and work life separated by city and sometimes state lines.
Lefebvre (1974, 339) suggests that time management is the use value of space: what a renter or
homebuyer is paying for is not just shelter, but also “a daily schedule.” Workers who can no
longer afford the crushing rent burdens or high sale prices of homes in New York City are
pushed instead to purchase for a lower price a more punishing daily schedule. They then
experience the “time-space expansion” that Katz (2004, 226) theorizes as a corollary to the timespace compressions of life under globalization.
This time-space expansion poses not only grave challenges to households, but also to the
political organizations that represent labor. As Herod (2017, 211) argues, “such restructuring of
the geography of residence in a city can impact working-class people’s ability to exert political
power in the workplace because it changes the geographical relationship between where people
work and where they reside and so affects workers’ opportunities to socialize outside spaces of
work.” Though Herod is referring here to waged labor, the point extends to include the unpaid
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work of social reproduction as well. Displacement not only interrupts the patterns of home and
work life, but also the patterns of neighborhood association, community organizing, and placeattachment that can serve as the basis for building political power.
On a more mechanical level, however, time-space expansion undermines a key source of
both unions’ and non-profits’ power. If union members can no longer afford to live in the cities
where they work, their unions can no longer claim to represent a mass base of voters who can
collectively threaten to change the electoral landscape. Similarly, if the neighborhoods nonprofits represent become gentrified (save the base of residents in public or subsidized housing),
they can no longer speak with legitimacy as the voice of a mobilized territorial constituency.
Some non-profits have responded to these dynamics by increasing their suburban political
presence. NYCC, for example, is organizing in Hempstead, Long Island, where many displaced
former-New York City residents have moved; some Settlement Houses are moving with their
neighborhood’s displaced residents toward suburban and exurban areas, or cities farther
upstate.129 This shift is harder for unions to take on, however, because the geographical site in
which they have the most power is where their members work, rather than where they live. When
the two are disaggregated, the union’s ability to effect political change – a key element in New
York City union strategy (Hauptmeier and Turner 2007) – is severely curtailed.
While some non-profits have been able to adapt to these conditions, others are seeing
their role as affordable housing developers eclipsed by for-profit actors. While both the
Bloomberg and de Blasio administrations have offered development contracts to non-profits,
they often gave preferential treatment to for-profit developers that claimed they could scale up
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smaller organizations’ efforts. In interviews, Peterson explained that for-profit firms are now
able to “gobble up the vast majority” of city-mediated development deals, while the non-profits
get what Speliotis characterized as “these scattered site, very small projects with very small
developer fees.” Ultimately this trend becomes a self-perpetuating cycle, as the for-profit firms
gain capacity while the non-profits are denied the opportunity to build their own. Non-profit
leaders argue that while the scale of their operations was smaller, the housing they produce tends
to be more affordable to lower income households than what the for-profit firms build. They also
point out that their developments fund their organizing, which cannot be said for for-profit firms
(which are, in fact, often the target of many community organizing projects). Ironically,
however, non-profits can serve as experimental ventures in markets for which for-profit firms
have not yet developed business models (Wagner 2000, 144).130 Once non-profits develop a
fiscally sound model, for-profit companies edge out the non-profits originators. Worse yet,
having played a role (at times unwitting or unwanted) in demonstrating that private organizations
can perform functions once primarily considered state responsibilities, the non-profit sector
paves the way for the privatization of public services (ibid, 146). In these ways, the very land use
politics unions and non-profits practice to survive and grow in hostile conditions can ultimately
threaten their ability to persist.
If this status quo is ultimately untenable, so too are moderate reforms that reproduce the
same contradictions in renovated and perhaps marginally favorable forms. That, however, has
long been the trend in state reaction to movement demands around planning and housing. As
Madden and Marcuse (2016, 120) point out, “throughout American history, state policies have
channeled system-challenging demands for the democratization of housing into system-
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maintaining form. The result has been policies that, one way or another, reproduce the housing
problem.” Perhaps in light of this history and its impacts on radical imaginations, many nonprofits and unions pre-moderate their demands. As Aronowitz (1973, 13) argues, “the consistent
retreat of the left from its own fundamental ideas has characterized its activities in the trade
unions and working-class political movements since the first years of [the twentieth] century.”
Quite often, union and non-profit responses to the gentrification crisis conform to Harvey’s
(1973, 136) analysis of the limitations of liberal politics to deal with the other side of urban
uneven development, deep disinvestment. They “have as their basis the tacit assumption that
there is disequilibrium in urban land use and that policy should be directed towards getting urban
land use back into balance. These solutions are liberal in that they recognize inequity but seek to
cure that inequity within an existing set of social mechanism.”
There are, however, numerous examples of unions and non-profits that reject this
approach. Among unions, there is a burgeoning call to practice “bargaining for the common
good,” or to use collective bargaining to push for demands that benefit a far greater share of the
working class than any single bargaining unit (Brady 2019). This mode of bargaining has been
most often adopted in public sector unions whose leadership has been grasped by radical rankand-file caucuses. As I typed the first draft of this conclusion, the Chicago Teachers Union was
refusing to continue bargaining with the mayor until the union’s housing demands, including an
end to evictions during the school year, housing subsidies for teachers, additional funding for
students living in precarious housing, additional staffing to support students’ with their housing
needs, and a commitment from the city to support rent control and increased low-income housing
construction, all of which would be paid for through higher taxes on millionaires and
corporations and a redirection of Tax Increment Finance income (Madeloni 2019). None of this
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housing platform is radical in and of itself, and some of it conforms with traditional contract
negotiating demands around increased staffing and economic benefits for union members;
however, the fact that a large urban union in a key strategic sector is not just expounding on the
need for more affordable housing or supporting the mayor’s existing housing plans but using its
social power to force immediate concessions is an important development in contemporary urban
politics.131
In the realm of non-profits, Gilmore (2007b, 48) writes that while many non-profit
leaders have altered their programs to secure foundation funding, “the committed people took the
money and ran. I don’t mean they lied or they stole, but rather that they figured out how to foster
their general activism from all kinds of resources, and they were too afraid of the consequences
of stopping to cease what they’d started.” There are myriad examples of this behavior, though
the results can be hard to reproduce into the future. In 2018, the Ford Foundation was the
greatest single backer of the New York City tenant movement’s push to reform the state’s rent
laws (Kromrei 2019). Ford-funded organizations joined in a coalition which pushed for universal
rent control and won major pro-tenant reforms at the state level; the presence of Ford funds did
not seem to have in any way moderated the coalition’s positions. Shortly after this victory,
however, Ford ceased funding several of the key housing coalition members. Similarly, the
radical organization Picture the Homeless, which is incorporated as a non-profit in order to
qualify for foundation grants, has received funding from several foundations over the years,
including Oak and Mertz Gilmore; their failure to secure renewal grants, combined with other
foundations’ reticence to fund radical homeless organizing, has now put the organization in fiscal
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jeopardy (Whitford 2019b). The “take the money and run” strategy is certainly viable, but it can
be hard to sustain: non-profits that successfully execute it may find difficulty reproducing that
success once funders catch on.
The “bargaining for the common good” and “take the money and run” approaches both
represent a simultaneous continuity and break with contemporary practice: for unions, bargaining
for the common good means maintaining the relationship between collective bargaining and
planning but pushing the results in an entirely different direction than status quo practice; for
non-profits, taking the money and running means maintaining their financial relationships with
foundations and state agents while refusing to deliver the political moderation those funders
expect. MacDonald (2012, 215), however, argues that a deeper break must be made in order to
loosen the grip of real estate on the logic of labor politics. “Overcoming this dilemma would
entail no mere tactical repositioning, but the elaboration of a different accumulation strategy that
breaks with real estate and separates urbanization from the question of labor’s associational
rights, rather than bargaining for those rights as is currently the case.” Some of my sources who
work for non-profits offered similar strategic assessments. Stephenson (then of New York
Communities for Change) proffered that non-profits should reassess their priorities in order to
engage only in processes that strengthen their members’ or constituents’ power to challenge and
ultimately unmake and replace the real estate state. She argued, “We shouldn’t participate at all
until we have the power to control the process” of development, and thus advocated a sort of
participation strike.
Such breaks are certainly possible, but there is little reason to believe they are imminent
for more than a few unions and non-profits. It is no coincidence that the city’s most powerful
working-class institutions have a difficult time waging direct and sustained battle against the
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forces that profit off of displacement: this is how the system is supposed to work. The structural
dependencies this dissertation highlights are simply too strong for most well-meaning
institutional leaders to defy on the strength of their convictions or analysis. Only social
movements aimed at both those structural forces and those organizations’ leadership and by-laws
can create the scale of change necessary to de-couple the institutional well-being of individual
New York City unions and non-profits from the well-being of the real estate market and the
politicians who support it.
Movements aimed at undoing the structural linkages would seek political changes to the
systems of union recognition, non-profit funding, and city planning, including systemic demands
for sectoral bargaining, universal retirement systems (rather than private pensions), full public
financing of low-income housing, democratic comprehensive planning, and a return to the most
successful strategies for decomodifying housing and development: public housing, rent control,
community land trusts, and limited equity cooperatives. Movements aimed at forcing changes at
the level of the individual union and non-profit would focus on rank-and-file strategies to
withdraw consent for pro-real estate planning partnerships and demand a more aggressive
posture toward the real estate state.
This is a difficult prospect for union members, but one for which there is a process: union
leaders are elected, and workers-as-tenants can organize to unseat real estate-friendly union
representatives. The mechanics of such a strategy are more complex for non-profits. Even the
most representative membership-based non-profits do not elect their executive directors or board
members, giving members, clients, or constituents no more say over the direction the
organization takes than the staff and leadership decide to cede. For a rank-and-file strategy to
take hold in non-profits, members, clients, and constituents would have to stage public
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demonstrations of their lack of consent to be represented by the non-profit, including disruptive
actions in the streets, at meetings, and at public hearings. Real estate-friendly union and nonprofit leaders would not take such challenges lightly, and so such a strategy must be sure to build
significant support before moving forward with confrontational public tactics. To some extent,
the outlines of this approach are already taking form: due to popular pressure from their
members and client bases, as well as staffers pushing for a different approach, the left end of the
housing non-profits have been increasingly vocal in withdrawing their participation in real
estate-friendly planning agendas, and have in some cases joined with unincorporated tenant
groups and other left political formations to fight for stronger rent controls, roll back the Inwood
rezoning, and force City Councilmembers into opposing the de Blasio administration’s proposed
rezonings of Bushwick and Southern Boulevard. The more these contests manifest, the harder it
will be for other non-profits to maintain their legitimacy while pursuing a more conciliatory
approach.
The principle behind such a challenge is spelled out in another lyric from that most
famous of US labor hymns, Ralph Chaplin’s “Solidarity Forever.” The song’s fourth verse
begins:
All the world that's owned by idle drones is ours and ours alone/
We have laid the wide foundations, built it skyward stone by stone/
It is ours, not to slave in, but to master and to own/
While the union makes us strong
Cities as we know them may be collective creations, bringing together the inputs of labor,
capital, and the state, but it is workers – paid and unpaid – who fundamentally make the city
through the continuous work of construction, social reproduction, and cultural production: laying
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“the wide foundations;” building the built environment; caring for one another, and for the
products of our collective efforts; making meaning and memories through art, song, food,
language, and letters. Capital is present in the lyrics only in the form of an insult: the “idle
drones” who command our initial labor then profit off it for years to come. The state is absent
altogether – it is neither present as an oppressor or a representative body. Instead, we have “the
union” – a workplace organization, to be sure, but, given the song’s popularity among anarchosyndicalists in the Industrial Workers of the World, far more too: the collective organization of
labor, labor power, and labor’s power. Perhaps for many who sang it, the union that makes us
strong is the base for another kind of state, or the basis for its replacement altogether.
Whose is the city? The song tells us, “it is ours and ours alone.” This can be hard to
remember in 21st century New York, premised as it is on private property and real estate growth.
In moments of greater labor insurgence, the song’s claim to collective ownership of the city – in
fact, “the world” – might have felt more imminent, but it is nonetheless as true today as it ever
has been. Production of space is a form of labor. Labor makes the city, and labor continually
reproduces it. To a certain extent labor plans the city too, but it does not do so for itself alone.
Most times labor organizations do so for their own fractional interests: for their sectors and
benefactors, for their growth and survival, but not quite for their flourishing – for a quantum of
bread and perhaps a few rose petals now and then. This is the city we live in. It should be ours; it
could be ours; but by law, by right, and by deed, it is theirs. Labor’s task it to make untrue what
is so apparent before us. While “we stand outcast and starving ‘mid the wonders we have made,”
the city is ultimately “ours and ours alone.”
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